

we urgently need to stamp coca for aircraft propellers. Kok is a smooth aerodynamic a cap covering the propeller in front, and without it there is no combat aircraft. Muzrukov protested: they say, his press is powerful, slow-moving, but here we need a press stamping, for quick disembarkation. Beria abruptly cut him off, declaring that it was impossible to send planes to the front, and the "regular" presses were lost in the confusion of the evacuation.

Koki began to be stamped, although Muzrukov understood that this would not end well. I note, by the way, that Beria could not delve into a purely technological issue, but after all, engineers with aircraft factory had to understand that Muzrukov's press was not for their cooks and quickly will fail. However, from the opportunity to solve their problems at the expense of tankers, even while showing blatant engineering frivolity, they did not refuse. So wishing I recommend considering the situation as evidence of Beria's technical illiteracy abandon such an intention.

The main cylinder of the press after some time, of course, flew. And now Uralmash could not supply tanks to the front. What to do? Muzrukov is calling on Beria's HF... It's midnight, but Beria immediately picks up the phone.

"I'm reporting ...," Muzrukov recalled, "I hear, is silent, sniffs into the phone and suddenly asks: "Where is the second press?" I answer that I have no idea where the second (it was shipped to the Urals during the evacuation of the Novo-Kramatorsk plant, and it stuck somewhere. - **S.K.**). "What the hell are you, the director," shouts Beria, "if you don't know where the press shipped to you is!" And he threw handset. What was my surprise when in the morning the Sverdlovsk Chekists and report in what echelons are the units and details of the Kramatorsk press. It is incomprehensible, amazing: how in just a few hours, at night, you can was in great chaos and pandemonium of evacuation, among hundreds of echelons to find what you need. The echelons with the press were given the green light, a week later they arrived, and after another, it seems, two, they replaced the main cylinder ... "

From this story, the true Beria is clearly visible - not only able to ask, not only able to help, but also able to admit his mistake not in words, but in deeds and business to fix it. Let's think

about it! Even "Uralmash" for the scale of Beria is only one of a dozen priority problems. Well, they screwed up the press when completing Beria's assignment, but a member of the GKO he could well pretend that he had nothing to do with it - let Muzrukov take the rap himself, since "not managed to provide "...

And Beria - since here he is not without fault - is doing everything in order to bring personally Muzrukov and Uralmash as a whole are out of a difficult situation. And it's not just about an apology. After all, without the press there are no tanks! Of

course, it was not Beria who was looking for trains - others were looking for him on behalf of him. But according to him they found it on behalf of others, but on behalf of others... I

don't know if they would

have found it! And the reason is not in fear of the NKVD and Beria - other leaders of the country were able to threaten better than Beria and also possessed extraordinary military powers. But *their* the device could not fail, but it could *fail*. But Beria's apparatus - no, it could not. Because Beria had only competent personnel, not tolerating the incompetent. About the members

of the Council for the Evacuation of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A. N. Kosygin, People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev, Chairman of the State Planning Commission N. A. Voznesensky sometimes has to read that they supposedly always knew where which echelon was located and what goes where. However, at a critical moment, Muzrukov did not call "tank" People's Commissar Malyshev, and Beria.

Why?

Because Malyshev could help, or he could "set up", putting on a subordinate blame the director of Uralmash for disrupting the supply of tanks. And in Beria Muzrukov, it turns out,

was sure! He believed that Lavrenty Pavlovich would understand ... He would understand and help.

Already reading this chapter clean, I remembered, by analogy, about something similar situation from a completely different realm. In 1942, the legal resident of the NKVD intelligence in Sweden, Boris Rybkin-Yartsev (Kin), who worked undercover as an embassy adviser, and his wife and an employee, Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya, whom we know, received a "super-operational" task from the Center to establish a communication channel with the Red Chapel in Berlin. suitable a candidate was quickly found - a Swedish industrialist, married to a Russian emigrant and often visited the Reich on commercial matters. Getting an operational alias Director, he completed the task, although not the first time - inexperience summed it up. And suddenly from The center receives a message about the arrest and execution of all members of the Red Chapel. Center believed that this was the result of the Director's provocation and, in order to verify it, ordered Kin again send this contact to Berlin to communicate with the notorious "double", which the Center knew about it is certain that he works for the Germans.

After analyzing the situation, Rybkin and Voskresenskaya came to the conclusion that The director is an honest man, and to send him back to Berlin means dooming him to death as well.

"We persistently tried to prove to the Center that we were right," recalled Resurrection. - The order followed: "Follow the instructions." We ask again weigh everything. The answer is a harsh shout. Then we decided to turn to the drug addict. We ask you to cancel the instruction of the head office, not to destroy a person. Came in a couple of days answer. Sending the Director to Berlin is canceled, he is ordered to stop any connection."

But the "commissar" is Beria. The one whom the general from "democracy" Volkogonov called both a ghoul and a soulless monster. But the real Beria was, on the contrary, sensitive, although absolutely no lisping, and a wise man. Knowing this, Keane decided to appeal directly to him through the head of the immediate superiors.

And, since I digress, I will say in addition that I was struck by the memories of the widow Bukharin-Larina about the conversation between Beria and her at the Lubyanka in 1939. Larin-Bukharin departs from the standard assessment of Beria as a "satrap", but - without realizing it - passing conversation and behavior of Beria psychologically and in specific details accurately, painted the appearance of a surprisingly, I repeat, a wise and sensitive person who sincerely regrets that former fifteen-year-old girl, for whose happiness he eight years ago, when she was with him away with his father, raised a toast.

Let us return, however, to the war years and to B. G. Muzrukov. According to N. Z. Tremasov, he told me that once Beria smashed him on the HF so that Boris Glebovich was completely I decided that they would arrest him now, and even moved home to say goodbye ... And now he was already dressed, standing at the door, and then the HF telephone was ringing. Muzrukov came up, picked up the receiver ...

Beria ... -

What are you doing?

- I'm going to sit

down ... - I have to work, - came from the receiver, and immediately the all-clear beeps went off. After reading this, I remembered the stories about how Chief Rocket Designer Sergei

Pavlovich Korolev sometimes fired subordinates three times a day! There is a complex assembly, the schedule breaks, and the shop manager hears from him: "Goodbye! You're fired!"... A couple of hours pass, and the same subordinate hears: "I reprimand you"... And here the subordinate smirks: "But you have no right, Sergey

Pavlovich! - How?! I have no right to you!

Strict reprimand! - You don't have ... You fired me

today ... And they both laugh. Emotional and overburdened people have similar outbursts

feelings are possible and understandable. It's not libelous scribbling at the desk, it's -

work ... Such when you go into it not up to your throat, but up to your ears ... And up to your ears not only because she is fascinated by her, but also because there are so many of her that she overflows by herself above your throat! But when they write such things about the Queen, everyone is touched: they say, that's even how was! But in reality, Sergei Palych never fired anyone! And Lavrenty Palych is denied the

right to overlap in emotions ... He can't, he is a "monster", he is a "ghoul" ... But even Lavrenty Palych didn't jail anyone - for failures in

work! Neither Muzrukov, nor Malyshev, nor Vannikov, nor Shakhurin, nor the head of the GAU Yakovlev, nor the aircraft designer Yakovlev and others, who allegedly feared throughout the war that "plant"...

Someone, however, was sitting - but not through the fault of Beria! Even such a slanderer of Lawrence Pavlovich, as the former deputy commissar of armaments Novikov (we will meet him soon), recalled already in the years of "perestroika" that during the war it was after " we *were in the sphere of influence of the security agencies, the arrests of factory workers of any ranks have practically ceased.*

And the former People's Commissar Malyshev at the "Anti-Beria" plenum of 1953 involuntarily confessed:

"We thought that a person does a great job, gets excited, probably like that necessary ... of course, we **reckoned with authority** as me. - , (here and below it is highlighted **S.K.) we considered him infallible, and sometimes we were afraid ... "**

That is, they were not *afraid*, and sometimes *they were afraid* ... So, in a war, as in a war ... Moreover, we note that it was not Beria himself who considered himself infallible, but he was considered as such by no means not enthusiastic boys, but experienced "captains" of the Soviet industry. It turns out that almost always his managerial decisions "hit the point", which created a member of the GKO Beria has such a flattering reputation.

By the way, about the "landings" ... Even arrested twice before the war and sat in prison, the former People's Commissar for Armaments Vannikov, becoming the head of the "atomic" First headquarters, could in the era of solving the uranium problem, that is, when the Germans to After all, Moscow was not eager to transfer the engineer Abramson, who made mistakes during the installation work, to a prison camp. And at the same time "joking": "*You are not Abramson, but Abram is in the zone.* Although on the part of Vannikov it was a temporary measure.

However, Vannikov is not honored as a "satrap", but he is also served as a "victim" of Beria. A Vannikov, already in the fifties, in a private conversation at Arzamas-16, admitted that in his time "presumptuous" and "sat down" not without guilt.

And HERE is the style of Beria, described by a man, in his memoirs he never named Beria mentioned, but wrote exactly about him ...

In 1981, the Military Publishing House published the memoirs of the head of the GAU during the war years, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev "About artillery and a little about myself." And this is what he writes:

"Each of the members of the State Defense Committee was instructed be solely responsible: one - for the implementation of the supply plan for aviation technology, another - for tanks, the third - for weapons and ammunition ... "

It is amusing and at the same time sad that Yakovlev actually writes about the one in three faces (almost like the Lord God) of Beria. And this is what he writes (without mentioning the name, of course) about Beria "ammunition" ...

"Under the member of the GKO, who was responsible for the supply of weapons and ammunition, in At the end of 1941, groups were created from senior officials of the State Planning Committee and Council of People's Commissars headed by P. I. Kirpichnikov (weapons) and N. A. Borisov (ammunition). After that, the planning process went through these groups,

kept in constant contact with the people's commissariats and the GAU.

Let the reader not be confused by the words "Gosplan workers", which allow suggest that under the member of the State Defense Committee, about which Marshal Yakovlev writes, he means Chairman of the State Planning Committee Voznesensky. Firstly, it was Beria from the very beginning who answered GKO for arms and ammunition - he, as we will see later, was later awarded for this was. Secondly, Voznesensky was introduced into the GKO only in February 1942, and Yakovlev writes about the end of 1941. In addition, in 1981 the name "Voznesensky" was not taboo - in difference from the surname "Beria".

No, Marshal Yakovlev writes about Beria ... And once again I have to emphasize: here he, Beria's style, is to clearly structure the task, find the right people, and after that ... Yes What exactly is "after that"? If people are chosen correctly, if you can rely on them, then after that it remains just to work successfully. What happened. And this time, Beria

found the people that

were required. Here is what I wrote about

P. I. Kirpichnikov and N. A. Borisov Marshal Yakovlev:

"They were highly qualified specialists, exclusively hardworking people. They also had very knowledgeable engineers, they reported directly to the GKO, which had unquestioned power over attitude towards the people's

commissariats ... I cannot but say that the representatives of these groups are sometimes not very some senior officials of the people's commissariats complained. And first of all - for their tight control. But I'm sure in their hearts they agreed with the need for such uncompromising planning."

Alas, Beria has the right to the same - hard - control historians and memoirists for some reason they refuse. He has such an attitude to the matter is not explained by a sense of high responsibility, but selfish considerations. And so on the memoirs of one of Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments V. N. Novikov (later Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers of the USSR) I will have to dwell in particular detail ... In a well-known the reader of the libelous collection "Beria: the end of a career" in 1991 also has memories Novikov - "Patronage" of Beria. And I already ask the reader for forgiveness for making the text heavier, but I will have to comment on many passages of Novikov right away ... He begins with discussions about repressions, and then writes:

"... our people's commissariat at the beginning of the war was subordinated to the NKVD, or rather, as a member State Defense Committee, Beria ("Zubr" of the state administration Novikov cannot but know that no one has ever subordinated his People's Commissariat to the NKVD, but the NKVD - obviously "for fear" - remembers. - **S.K.**). Consequently, he was personally responsible for us before Stalin.

Now this sinister figure is often remembered, it seemed forever accompanying Stalin (it turns out that both Novikov and Beria served Stalin's bodyguards, because otherwise Beria would not have been able to accompany, and Novikov could not observe this. - **S.K.**). But fit him the assessment is simplified, without going further than the "gloomy personality" and the "bloody executioner". A he was the People's Commissar of the NKVD (Beria had many other government posts, about which Novikov cannot but know, but Beria is only an "NKVDist" for him. - **S.K.**) Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, far from simple and not as primitive as it seems most writers and other creative people, and with their light hand (here Vladimir Novikov got to the point, although it was necessary to write "... with a difficult hands"! - **S.K.**) and millions of readers and viewers. I

remember that at the end of July 1941, Beria held a meeting. We are with D. F. Ustinov (People's Commissar of Armaments. - **S.K.**) were invited about a sharp increase in the production of rifles ... He gave the impression of a man resolute. The face is wide, shaved (well, of course, so that the beard does not drink blood

interfered. - **S.K.**), sleek (**n-yes!**), with a pale tint (wouldn't go to the mountains for a tan wave at the end of July 1941! - **S.K.**), pince-nez glasses (another vice in "ghoul" - he wore glasses! - **S.K.**) ... On the hands of the ring ... "

The "true" detail about the rings I ask the reader to remember. As for the essence, Beria asked Ustinov when the Izhevsk plant could produce five thousand rifles per day?

Ustinov forwarded the question to Novikov, who a month ago was the former director of this factory. And he called a period of at least seven or eight months, because now they are releasing in essence

two. Novikov further wrote:

"Beria frowned: -

What are you, Comrade Novikov! You know that at the front some are killed or get hurt, while others wait for the released rifles, and you - seven months. Is not good, you have to meet in three months. You know the plant, who else can us help? I

replied that under any conditions meet the deadline

impossible.

They created a commission of two deputy chairmen of the State Planning Commission - V. V. Kuznetsov, P. I. Kirpichnikov - and myself. The term is two days. Give proposals on how to reach five thousand rifles a day in three months ...

Kuznetsov and Kirpichnikov were inclined to agree to a three-month period. I refused to sign the paper ... Again we are

at the report of Beria, again a cabinet full of people, including not only people's commissars of the defense industries, but

also others. The turn has come to our question. Beria reads the paper. Turning to Kuznetsov, asking why there is no Novikov's signature?

Vasily Vasilyevich replies that Novikov considers the deadlines unrealistic.

Then Beria rather angrily: - What

is the deadline, Comrade Novikov? I once

again confirmed that the minimum term is a stretch of seven months.

Beria spat to the side (well, of course, although he refers to "you", but boor! - **S.K.**), swore (but how could Beria do without it. - **S.K.**) and said: -

Accept Novikov's proposal ... "

Novikov reports that Beria accepted his offer because "it is fatal I was afraid to deceive Stalin, who forgives a lot, but deceit - never ..."

I repeat, it is sad to see how an honored person behaves vilely ... Firstly, Beria was not "mortally afraid of deceiving Stalin", but could not deceive him! He could not, because he himself did not tolerate deception from his subordinates, and because a major leader who forgives deceit by his subordinates is automatically *incompetent* by this criterion !

And about "mortally afraid" ... If so, then Beria would risk wearing it, and even and in July 1941, *rings*? Yes, Stalin would have arranged something *like this* from his office anyone! And fair! It was Heydar Aliyev who could give to "dear Leonid Ilyich" in Baku huge diamond ring. And "dear Joseph Vissarionovich" even for his there was no close circle - he was "comrade Stalin" for him too. And a comrade who did not tolerate personal indiscretion. Beria took into

account the opinion of Novikov simply because it was expressed by a specialist who objectively should have known the situation at the Izhevsk plant better whoever it was. After all, Beria's method was not a whip, but reliance on people and trust in competent professionals.

But that's not

all ... In 1988, Politizdat published Novikov's book "On the Eve and in the Days of Trials", where

there is a chapter "On the glorious Russian rifle, and not only about it" ... And there Novikov didn't even mention the task of five thousand rifles a day, and immediately proudly announces the task of the State Defense Committee twelve thousand! At

the same time, already in November 1941, the Izhevsk people produced four thousand, and "by the end summer of 1942" - twelve thousand rifles a day! And Novikov himself writes that Voroshilov, who arrived in Izhevsk, could not believe his eyes: "Rifles cannot flow like a river." And Novikov answered that "this is how rifles flow around the clock from week to week, from month to month...

That is, in fact, for a plan of five thousand rifles, the real period was no more than five and even four months. So, one wonders who was afraid to take responsibility for pushing deadlines? Yes,

Novikov had to stay in Izhevsk for months, but Beria was hoping for his extraordinary efforts. And he had every right to do so, not only because the times were extraordinary, but also because he himself gave everything extremely every day, and therefore had "pale shade" of the face. The

same Novikov describes another significant case ... In the spring of 1942, to Lieutenant-General Tkachenko came to Izhevsk from Beria with instructions personally to observe the progress of the production of machine guns "Maxim", which Tkachenko himself announced at first visit to the deputy commissar of armaments. I can't confirm, but it looks like it was the head of the 7th secret department of the NKVD for the KGB production support mortars, so Novikov could not have him for a particularly long time. But for a while Tkachenko "delved into", following Novikov - according to the latter - like a shadow. By the way, Aleksey Toptygin, the author of The Unknown Beria, considers Novikov's story about a collision with general of the NKVD "a frankly far-fetched anecdote", but this story is basically, as I understand it, true. So, soon Tkachenko introduced Novikov

to his memorandum from Beria. I note that it was not behind Novikov's back that he decided to send her to the people's commissar, but he introduced her! And despite Novikov's objections, sent her to her destination. It is unlikely that Tkachenko was right in everything, although he, for example, assessed the director of the machine-gun plant Dubovoy as a weak worker and proposed to replace him with the chief mechanic of plant No. 74, P. A. Sysoev, and Novikov "defended" Dubovoy as follows:

"As for the director of the plant, Dubovoy, he works in good faith, but ... I replace him in these difficult days. And if you need to release, according to you director, so it is necessary to release me.

That is, Novikov did not understand either in 1942 or in the 80s that, at least in relation to Dubovoy actually admitted that Tkachenko was right - strong workers in the bosses props do not need, and, according to Novikov, the actual director of the machine gun the plant was not Oak, but he. By

the way, in July 1942, Sysoev was appointed director of the new mechanical plant in Izhevsk, which I learned from the solid collective monograph "Weapons of Victory", published in 1987, edited by Novikov. Moreover, the name (and portrait) of Sysoev, Tkachenko's "protégé", is there, but Novikov's "protégé" is Dubovoy, in this monograph not even mentioned.

One way or another, Tkachenko's report was gone. And here is Novikov at about three o'clock in the morning calls Beria on HF and begins to find out his opinion about those workers whom Tkachenko rated as "pests". Novikov rejects everything, and Beria asks where is Tkachenko? A he just appears at the door, and Novikov passes the phone to him ... Further, according to Novikov, it was this:

"... I hear, every three or four words there is such a mate that ... In short, the meaning boils down to the following: "Why did I ... send you to Novikov to spy on him

Or help him? For your telegram, you, so-and-so, are to be shot... You are engaged in the wrong thing, I sent you to help, but what are you doing? .. Slanders breeding for good workers?"

Tkachenko is not pale, but blue and only mutters endlessly: "I obey, Comrade People's Commissar" ... I have never heard such "education" in my life either before or after. After On this occasion, Tkachenko did not appear to me for about ten days. And soon gone somewhere..."

Allegedly "in a black way" Beria's obscene lexicon and "did not appear for ten days" are on the conscience of the memoirist. Firstly, Tkachenko before the war, and during the war, and after the war was in the working "team" of Beria, and, as a rule, he was entrusted with control functions. That is, Beria Tkachenko invariably trusted, and the people's commissar had no intention of humiliating people. custom. Secondly, it is unlikely that in wartime the lieutenant general of the NKVD after such turn of events could afford to spend almost half a month in Izhevsk, and not leave for Moscow.

But what is important in Novikov's testimony? And the fact that Beria severely besieged his subordinate solely on the basis of Novikov's objections! So where is here suspiciousness and inability to trust people? Moreover, Novikov himself emphasizes that *"in especially acute cases, he called Beria directly ... And he usually answered: 'Okay, something let's think of '...'"*

However, Novikov explains this reaction of the GKO member again by the fact that Beria de "I was afraid of Stalin, I was afraid of his anger, I was afraid of losing his trust and disposition ..." Conclusion is clear: not about the cause, not about the needs of the front, the "monster" was sick with his soul, but worried about his own skin ...

The case with Tkachenko is cited in their books by both Yuri Mukhin and Alexei Topygin, and Elena Prudnikova. And Yu. Mukhin states that Novikov, assessing Beria as a self-seeker, judged by himself ... This, of course, is too harsh an assessment of Novikov - he did it during the war for a lot of front. However, Novikov's example is different. As in many other cases when someone who had personal dealings with him speaks of Beria, memories of Beria can be divided into two opposite parts.

From the description of *the facts* relating to the personal business communication of the memoirist with Beria, one can see a wonderful, in general, person, devoted to the cause and able to do it.

From *the assessments* and from the information transmitted by the memoirist *from other people's words*, it appears the usual image of a villain. So,

Novikov writes that when coal was left in Izhevsk for a day, he called Beria, and coal came. This is an exact fact from the lips of Novikov. He himself asked for this coal himself received it. But

Novikov writes that Beria, using his power, turned to Izhevsk "coal" routes from Kuzbass, intended for aircraft factories in Kazan. Like, currying favor with Stalin, Beria de ignored the interests of the common cause and infringed de "aviator" Malenkov. In principle,

the redirection of trains could have taken place, although it is unlikely that Novikov, sitting in Izhevsk, knew about it. Was it up to Novikov to find out where the coal came from? Came, and okay! But the fact that Beria arbitrarily and selfishly

intercepted coal from Malenkov, "who took care of aviation," this already fully applies to Novikov's fabrications, inspired by the tradition of blackening Beria to blackness of a miner who had just risen from

slaughter. And the point is not even that such arbitrariness would immediately cost Beria dearly! The thing is the fact that Novikov could not know the general situation and the general picture of transportation. That is, when wrote his "perestroika" essay, took advantage of anti-Beria gossip. And it's not Antonov-Ovseenko, and an outstanding organizer of industry, Hero of the Socialist Labor ... Alas, he was not the only one who slipped on a dishonorable attitude towards Beria.

Finishing the topic "Beria -" gunsmith "", I will say that these merits of his in the war are not

only hushed up, but also repeatedly distorted even in official sources. And so even E. Prudnikova, who is completely loyal to her hero, counts Beria as a member State Defense Committee, supervising the production of weapons and mortars only from February 4, 1942 - instead of Voznesensky, who allegedly led this production at first as an adviser to the State Defense Committee (He became a member of the GKO in February 1942). But this simply cannot be! Otherwise case, Beria would not have held any meetings on rifles in July 1941! At him that, their affairs were not enough? And then in September 1941 the 7th department would not have been formed NKVD on mortars. In addition, what else of the weapons can be attributed to Beria, as a member of the State Defense Committee, with *the start of the war*? There were only five of them in the GKO at that time, including Stalin! Tanks like us we know that at first Stalin gave it to Molotov, aviation was initially supervised by Malenkov (with connection of Lavrenty Pavlovich) ... Armaments and ammunition were "clean diocese" member of the GKO comrade. L. P. Beria.

And only then did the tanks with the planes go to the original "gunsmith" and "ammunition" Beria (E. Prudnikova did not notice that Novikov himself dates the beginning curating Beria over the People's Commissariat of Armaments at the beginning of the war). Alas, and, say, A. Topygin reported that "GKO (that is, in fact, Stalin. - S.K.) assigns control over the tank industry of the Soviet military-industrial complex "to Beria "from the end of 1942 of the year", while Beria "engaged" in tanks much earlier. Beria did a lot to establish the production of the entire range of rockets for guards mortars - "Katyusha". And one more thing ... In his notes of the 40s Vannikov assessed Beria's efforts in helping the People's Commissariat of Ammunition as heroic. And this was, I remind you, only one of the "hypostases" of Beria in his military biography ...

RESERVE front, barrage detachments - this is a visible war. And for the Chekist Beria has long become familiar, if you use journalistic clichés, "a front without front lines", "invisible front". And from July 20, 1941, after the reunification of the NKVD and The NKGB, he again began to command this specific "front" ... No wonder he left personally supervision over the work of overseas intelligence. Much can be written on this topic, but my book will be voluminous anyway. Including therefore, in order to avoid the growth of volume, I did not give above many impressive figures according to the growth rate of armaments for the front and other actual data showing the importance of Beria in ensuring such success. And it would be worth it!

So in the story about the sphere of intelligence during the war, I will limit myself below to one an example showing Beria as a person. Moreover, the topic "Beria and intelligence in 1941-1943" is immense, and I will later have to dwell on the aspect of the initial "atomic intelligence" associated with the work of Beria in the NKVD of the war years. Therefore, together with the well-known tall beauty Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya, we let's go into Beria's office to look at the development of events there.

Shortly after the start of the war, Voskresenskaya was included in a special group, and she was engaged in "selection, organization, training and transfer to the rear of the enemy of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. And now, in October 1941, Rybkina was preparing for another separation from her husband - a major intelligence officer Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin-Yartsev. How the reader already knows, under the legal guise of an embassy adviser, he was heading to Sweden.

And here's what happened next:

"On the eve of his (husband. - **S.K.**) departure, everything turned upside down in my fate. The Commissar called me and asked what I was doing. I said I'm getting ready to go work behind the scenes. "As whom?" - "Railway watchman on relocation". The People's Commissar laughed: "The Germans will arrest and shoot such a watchman. You need to go to

Sweden"... I had to hand over my cases ... A few days later, the two of us were already flying to "duck" (U-2) to Arkhangelsk ... "

And the tone of the conversation of the nameless - in the presentation of Zoya Ivanovna - "People's Commissar", and the essence of it decisions are able to bribe any person with their rationality and humanity. A after all, the "commissar" is still the same General Commissar of State Security of the USSR Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria!

The reader will recognize this - attentive to the fate of the intelligence officer, calm, friendly and competent, unlike the immediate superiors

Rybkina - "People's Commissar" "demon" and "fiend"? But

about Zoya Ivanovna herself - a woman of rare charm (this is even from her photo apparently) spread vile gossip. So, KGB Colonel E.P. Sharapov wrote that who lived with her much later than the time of the war in the same house on Krasnoarmeiskaya Street "The poetess Margarita (Marietta? - S.K.) Shaginyan warned her neighbors to be be careful in dealing with Voskresenskaya, because she has "blood on her hands to the elbows" ... "

Y-yes ... A familiar dictionary!

The baton from Shaginyan was taken over by the "democrat" Marina Kudimova, who was also "passing" along poetry department. And on October 20, 1993 (this is after Yeltsin's bloody execution of the White House!) in the television program "Lyasa" Kudimova talked about "Chekist woman, whose hands are up to the elbows in blood."

Well, just like the Chekist Lavrenty Beria!

And NOW it would be necessary, and also briefly, to say about Beria - a "partisan" and a "saboteur" ... In the introductory article to volume 20 (9) of the Russian Archive - "The partisan movement in the years Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" says:

"In July 1941, to ensure the preparation of the party underground and formation of partisan detachments, a commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was created. But to she never got to work. Since August 1941, in the NPO system of the USSR, to operate a special department for the leadership of the partisan movement, but and it ceased to exist at the beginning of December, since Stalin instructed create a Central Headquarters at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command partisan movement (TSSHPD). However, in January 1942, when in full swing with with the help of the General Staff, the formation of departments and departments of this headquarters ... an order was received from the Supreme Commander to stop all this work ... and personnel to transfer to the NPO of the USSR ... "

Reading these lines, you are perplexed: "And who, before that, from the first weeks of the war, organized a guerrilla war in the rear of the advancing German troops?" AND the standard answer: "The Party..." is unlikely to be accurate and exhaustive here.

So who is it? It turns out that no one really led the partisans, and the German echelons flew downhill! Strange... And why did it take so long for everything to get organized? Almost official publication of Yeltsin's Russia (the Russian Archive series is published under the auspices of

Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) blames everything ...

Whom?

Well, it's clear who:

"... in such an unexpected turn of affairs, the influence of L.P. Beria affected. He managed to convince I. V. Stalin of the inexpediency of creating special bodies to control partisan detachments "from the people", since, Beria assured, the activities of such partisans are spontaneous, fragmented, not lends itself to leadership and cannot give the expected operational effect (Beria, it must be said, was absolutely right here! - **S.K.**). Such results, in his opinion, are only possible for qualified saboteurs, for training and leadership which have special bodies. "This is a most harmful point of view," recalled P.K. Ponomarenko (First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus. - **S.K.**),

- unfortunately, shook the members of the State Defense Committee, and the organization of the Central Staff was cancelled." But the need for such a body was so obvious (to non-professionals. - **S.K.**), that the Central Committee of the Party and the government soon again had to return to the solution of this issue.

The TsPSHD was created only in the eleventh month of the war - on May 30, 1942. P.K. Ponomarenko, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, P.K. Ponomarenko, was approved as its head by the GKO ... "

I apologize to the reader for the long quote, but it concentrates all the main accusations against Beria, who allegedly interfered with the normal development of the partisan movement. And in order to deal with this accusation, I will continue to often resort to quoting documents. So, I think it will be more reliable and easier. An opinion is an opinion, and a fact is a fact even for a "democrat". Unless, of course, he ("democrat") is no longer on the way to Moscow "bedlam" - Kanatchikova dacha, or its analogue - the structures of "power". So, the facts ...

The Central

Committee resolution on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops was adopted on July 18, 1941, but did not give the proper result because bringing the content rulings before the population of the occupied territories was hardly possible. Need there were not general appeals, but specific measures. But, according to the most experienced master special operations of the NKVD General Sudoplatov, already on the first day of the war he was instructed lead all reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army. Well in the first not the first, but it was instructed ... And from the context reported by Sudoplatov, one can to understand what Beria was entrusted with, although until July 20, formally, the people's commissariats of the VD and GB were still considered disconnected. Nevertheless, on July 5, 1941, by order of the NKVD, a A special group under the people's commissar (Zoya Rybkina was also a part of it). Sudoplatov's deputies such KGB "bison" were appointed as Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Mordvinov, Gudimovich, Orlov. On October 3, 1941, the Special Group was reorganized into independent 2nd department of the NKVD while maintaining the direct subordination of Beria. Finally, on January 18, 1942, the 2nd Department was deployed to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD with expansion of tasks and powers.

Unlike the generals of the General Staff and party functionaries, Beria's line was here, as always, a clear and appropriate situation. 1) The

war has begun - you need to have a special operations leadership group. 2) By autumn it becomes clear that the war is for a long time. And the group expands to a department. A then - and to management. A

selective 25,000th (!) OMSBON was formed - a separate motorized rifle special purpose brigade of the NKVD of the USSR, this genuine forge of partisan personnel for special detachments and special groups, with which the names of Medvedev, Vaupshasov, Stekhov, Prokopyuk, Kuznetsov are

associated ... Bureaucrats in uniform from the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense failed to start the "big" war. Now they also failed the guerrilla war. It was January 1942, and The General Staff "in full swing" was still *forming* the TsSHPD.

The subordinate of the people's commissar of Beria, the captain of the GB Dmitry Medvedev during this time managed to form a special detachment "Mitya", on September 4, 1941, go with him to the Bryansk forests, conduct there and in Belarus a number of operations, January 12, 1942 return to Moscow, February 17 receive your first Order of Lenin and start preparing for a new drop already near Rovno.

But on December 12, 1941, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria reported to the State Defense Committee "about actions of the commander of the partisan detachment of the NKVD of the USSR, captain of the State Security Comrade Medvedev "for last month: a railway bridge was blown up, a train derailed, three bridge, three oil refineries, a turpentine plant were destroyed, the military commandant's office was destroyed and the police department, destroyed two planes that made an emergency landing. 10 officers, 39 soldiers, translator, two policemen, one traitor, three deserters were killed. Squad losses: 1 killed, 2 slightly wounded.

Beria's report ended like this:

"The partisan detachment currently consists of 218 people and is growing over account of military personnel who were surrounded by German troops. Armed for trophy count.

NOTE. Partisan detachment comrade. Medvedev organized in Moscow and transferred to the front line in September 1941.

And the report on Medvedev's actions was, of course, vivid, but only one of many pages in the general folder of files of the 2nd department and the 4th department of the NKVD. And the General Staff "formed", and the head of the Main Directorate for the formation and staffing Red Army Shchadenko slipped Stalin the stupidest draft orders "on formation of partisan armies "(I'm too lazy to even quote them) ... But even the name of our most famous "non-Chekist" partisan commander, future twice Hero of the Soviet Union Sidor Artemovich Kovpak, became first known to Stalin from the report of Chekist Beria dated November 21, 1941. These were the first news about the actions of Kovpak, and in the report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs there was no quite true "Kolpak's partisan detachment".

That is, the real result was given by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Therefore it is clear why Stalin agreed with his people's commissar - the Moscow clerks only "formed" *their* headquarters, and the Chekists have already undermined the *German headquarters!*

However, Ponomarenko Stalin, as we see, still "put the squeeze on". And in this confrontation party apparatchik Ponomarenko and manager Beria were not affected by some "Departmental" friction, but two different approaches to the problem. Ponomarenko's approach was in many ways "ostentatious", and Beria's approach is purely businesslike.

How did Beria understand the tasks of the war behind enemy lines? The main thing is to contribute to the speedy the expulsion of Nazi troops from the USSR with the minimum possible effort and loss with the greatest possible effect. Therefore, he saw the war behind the front line as a network continuous special sabotage and reconnaissance operations organized by professionals and carried out by professionals with, of course, the support of the people on occupied territories. Beria himself was a specialist in special operations. and experience he had counter-partisan actions - in Transcaucasia in the 20s and 30s with the plenipotentiary of the OGPU there were all the possibilities for gaining such an experience!

Moreover, it is impossible to explain Beria's desire to lead the war behind enemy lines. the fact that he wanted to show off to Stalin also his "partisan" merit. Beria already had enough to do, and therefore success, because for Beria to do business meant doing it successfully. But

Ponomarenko ... No,

Panteleimon Ponomarenko also wanted a speedy victory no less than Lavrenty Beria. But Ponomarenko is a party "general", and even temporarily without an army. Belarus is occupied. And just Ponomarenko had to be shown to Stalin: the Belarusian land is burning, Comrade Stalin, under the feet of the Nazi invaders. A organizes the movement of people's avengers, our native party ... That is, Ponomarenko. So who, one wonders, acted here as a careerist and intriguer?

In the end, the TsSHPD was created under Ponomarenko's hand. But let's compare the two dates ... The TsSHPD was formed on May 30, 1942. And on May 18, 1942, Kovpak received his first Golden Star. Without the "guidelines" of the head of the TSSHPD, but not without business assistance weapons, personnel, assignments (after all, this is also help!) From the department of Beria.

Of course, the benefits of having a TsSHPD during the war were still greater than the harm. But - no more than that. I think if everything was tied only to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, the war behind enemy lines would have been much more effective, without losing the completely popular character. After all, Beria did not rule out, but welcomed the expansion and development of special forces NKVD at the expense of "local resources", but the commanders *of such* detachments skillfully withstood

proportions between the number of detachments and the effectiveness of their combat work. They knew that professionals fight not by numbers, but by skill, even at the front. And behind the line front ...

Professional Stanislav Vaupshasov, finding himself *alone* in an acute situation, from behind the bushes instantly shot six punishers at once, carelessly, unprofessionally released *en masse* in the meadow. Not in a Hollywood action movie, but in real life, this is extremely difficult to do.

Yes, the professional Chekist Beria had a clear line and consistently spent. And the "professional" apparatchik Ponomarenko rushed from the "concept" of small detachments to the recognition of the existence and usefulness of formations of several thousand fighters like Kovpakovsky. In July 1942, Ponomarenko prepared a draft order People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, that is, Stalin, about the intensification of the partisan struggle, which remained a project - it was very stupid, non-specific, divorced from reality and sustained in the worst traditions of party bureaucracy. Ponomarenko wrote:

"Experience shows that large partisan formations reaching sometimes up to several thousand people, sedentary, easily detected enemy... badly controlled... I order: 4.

Stop the practice of creating (this passage just touched. - **S.K.**) large partisan formations ... since experience showed that the most successfully operating is a well-knit, maneuverable detachment of 60-100 people ...

5. Without the knowledge of the partisan movement, no movements in the command do not produce composition ... "

etc.

Sidor Kovpak at that time was conducting another raid of the two thousandth unit, Alexei Fedorov-Chernigovskiy was building up his own to a similar size ... And already whole partisan regions were formed with new ones, without the knowledge of Ponomarenko promoted commanders. In reality, everything was determined locally by life itself, and not by pieces of paper. TsSHPD.

A true partocratic masterpiece, I would call a memorandum Ponomarenko to Stalin dated March 4, 1943. I'll give it in full:

"As a result of the successes of the Red Army in Belarus and Ukraine there is a rapid growth of the partisan movement. In Belarus, the number partisan detachments reached 460 with the number of partisans over 60,000, and hidden reserves reach up to 200,000 people. In Ukraine, only Zhytomyr, Rivne and Chernihiv regions reserves of partisan detachments number up to 60,000 people.

I ask you to accept for the report and receive instructions on the fundamental further development of the movement. **P.**

Ponomarenko.

No, "hidden reserves" are great! "I recognize zealous horses by their scorched Taurus, I recognize the arrogant Parthians by their high hoods," wrote Pushkin. But the partycratic "party" secretary can be recognized by these "hidden reserves! Alas, Stalin himself sometimes sinned like this, but he already knew how to make his mistakes and straighten.

Beria sent over 2,000 task forces behind the front line. numbering 15,000 people. Little compared to Ponomarenko's numbers? How can I say ... These were not just people with weapons, but people who had been trained, who had targeted tasks, radio communication with Moscow. On the spot, they were "overgrown" with new ones as necessary.

people.

However, not only operational groups, but also most effectively operating detachments and formations had the core of the NKVD personnel. Heroes of the Soviet Union partisans Dmitry Medvedev, Stanislav Vaupshasov, Dmitry Emlyutin, Viktor Karasev, Alexander Saburov, Nikolai Prokopyuk, Evgeny Mirkovsky - these are all personnel Chekists. Heroes of the Soviet Union, leaders of underground centers Viktor Lyagin, Ivan Kudrya and Viktor Molodtsov are also career Chekists. And this is only a part of the glorious, heroic names of the glorious subordinates of the Commissar Chekist Beria.

In 1943, Gauleiter of Belarus Kube was blown up in his own bed in Minsk. Three women - Elena Mazanik, Maria Osipova and Nadezhda Troyan - November 4, 1943 received the Stars of Heroes of the Soviet Union for this operation. But the operation itself is development operatives of the NKVD in cooperation with the GRU of the

General Staff. The acts of vengeance in Rovno of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov (Paul Siebert) were developed by professionals from the Lubyanka, prepared by Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander Lukin are also professionals from the Lubyanka, but Nikolai Kuznetsov himself was professional. And also from the Lubyanka!

Yes, in fact, in the leadership of the TsSHPD, as well as the republican headquarters, they were in mainly representatives of the NKVD, including the Chekists Strokach, Sprogis.

Nevertheless, Beria, by his directive of July 13, 1942, forbade the transfer to the headquarters partisan movement personnel of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of a special appointments operating in the German rear, intelligence residencies, couriers and messengers, as well as correspondence on the partisan formations of the NKVD (summaries, dispatches, reports, radiograms) ... He is now reproached for this, but everything was true. What Beria retained in the competence of the NKVD was very "subtle matters." AND it would be unwise to leave them in unskilled hands. And Beria is not talking about his own ambitions here. worried, but about the strictest secrecy and safety of those people who every day enemy rear lived under the threat of failure.

Beria's fears were certainly well founded. There is an amazing self-disclosure (albeit involuntary, unconscious) a historical document - a letter Head of the TsShPD P. K. Ponomarenko to the Secretary of the Smolensk Regional Party Committee D. M. Popov dated February 10, 1943, where Ponomarenko noted that:

"... some comrades organize in the occupied territory district committees, as a rule, according to the usual type, more or less broad composition, arrange meetings, meetings, hear reports from political workers brigades and detachments ... and at the same time they do not pay attention ... to the formation and organization of a deeply conspiratorial Bolshevik underground.

Could intelligence networks, cadres, communications be trusted to such "pro-sessions"? It would seem that the answer is obvious, however, even here Beria did not please those about whom Shota Rustaveli accurately said: "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side" ... So, in 2001 in Minsk, under the general editorship of the notorious Taras, a book by V. I. Boyarsky was published "Partisans and the army. (History of Lost Opportunities)", which states:

"A number of gross miscalculations and mistakes were the result of erroneous actions ... of the leadership of the NKVD, dictated by departmental interests, the desire ensure not only penetration into all available spheres along the line security, but also a line of influence, if not leadership."

This phrase alone reveals the whole depth (or rather, pettiness?) of misunderstanding of the essence and meaning of the activities of Beria and his associates during the war. Of course, the Chekists were people and therefore were not always alien to ambition, and it was not always

healthy, but at a time when they can be strictly *asked for miscalculations in work*, in their own way initiative, only volunteers take on the additional burden. And they, like known, careerist motives are not overwhelmed. And to finish with the theme of the "partisan" Beria, I will introduce the reader to extracts from another letter from P.K. Ponomarenko, written by him in early March 1943 to a member Military Council of the 4th Shock Army A. A. Stulov. Perhaps the reader remembers this "Party" surname according to the report of the military prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison? This the same Stulov is. In 1943, he was still the secretary of the Vitebsk regional committee, and Ponomarenko wrote to him:

"Got a note from you <...> that some commanders and commissars of brigades and detachments are taking the wrong line of conduct on in relation to the regional committee of the party. <...> It is clear that the role of the regional committee and district committees ... in the leadership of the partisan movement in the region should get up. The regional committee of the party is obliged to stop any attempts ... to belittle or thereby more to tear off the regional committee ... from the leadership of partisan detachments and brigades. <...> In the current situation, when the regional committee is not located in the Vitebsk region, of course, you will continue to encounter facts when they pass you by in some cases materials come in ... It's another matter if the regional committee be where the partisans are. Then, of course, everyone will be concentrated at the regional committee the threads of connections and all the questions of the activities of detachments and brigades ..."

The first secretary of the Chernigov regional committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine, Fedorov, was just where the partisans were, at the head of a powerful partisan unit. That's why he earned - by personal military labor - two Gold Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union. And his colleague party work Stulov started the war mediocre and cowardly, so he continued it, only for another chair sat down - a member of the Military Council of the army ... And he could not sit on any with really for business.

After all, this was not a master of management, unlike Beria and his combat associates Sudoplatov, Vaupshasov, Medvedev, Prokopyuk...

ON THE ROLE OF Beria in the defense of the Caucasus, if one could find deaf mentions, then only in the usual way for the "anti-Beriad" - the tyrant de Beria, sent by the "tyrant" Stalin as a representative of the Headquarters of the VTK to the Caucasus, in every possible way prevented us from defending North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. You don't have to look far for an example - Triumph and Tragedy by Dmitry Volkogonov:

"The fighting of Beria in the Great Patriotic War is limited two of his trips as a member of the GKO to the Caucasus (he was heading there Stalin, not only as a member of the GKO, but in fact as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in the manner of the same Zhukov. - **S.K.**) in August 1942 - March of the following year. The archives testify: here, on behalf of Stalin, he instilled fear in the military workers, filmed people who were objectionable to him, shot them. Accompanied him in those trips Kobulov, Mamulov, Milshtein, Piyashev, Tsanova, Rukhadze, Vlodzimirsky, Karanadze, Kakuchaya, his own son. Tyulenev, Sergatskov, other military leaders got it.

Volkogonov strove to pose as an analyst, although he was simply a scoundrel, and even stupid, because smart scoundrels subtly "correct" the historical truth, and do not lie totally. After all, it is easy to expose a total lie - there are too many "punctures" in it!

What is funny, Volkogonov did not put the words "military operations" in quotation marks, although formally Beria did not participate in the hostilities - it was not then that Stalin sent him to the Caucasus. However, in the course of German air raids, sometimes you had to risk your life ...

Several officers from Headquarters, who arrived in the Caucasus with Beria and Colonel Shtemenko, who was in charge of the Caucasian direction in the General Staff (in 1953, although he would renounce Beria, but suffer "for communication" with him), was killed. Got shot in the head by a dick of the Military Council of the Front, Lazar Kaganovich, Admiral Isakov was wounded (he had to take away leg) ...

But let's return to the quote from Volkogonov ... To the list of Beria's associates in defense Caucasus, taken by him there, he could add Merkulov, Sudoplatov, Maslennikov, Khomenko, Orlov ... Almost all of those listed by

Volkogonov, as well as Merkulov, Maslennikov, are the old "team" of Beria in the Transcaucasus, who knew the situation perfectly and was able to start act "half-turn". And Chekist Sudoplatov, border generals Piyashev, Khomenko - these are also long-verified cadres, but - already according to the allied NKVD. Sergo Beria he was also in the "team", but he took him, firstly, Shtemenko, and secondly, he was clearly useful both with their knowledge and ingenuity.

In general, the fact that Beria took his own on a difficult trip just proves that he knew how trust people completely. But - only to those who have been tested by him more than once in specific affairs.

The situation in the Caucasus by August was critical. Demonstrating intent and 1942 to deliver the main blow by Army Group Center on Moscow, Hitler's main considered the "Blau" plan to seize the oil of the Caucasus and enter the Volga in the region of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad epic (there, by the way, as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was directed by Malenkov) we know well. We know Caucasian much worse. And, perhaps, it happened because Beria played one of the key roles in it. Caught on the straight front, it worked effectively here too, but that's why the objective image Khrushchev and other partocratic "historians" of the struggle for the Caucasus became after July 1953 impossible.

I do not intend to analyze the operational situation in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia fronts, however, I will give an assessment of the situation given by the "Pospel" "History of the Great Patriotic War", where on page 461 of volume 2 it is said:

"The command of the German Army Group A believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus have lost their combat effectiveness and can no longer provide significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regrouping of troops in order to simultaneously develop an offensive on Baku and Batumi... The 1st Panzer Army was deployed with the front to the southeast and should was to advance ... in the direction of Grozny - Makhachkala - Baku. 17th Army received the task of advancing from the Krasnodar region to Novorossiysk, seizing it and develop an offensive along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi-Batumi. 491st the mountain rifle corps was supposed to strike from the Cherkessk region through passes of the Main Caucasian Range, go to the Sukhumi region and contribute breakthrough of the 17th Army to the Black Sea coast ... On August 18, fighting began in the passes ... "

That was the situation when Beria was once again the first figure in Transcaucasia. He knew everyone here, and everyone knew him, so everything immediately accelerated in all directions. Moreover, now at the disposal of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria were "their own" sensible the military, on whom he could rely - first of all, Ivan Maslennikov. And August 8 1942 - even before Beria left for the Caucasus - the Northern Group was created Transcaucasian Front, commanded by Lieutenant General Maslennikov.

The idea of this appointment belonged, of course, to Beria. However, the creation of the North group and the appointment of Maslennikov took place only after the head of the of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General Vasilevsky and head of the direction The Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel Shtemenko, discussed this with Tyulenev.

They informed him that Maslennikov might be with him "in two or three days."

And soon Beria himself arrived with Shtemenko to Tyulenev in Tbilisi. And the big one began Job.

The passes were urgently strengthened - the experience of Sudoplatov and Merkulov helped a lot here. mobilization of climbers, organizing ambushes, sniper groups, setting mine fields. Sudoplatov recalls how Stalin reprimanded Merkulov for *"unjustified risk in mining operations: he put his life in danger and could be captured by the advanced units of the Germans"*. Beria also flew in, and he warmed up Sudoplatov for the poor guardianship of the first deputy people's commissar.

Well, war in critical moments is toughness. Beloved by the "democrats" Zhukov in such moments, except for the mat, did not use anything in the conversation and shot mercilessly. Beria was only cruel, but not cruel, and if he shot, then in extreme cases. It is not for nothing that the same Volkogonov does not give the specific names of those who were shot, but only claims that "Tyulenev, Sergatskov got it" ... Fifty-year-old

army general (already in 1940!) Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev before the war he commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District, and shortly after it began was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, which became the Transcaucasian Front in May 1942. Tyulenev commanded them until ... June 1945. Not having outstanding military qualities, he was, as they say, a strong middle peasant, that is a fairly reliable figure, especially in defense. And nothing else from him required, in addition to a solid defense of the Caucasus and Baku oil. And

Beria helped him strongly in this. First of all, he helped in what he could and was obliged to help precisely in the Transcaucasus, namely Beria - in the mobilization of people, reserves and the economy. I will give specific examples, and now I will say that Beria also helped militarily! Tyulenev later wrote (without mentioning Beria's name, of course):

"Some of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed.

Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. As directed from Moscow, we have developed a new plan for the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian ridge: it was divided into directions, headed by experienced commanders and staffs.

Tyulenev sets out here such a concept of defense, behind which Beria is immediately visible. I think it was not without Beria that on September 1, 1942, Stalin made the decision to unite North Caucasian and Transcaucasian Fronts into one Transcaucasian Front.

It was necessary to create a defense in depth. And during August and September 1942, on the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze, Grozny and Makhachkala, was built along five or six defensive lines, and on the outskirts of Baku - more than ten. On this construction, 90 thousand people of the local population were mobilized daily. And all was on a member of the GKO Beria. However, he, as a rule, did not get involved in operational decisions - where and which parts to direct, how to plan strikes, etc. He himself was so professional in what he was professional in, that he always respected professionalism and in others.

But the selection and placement of personnel - Beria understood this, and with some of whom he really figured it out... Thus, Volkogonov mentioned Sergatskov. Born in 1898, Vasily Sergatskov managed to fight on the Western Front in the First World War, in the rank The lieutenant commanded a company. In the Red Army he commanded a regiment and divisions. From May 1941 became senior lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff ...

On August 28, 1942, Beria removed Major General Sergatskov from command of the 46th army and appointed Major General Leselidze in his place. Well, let's say Beria was to Sergatskov is unfair. But who prevented him from deploying in all his military talent later? However, Sergatskov continued to fight medium and from the post of commander of the 11th

Guards Rifle Corps in January 1944 was "for health reasons" transferred to "command" the department of general tactics of the Frunze Academy. Although lived then with "bad health" is not so little. He died in 1975 in Moscow at the age of 77 life.

But what about General Leselidze? Born in Georgia in 1903, in the Red Army since 1921. He began the war on the Western Front as the chief of artillery of the 2nd Rifle Corps, fought bravely near Moscow. After the Caucasus, he fought in the Kuban, in Ukraine, in 1943 he became Colonel General, was mortally wounded and on February 21, 1944 died of wounds in Moscow hospital. Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). He fought for the freedom of Georgia, he died for Ukraine, and if it's for sure, for our Soviet Motherland.

The "godson" of Beria was also the same age as Leselidze, the future Marshal Andrei Grechko, who was appointed commander of the 47th Army on September 8, 1942. True, later about this "Kinship" Grechko kept quiet.

So, in a purely military, partly even military leadership, attitude, Beria is not "failed". However, without exaggeration, the role of Beria in organizing rear support of the front. I will again resort to an extensive quotation from volume 2 "Pospel" 6-volume "History ... of the war" edition of 1961 (in the editorial which included Grechko), and then I will illustrate this text with another quote. So:

"... On September 9, martial law was declared in the republics of Transcaucasia.

Due to the fact that the main communications connecting Transcaucasia with industrial regions of the country, were intercepted by the enemy, in Transcaucasia, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee, the plan was increased production of military products ... Many enterprises, especially local industry, were entirely transferred to the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment for the army ... An increase in the production of military materials in the Transcaucasian republics allowed the State Committee Defense cut centralized supplies to the troops defending the Caucasus. The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from industrial centers countries only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms made on site."

This is also all Beria, my dear reader! All this was done in Transcaucasia during his time there, and in no small measure *because* of his time there. Of course, here we are talking about the efforts of millions of people. But the initial impulse of these efforts is he. Autumn 1941 he was enriched with new experience as a curator of defense production and now he used it, as they say, "to its fullest." Moreover, we must remember

that the battle for the Caucasus took place against the backdrop of the beginning the battle for Stalingrad, and therefore Beria and his comrades in Transcaucasia also defended him, allowing him to transfer the maximum possible there due to the fact that the Caucasus began to do a lot myself.

And now - a "concrete", illustrating quote. Head of the Chief Artillery Directorate of the Red Army Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev writes in his memoirs:

"...simultaneously with the Battle of Stalingrad, a grandiose battle for the Caucasus. Moreover, on a huge front stretching from Chernoy to Caspian Seas. And if the supply of weapons and ammunition to our troops in the area of Stalingrad was difficult, then the Caucasian epic in this respect in general was unsurpassed in its complexity ...

The supply of arms and ammunition to the troops defending here ... should

was to go in a roundabout way - through Central Asia, Krasnovodsk, Baku ...

However, the transports

were moving ... The industrial enterprises of Transcaucasia also worked with a huge load. Under the leadership of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (whose work was led by Beria. - **S.K.**), having switched to military production, they gave the front thousands of guns, mortars and ammunition. It's hard to believe, but it

happened. Once I was informed that in Baku something similar to a munitions factory has been created. And on the basis of ... urban salvage. And in Tbilisi, the building of the slaughterhouse was adapted for this. And on such and such "factories" for five months of work were equipped with 647 thousand hand grenades, 1.2 million mines, 549.5 thousand artillery shells!

Yakovlev exclaims: *"Is this not a manifestation of the selfless devotion of the working people Transcaucasia to their socialist Motherland!"* Yes, that's right! But that's just too much proof.

how Beria skillfully organized these workers. And it was also

impossible to lose sight of the fact that there was, although neutral, but if the situation worsens, Türkiye is ready to enter the Transcaucasus. She's been twenty years I did it back ... And just in company with Germany. Beria took into account this moment, in the most critical days, holding back the temptation of the army to withdraw troops from the border to reinforce front. Already the pre-war leader of the Transcaucasus and his native understood that as a result a dangerous temptation for the Turks. The

critical situation made me think through all the options - down to the worst.

Sudoplatov testifies:

"Fears that Tbilisi, and indeed the entire Caucasus, could be captured by the enemy were real. My task was to create an underground intelligence network, on case if Tbilisi would be under the Germans. Professor Konstantin Gamsakhurdia (father of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) was one of the candidates for the post head of the agent network in Georgia. He was the senior informant NKVD. Beria also attracted him to cooperation ... Ironically, before during the war, he was known for his pro-German sentiments ... To me, he didn't seem very reliable. In addition, all his previous experience informant was reduced to informing ... and not exerting ... influence ... "

Here is the assessment of Mingrel Gamsakhurdia, with which one cannot but agree and which was given to him by a Russian subordinate of another Mingrelian, Lavrenty Beria. Yes, like I said, he was on His own Caucasus, because the Caucasus was his own. Beria in any, of course, case would give all the best in the Caucasus to the end, as well as on any other sector of the front, where he would send Stalin. However, in the Caucasus, Beria defended not only the great homeland - the Soviet Union, but also the "small" homeland ... So for the general mobilization of Transcaucasia for wrestling Caucasian Beria was an ideal figure in every respect. He was born here he was here like a fish in water, he had authority, he relied on people, he was in his time found and put forward. In the

"Pospel" "History ..." on page 467 it is said that in the November 1942 battles for Ordzhonikidze killed a member of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front, the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia A. N. Sajaya ... But it was one of the most experienced Georgian Chekists, brought up by Beria. During

the war, representatives of Moscow visited different fronts on different fronts and at different times: Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich ... Someone on the situation had a greater influence, someone less ... However, Beria's role in protecting Transcaucasia (and, by the way, also in the preparation of operations in the North Caucasus in March-April 1943) in the still unwritten objective history of the war must be highlighted especially. Perhaps, in no other military case did the personality so vividly show

their influence, powerfully contributing to collective success. And it's time to admit it!

IT IS 1943. On April 14,
the NKGB was again separated from the NKVD, and Vsevolod Merkulov again became independent people's commissar, however, this did not affect Beria's workload, because, removing from he had only problems, Stalin "threw" him others ... And not Stalin, but life itself: it was still necessary to work as hard in the economy, it was necessary to improve things in liberated areas. Yes, and
in the NKVD, new areas of work appeared ... In the country, especially where the occupation lasted for a long time, banditry increased, including political. arose the problem of prisoner-of-war camps combined with the problem of their mass use to rebuild the country. In the
autumn of 1943, Beria was also officially entrusted with ensuring the protection of the Soviet delegation at the Tehran Conference of the Three. Unofficially, I had to answer for President Roosevelt, who settled for security reasons in the Soviet embassy. Beria had the same instruction at the Berlin Conference in Potsdam in the summer 1945, and a little earlier - at the Yalta Conference of 1945, where he was responsible for the security of all delegations is already officially ... The
war went on more and more successfully for Russia, the country even developed, strengthened, recruited new forces, but Beria did not get easier and simpler - since 1944 he has been appointed also Deputy Chairman of the GKO I. V. Stalin. Considering that Stalin by this time had to focus on operations at the front and diplomatic preparing the future world, then...

Then almost the entire organization of the work of the rear for the needs of the front fell on the shoulders of Beria ... And he was already tired. History asked Stalin. This, of course, is a big responsibility. But Stalin asked Beria. And it was hard to say in which case the tension and load of psychological pressure were great. No, I'm not talking about fear here... Of course, not about it.

AVIATION DESIGNER A. S. Yakovlev recalled that in July 1941 they Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Dementiev had such a conversation with Stalin:

"Comrade Stalin, it's been more than a month since our Deputy People's Commissar for Balandin engines. We don't know what he's in prison for, but we can't imagine him being enemy. He is needed in the people's commissariat - the management of engine building is very weakened ...

- Yes, he has been in prison for forty days, but he does not give any evidence. Maybe there isn't for him. nothing ... It is very possible ... And it happens," Stalin answered.

"And the next day, Balandin," writes Yakovlev, "haggard, with his hair cut bald, already took his office in the people's commissariat and continued to work as if nothing had happened to him."

A few days later, Stalin asked: - Well, how is Balandin? - Works, Comrade Stalin, as if nothing had happened. - Yes, they planted it in vain. And in response to Yakovlev's puzzled look, they say, how can you imprison the innocent? — Stalin explained:

— Yes, that's how it happens. An intelligent person, works well, they envy him, under him dig in. And if he is also a brave man, he says what he thinks, he calls dissatisfaction and attracts the attention of suspicious Chekists, who themselves do not know, but willingly use all sorts of rumors.

What does this case say?

Firstly, that Balandin was arrested before the unification of the people's commissariats, so to his Beria had nothing to do with arrest. But the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin had because without his visa the arrest warrant was invalid. But they released Balandin already under Beria's NKVD.

Secondly, it follows from Yakovlev's story that Balandin was not beaten at the Lubyanka, only shaved bald, but that's understandable. But if so - for forty days not a single bruise, then it turns out that under Beria, in any case, there was no assault. But there was a war!

Thirdly... Thirdly,

this is what follows from this case... In Balandin, Dementyev and Yakovlev were sure and vouch for him. And Stalin (but Beria too!) to this guarantee believed, and Balandin was released. However, in the aviation industry not only Balandin was arrested. The same Tupolev with employees until July 19, 1941 worked formally still in custody.

So why didn't Yakovlev and Dementiev, and even People's Commissar Shakhurin himself, vouch for them?

Were you

afraid? And why weren't they afraid to ask for Balandin?

Was it necessary? Were others not

needed? Need! And the leadership of the People's Commissariat was not responsible for them. So it wasn't su total innocence of those arrested in the Tupolev case?

It would seem that the precedent created by the release of Balandin should have inspired Shakhurin's "team" to further petitions. But no feat ... So what claims can be presented to Beria? After all, unlike Shakhurin, Dementiev, Yakovlev and others industry leaders, workers in industries knew less or did not know at all. He was guided by operational materials, but they were not arrested out of the blue... But there was a war going on. But it was not for everyone ... And

I will tell the reader very interesting information about People's Commissar of Aviation Industry Shakhurin. And not only about him...

In the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the late thirties and forties he labored someone Konstantin Umansky ... The author of the book "Stalin's Secret Policy" G. Kostyrchenko considers him "an outstanding and at the same time a tragic personality" and, having distorted a lot, continues:

“An excellent connoisseur of the Russian avant-garde in painting, a friend of a journalist M. E. Koltsov, in the 30s he worked as a TASS correspondent in the countries Western Europe, then was sent to the NKID (for the first time he worked in the central apparatus of the NKID from August to October 1922. - **S.K.**), where occupied the position of the head (in the beginning - the deputy head. - **S.K.**) of the department seal, which E. A. Gnedin inherited after him (a figure even darker than Koltsov and Umansky himself. - **S.K.**). In 1939, Umansky was sent as an ambassador in the USA (in the beginning, from 1936 to 1938, he was an adviser to the embassy. - **S.K.**). And in critical days for the Soviet Union in November 1941, Umansky was recalled to Moscow...”

Umansky was replaced by Max Litvinov, who had a stronger position in the United States, although Umansky they were not bad. And until May 1943, this “friend of the journalist Koltsov” hung out as a member of the Collegium of the NKID, and in May he was appointed ambassador to Mexico (in January 1945 he died there in a plane crash).

Having said this, I will further quote the work of Kostyrchenko, which has the status of a serious monographs (and really abundant interesting factual material):

"... great grief entered the Umansky family (in May 1943. - **S.K.**). His daughter Nina, studying at a school for children of the highest nomenclature (Stalin's son Vasily studied at a regular school. - **S.K.**), became friends with Volodya Shakhurin, son people's commissar of the aviation industry, and a romantic relationship arose between them. a feeling that caused the tragic events that followed soon after. When ... it became known that Nina was leaving for Mexico ... the young people agreed on farewell meeting. During their meeting on the Stone Bridge, a stormy explanation, ending with the fact that the son of the People's Commissar, in a fit of despair from of the upcoming separation, he shot the girl first, and then mortally wounded myself..."

Dear reader! If someone is sorry for this newly-minted Romeo, then I'm about I can only shrug his antics. There was a hardest war ... Everything is honest and clean in the country strained its strength in order to be useful to the people in this war. Went to the front young girls, in Krasnodon, the peers of Shakhurin and Umanskaya, risked their lives, which by that time they had already martyred (January 15, 16 and 31, 1943, the Germans 71 people, partly alive, partly shot, were thrown into the pit of mine No. 5, 53 meters deep). And here is some overgrown blockhead ...

In short, the investigation began. It was led by the head of the investigative department of the Prosecutor's Office USSR Lev Sheinin (I draw your attention to the fact that at first the case was not conducted by the NKVD). And it was it was established that the Walther pistol, handed over to his son, served as the murder weapon Shakhurin by the son of Anastas Mikoyan - Vano.

The killer's mother, Shakhurin's wife S. M. Lurie, claimed that there was a provocation the Gestapo (who actually did not work behind the cordon. - **S.K.**).

And ... something related to the Third Reich, this story is really relevant had ... I will again directly refer to Kostyrchenko:

"According to the records of Volodya's diary discovered during the search Shakhurin, he and his friends from the families of A. I. Mikoyan, A. S. Alliluyeva, a surgeon A. N. Bakulev, American businessman A. Hammer (as in Kostyrchenko, p. 240, but this is hardly a mistake, Armand Hammer had a Russian wife. - **S.K.**) and others (I would like to know "others" too! - **S.K.**), having read borrowed from fathers "Mein Kampf" (Russian translation of the book was distributed at the direction of Stalin in a narrow circle of Soviet leaders), created the organization "Fourth empire" and secretly called themselves "Reichsführer" and "Gruppenführer". Of course, the state security agencies took up the investigation of these circumstances. (who then already, by the way, again left the subordination of Beria. - **S.K.**) ... "

The case was hushed up, and eight young men were deported from Moscow at the end of the investigation. How say representatives of the current "elite", already gravitating towards the Anglo-Saxons, - "no comments".

Here, of course, one could do without "comments". But I note that Shakhurin, perhaps because he did not intercede for the same Tupolev, because he did not have objective reason to believe in the loyalty of his own son to the Soviet government - so Shakhurin raised him. But was Shakhurin himself loyal to the Soviet government, I ask, if so? Loyal not to the state machine, in the "wheel" of which he was not the last "spoke", but in relation to the Soviet power as the power of the masses and *for the masses*?

I doubt this last one both about Shakhurin and about many other young "leaders" who came to the fore during the years of Soviet power and thanks to it. Kostyrchenko writes that, returning home from foreign trips, representatives of the new "worker-peasant" elite did not hide their admiration for "European chic", and this delight was passed on to their "Kremlin children" ...

Well, not for everyone, but for many it was. Beria's son at the beginning of the war, he graduated from intelligence school and participated in very delicate operations ... And his son Shakhurina played "fuhrer". But the apple falls not far from the apple tree, not from the birch. And by the fate of Beria's son can be judged by the personality of his father. As well as, perhaps, about the personality of Shakhurin the fate of *his* son. Alas,

the insides of many and from this - only emerging - "elite" somewhere began rot. And when someone was "taken", those who had a hidden weakness thought to themselves: "Maybe for the cause?" And instead of saying: "Yes, I answer for him with my head," they did the appearance that everything is going as it should, only in rare cases standing up for those who they were, firstly, desperately needed, and secondly, in whom they believed more than in

themselves. Konstantin Meretskoy, in his *memoirs*, presented the case in such a way that he, they say, on June 2, 1937, at an expanded meeting of the Military Council under People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, directly defended Uborevich before Stalin ... But if the dear reader gets acquainted with transcript of Meretskoy's speech at that council, he will see that Uborevich should have shoot already on the fact of his then assessment by Meretskoy. Uborevich, of course, is a conspirator... He should have been shot! He was shot... But why put on clean robes for dirty deeds? After all, when you compare memoirs Meretskoy and a transcript, the conclusion suggests itself: Meretskoy himself both times "took" for the case, but due to circumstances *spared*.

No, they weren't sure of themselves. And they demanded from Stalin, from Yezhov, from Beria, so that they believe in everyone, always and in everything ...

AMONG the large and small slander against Beria, there is also a certain slander about the plot "Beria - Sorge" - in the reference to Sorge, given in the biographical dictionary of K. Zalesky, it is stated: "Wife 3. - Ekaterina Alexandrovna Maksimova (1903–1943) 4.9.1942 By order of L.P. Beria, she was arrested and died in the camps "...

Only the date of Maksimova's arrest is accurate here. However, Elena Prudnikova in her book on Sorge documents that to the failure of Sorge, the arrest of Catherine - a year after arrest in Tokyo of her husband - had no relationship. Maksimova, who left for evacuation, was arrested according to the testimony of her relative Elena Haupt, who was arrested in May 1942. And Haupt hardly slandered Catherine, she just seemed suspicious of the way of life Maksimova, associated with the "incomprehensible foreigner". On

November 17, 1942, Maksimova was transferred to Moscow, and on March 13, 1943, Special meeting at the people's commissar sentenced her to 5 years of exile for connections suspicious of espionage. On May 15, she arrived (on her own) in the village of Bolshaya Murta, 120 kilometers from Krasnoyarsk, and on May 21 she wrote to her sister:

"Dear little sister! Here I am again enjoying the sky, air and full freedom"...

Maksimova began to work, judging by the future, in hazardous production, because that already on May 29, 1943, she was taken to the Murta hospital with extensive chemical burn and died on July 3. In the hospital, not in the camp ... And her sad

story, seemingly "fastened" by slanderers to the activities of Beria, is an extra drop, which reflects the life story of Beria himself, slandered both "big" and "little". Yes, the scoundrels have the audacity to pour dirt on Beria even during the war, when he was

the most active member of the GKO!

Colonel Souvenirs in his published by the decision of the Academic Council of the Institute military history of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Labor" writes:

"With the start of the war, things got to the point that they began to kill (n-yes. - **S.K.**) simply on the personal instructions of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Yes, in

In October 1941, Colonel-Generals A. D. Loktionov and Hero of the Soviet Union G. M. Stern, lieutenant generals of aviation F. K. Arzhenukhin, Heroes of the Soviet Union I. I. Proskurov and P. V. Rychagov, twice Hero Soviet Union Ya. V. Smushkevich, division engineer I. F. Sakrier, major generals P. S. Volodin, M. M. Kayukov, G. M. Savchenko, brig engineer S. O. Sklizkov "...

One could say "a few words" about almost every one of those shot. Actually, about I have already spoken to Smushkevich and Rychagov, but here I will add that I found vague information that Stalin, immediately before the war, entrusted Rychagov with a secret border inspection. If this is so, then the motives for the arrest become finally clear. Rychagov immediately after the start of the war - he gave Stalin false information. However, I will explain in detail the guilt of Major General Pavel Volodin ... On June 10, 1941, People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Order No. 0035, which began like this:

"On May 15, 1941, the German off-route aircraft Yu-52 completely was allowed to cross the state border without hindrance and committed flight across Soviet territory via Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk to Moscow. No measures have been taken to stop its flight by the air defense authorities. was..."

How do you like it, dear reader? And General Volodin ... However, I'd rather I will give the corresponding place in the order of NPO No. 0035:

"... Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Major General of Aviation Volodin and Deputy Chief of the 1st Department of the Air Force Headquarters, Major General of Aviation Grendal, knowing that the Yu-52 aircraft arbitrarily flew over the border, not only did not take measures to his detention, but also facilitated his flight to Moscow by allowing him to land on Moscow airfield and instructing the air defense service to ensure the flight ... "

Then Volodin was only reprimanded, but on June 27, 1941, he was arrested. After all, the situation on June 10 and June 27 differed like heaven and earth. However, Volodin and the rest were shot on the hardest day of October 27, 1941, not for "personal instructions" of Beria, and by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which received after the beginning of the war the right to sentence as an emergency measure to capital punishment. By the way, immediately after the war, Beria raised the issue of abolishing such a right, but was not supported in that.

POSSIBLE, the reader noticed that I, having told about some side of the activity Beria during the war, then, after some time, I return to it again, but differently it's just impossible ... Beria during the war looks like a real Figaro - he managed to do everything and everywhere. So, once again rereading this chapter, I suddenly discovered that I had not said anything about Beria as about a member of a special group of employees created on March 13, 1942 by decision of the State Defense Committee People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) and the Central Directorate of Military Communications General Staff (UPVOSO) headed by Kaganovich, Malenkov and Beria.

The former head of the UPVOSO, later - People's Commissar I.V. Kovalev, wrote about this in Pravda on April 15, 1982:

"On the night of February 14, I was invited to a joint meeting of the GKO and Politburo ... I expressed the opinion of the UPVOSO about the imperfection of management transport system and proposed the creation of the Transport Committee under the State Defense Committee - a single governing body for all types of transport by rail, road and air transport and river transport ...

It was a big event. Transport Committee, which included four

member of the Politburo, was able to mobilize all the resources of the transport system, eliminated the disorder in the use of all modes of transport, provided them interaction".

Three members of the Politburo, not named then by Kovalev, are named above by me. What's up the fourth term, then Stalin himself was meant, who was the first to support the proposal Kovalev and agreed purely formally, "for the authority" of the TC, to take on the title of his chairman. But practically here, at least a third of the load was pulled by the same Beria. AND for this reason, not only vile, but simply ridiculous, the stories about his military love affairs. Not only was he not a womanizer by nature (remember how he got on Serov, who was on a spree with the Polish prima donna), he did not have all this time!

Marshal Yakovlev recalled how dissatisfied Stalin was even in 1943 (!) Poskrebyshev could not find the head of the GAU for "full" forty minutes, because Voroshilov first took him to TsAGI, and then dragged him to his apartment in the Kremlin to have lunch, and Yakovlev was absent from the GAU somewhere from noon to six o'clock in the evening. But on Yakovlev had only GAU! And Stalin needed him much less often than Beria!

Yes, Beria was something like Figaro, but without Rosina as entertainment. But He was constantly satisfied with his work. There is

such a thing - "Hamburg account". It traces its history from absolutely closed world wrestling championships, which were periodically held at the beginning of the 20th century circus wrestlers, having rented a circus in Hamburg for this. The wrestlers' entrepreneurs lined them up ratings in a way that was beneficial for circus commerce, so often the strongest forced to lose to the weakest. However, the carpet masters also wanted to know the real the strength of each. So they fought in an empty circus - no fools. And the professionals only the "Hamburg" champion was valued.

So, if you build a "Hamburg rating" of personal merits in the Great Patriotic War, then the absolute "champion" is obvious - this is Joseph Stalin. But the second step must be given to Lavrenty Beria!

I have already said that the cultural bureaucrats of the Party recommended cutting razor from the fifth volume of the TSB article about Lavrenty Pavlovich himself. But too much meant Beria in the USSR until June 26, 1953, and he did too much for the country before this date, so that like this - with a wave of a razor - to remove it, if not from the official history, then from all volumes of the TSB published before June 26, 1953. Therefore, in volume 12, signed in printed May 28, 1952, on page 318 in the article "State Defense Committee" *and after June 26, 1953*, one could read in any library of the Union:

"The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 30, 1943 noted the special merits of the members of the GOKO in strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition and supply of the army in difficult wartime conditions: in the field production of tanks - Deputy Chairman of the GOKO V. M. Molotov; V in the field of production of weapons and ammunition - GOKO member L.P. Beria; V in the field of production of aircraft and engines for them - G. M. Malenkov, member of the GOKO; in the field of setting up the matter of supplying the Soviet Army with food, fuel and clothing allowances - a member of the GOKO A. I. Mikoyan. By this decree they awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

As we know (from completely "democratic" sources), Beria also oversaw production of tanks, aircraft and engines. But he received the Star of the Hero only for weapons and ammunition, although Lavrenty Pavlovich every now and then had to insure both the official "aviator" Malenkov, and - especially - the "tanker" Molotov, whom he quickly replaced even officially. In the biographical encyclopedic dictionary of Konstantin Zalessky about Molotov

it is said that he "during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was the deputy. prev. State Defense Committee - the second person after Stalin. But is it was it really? Until the death of Kalinin in 1946, he was the formal head of the USSR, and after his death - Shvernik. This is how *formally the second* was Molotov in the State Defense Committee from the very beginning of the war, if we have in mind the specific daily work of organizing the work economy.

But in reality, Beria was already the second, becoming from May 1944 the second person after Stalin even officially. Even

Zalessky (who hates Beria, as befits a liberal) reports that *"according to the GKO line, B. was entrusted with control over the production of weapons, ammunition and mortars, as well as (together with G. M. Malenkov) for the production of aircraft and aircraft engines* . About Molotov, the same Zalessky writes that in the State Defense Committee "his duties included, first of all, negotiations with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. And

who controlled the production of tanks? That's it!

To admit that control over the production of tanks was on Beria, this it would be too much for Zalessky! But it is no coincidence that in the leadership of that uranium the problem that Beria oversaw turned out to be so many former "tankers"! V. M. Malyshev, N. L. Dukhov, B. G. Muzrukov - Beria knew all of them and many others from joint affairs in tank building. And here is

how in 1995 in the collective monograph "The Creation of the First Soviet nuclear bomb ", Beria was evaluated by academician Petrosyants, who knew him in a business way since the war

"... Being by nature a very smart person, with a good technical acumen (in his youth he graduated from the mechanical and construction technical school, was fond of architecture), he became in the pre-war and war years the largest organizer of military equipment. Supervising on behalf of Stalin military industries during the war years, leading the relevant people's commissariats, he managed to organize the production of many thousands of tanks, self-propelled gun mounts, many millions of ammunition, shells, provided in the rear uninterrupted operation of metallurgy - ferrous and non-ferrous, etc.

Among all members of the Politburo ... and other top leaders of the country Beria turned out to be the most prepared in matters of technical policy and technology. I knew all this not by hearsay, but from personal contacts with him in many ways. technical issues related to tank-building and nuclear topics "...

To understand the weight of this opinion, one must know who the person who expressed it was. Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants in 1933 after graduating from the Ural Polytechnic Institute began as an ordinary engineer at the Ural plant of heavy engineering them. S. Ordzhonikidze and quickly rose to the position of chief engineer. In 1939, he was appointed a member of the board and deputy people's commissar of heavy engineering, and since 1940 - the first deputy people's commissar of the machine-tool industry. WITH October 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of the tank industry. And since 1943

Major General of the Tank Engineering Service Petrosyants worked in the State Defense Committee of the USSR - according to the same tank line. Looking ahead, I will say that at the end of 1946, Beria took him to uranium problem - Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate, and Petrosyants became one of the major figures in the rapidly emerging nuclear technology, later - the Hero of Socialist Labor, an academician. Alas, dear reader, I have not yet

given the entire characterization given to Beria Petrosyants, and only now I will fill this gap. Petrosyants began his story about Lavrenty Pavlovich like this:

"L. P. Beria since 1938 headed the NKVD of the USSR, before that he worked in the bodies

Cheka and NKVD of Azerbaijan and Georgia. These departments under the leadership of Beria carried out mass arrests and executions, brutal eviction operations indigenous people of Ingushetia, Chechnya, Ossetia, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and others nationalities in the remote steppes of Kazakhstan, Central Asia. During the war with Hitler's Germany, Beria created SMERSH and barrage detachments, which brought death to many people. But Beria, the punisher and organizer of mass arrests, had something else. face. By nature..."

and so on in the text above. I don't know about the reader, but as I reread the lines I've just quoted, I smiled, although there was nothing funny about that. Personally, Petrosyants knew only one face of Beria - a brilliant organizer, able to work and able to create conditions for work, selfless, seven-core (if you calculate his duties only according to the list

Petrosyants) a Bolshevik who gives all his strength for the victory of the country. That other, the "face" of the alleged punisher, Petrosyants **personally** could not be known, he never with those situations that he writes about as negative for Beria's assessment, **personally** encountered. He even misrepresents the pre-war biography of Beria and condemns Beria from **strangers** words.

Alas, this, as the reader has already seen repeatedly, is repeated over and over again: quite positive **personal** impressions that adequately characterize Beria, and right there - an uncritical perception of his negative image, imposed **from the outside**.

MY STORY about Beria of the war years is coming to an end. However, there is something else I should say... On

May 9, 1945, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders ended. And now it was possible to compare the progress and results of the two world wars that fell to the lot of Russia. First, let's look

at the First World War, in which the old Russia participated. AND that's what happens ...

Tsarist Russia - according to the assurances of the "democrats" - was not a country, but spread-raspberries! AND there was a "sovereign" "by the grace of God", and statesmen ... One Peter Arkadyevich Stolypin was worth something! As the white pique vests from the famed cafe would say "Florida" in the unforgettable Ilfo-Petrovsky Chernomorsk: "This is the head!"

Yes, and soldiers - brave kids, and big-faced "patriots" - thorny merchants of the hunters - were there. And the guardian of the Russian land was - St. John Kronstadt, unsurpassed Chrysostom.

There were also others, and others, and others ...

This Russia began a war with Germany, which immediately outgrew (as planned "Golden International") into the world war, of their own free will. At first even badly patted the "German" in East Prussia. The top

leadership, including the emperor, did not experience psychological shock from the start of the war. experienced, because there was nothing unexpected in what was happening - Russia was even the first mobilized! The industry of

Russia that started the war had every opportunity to work without interruptions in full force - for the entire war, not a single German or Austro-Hungarian bomb or the projectile did not fall on any of the strategically important industrial or military objects of Russia. And all of them remained intact **throughout the war**. Completely - the whole war - is preserved (for small losses in Poland) - in general, the entire economic potential of Russia.

And from the very beginning of the war, the Germans are forced to fight on two fronts, because from the very beginning **that Russia had powerful allies** during the war.

And then...

And only then - when the war developed further, Russia stomped on its borders, gradually surrendering its own, albeit marginal, but still - its territory!

Warsaw ...

Riga ...

And it fell apart more and more, fit more and more (as the Golden International") into external debts. And more and more there were not enough rifles, shells (although sometimes and argue otherwise), there were not enough resources.

And most importantly, they lacked that morale, which, according to Napoleon's accurate assessment, correlates with the material factor as three to one. During the years *of that* war there was no not a single significant work of art has been created - only "anyanyas in champagne, anyanyas in champagne" ... The Rylov geese, rustling over the Russian North with their wings: "What space!" not counting - they were already flying to the future new Russia. And in the end, the tsarist Russia of Nicholas II - as a result of the war - collapsed! Shameful and disgraceful! And what about Soviet Russia? How about Stalin's USSR? According to the same "democrats" and eternally dissatisfied with something Russian "intellectuals", it was not country, but a gloomy concentration camp, which was ruled, having intimidated the people before that, by the two main "executioners" - Stalin and Beria.

Talented people were in this prison country in the corral, and they were sent in batches to Kolyma.

The mediocre party and Soviet workers (that is, the authorities) the masses hated. Well, and so on ...

And now the insidious and strong enemy inflicts on this "colossus with feet of clay" a powerful, previously unprecedented in history - in terms of territorial and material scope - a military blow. The front is falling apart, entire formations are being captured. The enemy is fast occupies thousands of square kilometers of the country. Many government officials shamefully flee to the east, leaving everything to the mercy of fate. In some places the Germans they meet with bread and salt ...

"Tyrant" Stalin and his "satraps" are on the verge of collapse. Control is lost. Help small from the outside, no active allies, no second front. Much of the country occupied, part under bombardment... Even the capital is bombed, and the second capital gets into

blockade. Thousands of the most important industrial enterprises have either been lost due to the occupation, or destroyed, or evacuated to the east. Coal production fell from 165.9 million tons in 1941 to 75.5 million tons in 1942. Steel smelting - from almost 15 million tons in 1940 to 4.8 million tons in the same 1942, pig iron - from 18 million tons to 8 ...

And then ...

And only then, when the war developed further, Russia powerfully went forward, taking back at first spans, crumbs, and then ... And then reaching the "Europe"!

This, new, Soviet Russia was able during the war to recreate such a powerful economy, which gave the army tens of thousands of tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, hundreds of thousands of aircraft, artillery pieces!

And what tanks!

What guns! This

Russia has become a single military camp. Not in words, but in deeds, she lived with the call: "Everything for the front, everything for the Victory!" This Russia created in the course of the war outstanding works of art: symphonies and truly folk songs, novels and stories, poems and

plays...

This Russia even built new metro lines and stations! And what stations! And, in the

end, she defeated the enemy, came to Berlin, casting a medal from military bronze and for its capture, and for the capture of Budapest and Vienna, and for the liberation of Warsaw, Prague,

Belgrade ...

As a result of this World War II, which became the second Patriotic War for Russia, Russia finally took shape as a great superpower. What glory! What a result! And what a contrast compared with the results of that first, "tsarist" war.

WHY? How? For what? And under whose direction? In 1944, in the Urals, to that party organization, of which Boris Glebovich was a member Muzrukov, an application for admission to the CPSU (b) was received from the 74-year-old Academician Paton. Here is what he wrote:

"When the Soviet government took control of our country into its own hands, I was already 47 years old. Having worked for many years in the conditions of the capitalist system, I learned his worldview... I considered the undertakings of the new government unviable... When I got acquainted with the plan of the first five-year plan, I did not see its implementation. Time passed, work on the Dneprostroy began, which did not was not given to the former authorities. I began to realize my mistake as new construction projects were being carried out ... My worldview was changing more and more. I became understand that what brings me closer to Soviet power is that labor, which is the basis of my life, the Soviet government puts above all. I made sure of this fact ... The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War was a brilliant confirmation of the power and resilience of the Soviet system. Before my eyes the last two wars have passed - the Japanese and the imperialist. I had the opportunity to compare the situation then with what is happening now, during Patriotic War. I am amazed by the endurance and heroism with which the Soviet the people are fighting on the fronts and in the rear under the firm leadership of the Party and Soviet government...

But an assessment from the outside ... Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin was an enemy, but an enemy smart and experienced: fought in Poland, France, the Balkans, Africa, on the Eastern Front, and then again in France, in the Ardennes and in Germany itself ... He ended the war as the head headquarters of the 5th Panzer Army in the Ruhr pocket. In 1956, his book "Panzer battles - 1939-1945", published in our country in 1957 ("Tank battles. 1939-1945"), was published in London. Chapter XIX of his memoirs is called "The Red Army", and below I will give excerpts from it. So, a hereditary German officer, Wehrmacht General F.V. von Mellenthin:

"The Russian soldier loves his 'mother Russia' and that is why he fights for communist regime, although, generally speaking, it is not political fanatic. However, it should be borne in mind that the Party and its organs have in the Red Army huge influence. Almost all commissars are city dwellers and people from the working class. Their courage borders on recklessness; it's people very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it what was lacking in the First World War was iron discipline. <...> Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. She also was a decisive factor in achieving huge political and military Stalin's success. <...> The

industrialization of the Soviet Union, pursued persistently and mercilessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number highly qualified specialists. <...> ... during the war, the

Russians were constantly improving, and their higher commanders and headquarters received a lot of useful things by studying the experience of military operations their troops and the German army. They have learned to respond quickly to any changes in the situation, act vigorously and decisively <...>

... the Russian, in general, is certainly an excellent soldier, and with skillful leadership is a dangerous adversary

<...> The skillful and persistent work of the communists led to the fact that with In 1917, Russia changed in the most amazing way. Can't be there is no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent actions, and the level of his education is constantly growing.

Russian divisions <...> attacked, as a rule, on a narrow front <...> They appeared as if from under the ground, and it seemed impossible to contain an impending avalanche. <...> Only battle-hardened soldiers were in able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone. <...> After 1941, masses of tanks were added to the masses of Russians. Repel such attacks was, of course, much more difficult, and it cost a lot more nervous voltage. <...> My

remarks <...> concerned <...> actions of the Russian infantry, which during the Second World War fully preserved the great traditions Suvorov and Skobelev. <...> Russian artillery, like infantry, also used massively. <...> During the war, the Russians improved and developed artillery tactics in the offensive. Their artillery preparation turned into a genuine flurry of destructive fire. <...> Russian artillery is a very formidable branch of the army and fully deserves that the high appraisal given to her by Stalin. <...>

The extraordinary development of the Russian armored forces deserves the most close attention from those who study the experience of war. None doubts that Russia can have its own Seydlitz, Murat or Rommel - in In 1941-1945, the Russians certainly had such great commanders. <...> Tankers of the Red Army were tempered in the crucible of war, their skill increased immeasurably. Such a transformation would require exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and guides"...

A military man himself, General Mellenthin praised the purely military leadership USSR: "The Russian high command knows its business better than the command of any other army. But knowing what we know, we can add: "Knows thanks to political leadership, which formed during the war and before it a competent the potential of such a command!

Other evidence can be cited, but I will limit myself to confessions. the famous German aircraft entrepreneur and designer Heinkel. aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev wrote that the fulfillment of Soviet orders in the early 30s forced the German sharply improve technological discipline and methods of factory control. *"I thought,"* Heinkel was surprised, *"that I have an excellent factory, but the Bolsheviks work better."*

Russian "democrats" put candles in front of the images of the "innocently murdered Bolshevik villains" of "Saint" Nicholas II ... But the greatness of the state was provided era of Stalin.

And it is the era of Beria.

And it provided not at the expense of detachments and fear, but at the expense of constructive, creative forces of the people, headed by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin and his deputy L. P. Beria, about whom in all post-war publications history of the Great Patriotic War, if a couple of words were said, then only slanderous and abusive.

Chapter 17

THE FOUNDER OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

AUGUST 21, 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks on the outskirts of Washington, in a three-story

in a mansion built in 1802 and owned by Harvard University, a conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain opened. task

The conference was to develop the foundations of the future United Nations.

Usually the ancient building was filled with students who studied ancient and Byzantine art, and now three delegations have occupied it for more than a month, along with a technical staff numbering more than seven dozen people - for a representative there are not so many international conferences ...

Opening the conference, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that the preservation of peace and security in the future is the main goal of the international cooperation.

Almost six months earlier, in March 1944, at the Los Alamos National laboratories under the Manhattan Project began full-scale planning the first US atomic bomb test, codenamed "Trinity" - "Trinity". And during the conference in Dumbarton Oaks, members of the Military Technical committee in charge of the Manhattan Project, V. Bush and D. Conant in a memorandum addressed to Minister of War G. Stimson proposed to include the Soviet Union in the control system over nuclear weapons that have not yet been created "in order to avoid an undesirable complication relations." This proposal was rejected, having, in fact, no chance of Adoption. Effective control could be realized only in two cases: either under controlled general renunciation of these weapons, or controlled production both in the USA and in the USSR, and with a pre-agreed mutual minimizing future nuclear arsenals. America was satisfied only with a monopoly, and it walked towards her very quickly. Well, when there is money, everything (or *almost* everything) is decided fast. So

far, the atomic bomb was, however, the "skin" not only of the unkillable, but in general problematic bear. Nevertheless, the question turned out to be potentially so serious that even in the Soviet Union, which is waging the most difficult war, atomic work is already unfolded, although so far their scale was forced to be compared with the "Manhattan" and small.

But the work was carried on, carried out quite consciously, and just on the closing day of the conference in Dumbarton Oaks - September 28 - Exactly two years have passed since the adoption of GKO order No. 2352ss of September 28, 1942 "On the organization of work on uranium". Then everything still did not leave the stage of the first (and not very intelligible) organizing documents, and everything revolved around Molotov. And Vyacheslav Mikhailovich the organizer of technical projects has proven itself not from the best side - tankers from it has already been abandoned in favor of Beria, and the atomic scientists - I will say this, looking ahead - it was necessary to refuse it ...

And also - in favor of Beria!

On February 11, 1943, the next GKO order No. GOKO-2872ss was adopted,

starting and ending like this:

"In order to more successfully develop work on uranium: 1. Assign to vols.

Pervukhina M. G. (then - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar chemical industry. - **S.K.**) and Kaftanov SV. (Chairman of the Committee for higher education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and authorized by the GKO for science. - **S.K.**) duty to supervise the uranium work on a day-to-day basis and to provide systematic assistance to the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The scientific management of work on uranium shall be entrusted to Professor Kurchatova I.V. <...>

11. To oblige the head of the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus (Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. - **S.K.**) prof. Kurchatova I. V. to carry out the necessary research by July 1, 1943 and submit to the State Defense Committee by July 5, 1943 report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium

fuel.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee
V. Molotov.

I don't know why Molotov was called someone he never was (permanent Stalin was the chairman of the GKO), but this is how it is in the document.

Yes, the best way to understand an era is to read its documents. And if we turn to them, then immediately collapses, for example, one of the long-standing and stable "atomic" fictions: they say that Stalin did not understand the significance of the atomic problem even after he was at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945 was "enlightened" by US President Truman.

After acquaintance with the now declassified Soviet documents **of 1939 (thirty ninth) - 1944**, only the following can cause a smile, for example, a place in "Memoirs and Reflections" of Marshal Zhukov:

"I don't remember exactly what date (it was July 24, 1945, 8 days after tests of the first bomb at the Alamogordo test site (New Mexico) on July 16. - **S.K.**) ... Truman informed I.V. Stalin about the presence of a bomb in the United States unusually large force, without calling it an atomic weapon. At the time of this information, as they later wrote abroad, W. Churchill dug into the face of I. V. Stalin, watching his reaction. But he did not give anything their feelings ... Like Churchill, and many other Anglo-American authors it was believed that, probably, Stalin ... did not understand the meaning of the message made to him. In fact ... I. V. Stalin, in my presence, told V. M. Molotov about the conversation with Truman. V. M. Molotov immediately said:
- They inflate their own value. JV Stalin laughed:
"Let them stuff them." It will be necessary to talk with Kurchatov about acceleration our work. I realized that it was about the atomic bomb ... "

I don't know if Zhukov really understood anything then, because the information according to our atomic work, he was not allowed even close at that time. And the surname Kurchatov Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov hardly said anything then. But apart from the marshal Zhukov, there was another Marshal of the Soviet Union in Potsdam, and although he is in his memoirs Zhukov will not be remembered, the name Kurchatov was familiar to him. Moreover, this marshal was familiar with the professor (in fact, by that time already an academician) Kurchatov is not the first year. And less than a month after the end of the Potsdam Conference, they will begin to work together - closely and fruitfully.

This Marshal of the Soviet Union was Beria, who was responsible for the protection of the Soviet delegations. However, in a letter from his cell in 1953, Beria reminded Molotov that although he was in Potsdam "by the nature of his work", Molotov suggested that Beria directly enter into members of the delegation.

In any case, even without formally being a delegate, Beria remained deputy GKO Chairman. However, this is not even why Stalin could not immediately inform Beria about Truman information. He simply had to do this, because on December 3, 1944, he himself approved GKO Decree No. 7069ss, the final paragraph of which read:

"Assign Comrade L.P. Beria to supervise the development of work on uranium."

If we recall that at first these duties were assigned to Pervukhin and Kaftanov and that the name Molotov appeared in the first documents of the GKO (GOKO), it will become clear that the war had not yet ended, and Beria had already been prepared for a new and still "that" job, which others did not pull very well even at the initial stage of the development of the problem. To what has been said looked more convincing to me, I will give extracts from one memorandum and one

letters.

On May 19, 1944, Kurchatov wrote a note addressed to Stalin "On the status of work on problem of uranium on May 20, 1944", where there were such words:

"The attention and help that was invariably given to Laboratory No. 2 Comrade. V. M. Molotov, direct and daily management of her the activities of comrade M. G. Pervukhin, support from comrade. S. V. Kaftanova helped ... the laboratory to overcome difficulties, get stronger, start working and get a number of important results ... "

Tov. M. G. Pervukhin on the same day sent a note from Kurchatov to Stalin with in his own letter, where in the fifth paragraph he proposes:

"...5. Establish a Uranium Council under the GFCS for day-to-day control and assistance in carrying out work on uranium approximately in the following composition: 1) Comrade L.P. Beria (chairman of the council); 2) comrade V. M. Molotov; 3) comrade Pervukhin M. G. (deputy chairman); 4) Academician Kurchatov I. V. ... "

In the light of paragraph 5 of Pervukhin's letter, Kurchatov's curtsy towards Molotov looked like just an act of courtesy towards an outwardly imperturbable, and in reality to quite touchy Molotov. But on the eve of a great work, those who it was necessary to deal with its organization and leadership in practice, they preferred to have deal with the most powerful manager of the state - Beria. For the matter of the state is still leading the war, an unprecedentedly difficult task lay ahead, and Russia, like the Yankees, had no money for it so much.

But before starting the topic of Beria in the uranium problem, I will finish the topic of Marshal Beria. On July 9, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Did Lavrenty Pavlovich deserve it? rank?

To correctly answer this question, let us first ask ourselves another question: "A did the aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev, who had never been at the front for a single day, deserve the rank of colonel general? Or the designer of heavy tanks Leonid Dukhov - title major general, albeit an engineering tank service? .. " Beria's

contribution to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was huge, truly marshal. And he risked his head (in war as in war) no less than any of the front marshals. So his marshal rank he received, perhaps, by right. After all, he participated in such a war, where the rear was the front, where victory was ensured only by the tension of all the forces of the state, brought together without dividing into purely military and purely economic.

But in general, these are, so to speak, emotions ... And if you stick to dry facts, then Lavrenty Pavlovich received the title of Marshal for the reason that by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 6, 1945, special ranks for commanding staff of the NKVD-NKGB, introduced on October 7, 1937, bringing them to combined arms. The highest special rank of the General Commissar of Security of the USSR was reasonably equated at one time with the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. And only Beria was the General Commissar of Security. Someone about "Lubyansk Marshal" ironically, but after all, Stalin did not spend a single day at the front, and He deserved the title of Generalissimo without a doubt.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov - commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, became an army general, commissars of the State Security Service of the 2nd rank Abakumov, Kruglov, Serov, Kobulov, Chernyshev, Goglidze, Pavlov - colonel generals, etc.

HOWEVER, almost immediately after the end of the war - not even six months had passed, the essence and

the nature of the state activities of Marshal Beria changed dramatically - he became the main curator of the uranium problem, and in fact - the founder of our nuclear industries. And that's why his contribution to a new business for the country was also outstanding.

Although ... Although by the summer of 1945, not so much, I repeat, "atomic" cases were *new* for both many Soviet people, and personally for L.P. Beria. Firstly, already in the thirties the USSR had a good domestic material base of nuclear physics and good personnel, quite adequately looking at nuclear prospects humanity. On December 31, 1940, Izvestia published an article with a significant named "Uranium-235".

True, the physicist Pyotr Kapitsa, in a conversation with the active writers of the magazine "Children's literature", published in the April issue of the journal for 1940, in response to the question: "Is it not possible to expect anything from the development of chain reactions?", answered: "If such the reaction happened, it could not stop and the Earth would not exist ... "However Kapitsa - for all his talent - was more ambitious than brilliant, and through five years, the fallacy of his point of view will be revealed after the implementation of an explosive chain reactions on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo.

Not on Kapitsa, however, physics converged, and in 1940 the Uranium Commission under the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The memorandum of Academicians Vernadsky, Fersman and Khlopin addressed to Bulganin dated July 12, 1940 stated:

"Works on the physics of the atomic nucleus led ... to the discovery of the fission of atoms element of uranium ... which releases a huge amount of intra-atomic energy ... If the question of the technical use of intra-atomic energy will be resolved in a positive sense, then this should radically change the whole applied energy.

However, on August 8 and 9, 1945, "a huge amount of intra-atomic energy" incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And this fact determined Russia's "nuclear" priorities for many years to come.

And HERE now, perhaps, you can go to the "atomic" line in the life of Beria, Starting during the war years, it, no longer interrupted, continued literally until his last day stay at the heights of the highest state power.

This line began, as one might expect, in her Chekist, intelligence aspect. And one of the first tasks for "atomic" reconnaissance was set in the operational letter No. 1 of the 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR to the deputy resident of the New York residence Hayk Hovakimyan before the war - January 27, 1941. Letter to Gennady Hovakimyan was signed by Viktor (the operational pseudonym of the head of foreign intelligence Pavel Fitin), but this task was sanctioned, of course, by Pavel, that is, Beria, because the letter to New York went, although shortly before the division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB, but still before this separation. So what about the possibility of obtaining a "new substance with enormous energy, exceeding the energy of coal several million times" (as it was said in a letter), Beria knew at least from the beginning of 1941, even before the war.

With the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB after it began, intelligence issues again entered the sphere Beria's responsibility. The Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow, but the flow of reconnaissance information did not stop even when Beria was not very much up to him. Yes, a note. Head of the 4th Special Department (Special Technical Bureau) of the NKVD of the USSR V. Kravchenko, People's Commissar L.P. Beria on the work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes abroad and the need to organize this work in the USSR is dated October 10, 1941. It started like this:

"Sent from England owls. British secret material

governments concerning the work of English scientists in the field of use of atomic energy of uranium for military purposes, contain two reports of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the British Defense Committee on the question of atomic uranium energy...

Judging by these materials, great attention is paid in England to the problem of use of uranium atomic energy for military purposes ... "

And even then Kravchenko proposed "creating a special commission under the State Defense Committee of the USSR from number of prominent scientists of the USSR ... who should be instructed to present considerations on the possibility of carrying out in the USSR work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

However, the official letter of the NKVD of the USSR to the State Defense Committee addressed to Stalin and Molotov No. 1720 / b Beria sent only October 6, 1942 - almost a year after the preparation of the first draft letter based on Kravchenko's note.

Some delay in Beria's information compared to the date of adoption of GKO resolutions (September 28, 1942) on the resumption of work on uranium essential cannot be recognized. The decision of the GKO was due to the understanding of the problem by the Soviet physicists, and Beria's letter - information about the understanding of the problem by foreign physicists. Moreover, Beria instructed to conduct an "internal" examination of intelligence materials by the NKVD specialists, which was not superfluous. The materials could be misinformation (say, academician Kapitsa would appreciate them, very likely, precisely so), and before the report, Stalin had to carefully weigh everything. Beria's

letter was accompanied by a highly informative certificate from the 1st Directorate of the NKVD USSR "The use of uranium as a source of energy and as an explosive." And further intelligence materials received from the Commissariat of Beria on behalf of Molotov analyzed Kurchatov. On November 27, 1942, at the conclusion of his memorandum addressed to Molotov, he wrote:

"1. In research into the problem of uranium, Soviet science lagged far behind science of England and America and has at the present time an incomparably smaller material base for the production of experimental work. 6. To guide this intricate and enormous task it seems necessary to establish under the State Defense Committee of the USSR under your presided over by a special committee..."

At the same time, for the first time at the highest state level, the names of professors appeared. Alikhanov, Khariton, Zeldovich, Kikoin, Aleksandrov and Shalnikov...

The next day, November 28, Molotov addressed Kurchatov's note to Stalin. The "chain reaction" of state work on the uranium problem began, although before the establishment of the Special Committee proposed by Kurchatov already at that time should have been taken almost three years.

In 1943, the NKGB was separated from the NKVD, and Beria from operational information on atomic affairs is temporarily receding ... Nevertheless, the matter was advancing - although not shaky or roll. In 1943-1944, the rate of receipt of intelligence materials from behind the cordon was perhaps even faster than our own work on uranium.

Head of Laboratory No. 2 Professor Kurchatov wrote reviews on intelligence materials, wrote memos to Pervukhin, but before breakthrough action was far away, and the reason was, I think, not only wartime. Just this the problem was dealt with so far by managers, although experienced (the same Pervukhin), but to the level problems are not up to par. And at the end of 1943, on December 22, Kurchatov sent Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry of the USSR M. G. Pervukhin another note about the failure of the departments to comply with the "uranium" resolutions of the GKO. Yes, the

problem was still waiting for its Manager... And the events in the world were developing, and

the formidable beginning of the atomic era was already at hand.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union, in pursuance of the decisions taken before the Allies obligations declared war on Japan. On the same August 8, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the next day - to Nagasaki. September 2,

1945, representatives of the Japanese high command on board US battleship Missouri signed an act of unconditional surrender.

Ninety-one years earlier, in 1854, Commodore Perry under the ship guns "revealed" Japan, which had been in self-isolation for almost three hundred years. Perry was the first Yankee to dictate "the will of the white man" to the Japanese. And now General MacArthur ordered that Perry's flagship be delivered to the Missouri, and, placed in a glass case and installed in a conspicuous place, this flag was again showed Japan its place. The Yankees love the symbolism that is associated with pleasant things for them. memories.

Two days later, on September 4, 1945, the State Committee was abolished. Defense. December 29, 1945 Beria by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces was released from duties of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. January 10, 1946 he and the new people's commissar Kruglov signed an act of acceptance and delivery of cases on the people's commissariat, and on January 15 in the Izvestia newspaper in In the Chronicle section, several lines appeared:

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR t. L. P. Beria on his release from duties People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to the congestion of his other central work. Comrade S. N. Kruglov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Nothing was reported about the essence of the other "central work", and there could be nothing reported because the Resolution of the GOKO dated August 20, 1945 No. 9887ss / op "On Special Committee under the GOKO" was stamped "Top Secret (Special Folder)". AND This resolution created a Special Committee with emergency powers to solutions to any problems of the "Uranium Project".

It consisted of: L.P. Beria - chairman; G. M. Malenkov - Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU; N. A. Voznesensky - Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR; B. L. Vannikov - People's Commissar ammunition; A. P. Zavenyagin - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, head of the 9th management of the NKVD; I. V. Kurchatov, Head of Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, academician, scientific adviser of the problem; P. L. Kapitsa - Academician, Director of the Institute physical problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; M. A. Makhnev - Secretary of the Special Committee; M. G. Pervukhin - People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry of the USSR.

Molotov, as we see, did not figure here in any capacity. Yes, and in what capacity could he be featured here in a *businesslike* manner? For

"direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and industrial enterprises on the use

intraatomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs "was organized by the First the main department under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, subordinate to the Special Committee. Became the head of PSU Vannikov, who was released from the duties of the People's Commissar of Ammunition, and his deputies: A. P. Zavenyagin (first deputy), N. A. Borisov (from the State Planning Committee of the USSR), P. Ya. Meshik (ensuring secrecy), P. Ya. Antropov (exploration and development of uranium deposits ore) and A. G. Kasatkin (deputy people's commissar of the chemical industry).

Perhaps the reader will find the name N. A. Borisov familiar. Yes it was the one Borisov himself from the group under the GKO member A.P. Beria, which during the war provided current management of the production of weapons and ammunition. Now Deputy Gosplan of the USSR, Borisov actually transferred to PGU. And Beria took him to him - he knew how appreciate professionals, and since he has already received the right to take anyone into the Special Committee system, then he chose not just the best, but those of the best who were tested in practice by himself.

Vannikov, Zavenyagin and, of course, Meshik and Makhnev were involved in nuclear

Affairs, too, Beria.

Paragraph VII of the protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Special Committee of September 28, 1945 it was also planned to organize, as part of the Special Committee, a certain Bureau No. 2 with subordination directly to Beria. The functions of this Bureau were already visible from the one who led. The deputy head of foreign intelligence has become the head of the Bureau, it's good for us acquaintance Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, and his deputies N. S. Sazykin, N. I. Eitingon and A. P. Vasilevsky. These were also old employees of Beria, and their attraction, too, was, of course, not accidental - everyone had more than serious.

Such an attitude towards personnel proved better than any verbal assurances that Beria remembered and respected those who knew how and wanted to work. And the one who is able to understand the importance for the success of the "human factor" cannot treat others with disdain. AND already by this criterion, we can confidently dismiss the stories of even "eyewitnesses" about supposedly rudeness of Beria, especially since, upon closer examination, such stories turn out to be or retellings, or clearly embellished with "artistic" details in the spirit of political correctness, both partocratic and anti-Soviet.

Sometimes, however, we are dealing with a desire to somehow embellish our own role. There are, say, supposedly Vannikov's recollections that allegedly on the eve of the adoption decision of the GKO on the formation of the Special Committee, he was summoned by Stalin - to consult on whether to agree with Beria's proposal to close the leadership of the Atomic Project to NKVD. Vannikov allegedly cautiously expressed doubts about the expediency such an option, and Stalin listened to the advice, coming to the idea of "party control" over the project.

Such a style of making decisions was, I must say, not typical for Stalin, yes and Vannikov for Stalin was a figure not of the level to consult with him, and even on "atomic" matters, about which Vannikov then hardly had a clear idea. At a careful look at the "reliable evidence" turns out that the son of Vannikov, who died in 1962, passed these "memories" to a certain V. A. Baranov, and then they were uncritically reproduced in the book *The End of the Atomic Monopoly. How it was...*, published by the Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Arzamas-16. In reality, already on

January 25, 1945, Stalin had his first personal conversation with Kurchatov, and Beria and Molotov took part in this conversation, so that the contours of the general schemes of the Special Committee began to take shape even then, without the mythical "participation" of Vannikov. Alas, such "reliable gossip" associated with the "atomic" Beria (as well as with Beria in general), even roams about seemingly "authoritative" literature a lot. And something about I will say this later. But what is certain is that all the work on uranium problem from the very beginning was under the constant control of Stalin and with his daily information about the progress of work. Here is a typical example ... January 31, 1946 Academician A. I. Alikhanov sends a letter to Stalin:

"Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria informed me that you are interested in the following questions: 1) what role does the study of space sciences play in modern physics? rays;
2) what we have done in this field of science; 3) in what directions these works should be developed and, finally, 4) what measures can be taken to help this work. The first three questions are answered in the attached note; concerning answer to the latter, it is given in a separate appendix ... "

And then followed a detailed note and application. According to Stalin imposed a sweeping resolution: *"I agree. I. Stalin."*

And in the lower left corner of the letter is Beria's visa (typewritten): *"The question of*

cosmic rays was resolved by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 4, 1946 No. 503-208ss" and by hand: "Comrade. Makhnev. L. Beria. 4/III 46".

Actually, the organization of the matter was built like this ... All serious questions were considered and prepared in the staff of the PSU, in the secretariat of the Special Committee and in apparatus of the Technical Council of the Special Committee.

Then the issues were considered at the next meeting of the Special Committee and formalized his protocol. The meetings were convened on Fridays, at 9 pm, in the Kremlin (in reality, However, this did not always work). Projects were prepared on the basis of the protocol decrees of the GKO (later - the Council of People's Commissars and even later - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR, which then they were handed over to Stalin for signature. Sometimes Beria signed them. The

staff of the central office of PSU in 1946 was 762 units, of which 50 were in the secretariat, and this was not accidental - from clear and prompt work technical assistants to the management of the CCGT depended to a large extent on the accuracy of the work of the CCGT at all. The salaries in the apparatus were as follows: head of the PGU - 4,500 rubles, deputies - 4,000 rubles, senior engineer - 2,000 rubles, draftsman-designer - 1,200 rubles, cleaner - 400 rubles. Initially, PGU allocated a building in Krivokolenny lane, and the secretariat of the Special Committee (not PGU) sat in ten rooms in the Kremlin - where there was also Beria, whom atomic duties did not release from duties Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

ENTERING Lavrenty Pavlovich into the uranium problem turned out to be gradual, but durable. And Beria, as already mentioned, until the end of his public life remained competent leader of the Soviet Atomic Program. But by the work of the special services, he Stalin was no longer in charge (and no longer supervised this work in the first place).

And here it is necessary to make an explanation ... In the personnel of the Special Committee and its working body - the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people were gathered from various departments, including those who came from the NKVD and the NKGB. It was quite understandable - Beria gathered his "atomic" guard from everywhere where there were acquaintances to him personally intelligent workers. But now they were not employees, for example, of the NKVD. Beria could, as deputy chairman of the council of ministers and chairman of the Special Committee, give orders to the people's commissar (and later - to the Minister) of Internal Affairs Kruglov, but - only in part of the "atomic" affairs.

It was the same with intelligence issues. Beria did not dispose of her - it was the prerogative of the Ministers of State Security Merkulov, Abakumov, Ignatiev, although the influence on this side had affairs, because paragraph 12 of the Decree of the GKO, signed by Stalin, on formation of the Special Committee read:

"Instruct comrade. BERIA to take measures to organize **a foreign reconnaissance work** (in italics entered by hand. - **S.K.**) obtaining more complete technical and economic information on **uranium industry and atomic bombs**, entrusting him with the leadership of the entire **intelligence work in this area** , conducted by **intelligence** agencies (**NKGB, R.U.K.A. and others**)".

I highlighted the words "in this area" in bold type. And let me remind you that all business documents of this kind, signed by Stalin, did not have even a hint of uncertainty. If it says: "in this area", then not a single intelligence material on the atomic subject should not have passed by Beria, but - only on the "atomic" subject.

So, Beria was entrusted with the overall management of atomic work, that is in fact, leadership in the creation of a new branch of the national economy. And although the first nuclear work in the USSR began during the war and even before the war, now it was necessary give them a qualitatively different dimension.

Exploration of uranium deposits, organization of production of uranium raw materials at territories of the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, conversion of old and

the creation of new plants and factories, new production of various materials (for example, graphite of such high purity was required, which had not been produced in the country before), the provision of scientific research, living conditions at "objects" - none of this

it was impossible to lose sight of ... And all this was included in the sphere of constant (moreover, competent and active) attention of the Chairman of the Special Committee L.P. Beria.

And the fact that what was said is not a routine phrase is convincingly proved by the documents. Necessary to say that the "atomic" Beria turned out to be "documented" most fully, since today an honest researcher has at his disposal the major publication "Atomic project of the USSR: Documents and materials...", published in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17, 1995 No. 160 on the work to identify, select and publish official, previously highly classified "atomic" materials. It was their special

secrecy that saved them from the "attention" of such prominent destroyers of historical documents, like Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, Gorbachev and Gorbachev Yeltsin. I have made extensive use of these materials, although only a few of what, I am sure, would be interesting to the reader. And just studying mentioned edition finally clarified for me the true face of the outstanding son of Russia - Lavrenty Beria. Moreover, without having this array at its disposal **accurate** information, nothing good, not only about the "atomic" Beria, but in general about Beria - as an organizer and a person, it is perhaps impossible to write. There are no memoirs, personal opinions in the already published eight books. Here only scrupulously processed (with a message about all visas, signatures, notes, underlining, strokes, etc.) declassified documents. Vultures: "Absolutely secret" and "Top secret (Special folder)", "Keep on a par with the cipher". Intelligence specific and businesslike, although sometimes documents capture no less than a detective novel.

These weighty, well-published volumes are a phenomenon in the world of publishing. historical documents, no doubt, unique primarily because many years in a row they are being prepared for publication not by historians, but by the "atomic" professionals mentioned by me major weapons physicist, laureate of the Lenin Prize, Hero of Socialist Labor Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences German Arsenievich Goncharov and Colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko. Their work is completely devoid of subjectivity, opportunism and unprofessional and is distinguished by thoroughness and a complete understanding of what is at stake speech in the documents published by them from the archives of the "atomic" departments, as well as intelligence.

And from the thousands of letters, memorandums, protocols, reports, resolutions and orders addressed to Beria or signed by him, the leading role is DOCUMENTALLY clear Lavrenty Pavlovich and in solving the first, most urgent task - the creation of an atomic bombs, and in solving an even more complex and majestic task - the creation of a domestic nuclear industry.

Visas and notes show that the head of the Atomic Program was able to organize the work of a new huge business brilliantly, delving into the little things, if necessary, while necessity - looking at the question broadly. And, I emphasize, **without any hint of punitive action!** Of

course, outgoing documents signed by the Chairman of the PSU were prepared by others (this standard practice). But he did not sign them mechanically, just as numerous *incoming* documents addressed to him bear traces of thoughtful work the addressee above them (abundant underlining, strokes and, most importantly, businesslike and smart resolutions and orders, testifying to the adequate assimilation of Lawrence Pavlovich of the essence of the issue).

HERE I open the first book of the II volume of documents and materials of the Atomic Project, where on pages 242-255 are three minutes (Nos. 53, 54 and 55) of the meetings of the Special committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on January 28, February 7 and February 27, 1948, and

write out a list of issues under consideration, indicating those who had to them relation.

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that the order of surnames is not determined each time hierarchy, but the level of involvement and responsibility of a particular person. Yes, in the protocol. already No. 56 on item IV "On measures for the manufacture of tubular filters" responsible "tt. **Beria**, Pervukhin ", and on question V" On the organization of an experimental production of corrosion-resistant materials for gaskets in the equipment of the plant No. 817 and plant No. 813 "-" tt. Pervukhin, **Beria**.

And I will immediately warn the reader that below I give the first, but not the last boring list to read. So what to do?! Or do we want to understand who and what he was Beria in the history of the country, and then we deal with this "without fools"! That is, software DOCUMENTS!!! Or ... Well,

I'm sure that among the readers of this book there will be those who are familiar with the following will seem uninteresting. So (without breakdown by dates), all questions of the three Ordinary meetings of the Special Committee:

On the work plan of KB-11 (comrades Khariton, Zernov, Makhnev, Alexandrov, Malenkov, Voznesensky, Pervukhin, **Beria**). On

the plan of special work for 1948 (comrades Borisov, Malenkov, **Beria**, Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Voznesensky, Kruglov, Makhnev, Cherepenev).

On measures to ensure research work in 1948 cosmic rays (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Vavilov, Pervukhin, Kruglov, Borisov). About the resettlement from the regime zone of the plant No. 817 (comrades Rodionov, **Beria**).

On changing the boundaries of the Training Ground No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrades Antonov, **Beria**,

Pervukhin, Makhnev). On the term for the development of an operational plan for conducting research on Training ground No. 2 of the MVS of the USSR (comrades **Beria**,

Pervukhin). On the procedure for financing special construction projects of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (comrades

Zavenyagin, **Beria**, Voznesensky, Kruglov) On measures to help the Vacuum Research Institute Ministry of Electrical Industry in the production of prototypes high-vacuum equipment (comrades Borisov, Komarovskiy, Meshcheryakov, **Beria**). On the allocation of foreign currency to PGU for 1948 (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky, Pervukhin).

Note by

comrade Vannikov (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky, Malenkov). On the allocation of a turbogenerator to plant No. 544 (comrades Zhimerin, Klochkov, Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, **Beria**). On the

organization in the USSR Ministry of Finance of the department for financing and control over the spending of special funds, rare and precious metals (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky).

On measures to provide personnel for plant No. 817 and plant No. 813 (comrades Pervukhin, **Beria**, Vannikov, Voznesensky, Pronin, Kruglov, Meshik, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin). On the

organization of the production of highly refractory products (comrades Voznesensky, **Beria**, Tevosyan, Vannikov, Mitrakov, Borisov). On the plan for research work at

the Ms installation in 1948 (comrades Kurchatov, **Beria**). On the progress of the construction of the "M" installation

(comrades Mints, **Beria**, Kabanov, Vannikov, Makhnev). On the development of deposits B-9

(thorium. - **S.K.**) on the territory of the trust Yakutzoloto of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Kruglov, Mamulov, Melik Stepanov, Lomako, Malyshev, Vannikov).

On measures to ensure the protection of hydroxylin (heavy water. - **S.K.**) (comrades Pervukhin, **Beria**, Kruglov). On

the use of repatriates and special settlers in construction objects of the First Main Directorate (t. **Beria**).

On the production plan P-9 (code name for uranium ore. - **S.K.**) in Poland (comrades **Beria**, Zavenyagin).

On the results of the verification of an anonymous letter about the disorder in the Soviet joint-stock company "Vismuth" (comrades Meshik, Voznesensky, Malenkov, **Beria**).

And so in each protocol: this or that participation of Lavrenty Pavlovich provided for the solution of almost **all** issues that are in the field of view Special Committee. Therefore, we have the right and even the obligation to say today: the creation of an atomic industry and the solution of the nuclear problem is the result of the combined efforts of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots: scientists, engineers, intelligence officers, builders, production workers, but L.P. Beria's personal contribution to this collective success must be defined as outstanding.

He knew how to combine the work of many into a single whole. And the fact that the Soviet Union liquidated the US nuclear monopoly so quickly, we owe it to his organizational and human talent. Eliminating

the threat of US dictate was then really a matter of life and death Russia! Already in 1949, when the first bomb was tested, Stalin once said in a narrow circle that if we were late with our bomb for a year and a half, then, probably, we would "try" it on ourselves. So it would be. On February 22, 1946 Chargé d'affaires a.i. in the

Soviet Union George Kennan sent a telegram from Moscow to the US Secretary of State. known as "Kennan's long telegram", a note to Washington was published in the summer of 1947 magazine "Foreign Affairs" in the form of an article "Sources of Soviet behavior" under famous pseudonym "X". Kennan, accusing Moscow of being insensitive to "the logic mind," he said:

"Without being provoked by the forces of intolerance and subversive forces, the 'capitalist' world is today quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia."

And on September 27, 1946, the USSR Ambassador to the USA N. Novikov sent a note to Moscow, at the request of Foreign Minister Molotov, began with the opposite statements:

"U.S. foreign policy reflecting imperialist tendencies
American monopoly capital, characterized in the postwar
period of striving for world domination "...

Molotov emphasized the last two words, and they really reflected the essence of situations. The first plan for a nuclear strike on the USSR "Totality" was developed in the United States towards the end 1945. 20 atomic bombs were to be dropped on 17 cities of the USSR, including Moscow, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov...

And then it went - July 1946: plan "Pincher" ("Pincers"), 50 bombs in 20 cities (Moscow, Baku, Ural industrial region, etc.) in the period from mid-1946 to middle of 1947. Late

1948: Plan "Sizzle" ("Sizzling Heat"). 133 bombs in 70 cities (on Moscow 8 bombs, Leningrad - 7). And so

on - incrementally. And all these plans are intelligence of Minister of State Security Abakumov laid Stalin on the table. These materials were also received by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman Beria Special Committee.

In the summer of 1947, the United States proposed the Marshall Plan to Europe, aimed at economic attraction to the United States. Russia rejected it, but otherwise, with such the direction of the Marshall plan could not have been. The Marshall Plan paved the way for NATO.

By early 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan "Dropshot" ("Instant Strike"), the main goal of which was the elimination of the Soviet Union as a state in four stages. The first

stage was to be the atomic bombing of 200 of our cities with use of 300 atomic bombs with the destruction of up to 85 percent of the economic potential. I ask the reader to imagine what form our Motherland would have acquired then.

That is, the confrontation took shape completely, but the Russians could be blamed for this or rascals, or fools. Russia has just ended such a war that... Oh, yes, I understand What!

In some respects, the five war years of the life of the USSR fit into several columns of figures for the economic development of the country, calculated as a percentage in relation to 1940. And this is what the picture looked like over the years:

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 National income 9266748883 Gross output industry 98779010492 incl. people's commissariats of the aviation, tank industry and arms and ammunition industry 140186224251 Capital investments in national economy 8653537289 State budget revenues 9892113149168 All during the war years, sharply and continuously grew, as we see, only military production - to the detriment of everything else. But the war is over. And let the reader not be confused by the fall national income of gross industrial output in 1945 - that was a beneficent fall, because it marked the beginning of a peaceful restructuring of the economy. AND this was expressed in the growth of capital investments in the national economy and in the growth budget revenues. However, half of the economically developed part of Russia lay so far in ruins...

In 1939 we produced 43.2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, and in 1945 also 43.3 billion. We smelted 12.3 million tons of steel in 1945 against 17.6 in 1939, 19.4 million tons of oil were produced instead of 30.3 million tons. Cereals of all kinds collected 47.3 million tons against 97.4 million tons in 1937.

What kind of "aggressiveness" of Russia could we talk about? But we had to have our own bomb. And as soon as possible...

ONLY a classic "democratic" political scientist or journalist, never in his life who lifted nothing heavier than a glass of cognac and the hem of a woman's skirt, may think that large scientific and technical projects are implemented overnight and thanks to "geniuses" like Andrei Sakharov or Lev Landau. In fact, success in this kind of projects provided by daily branched work, which includes: • Dozens of people as the main generators of ideas in all areas; • hundreds of people as key, hard-to-replace executors called develop basic ideas and generate private ideas; • thousands of people as assistants to these performers, and, finally, tens and hundreds of thousands of technicians and workers in design bureaus and research institutes, at factories and construction sites, who follow specific instructions and work according to precise formulated tasks.

But all this work is successful when it has a true leader. Beria them was. All important organizing documents of the uranium problem are resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers or Beria as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But in any case they went through Beria. In addition, there is a huge array of letters from Beria to Stalin, protocols Special Committee, signed by Beria, letters addressed to Beria. Sometimes documents directly sent to Stalin, for example, Vannikov and Pervukhin, but they still viewed by the Chairman of the Special Committee. Of course, he was not able to make any technical adjustments to this or that decision - this side of the matter was in charge private matter experts. But Beria delved into them in such a way that he was always able or

approve the right decision, or make it yourself.

Let's say, without ultrapure graphite, there is no reactor for producing plutonium ... And there is no ultrapure graphite without new technological equipment. And this equipment not without new cleaning methods ... And these methods should be developed by chemists and engineers who, in their lives, will not even come close to an atomic bomb and may not even know that are direct participants in the project to create an atomic bomb.

Beria did not solve this pile of "graphite" problems, but he should have known about them. So the same as about all other problems - more or less significant. And they were depressingly many.

So I open at random the book of the 3rd volume of the II documents and materials "Atomic Project USSR" on page 173 and, turning the pages, I begin to write out only numbers and names documents, reminding the reader that A-9 is the code name for natural uranium, and B 9 is the code name for thorium (such code substitutions for the names of all special "atomic" materials were standard practice for CCGT documentation). So, let's begin...

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 24, 1947 No. 656-232ss "On production of special powerful mercury rectifiers for the needs of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR" (signed by Stalin).

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 24, 1947 No. 657-233ss "On organization of the production of A-9 from Krivoy Rog iron ore" (signed Stalin). Order

of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 25, 1947 No. 2919-rs on the transfer of protection buildings of PGU under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (signed Deputy Chairman of the Council of

Ministers Beria). Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 29, 1947 No. 3183-rs on search and exploration work on A-9 and B-9 in the area of the Vanch Range in the Pamirs (Signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria).

Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 9, 1947 No. 3745-rs on approval contingents accepted for centralized supply (including dependents adults in Moscow, Leningrad and 43 cities - a total of 16,220 people and children under 12 years old - a total of 23,770. - **S.K.**), and additional food limits for the II quarter. 1947 (signed by Stalin). Letter from L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin dated April 19,

1947 with a presentation for consideration of a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on measures to ensuring the construction of the "M" facility (a powerful cyclotron with a weight electromagnet 6-7 thousand tons to accelerate elementary particles to energies 250 MeV, the construction of which was planned in the area of the Ivankovskaya hydroelectric power station, 125 km from Moscow. - **S.K.**).

Letter from L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin dated April 19, 1947 with a presentation for consideration of the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the organization at the plant No. 92 (Gorky Machine-Building Plant, which manufactured diffusion uranium enrichment machines. - **S.K.**) Ministry of Armament serial production of special turbochargers and measures to help this plant.

Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 20, 1947 No. 4285-rs on conducting exploration at A-9 and the organization of pilot production of A-9 in North Karelia (Signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria).

Enough, dear reader? I think

so ... But we,

after flipping through a dozen pages, stopped only on page 184 of one only volumes of 895 pages. And all these pages in seven directly "Beria" volumes of more than six thousand, which contain only *declassified* documents specially *selected for publication* , many of which went through Stalin and all through Beria!

Many of them have very intriguing headlines, for example:

"Instruction of L.P. Beria to B.L. Vannikov, M.G. Pervukhin and A.P. Zavenyagin on work with German specialists", August 1946;

"On the search for a uranium deposit from an airplane", August 1946; "On the results of the work of the Geophysical Complex Expedition", October 1946; "On

the extraction of bismuth and cobalt ore in Saxony (in the Soviet zone occupation of Germany)", October 1946;

"On the construction of a refinery on the basis of warehouses of the Naval forces", August 1947;

"Letter from V. A. Makhnev to L. P. Beria about the program for the development of the general plan for the use of atomic energy for 20 years, September 1947;

"On the organization of a radiological room at the biological department Academy of Sciences of the USSR,

October 1947; "Report S.I. Vavilova L.P. Beria about the publication of the results research on cosmic rays", February 1948 ...

Etc.

NOW I - to tire the reader, so to tire! - no longer at random, but after conscious selection of an example, I will give the headings of sections and subsections of the report dated December 23, 1946 by Kurchatov, Vannikov and Pervukhin addressed to Stalin on the status of work on problem of the use of atomic energy in 1945–1946: **I. Raw material**

base of uranium Uranium

deposits in the USSR

Uranium deposits abroad

Enterprises for the extraction of uranium ore

Obtaining pure metallic uranium

Thorium

II. About work on uranium-graphite boiler

Work on protecting uranium blocks from corrosion

Making Pure Graphite

Work on obtaining pure graphite

Studying with the help of test benches the hydrodynamic issues of the project

Study of the corrosion resistance of materials used for the manufacture

uranium-graphite boiler and radiation resistance

Product transport from the boiler

Water treatment design

Boiler power control

Separation of plutonium from the boiler

Construction of a uranium-graphite boiler and plant No. 817 (I ask the reader to remember this number. - S.K.)

III. On separation by the diffusion method of isotope separation

Diffusion method of isotope separation

The work of laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences and involved organizations on diffusion method

Main elements of a separation plant

Raw material - uranium hexafluoride

Filter problem

Superchargers (compressors), sealing and lubrication

Work at the plant. Stalin in Gorky

Lubricants and barrier fluids

Light isotope enrichment analysis

Automatic process control

IV. Electromagnetic methods of isotope separation and electromagnetic installations

Main tasks

Institutes, design offices and laboratories involved in the development of methods, and their tasks

Development of new calculation methods

Work of sector No. 5 of laboratory No. 2

Work of sector No. 1 of LPTI

The work of the Design Bureau of the plant

"Electrosila" The work of the Central Vacuum Laboratory

New installations for the development of nuclear physics

The need for the organization of the vacuum industry

V. On the state of work on the production of heavy water

Purpose of heavy water

Research and other organizations working on heavy water

Methods for obtaining heavy water

Production by water electrolysis

Plant for the final concentration of heavy water ChEKhK (Chirchik electrochemical plant. — S.K.) Construction

of new electrolysis plants

Water electrolysis with isotope exchange

Moscow electrolysis plant

Preparation of heavy water by water distillation

Obtaining heavy water by the method of distillation of water from a nitrogen-hydrogen mixture

Production of heavy water by distillation of ammonia

Physico-Chemical Institute. Karpov

Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

VI. On the state of work carried out in KB-11 at Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Status of works

Development of composite charge elements from conventional explosives

Development of a methodology for studying the processes of metal compression by an explosion

Development of electric detonators

Development of a high-voltage installation for undermining detonators

Development of the design of the atomic bomb case

Development of a simultaneous shot from two barrels

Development of a fuse that fires at a given height

Development of the neutron fuse

Calculation and theoretical work

VII. Research work in the field of the use of atomic energy

and development of molecular physics The

work of the Leningrad Physicotechnical Institute

Electrolytic separation method

The work of the Kharkov FTI

Work of the Radium Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Laboratory work No. 2

Laboratory work No. 3 **VIII.**

Work on Radiation Protection IX. On the Use of

German Specialists Deployment of German Specialists

in the USSR and Organization of Scientific Institutions

Dr. Riel's group

Institute "A" (director - Professor Ardenne. - S.K.) Institute "G" (director
- Nobel Prize winner in 1925 Professor Hertz. - S.K.) Laboratory "B" (supervisor - Professor Poze. - S .TO.)

I don't know if the reader had the strength to read the outline of this report in one sitting. Stalin, which occupies 67 pages in the book of the third volume II of the documents of the Soviet Atomic project. But Beria studied it carefully, with a pencil in his hands! And all in order to then give the order recorded on the back of the last sheet
General Makhnev, Secretary of the Special Committee:

"According to the instructions of Comrade L.P. Beria, the report was not sent
anywhere. **V. Makhnev.**

And such a decision was quite justified - the report turned out to be redundant - for Stalin - detailed. But for Beria and his employees, he was quite acceptable and useful, allowing you to once again cover all the problems and tasks at once.

Well, how, I ask the reader, all this is very reminiscent of the range of interests and lifestyle "monster", "devil", "ghoul", "executioner"? Yes, plus - also a "sexual maniac", who only thinks about what other ninth grader to order to drag into his "black Raven"...

PAST Beria did not pass questions even, it would seem, of secondary importance. Thus, on April 10, 1948, Academician Alikhanov, Director of Laboratory No. 3 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, addressed "To the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P." with detailed a letter substantiating the need to publish *"in closed form a number of manuals on various issues of nuclear energy production and, first of all, with a request for permission to publish in closed form for official use the book of A. Akhiezer and I. Pomeranchuk.* The

monograph on the general theory of reactors was meant, and Beria instructed the invariable To V. A. Makhnev (more will be said about him) to send a copy of Alikhanov's letter "to conclusion of the Scientific and Technical Council".

What did Beria understand in the theory of reactors? He had more than a general idea about the processes taking place in them, and he was aware of this. And the rest knew. And Alikhanov too. However, Alikhanov knew that if you turn to someone else, they will "wrap up" for a long time. Yes, that's how it was because the academician explained:

"This book (by Akhiezer and Pomeranchuk. - **S.K.**) ... is extremely valuable and useful, and meanwhile the manuscript without any movement lies in the archive Technical Council, and so far no steps have been taken to publish it in a closed form for official use. This circumstance does not allow
neither researchers nor students can use the book.

That is why Alikhanov wrote directly to Beria, knowing that he would decide everything promptly. Moreover, Lavrenty Pavlovich did not begin to delve into the essence of the matter - he did not understand it. But decided competently - as a manager! I was not indignant at the "pettiness" of the subject of the letter, but forwarded it through Makhnev to Zavenyagin and to the Scientific and Technical Council. realizing that since the "question" has come into Beria's field of vision, then it's no longer possible to lie "without any movement" If it happens, they won't decide for themselves, so General Makhnev will remind

anyone who needs it. And here, perhaps, it is necessary to say at least a few words about Vasily Alekseevich himself. Makhnev - a modest man, but, according to knowledgeable people, unique. Vyatich, born in 1904 (died in 1966). After graduating in 1926 from the Institute of National economy and work in Vyatka and Gorky in the system of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection, in 1940

In 1992 he became deputy of the Committee of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1941-1945 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Munitions, being from 1942 at the same time Deputy member of the GKO Beria.

Since 1945, Makhnev has been a member of the Special Committee and head of its secretariat. In 1949 after testing the first atomic bomb, he became a Hero of Socialist Labor, in 1951 - a laureate of the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree, and in 1953 - of the 2nd degree.

As I understand it, he was for Beria something like Poskrebyshev for Stalin. Perhaps he can also be called Beria's "atomic gray cardinal", without forgetting that although the "gray reverend" Joseph du Tremblay was extremely smart, his boss himself was great Cardinal Richelieu. The

French say: "What is the master - such is the servant." And Vasily Makhnev was worthy servant - not Beria, but Russia, the Soviet Union.

The READER is already familiar with Andranik Petrosyants. Beria knew him well from People's Commissariat of the tank industry, and then - for joint work in the State Defense Committee, and at the end of 1946 he achieved his transfer to the nuclear industry. At PSU Petrosyants ensured the construction and commissioning of plants No. 813 and No. 418 for diffuse and electromagnetic separation and enrichment of uranium-235, and almost ten years after Beria's death, in 1962, became chairman of the USSR State Committee for use of atomic energy. Earlier, I gave his assessment of the role and merits of Beria during war. And here is how he said about the "atomic" Beria:

"Beria ... managed to fully justify Stalin's trust, using all scientific potential of scientists of nuclear science and technology ... He gave all work on the nuclear issue needs scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed great energy and efficiency, was an organizer, able to bring every work he started to the end. Often traveled to objects, got acquainted with the course and results of the work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and dealt severely with negligent performers, regardless of their ranks and position. In the process of creating the first Soviet nuclear bomb, his role was in immeasurable in the full sense of the word. His efforts and opportunities to use all types and directions of industries of the country in the interests of creating nuclear industry, scientific and technical potential of the country < ...> provided him with complete freedom of action and victory for the Soviet people in this scientific and technical epic "...

Alas, dear reader, I have something in this characterization of Beria by Petrosyants released. Instead of an ellipsis in bold angle brackets, Petrosyants' text is as follows: *"... and huge masses of prisoners, fear of him ..."* As for the "fear" -

this, alas, is a cowardly equivalence of Academician Petrosyants aside "democracy" that had raged by 1995. And if in front of the mind's eye of the reader reading the words "cracked down on negligent performers" there is a thick "camp dust," then I can assure him that he should not close his eyes - this dust will not eat out his eyes reason for its absence. I will give examples later to justify what has been said, but, touching on this topic, I will immediately say the following ...

An objective study of declassified documents and specific (without a general "camp dust"), the memories of those of the atomic scientists who directly dealt with Beria allow us to make quite unambiguous conclusion that the role of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria in the Soviet The nuclear project was not only outstanding - this is obvious, but also quite positive from the standpoint of ensuring a normal business climate in the industry. Here is how, for example, the appointment of Boris Glebovich Muzrukov as a director plant number 817.

Combine No. 817, aka: State Chemical Plant, object No. 859, "Project

No. 1859 mining and processing plant", Base-10, plant "A" or "unit No. 1" is a complex of facilities for the first industrial plutonium-producing reactor, built 16 kilometers east of the city of Kyshtym, on the shore of Lake Kyzyl-Tash in Chelyabinsk region. Its modern name: production association (PO) "Mayak". The closed city that arose at the plant was later named "Chelyabinsk 40" (now Ozersk) - colloquially "sorokovka". By the way, Vasily Vasilyevich Chernyshev, Deputy

People's Commissar at the beginning Internal Affairs Beria, and then the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov (K. Zalesky in his biographical dictionary calls General Chernyshev "the owner of millions of slaves GULAG") in 1947-1949 almost constantly lived in the "forty" with his family, controlling the construction of nuclear enterprises in the Southern, Middle and Northern Ural. He died only 56 years old in 1952 (such of his former "slaves", such as Lev Razgon, safely polluted the minds and souls of fellow citizens even in the 90s last century).

Beria came to this "object" more than once, and he had it on a special account, because for all the general enormity of the problem, its key and most expensive link it turned out to receive active, fissile weapons in the required quantities materials - highly enriched uranium-235 and plutonium.

Here, in contrast to the work on the scheme and design of the atomic bomb, there were fewer "fine" science, but a lot of "rough" organizational routine, which constantly threatened turn into a web. And here Beria was able to see without consulting scientists reserves of acceleration and optimization, including personnel.

At one time, the "object" was in a fever. Chief engineer Slavsky and authorized Council of Ministers Tkachenko (the same one who came to Izhevsk during the war, the NKVD general) sent reports to Beria about the trouble.

Somewhat digressing from the story about Muzrukov, I will quote Beria's order of June 27 1947, which is not signed by him, but *written* by him:

"TT. Kruglov (convocation), Vannikov, Zavenyagin, Chernyshev (deputy minister internal affairs. - **S.K.**), Borisov (PGU and Gosplan of the USSR. - **S.K.**), Komarovskiy (a major builder, head of the Glavpromstroy of the NKVD of the USSR. - **S.K.**) 1. Urgently review

the memos of vols. Slavsky and Tkachenko and report on the measures taken to speed up and streamline the construction works on construction No. 859.

2. Contact TT. Khrulev (Head of Logistics of the Soviet Army. - **S.K.**) and Kaftanov (Minister of Higher Education of the USSR. - **S.K.**) and together with them develop measures for an additional dispatch for the construction of No. 859 of the required number of junior and middle engineering staff from young builders graduating from universities, as well as from among the commanders of military construction

battalions. 3. Tov. Kruglov to send the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Chernyshev for a period of 2-3 months to build No. 859 to strengthen construction management and taking on site all necessary measures to ensuring the completion of construction and installation works within the established government deadlines.

4. Tt. Chernyshev, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Komarovskiy, Borisov, who are leaving for construction, to consider the state of affairs on the spot construction and installation of plant No. 817, take the necessary measures and report the results. Tov.

Kruglov and tov. Vannikov to take control of the construction and installation work at plant No. 817 and report on the state of affairs every 10 days on this construction and on the measures taken. **L.**

Beria.

However, the situation did not improve, and on July 8, 1947, Beria first arrived at Base 10 himself, removed director P. T. Bystrov from his post (he remained in the swing) and appointed him to his place is Yefim Pavlovich Slavsky (we will meet him more than once). However, Slavsky also had problems, and V. A. Malyshev left for the Urals - People's Commissar transport engineering, without five months - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A conflict arose already between the imperious Malyshev and the extremely self-confident Slavsky. Vyacheslav Alexandrovich called Beria and immediately offered Slavsky take off. As a result, on October 20, 1947, Beria again arrived at the plant. And then Malyshev offered to replace Slavsky with Muzrukov, who was well known to Beria and Malyshev from the war for tank affairs, for Uralmash. Lavrenty Pavlovich agreed, turned to Stalin and, having received his consent, summoned Muzrukov to

Moscow. After listening to the proposal (not an order!) Beria, Boris Glebovich thought about it - the matter was new to him. And this is how Beria did ... He did not stamp his feet (I think he generally he never stomped his feet or pounded the table with his fists - not his style). They did not order. He first brought Muzrukov and Kurchatov together. And Igor Vasilyevich spent operational and intelligible "educational program" of a potential colleague. Only after that Muzrukov came to Beria and agreed under two conditions. First ...

Kurchatov was formally listed as a supervisor before that plant, but Muzrukov asked to appoint him as his deputy "on the case" (of course, with the consent of Kurchatov). Second... Responsible representatives of the general designer of the plant - GSPI-11 and the general developer of equipment - NIkhimmash, as well as the CCGT itself they will manage the construction and installation not from Leningrad and Moscow, but on the spot, quickly resolving all "sick" issues with Muzrukov. At first, they wanted to demote Slavsky greatly (to the chief engineer of one of the factories plant), but Muzrukov asked Beria to leave him as the chief engineer of all plant. Slavsky worked selflessly (at that time there was enough radiation at the plant for everyone, including the bosses!), became the Hero of Socialist Labor Three times, the first Star received under Beria. But, being a man, alas, vindictive, Slavsky then kept resentment against Muzrukov all his life, and after all, over the years, Efim Pavlovich became the "atomic" minister. And Muzrukov, having one Star of the Hero of Labor for tanks and a second for the first Soviet plutonium never received a well-deserved third star for leadership from 1955 to 1972 the largest weapons center in Arzamas-16.

However, the last fact has nothing to do with Beria, but the fact that Beria not only boiled over the conditions of Muzrukov, and completely agreed with them, promising full support, suggests that unhealthy ambitions for Lavrenty Pavlovich are not existed.

But a lot of unhealthy gossip around the name of Beria was subsequently woven. AND the same displacement of Slavsky, even some honored veteran gunsmiths in later memoirs (!) described in such a way that the initiator of the removal of Slavsky turned out to be, moreover, on an absurd occasion, Beria, who allegedly behaved rudely with Slavsky.

No, Lavrenty Pavlovich proceeded from the considerations of the case and respected everyone who thought so same ... And if they were people of ideas, then he forgave them even serious mistakes. Yes, already being the director of plant No. 817, Muzrukov recklessly, without the sanction of PGU, carried out negotiations on the possibility of inviting a person to work, in a "regime" respect dubious. This case was dealt with even by Stalin, but everything ended with a strict a suggestion to prevent this from happening in the future.

In total, Beria visited the Sorokovka four times. The second visit, on October 20, 1947, ended with the appointment of Muzrukov. The third time Beria came in October 1949 - to personally reward people for their heroic work.

What is significant - in Chelyabinsk-40, Beria then carried out an unprecedented

agenda of the 86th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. It became one of the few visiting, and although its protocol is printed on a standard form with a typographic position "G. Moscow, Kremlin", here it is crossed out and printed on top: "Combine No. 817".

The entire meeting was devoted to one issue, and its protocol is so expressive that I will quote it in full! The old-timers of the Sorokovka, if we recall the legends, said that everything began to spin after Beria, having entered the store, became a witness dissatisfaction of some of the townspeople with the meager assortment of the gastronomic department. I think it's still a legend. But the protocol is a reliable historical document.

Here he is:

"Combine No. 817

October 22, 1949 **Strictly**

secret (Special folder) *Present:*

Makhnev V. A. tt. Beria L. P., Vannikov B. L., Kurchatov I. V.,

Present (when

considering relevant issues): Deputy. Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Comrade Borisov, pom. Vice Chairman

Council of Ministers of the USSR comrade Sazykin, head of Glavpromstroy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade Komarovskiy, secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade Beloborodoe, director of the plant No. 817 v. Muzrukov, head of construction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 247 v. Tsarevsky, ch. plant engineer comrade Slavsky, authorized by the Council of Ministers of the USSR comrade Tkachenko, deputy. director of the plant Bystrov, deputy. HR director of the plant Comrade Surmach, Head of the Combine's Political Department Comrade Morkovin, Head of the Political Department construction comrade Antonov, deputy. director of the plant for working supplies T. Smirnov, pom. director of the plant for everyday life comrade Ovchinnikov, head of the medical unit of the plant comrade Moiseitsev, head of the office of the trade pit of construction comrade Rosenthal, deputy. the head of the office of the trading pit of construction, comrade Ivanov.

On complaints about shortcomings in trade, medical and cultural maintenance of workers and employees of the plant No. 817 (t.

Beria) 1.

Instruct TT. Kostygov, Muzrukov, Tsarevsky, Chestny and Panichkin in 5 days to check the available signals about the facts of unsatisfactory state of trade, medical and cultural services for workers and employees of plant No. 817 and construction, take prompt action to eliminate deficiencies and bring those responsible for these deficiencies to responsibility.

Proposals on measures to decisively improve trade and cultural and community services for workers and employees of the plant and measures to strengthen management of these sections to submit to the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 7-day time. 2. To

oblige the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to monthly period to re-check the state of trade and cultural and community maintenance of workers and employees of the plant and report on the results.

***Chairman of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers
USSR L. Beria.***

The very composition of those called to the meeting says that it was completely "social" event and none of the social issues was forgotten there. And reader there can be no doubt that the meeting was held on the initiative of Beria. He's still in In 1920, he was engaged in improving the life of workers in Baku. And learned the lessons of those days the way they is obliged to assimilate a real social leader-Bolshevik.

Of course, the significance of the unusual in terms of the venue and agenda of the meeting The Special Committee went far beyond the life of only the "forty". The rumor that Beria held such an event at Muzrukov's, naturally spread throughout the industry, this fact took note of all the directors of all "nuclear" facilities, so as not to fall into

awkward position. I think that Lavrenty was also guided by this consideration.

Pavlovich, collecting at the 817th plant his management for participation in the 86th meeting Special Committee.

But in Sarov ("Arzamas-16"), in KB-11 to General Zernov and Professor Khariton, he never came. There are also enough legends about this, but the fact that Beria is in the development center there has never been an atomic bomb directly, it is precisely documented.

He is no worse than Kurchatov, who is fully admitted to the entire intelligence "atomic" information from the USA, knew that a workable design directly bombs will be developed - after all, in addition to their ideas, leading developers have at their disposal was an American scheme, known in sufficient detail. And Beria understood: if "product" of plant No. 817, then the state will also have a nuclear

shield. So why would he visit physicists? In the Urals, his experience and powers could help correcting failures. And they helped. And what could he suggest to theorists, experimenters and designers of KB-11? To carry out "general intervention in the affairs subordinates" he had no habit.

NO, Beria did not manage with the help of fear, even in critical situations. But it is not ruled out - if necessary - justified rigidity. Near

Ural village Verkh-Neyvinskoye (closed city "Sverdlovsk-44", later Novouralsk) plant No. 813 was created for the production of weapons-grade uranium-235 by the gas diffusion method. However, things did not go well, and Beria, having arrived at the facility, at the end in the end, he firmly stated that the development of a specific technology is a state task and if it is not completed on time, it will be considered that the team has not coped with it.

There were no threats, and it is unlikely that they would have helped here. Solve complex engineering and the design task is not to dig a ditch. But toughness and high status assignments played their part. Instead of the previous "rocking", the real work began in "brainstorming" mode - we sat at the drawing boards and in the shops day and night, everything was decided quickly and amicably - without formalities and bickering. And

the task was completed, but how! Such production was created, which *to this day* day has no analogues in the world in terms of cheapness and productivity of enriched uranium! IN the world has no analogues! And the work on that assignment from Beria at the enterprise is remembered as legend, proud of it and ... And giving Lavrenty Pavlovich his due. Yes,

the Soviet Union solved the nuclear problem at an accelerated pace! August 30, 1945 year the First Main Directorate is formed.

April 9, 1946 marked the beginning of KB No. 11 (the very first, which disappeared almost immediately, the names are also "Laboratory No. 5" and "KB-5") with deployment in the village of Sarovo Mordovian ASSR. The head of this research complex for designing nuclear weapons was appointed General Zernov, Chief Designer - Professor Khariton, his deputy - the physico-chemist Shchelkin. And

in August 1949, "Training Ground No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (defense) of the USSR" in Kazakhstan - our first nuclear test site, was already preparing for the first test. August 27, 1949, at 2 am, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov approved signed by Zernov, Khariton and Shchelkin and executed by hand in a single copy back on August 21 "Operational plan for the final assembly and undermining of the product" ... "Product" was called our first-born atomic - the RDS-1 bomb. The final

and irreversible countdown has begun. At 8.00 on August 27 1949, the dispatcher on duty, a Muscovite, a graduate of Moscow State University, candidate of technical sciences, a former employee of the Moscow

Energy Institute, and in KB-11 - senior researcher of department 25, Sergey

Sergeevich Chugunov. According to the schedule, 48 hours remained before the experiment. By this time at the training ground Everyone involved in the experiment and responsible for it has already

gathered. Chairman of the State Commission Beria together with Kobulov and Makhnev

visited the assembly building on the morning of 28 August. A natural feeling of preoccupation, and - presumably - simple human curiosity, led him there for a while. However, Lavrenty Pavlovich did not stand "over his soul" among the gunsmiths, although on the morning of the next day and he, and everyone who lived for the past four years in anticipation of the approaching event, was facing the final exam. In

Sergo Beria's book about his father, he writes that he was also present at that first test, but this could not be and was not. Only those whom the tests concerned in a direct, official way were strictly allowed to the test site. Even such a large rocket launcher as Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, got to the test site only in November 1955, when he was tested our first "two-stage" thermonuclear charge RDS-37 - a prototype of a nuclear warhead equipping the first intercontinental ballistic missile R-7 developed by OKB Queen. Moreover, Sergo Beria's description of the course of the experiment shows that he writes about that he was not a witness, although Elena Prudnikova, for example, mistook his stories for clean coin.

And here is the testimony of such an authoritative expert as Julius Borisovich Khariton. It was published in various publications, but I quote it from a collective monograph. "Soviet military power from Stalin to Gorbachev", which says:

"A heap of blunders, hoaxes, or even just misunderstanding of the issue under discussion ... almost the entire chapter "Nuclear shield" book by S.

Beria. In the interview book "The son of Lavrenty Beria tells ..." R. Chilachava ... S. Beria agreed that he and I. V. Kurchatov "business cooperation was to develop the design of nuclear charges, "although Kurchatov, heading the Soviet atomic project, did not directly was doing. Moreover, S. Beria was not involved in the "development of the design of nuclear charges" ... "

So, the assembly work went according to plan ... A hitch that occurred during installation "Piston" with a plutonium core, although it delivered unpleasant minutes, had the same the same reason as the Americans - precision assembly led to an air "cushion" under the piston, but the air was gradually bled through the thinnest annular gap, and everything became in place. Finally, the last assembly operations were completed.

The time has come to lift the "product" and fix it on the work site 37-meter steel truss tower. In the free air, near the tower, stood Beria and Kurchatov. Shchelkin approached them - for permission to take the charge out of the assembly building DAF.

The "team" of KB-11 rolled out the "product" along the rail track and installed it in the cage freight elevator tower. The roll-out was observed by the DAF's external officer guards - several colonels from the USSR Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Beria went to the command post of the experiment. Some time later there Zavenyagin and Shchelkin arrived at the empty area around the tower. At 6.18 Chairman State Commission L.P. Beria and scientific supervisor of the experiment I.V. Kurchatov was reported to be fully prepared to undermine. The

head of the range, General Kolesnikov, confirmed the full readiness of the range and their subordinates. General Komarov, who was in charge of aviation, was a Hero of the Soviet Union, during the war he was the commander of an assault division, unlike them, he was not happy. Because of non-flying weather, the departure of aircraft with photographic equipment was delayed.

Beria, Pervukhin and Kurchatov left the KP building under the open sky in the hope see some clarification. However, as K. I. Shchelkin's report recorded, "the weather didn't bode well." In these places, in such weather, one would expect this any time of the year - up to a thunderstorm.

Many years later, one of the participants in the RDS-1 assembly Hero of Socialist Labor

Professor D. A. Fishman recalled:

"The bad weather on the night of August 28-29, as it were, repeated the situation with the 1st American explosion in Alamogordo".

In Alamogordo, before the test, the weather really deteriorated, and also unexpectedly, contrary to the weather forecast. General Leslie Groves in his famous book "Now we can talk about it," wrote:

"The main trouble was related to the weather ... That evening turned out to be rainy and windy. Many insisted that the test be postponed for at least 24 hours."

Fearing the vagaries of the weather, the Americans were forced to postpone the explosion for some time - although less than a day. In our case, it turned out the opposite... Kurchatov, fearing surprises from the wind and rain, decided to move the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00. And at 6.33 Shchelkin and employees of KB-11 Matveev and Davydov, on the instructions of Kurchatov, in the presence MGB General A. N. Babkin removed the seals from the door to the control room, opened it and turned it on power supply for the automation system.

1300 instruments and 9700 indicators were fully prepared to register all explosion phenomena.

Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin in his report described these last incomplete half an hour before explosion is very detailed and bright:

"Dispatcher of the last stage of the experiment, Comrade Malsky A. Ya. announced to the public address system in a somewhat mournful voice: "25 minutes left." Everyone at the command post fell silent. The electric clock measured seconds. Tov. Malsky A. Ya. periodically singsongly announced the time remaining before the

explosion. 12 minutes before the explosion, the field machine was turned on. 10 minutes automatic turned on the glow of all the lamps in the devices, arranged along both radii of the experimental fields.

Long minutes passed...

Of course, not only the filaments of radio tubes glowed, but the glow also grew inside those who were now at CP. Three minutes before time "Ch" Beria, Kurchatov, members of the Special Committee Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Makhnev, not directly involved in the finishing operations, the leaders of KB-11 approached the open door, prepared dark protective glasses...

I will turn again to the authority of Yu. B. Khariton in order to refute another myth associated with Beria:

"In one of Golovin's books (I.N. Golovin is an employee of the Kurchatov Laboratories No. 2, famous physicist. - **S.K.**) it was written that when an automatic device for the phased activation of all devices for igniting capsules was launched, then Beria told Kurchatov that you probably wouldn't succeed. But this is not was. Golovin was not at these works, and all sorts of rumors spread ... "

Here you can see the same desire to present Beria as a kind of provocateur, which really wasn't. 20

seconds before the explosion, the operator, at the command of the head of the explosion, turned on the main connector (switch) connecting the product with the automation system.

"From that moment," Shchelkin wrote, "all operations were performed by

automatic device. However, the possibility remained with one movement hands at the command of the chief to stop the process. There was no reason to stop and exactly at 00 the whole area was lit up with a dazzling light. Approximately through 30 seconds to the command post approached [shock] wave. It became clear to everyone that the experiment was a success."

YES, At 7:00 AM on August 29, 1949, the countdown ended. The real moment "0" has come ... And over the Kazakh feather grass steppe that morning, as if the second time the sun rose ...

However, it really was the morning of a new day on the planet - the day when Russia gained that nuclear shield that could hold back the nuclear sword of world evil already raised above it. Future academician and future scientific supervisor of the test site M. A. Sadovsky described the first minutes of the new era as follows:

"What was there! We rushed to each other, hugged, congratulated each other friend and themselves, shouting: "We have it!", "We managed to make it! .."

Beria also hugged - everyone remembers how he impulsively hugged Kurchatov. He hugged and Khariton, and he kept escaping, trying to close the door before the arrival of the shock wave.

Everyone was happy, but at the CP of the first test, Lavrenty Pavlovich was the only one who knew what an important event in the history of Russia had just happened. After all, he is the only one of all those gathered here, not even as chairman of the Special Committee, but as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had all the information about the plans US nuclear aggression against Russia.

Julius Borisovich Khariton recalled how Beria kissed him on the forehead ... Surely was ... But a particularly interesting episode was remembered by the famous Georgy Nikolaevich Flerov, and told about him in his memoirs another major gunsmith, Alexander Ivanovich Veretennikov, Flerov's student...

The neutron background from the "neutron fuse" (NC) of the charge was recorded by a mechanical counter installed at the test command post. The constancy of the background (in other words, the number of clicks of the counter with a frequency of 2-3 pulses per minute) proved the safety NZ before the explosion.

Veretennikov wrote:

"When the explosion occurred, no one paid any attention to the counter, and Beria looked at his testimony and found that the last time he ... registered 3-4 impulses in both channels at once. Immediately he demanded an explanation, what happened to NZ? GN (Flerov. - **S.K.**) replied that This, apparently, is a tip on the equipment. And no one knew at that moment those present that one of the first registrations unexpectedly took place here electromagnetic phenomena accompanying a nuclear explosion.

Flerov could not have come up with this, but when did Beria manage to catch a surge of momentum? This phenomenon is instantaneous, and he could not expect it in advance! So how do you need to control yourself in order to fix such details as the clicks of a counter in a state of nervous expectation! And, it turns out, the only attentive observer-experimenter, for the first time in the USSR whatever one may say, Beria turned out to have fixed the phenomenon of an electromagnetic impulse. AND his observation was not wasted - scientists remembered both the fact and Beria's question, and when excitement subsided, thought. So the inquisitiveness of their chief curator subsequently helped understand that we are dealing with a new phenomenon.

In the memoirs of the same Mikhail Alexandrovich Sadovsky, published in which, alas, has a meager circulation of 750 copies of the 11th issue for 1997 of the "History

Atomic Project" of the Kurchatov Institute, there are two more striking pieces of evidence concerning Beria. Sadovsky writes that immediately after the explosion, "using situation", he went to the field. In its

center, where the tower stood, he saw a relatively small depression and *"a shiny, glassy layer of melted soil. Slipping, on it, jumping, crawled a burnt golden eagle .* Sadovsky knew that it would be a long time to stay here impossible (in fact, immediately after the explosion at this point there was such an amount of X-rays that it was impossible to be here at all, but ...), and headed back.

"We are going back," Sadovsky recalled, "and suddenly we see another a car driving out of the ruins. It turned out that L. Beria himself with his approximate (the anti-Berian "negative" was driven into everyone so that a different word M.A. I didn't find it, although Beria was not traveling with "close associates", but with comrades and colleagues. - **S.K.**) one of the first, if not the first, managed to get into place explosion. He asked me what I saw, and when I said that a burnt eagle, then Beria and his team laughed for a long time, saying: "He saw an eagle!"

There was no heartlessness in such a reaction of Beria. And it's not just that he and his "team" four years ago came out of such a war that sensitivity is inevitable dulled. Laughter became a nervous discharge after the stress experienced. Besides those traveling to the epicenter of the explosion again experienced tension - after all, they knew what to go there very dangerous! However, the desire and *the need to see for themselves* overcame caution.

Two years earlier, in 1947, due to panic radiophobia, it had to be replaced by plant No. 817 of the director of the Voskresensky chemical plant, who arrived with Muzrukov. He, who was appointed chief engineer, said that he was physically unable to work at the nuclear object (although chemical production has never been a resort either). Precisely the rejection Sunday allowed Muzrukov to ask Beria to appoint him to the post of chief engineer Slavsky. But

Beria had strong nerves and had considerable inquisitiveness. And yet, the feeling responsibility. He was obliged to report to Stalin: "Yes, Comrade Stalin! I was in the center myself, personally! I saw everything and stood on a glass crust! There is a bomb! Although Stalin will watch a film, the first viewers of which were the participants of the experiment together with Beria. Here is how described this, without exaggeration, the historical film show of Sadovsky:

"They also managed to develop a film, which, in connection with the urgent departure of Beria decided to demonstrate directly in the optical laboratory of the test site. The birthday boy... was my friend G. L. Shnirman... We decided that he deserved the honor personally demonstrate to Beria the results of his work. In ... the laboratory ... they installed a movie camera, adjusted the blackout. About 30 spectators gathered, including Beria and his entourage (alas, again! - **S.K.**). Georgy Lvovich took up the film projector with undisguised pleasure, loaded the film, darkened the room and asked permission to start. Having received

agreement, turned on the projector, and suddenly a strong flash, an explosion! .. Everyone is horrified, silence. Finally, Georgy Lvovich declares: "The light bulb has burst. Now Let's put in a new one." I put it on, turned it on, everyone looked with pleasure and had fun dispersed."

They parted merrily ... And none of the "close associates" of "Stalin's satrap" Beria after flashes and explosions (!) did not rush in the dark to grab the "terrorist" Shnirman ... No one after session did not begin the investigation with prejudice. Everyone parted happily. Because there were normal people with normal reactions, and this incident is nothing but laughter, could not call.

SUCCESS is success, and everyone understood that those who ensured it would be rewarded. But another anti-Beria slander also entwined around the first "atomic" awards: they say that Beria ordered to give awards according to the principle: to whom, in case of failure, was determined execution, to give the Star of the Hero. To whom - the maximum term of imprisonment - to that order Lenin, etc. This slander was not shunned, for example, by Professor V. Ya. Frenkel in an article published in No. 7 of the Zvezda magazine in 1990. Another myth - about possible reprisals in case of failure - spread after execution of Beria even by respectable people from the weapons environment, but this was also just anti-Beria myth, as well as stories about Kurchatov's alleged constant fear of Beria. Professor V. A. Tsukerman, Hero of Socialist Labor from Arzamas-16, in the book "People and explosions" reports that Kurchatov, who liked to invent "sharp words and phrases," publicly used the word "rukrebyata" (abbreviated as "leading guys"), calling everyone like that, "starting from the deputy minister." So what kind of "fear" are we talking about here? And about what "understudies", which in the case failures supposedly started new works instead of the repressed Kurchatov and his colleagues?! This after all, nonsense even from a purely business point of view! In works on the uranium problem, all the best forces of the country are busy, and Stalin knew this very well.

In some respects, the lie about the fear of "atomic" reprisals reminds me of the lie about company, shot de by their own barrage detachment. After such an idiotic the execution of the detachment would have been forced to take the blow of the attacking German troops on itself, since it would have deprived itself of a "shield" in the form of a company. And for this reason no one ever did not shoot one of his companies. So here too! No one is talking about any possible reprisals I thought then! This is already in Khrushchev's times after the first "refusal" in the tests of a certain the gallant colonel of state security wanted to "start an investigation." But even then Minister Malyshev just roughed him up. Although this one, already often walking through the pages of "historical research", the episode is known only from the words of the long-term Chief Designer nuclear charges of Academician, Lieutenant General E. A. Negin and cannot be considered as absolutely reliable. There were 15 versions of Savinkov's capture in the Chekist environment, but in gunsmiths have their own folklore...

As for the awards, the issue of them was resolved calmly and in a businesslike manner. General A. S. Alexandrov from PSU (then he was for some time the head of KB-11 in Sarov), recalling, testified that it was Beria, after the RDS-1 was successfully tested, when discussing the issue of how to reward gunsmiths, became the initiator buildings - as a reward at the expense of the state - dachas to leading gunsmiths, allocating them cars, etc. However,

this is only a legend, although for the "image" of Beria and positive. But I, writing this book about Beria, do not even need "white" tales about Lavrenty Pavlovich. The truth about the hierarchy of atomic awards is this ...

Almost two and a half years before the RDS-1 was successfully tested, it turned out top secret Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin No. 627-258ss of March 21, 1946, where the **types** of awards and rewards for scientific discoveries and technical achievements in the field of use atomic energy.

There were five types of awards. And about the first prize it was said like this:

"1. The first prize is awarded for solving one of the following tasks:

- a) for the development of a proven and accepted for industrial use plutonium production method; b)
- for the development of a proven and accepted for industrial use uranium-235 extraction method; e)
- for the creation of a proven design of the atomic bomb ... "

That is, everything: the titles of Heroes and laureates, large cash prizes (up to a million rubles), houses-mansions with furnishings, cars, the right to free travel for himself and family members within the USSR by all modes of transport (Khrushchev has this right selected gunsmiths), etc., all this was determined in advance!

But gunsmiths were awarded secretly. Secretly because the very fact of success was hidden - a TASS message dated September 25, 1949, made "in connection with the President's statement United States of Truman on conducting an atomic explosion in the USSR "had strategically disinformation character. The fact of the explosion was denied, and its fixation by the West was contacted with "construction work on a large scale". The TASS statement, in particular, stated:

"As for the production of atomic energy, TASS considers necessary to recall that as early as November 6, 1947, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov made a statement regarding the secret of the atomic bomb, saying that "this secret has long ceased to exist" ... Scientific circles The United States of America accepted this statement by V. M. Molotov as a bluff, believing that the Russians could master atomic weapons no earlier than 1952. However they were wrong...

It should be said that the Soviet government, despite having nuclear weapons, stands and intends to stand in the future in its old position an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons..."

In such a bluff was Stalin's precise and clever calculation for the creation of that psychological the effect of the uncertainty of the result of nuclear aggression against Russia, on which to this day the regime of nuclear deterrence, or rather, nuclear stability, is maintained throughout the day. Let the Yankees think that the Russians have had the bomb for a long time!

It is significant that in a letter sent to Beria by the Chief of the General Staff S. M. Shtemenko November 19, 1949, in particular, it was said:

"... the Americans believe that if the bomb tests were successful, then, Apparently, mass production of atomic weapons has already begun in the USSR.

As you can see, the utmost secrecy was useful. And so the gunsmiths were awarded secretly, but generously: Gold Stars, orders, Stalin Prizes and simply large prizes ...

Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Slavsky, Dollezhal, academicians Khlopin and Bochvar, corresponding members Vinogradov and Khariton, Zernov, Shchelkin, employees of KB-11 Alferov, Zeldovich, Flerov and a number of nuclear scientists became Heroes of Socialist Labor.

Kurchatov, Slavsky, Khariton, Shchelkin and Zeldovich would later become Heroes three times, Zavenyagin and Zernov twice. And the precedent for the secondary awarding of the Gold Star was established in 1949. At the suggestion of Stalin, Vannikov, Muzrukov and Dukhov became the first twice Heroes (Nikolai Leonidovich Dukhov, like Vannikov, would later receive a third star).

Became a Hero of Socialist Labor - also at the suggestion of Stalin - German Professor Riel. But

what about Beria?

On October 29, 1949, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers adopted Decree No. 5039-1925ss and on its awarding.

"For the organization of the business of atomic energy production and the successful completion tests of atomic weapons " Beria received a) gratitude; b) Certificate of honor; c) Order of Lenin; d) the Stalin Prize of the first degree.

And

that's it! But such an official formulation of merit is in fact an admission that the business of producing atomic energy (in other words, the nuclear industry) was organized by him -

Lavrenty Beria! And the scope of his efforts and the efforts of his associates is also visible from the fact that the period from August 1945 until the moment the RDS-1 was tested, only decisions and more than 1000 orders of the GKO, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted! Around 20 per month. And each of them was not an empty stationery, but the result of a serious study of the issues that these resolutions and orders dealt with. AND to all of them one way or another, Beria was related. A

thousand organizing documents of only the highest, governmental, level! A there was also a daily current flow of other papers, behind which were large and small Problems.

When is there to catch girls in the alleys! The current "democratic" reformers have almost ruined the Sovereign Cause, which was organized by the supposedly "totalitarian", but able to be - according to the testimony of academician Khariton - "polite, tactful and just a normal person" Lavrenty Beria. And then - at the turn of the forties and fifties - this is the case after the first success developed rapidly.

And so the story about him must continue.

CHAPTER

18 SPECIAL COMMITTEE WORK AND GOSSIP ABOUT THEM...

ANY big business is overgrown with legends. When I arrived at Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, stood in the early July morning of 1981, leaning against the balustrade platform over the Irtysh not far from the building of the headquarters of the landfill, I was told that from this the very place Beria admired de air nuclear explosion. This is a harmless

legend. But the legend, say,

that the work of Soviet nuclear scientists took place in the conclusion under the harsh hand of the "gloomy" 9th Directorate of the NKVD - this is a legend maliciously caricature. At the beginning of 1946, the 9th Directorate (Department of Special Institutes) headed by

Deputy People's Commissar A.P. Zavenyagin, formed by order of the People's Commissar No. 0081 of January 26, 1946 of the year.

On March 15, 1946, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, like all other people's commissariats, was transformed into a ministry. And from that moment under the jurisdiction of the 9th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR were:

- Institute "A" in Sukhumi, located in the premises of the sanatorium "Sinop", with the German director Professor Ardenne, the creator of the electron microscope;
- Institute "G" near Sukhumi, located in the premises of the sanatorium "Agudzery", with German director Professor Hertz, Nobel Prize winner;
- laboratory "B" (object "Lakes") in the area of the city of Kasli, Chelyabinsk region on base of the sanatorium "Sungul", where the study of issues of protection against ionizing radiation and where the head of the radiobiological department was "Zubr" N. V. Timofeev Resovsky, who worked here with the same German colleagues with whom he on behalf of the leadership of the Third Reich, he dealt with the breeding of the race superhumans, for which he received from the Soviet country a "voucher" to the sanatorium "Sungul".
- laboratory "B" in the Kaluga region, near the Obninskoye station, located in premises of the former colony of Spanish children and gave rise to the Physical and Energy institute. In 1947-1949, the development of laboratory "B" was led by the 9th management of such a "densely uneducated" person as a full member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR A. I. Leipunsky. As

you can see, in the conditions of imprisonment (in the sanatorium, however, Germans and some of our specialists convicted of very real sins. And for illustrations of Beria's style, as well as for a more voluminous picture of the era, will be useful

to acquaint the reader with an extract from Beria's instructions of August 16, 1946:

"TT. Pervukhina and Zavenyagin to check on the state of affairs in institutions "A" and "G" (taking Comrade Leipunsky with him), take the necessary measures and within 2 weeks to submit their proposals to ensure maximum the use of the Germans.

At the same time, keep in mind the need to establish regular monitoring of fulfillment of tasks by the Germans (both in terms of quality and timing).

Persons who successfully complete tasks should be presented for the award, and persons who skimp on work should be withdrawn from institutions and sent to camps.

L. Beria.

And although camps are mentioned here (where none of the Germans was sent), but here too there is no notorious "camp dust".

In March 1948, Kruglov and Zavenyagin turned to Beria with a written request for the transfer of all these "sanatoriums" from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of PGU, since the subject of their work was completely "pegushnoy" and all work issues were resolved in PSU. Beria got in touch with Pervukhin, he spoke with the head of the PGU Vannikov and on March 27, 1948 he reported Beria that Vannikov "categorically objects to the admission of these institutions to First Main Directorate.

Only on August 15, 1948, a decree of the Council of Ministers signed by Stalin was issued. No. 3091-1248ss / op on the transfer of all objects of the 9th department from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to PSU, and paragraph 6 of the resolution ordered Minister Kruglov:

"a) to enroll in the current reserve of the Ministry of Internal Affairs the generals and officers of the 9th the Office and its institutions, laboratories and facilities; b) provide them with the required uniform; c) keep the apartments they occupy."

And this item had its own background ... July 28, 1947, Deputy Chief PGU Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik turned to Beria with a letter. Personnel Chekist (born in 1910, in 1932 he graduated from the Central School of the NKVD), he was responsible for personnel and mode. A lot of vile things have also been written about him, however, according to the memoirs of KB-11 veterans, for example, he was a tough but fair person (an assessment that applies to Beria), and in life is also kind. In 1953, he, like Beria, was arrested and at the end of 1953 shot. So

Meshik wrote:

"To Comrade Beria L.P.

In the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a significant number of officers of the Ministries of the Armed Forces, Internal Affairs and State Security. Decree of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR of October 5, 1945 ... for the generals and officers seconded or transferred to work in the First headquarters, all rights and benefits provided for generals and officers of these ministries and they are listed as members of personnel for the entire time of their work in the First Main Directorate.

However, PGU officers under the Council of Ministers of the USSR are deprived of many rights and benefits, i.e. they do not receive a cash bonus for officer ranks, as a rule, the assignment of the next officer ranks is delayed, they are not submitted to long service awards and are not provided with sanatorium treatment.

We ask you, Lavrenty Pavlovich, to help the officers of the First Chief management under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to receive the

government benefits in accordance with the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 5.X.45, No. 2531-678 ss.

P. Meshik.

The problem was serious - due to the uncertainty of their position, many sought to leave the "honorary" service at the PSU back to their departments. And Beria addresses a letter to the Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin with a visa: *"I ask you to urgently consider and to resolve the issue of the officers of the First Main Directorate. L. Beria. 12.VIII.1947.*

And such prompt concern for people doing the same thing with him was for Lavrenty Pavlovich characteristic. He even gave the cut he received for the People's Commissar's overcoat, after the overcoat was cut, to his colleagues. In contrast, by the way, from Marshal Zhukov, who stored trophy cuts at home for kilometers. For example, in early July 1947,

Beria personally visited the construction plant number 817. Visited for the first time. That on his third visit he spent there special "social" meeting of the Special Committee, we know. But even after the first visit, he was concerned about the situation in the social sphere on the "sorokovka". And immediately gave an instruction to Vannikov to improve the housing and living conditions of the workers of the plant. AND already on August 20, Vannikov reported to him that:

“• For 1947, a housing construction plan of 15,000 sq. meters, but it was decided to build another 5500 sq. m. standard wooden single-family and two-family houses;
• it was decided to build 4500 sq. m. m permanent residential stone and wooden buildings for temporary occupancy by builders with their transfer to the plant at the end of construction; • in the town of the plant are being built and will be put into operation in 1947 a ten-year school, a bathhouse, a laundry, a canteen-restaurant, a kindergarten, a nursery, a central boiler room (by October 5), a temporary wooden cinema, and a permanent bakery was already built in 1946.”

At the end, Vannikov suggested:

"In order to improve the cultural and social services for the workers of the plant No. 817, it is necessary to speed up the opening of commercial stores, cafe-restaurants, tea houses ... "

Moreover, all these measures applied not only to the workers of the still under construction "plutonium" plant, but also to the builders themselves.

TO SAY that Beria enjoyed universal love is impossible ... He was not by nature prone to lipping, and for many years of such a life, when, in fact, continuously, day after day day, it was necessary to make many heterogeneous decisions, they could not help working out from him naturally decisive demeanor. And she could not please everyone, and certainly not could not please people of a cold soul and petty mind.

And if objective observers (the same academician Khariton or a German professor Ril) noted the politeness of Beria, this indicates an initially very high internal culture and self-discipline of Lavrenty Pavlovich, because few people, placed in conditions of Beria, would have retained, even at the heights of power, the ability to relate to others with understanding. And to treat with *understanding* - at this level - this is a lot!

Managers at Beria's level are extremely busy. In order to highlight the importance of businessman in the West, they say that a minute of his work is worth so many thousand dollars. A minute of Beria cost tens of thousands of dollars. And if she was wasted wasted, it brought a loss not to him personally, but to the country. Therefore, sharp, decisive, and with necessity (alas, often occurring) and the tough style of conversation was almost inevitable.

I say "almost" because, judging by the style of the visas on the documents, and by a number of memories, Beria was, as a rule, quite restrained in expressing emotions.

And the

charm? He didn't even have time to be charming! It presupposes the opportunity to chat a little, joke, smile ... And when could he behave like that? Only in a very close circle, not just close employees, but those who were devoted to him. There were few admitted to sincerity. But those who respected him not only as

leader, but also as a person, there were many, only for many decades of defamation

Beria, they almost all managed to die out, not having the opportunity to tell the truth about him. But someone was able to pass it on, so to speak, the baton. In

2003, the Minsk publishing house "Belarusian Encyclopedia" published a book by Fyodor Dmitrievich Popov "The Atomic Bomb and the KGB". The author got to the "object 550" (KB-11, base No. 112, Privolzhskaya office of Glavgorstroy), that is, to the center for the development of nuclear weapons in Sarov - "Arzamas-16", in 1954, when Beria had long been betrayed by the official ostracism.

And here is the operational commissioner of the "objective" department of the KGB, Captain Popov presents himself to the head of his department, Lieutenant Colonel V. I. Bronnikov, and begins a detailed conversation about the "atomic" history of the "object", about the former Sarov desert, about operating conditions, etc. F. D. Popov writes:

"Bronnikov noted that the decisive role in the development of the atomic epic played by Kurchatov, Khariton and Beria. "If not for them, then the atomic bomb in the USSR would hardly have been tested in 1949," he said.

This, dear reader, is an episode of 1954 (fifty-fourth), when Beria was on top-level declared agent of international capital!

Captain Popov was not familiar with Lavrenty Pavlovich, but he knew both those who knew him personally, and those who worked "in the time of Beria." And therefore Fedor Dmitrievich let him out second-hand, but he was also able to tell the truth about him - in modest but honest sizes:

"Wide deployment in KB-11 of activities in its main profile was strictly regulated by the availability of housing ... Many specialists huddled in overcrowded monastery hotel, which was formerly used pilgrims of the Sarov monastery. The

situation with housing changed dramatically after the intervention of Beria. According to him Direction under Directorate No. 880 (for the construction of a "facility" in Sarov. - **S.K.**

) ... a specialized housing unit was created. IN

1948-1950 many residents of Arzamas-16 celebrated housewarming. For three years occupied more than 200 houses. They were different - and duplex cottages, and Finnish prefabricated panel houses, and multi-apartment stone and block-block houses. Next to the old monastic buildings stood three- and four-story Houses. The monastery itself with temples, chapels, a bell tower, cell houses and the refectory turned out to be in the very center of the object "...

This is verbal proof of Beria's concern for the ordinary participants in the Atomic Project. And here is a documentary example from the "top floor" of the project ... July 12, 1946 Kurchatov on the letterhead of laboratory No. 2, he writes a top secret letter with the following content:

"To Comrade Beria L.P. I report that the state of health has sharply deteriorated lately comrade Kharitona

Yu. B. Examination in the central polyclinic of the Ministry of Health The USSR showed that there is a functional disorder of the nervous system and

cardiac activity (pulse 120 per minute) with general severe overwork and depletion of the body. According to the conclusion of the chief physician of the polyclinic, Dr. Sosyan needs a break in the work of Comrade. Khariton for sanatorium treatment.

I consider it possible to give Yu. B. Khariton a vacation of one and a half month.

I ask for your decision and help.

Academician I. Kurchatov.

So, once again, Beria had to move from the general problems of uranium problems to seemingly minor issues ... And what, Kurchatov was afraid to take on responsible for Khariton's vacation? Of course not! But he knew that if he turned to Beria, then Lavrenty Pavlovich would also make sure that Khariton was treated according to first class and that in general everything was first class ...

And so it happened: Beria imposes a visa right there, by hand, without entrusting it typist: *"tt. Chadaev and Busalov. Provide everything you need. L. Beria. 12/VIII.*

Moreover, Lavrenty Pavlovich, with all his thoroughness, put an extra dash, because Kurchatov's letter lay on his desk on the day it was written - July 12, and already on July 18, Makhnev's assistant A. Vasin noted:

"By order of Comrade Busalov, Comrade Khariton was provided with treatment in sanatorium "Barvikha".

A. Vasin.

The pulse of Beria himself was not taken into account by anyone. He asked for vacation no one - except perhaps Stalin. Yes, and Kurchatov also worked in permanent mode. overload. Fourteen years later, in the winter of 1960, at the age of 57, he instantly dies on a garden bench during a conversation with Khariton, in fact - on his hands. By that time, almost seven years had passed since the death of Beria.

After reading Kurchatov's letter, I thought - why didn't he turn to Vannikov with this? To Malyshev? To Pervukhin?

To Zavenyagin?

After all, they all

also possessed considerable, it would seem, power ... And he turned to Beria. Or here's another case. March 9, 1948

Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Nikolai Andreevich Borisov writes to Beria about the problems with the allotment of land for the "construction cottages for German specialists currently living in Ozyory..."

It was inconvenient for the Germans to get to work in laboratory No. 2 and NII-9, and Zavenyagin prepared a draft government decree on the construction of cottages in a suburban area. However, the executive committee of the Moscow City Council categorically objected, citing the refusal by the fact that "this the site is included in the forest park protective belt of the city of Moscow and is not subject to development.

Today, any "oligarch" or a major official solves such problems in his own way. benefit in passing, ruthlessly cutting down not only protective zones, but national parks. And here in the "totalitarian" USSR, even PGU had problems here.

So, Zavenyagin insisted, Borisov believed that "as an exception" to agree Can.

And how does Beria decide? He immediately finds a quite obvious (after being found) way out. His visa is:

"T. Zavenyagin A.P. It is necessary to do without the construction of special cottages for these specialists, and find a residential building near their place of work and adapt it.

L. Beria. April 10, 1948".

All right! Why damage the protective belt of the capital when everything can be solved easier and cheaper? Why didn't Zavenyagin think of this before with all his managerial experience? Why did Beria have to think about the forests around Moscow? And what a "monster"! So, you see, they would build in fabulous places, next to Moscow (15–20 km) a group of cozy cottages, and here the Germans will have a good time to leave (their contracts provided for the return home after completion of work). And in cottages you can settle the highest state bureaucracy. And the "ghoul" (the term of the "general" Volkogonov) Beria took, but he hacked everything in the bud ... He didn't cut down the forest, but the administrative stupidity!

DETAILS about the resolutions of Beria on the official documents of the Atomic Project, I I'll talk. But how often the need for these resolutions was caused not by an objective the complexity of the issue, but the elementary unwillingness of Beria's colleagues to decide on their own in cases where everything could be solved without the chairman of the Special Committee and the deputy chairman Council of Ministers ...

In July 1946, the United States announced two nuclear tests on the atoll Bikini in the Marshall Islands. On July 1, a powerful atomic bomb from an aircraft was to be dropped on the atoll lagoon, where 73 obsolete ships were stationed, and on July 25 an underwater nuclear explosion was supposed. And in the USSR a natural idea arose to organize in the Pacific Ocean a special integrated research expedition to obtain information about these tests.

On June 11, 1946, Beria, as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, signed the order of the Council of Ministers No. 7877-rs obliging the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Academy of Sciences, the Main Department of hydrometeorological service under the Council of Ministers to take the necessary actions. And it started...

Admiral Galler on June 26 asks Beria for instructions on the allocation of fuel in excess of the limits for ships and aircraft, and Beria authorizes the expenditure from the mobilization reserve Pacific Fleet ... On July 2,

academicians Semenov, Kurchatov and Alikhanov turn to Beria with a proposal about sending an aircraft to the test area to take samples from the radioactive cloud of the explosion.

On July 2, for some reason, Vannikov asked Beria to give additional instructions to the admiral Kuznetsov.

On July 3, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, considering the idea of three academicians "acceptable", informs Beria that it is necessary to give instructions to the Minister of the Navy of the USSR Shirshov (to one of the Papanin's four, drifting at the North Pole-1 station) about providing the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yumashev, with transport "Yerevan", as well as about allocation of fuel - additional to additional.

July 5 Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Golovko in addition to Kuznetsov's letter actually disavows the idea of academics, referring to the fact that the Americans declared the district tests dangerous, and claims "a low probability of obtaining gaseous products explosion outside this area "... The position

of the fleet looks strange! A dangerous area is not a restricted area. This is international waters, you can go in them! And everyone who turns to Beria has already received grounds for action - Order of the Council of Ministers No. 7877-rs. Now the risk is the problem fleet. Later, American ships constantly entered those areas of the World ocean, which were declared dangerous for navigation by TASS in connection with the launches Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, "decision

makers" do not make them, so July 5 Academician Semyonov reformulates the idea of sampling and writes to "deeply respected Lavrenty Pavlovich":

"... Lavrenty Pavlovich, of course, there is no guarantee that it will be possible get the result (the theory is inaccurate, you can make a mistake in the direction of the wind, an explosion can be carried out very deep under water, i.e. at a depth greater than 10–20 meters, etc.). However, there is a chance for success, and the information received is exceptionally great interest.

To have time to do it, you need to give an immediate order.

Vannikov, in a letter to Beria dated July 6, supports Semenov and again asks "to give instructions to Admiral Kuznetsov.

But even Beria seems to be tired of all this paper storm in the vast ocean of clerical ink, and he sends a letter from Semenov dated July 5 to the Minister of the Armed Forces USSR Bulganin, writing on it by hand:

"Tov. Bulganin. At your discretion. **L. Beria.**
6/VII".

Bulganin, on the other hand, is not a ministerial matter, to think, - imposes on a letter resolution:

"AM Vasilevsky. I ask you to consider this issue with a call to comrade.
Kuznetsova.

N. G. Bulganin. 7/7/46".

Everyone involved in the bikini-related vicissitudes had a solid base for any actions - the order of the Council of Ministers. And they all had great independent government powers. Imagine there was a war going on and the changed operational environment would require the urgent preparation of a major operations at sea. Is it really the fleet represented by Admirals Kuznetsov, Galler, Golovko, Yumashev would not have found reserves of fuel without turning to Beria?

The Marshall Islands are not a low beam, but could it not be possible to change the plans for combat preparation of the Pacific Fleet so that the sending of Soviet ships there is considered as planned combat training campaign?

Yes, for this it was necessary to urgently break the approved schedules, estimates, etc., but if real managers run the business, everything becomes possible, and everything becomes possible in the shortest possible time. Rocketeer Korolev said: "Whoever wants to do business will find means, and who does not want - a reason for refusal. Alas, the admirals and the military chose the second option. After all, it didn't really concern them...

Seven years will pass, and many participants in this story will take part in the creation primary antiberiad. And they will agree when Beria begins to attribute the most ridiculous "crimes" and "sins". And Beria will not even have the opportunity to do anything object, because he will be deprived not only of the right to work for the good of the state, but in general the right to life.

He was loaded every day, managing to control all the key moments. For example, from the Urals, from plant No. 817, at the beginning of August 1949, they should bring to the Volga region in KB 11 a precious (and what a "precious" - priceless!) plutonium "ball" for carrying out control assemblies before sending the "product" to the landfill in Kazakhstan. And all Beria personally monitors the movements of the letter train. This

is not a reinsurance and not distrust. And not only heightened responsibility. This also competence, understanding that this is the only way to help solve all possible hot questions in real time! After all, he is Beria! He is everything solve it the right way!

In April 1948, officials from the Ministry of Cinematography deprived KB-11 of the right to receipt of feature films on the grounds that applications for films do not indicate-

de "exact geographic coordinates and the name of the ordering organization." And the general Zernov and the head of the political department of the "object" Razorenov write a letter to Beria with a request settle the matter.

And he settles.

Bureau No. 2 of Sudoplatov receives American materials on the production residential construction for nuclear plant personnel in Clinton and Hanford. And their Beria immediately addresses the main "atomic" builder A. N. Komarovskiy with a clear hint - we need to build no worse ... But how tiresome it all

was! And if he still knew what he would receive from his descendants, from the country for these great and daily works in decades? .. And what are the descendants - in four years his name will be trampled into the mud by his own colleagues in the leadership of the country.

All this is sad, comrades ... Alas,

when we come across the "memories" of Beria, "told" to us through many years after Beria was presented as a villain for the first time at the July plenum of the Central Committee, then one must be very careful even in cases where the memoirists are doctors Sciences, and even academics. Cautious because when Beria is presented as a "monster" and "Executioner", we are not told about the real historical Beria. We are being rehearsed with the rumors that he has acquired over many decades of blasphemy against him. And if unscrupulous attitude towards the memory and good name of Lavrenty Pavlovich are engineers and scientists, then what can we say about "creative" people who are fiction by occupation put! And

"reliable testimonies of the victims" about "torture, led personally by Beria", about his hands "up to the elbow in blood"... Well, why is it necessary to be "up to the elbow"? would write already - on the shoulder, or at least on the forearm ...

Here is another example... The book I mentioned about Zavenyagin was published with the support of OAO Mining and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel, because Zavenyagin, having graduated from the Mining Academy, was one of the founders of the Norilsk Combine. By the number of quotations from sources malicious at Beria's address can be attributed, I repeat, to the classic ones, and the manuscript of "memoirs" is especially often cited there.

I. I. Novikov" from the archive of the author-compiler M. Ya. Important. In the index to the book

it is said briefly about the memoirist: "academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences", and Important cites his revelations as follows:

"Zavenyagin, better than anyone else, realized how important it was in the most short deadlines to create an atomic bomb, and, moreover, so that it was not a single copy ... but at the same time, production should be launched to ensure the release of the required number of such bombs.

The strategic task formulated by Zavenyagin, Vannikov, Kurchatov (exactly in this order. - **S.K.**), was to in the shortest possible time to establish the industrial production of nuclear weapons ... "

etc., etc. Zavenyagin at PSU was actually Vannikov's deputy for general issues, and in accordance with the distribution of responsibilities of the management staff of PGU, he directly observed (quoting from the docs):

"1) the question of metallurgy; 2) the issue of refining and mining enterprises; 3) questions of geology; 4) construction; 5) GSPI-11 (State Union Design Institute. - **S.K.**); 6) control group; 7) labor protection; 8) general supply; 9) transport".

These are all important questions, but they are not key. Into strategic issues Zavenyagin was not particularly involved, although he also had to decide something. Sometimes - and strategic area. But who is Academician Novikov himself? What contribution did he make to the Soviet Nuclear project? Judging by another passage of his, given in a book published by "Polymedia", then the academician did a great job in the weapons problem and knew everything to the point, for example:

"The hard work, which also took place in an atmosphere suspicion and distrust on the part of Beria, constant threats and encouraged Beria denunciations, exhausted the body and undermined the health of Zavenyagin, Vannikov, Kurchatov ... "

Or:

"On the eve of the first explosion of the atomic bomb, Beria prepared proscription lists for Kurchatov and his employees, whom he intended severely punish in case of failure of the test "

etc.

So who is this expert on the "atomic" history of the country? In the reference book of the Ministry of Atomic Energy for 1995 "Who is who in nuclear energy and industry" there is no such nuclear scientist was found, but in the all-Russian reference book it was stated:

"Novikov Ivan Ivanovich, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, b. 1916, adviser to Directorate of Institute of Metallurgy. Main areas of scientific activity: fundamental research of the gaseous state, especially the water state pair" ...

That's so "gunsmith"! That's the "expert"! A trace of Ivan Ivanovich was found and in reference book of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for 1977. Then still a corresponding member, Novikov, being a member of the Department of Physical and Technical Problems of Energy, worked at the same Institute of Metallurgy named after A. A. Baikova. As a heat engineer, he seems to have been involved in nuclear work. energy, but he was absolutely not oriented in weapons problems. However, the ugliness about Beria, under the guise of an academic toga, launched into public circulation.

Perhaps some of the readers will find my tone in relation to well-deserved person. But in the course of working on this book, more than once I simply bitten by the vile irresponsibility of such "water vapor specialists", on old age who decided to acquire additional qualifications of specialists in "camp dust". So for your evil irony in their address, ask for forgiveness from no one intends. And this connoisseur of the "gaseous state" also poured mud on Pavel Sudoplatov:

"Apparently, in order to intimidate Beria, he introduces into the apparatus of the Special Committee for the rights of the head of the technical department (this is how the academician calls Bureau No. 2 for intelligence. - **S.K.**) political killer Sudoplatov ... "

What can be said here? Sometimes not only for deeds, as Christ affirmed, but also for one can recognize *them by their words*... Moreover, the word is also a deed.

LOVERS of throwing "camp dust" into the eyes of gullible people wrote a lot about draconian-de regime measures, about the sinister "authorized" Beria, lead-de hanging over the soul of nuclear scientists. Plenipotentiaries of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for nuclear objects really were. However, they were selected from among technically educated Chekists. Arkady Konstantinovich Kruglov, author of one of the first serious and

professionally accurate books about the nuclear industry, "Atomprom Headquarters", wrote about them as follows:

"Naturally, the style of work of these commissioners was different and could not like everyone in the conditions of that race of work on the Atomic Project, but the label "informer" or "taskmaster", who, with the light hand of journalists, and a number of specialists, has become widespread, very primitive and biased characterizes the activities of these people.

Beria, as we remember, was an experienced intelligence officer and counterintelligence officer (which in one face is not often successfully combined), and the introduction of the institution of authorized representatives of the Council of Ministers in the structure of atomic work was his good idea. And much in our "mode" was taken from the experience of organizing regime security measures used in Manhattan US project - they were the first.

And the "regime" in the "democratic" States was by no means benign. The reader should remember the name of Vladimir Kozmich Zworykin, who emigrated to the United States in 1919. Zworykin - the inventor of television, the largest specialist in the field of electronic optics, president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). His army night vision The United States used it during World War II!

Having nothing to do with politics, Zworykin in 1943 headed, however, the New York branch of the Fund for Assistance to Victims of the War in Russia (even wife of President Roosevelt). And in 1945, Zworykin was included in a group of specialists tasked with searching for the scientific and technical secrets of the Reich in Germany. But when he appeared with a group at the Washington airport, it turned out that leaving outside the US he is prohibited. Zworykin recalled it this way:

"I learned that my passport was being held by the State Department because I am a member of the Fund for Assistance to the Victims of the War in Russia ... Needless to say, bitter a pill after... so much work given to my new country. I felt like in a cage. I had to...prepare to be fired from RCA as I lost access to his work on secret projects. Here for me General Sarnoff stood up (the head of the research firm David Sarnoff. - **S.K.**) ... In the end, in 1947, my passport was returned to me, and I again became a free man."

I gave this example not to condemn the actions of the US authorities. Each country has the right guard their secrets as they see fit. But to complete the subject of rationality and the benefits of regime restrictions, I will give another story with the same Zworykin.

Firm RCA in 1935 entered into a major agreement with the People's Commissariat electrical industry of the USSR for the supply of technical documentation and equipment for production of electrovacuum devices. The last time Zworykin came in connection with this to Leningrad and Moscow in 1936. Today it is sometimes argued that in the future Zworykin until 1959 even refrained from official trips to the USSR in connection with extension-de-repression, but there is evidence to explain this abstinence otherwise. In September 1934, 28-year-old Leningrad scientist Leonid Kubetsky demonstrated to the Russian American his new development - multi-stage electronic multipliers. It was a phenomenally fruitful idea, useful to many practical purposes. Having sketched Kubetsky's scheme on the first piece of paper that came across, Zworykin, upon arrival in the United States, quickly developed his own multiplier, received a patent for it and in October 1935 he made a presentation on this new class of electronic devices at the New York branch of the Institute of Radio Engineers. However, on Kubetsky's priority, Naturally, he didn't refer.

Is anyone interested in the fate of Kubetsky? Well, in 1948 he got Stalin Prize and just in the year of Beria's death he was awarded an article about himself in the Bolshoi

Soviet encyclopedia ... But he was frank with Zvorykin all the same in vain. And if in at the moment of their conversation there was, say, an authorized representative of the Council of Ministers, lieutenant general Tkachenko, then perhaps the New World would have had one less discovery.

It was not in vain that I remembered I. M. Tkachenko. At the beginning of the war, he was the head of the 7th department of the NKVD, responsible for the Chekist maintenance of the production of mortars, and in The nuclear project became authorized by the Council of Ministers of the USSR at plant No. 817. As the reader remembers, I hope, in his memoirs Novikov the gunsmith (let's call him that from Novikov-heat engineer) made Tkachenko almost a fool. And he was just useful pedant. He did not forbid anything - he had no such rights. He informed and, say, on June 24, 1948, he wrote to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P. about the violation of safety rules by Kurchatov and Slavsky:

"Academician I. V. Kurchatov sometimes ignores all safety rules and precautions (especially when something goes wrong)... Comrade Slavsky E.P. behaves even more imprudently.

So, on June 21, Comrade Kurchatov went down in an elevator to a mark of minus 21 meters into the moisture detector room at a time when there was activity in it. over 150 allowable doses.

The security guards of the MGB attached to it, without being on this account briefed, and the employees of the radiometric service, bowing before his authority, did not interfere with Comrade. Kurchatov ...

Since his visits to infected places are not caused by any necessity, I personally asked Comrade. Kurchatov to be more prudent ... I ask for your instructions ... "

And Beria personally and strictly warns the "violators" - in the name of their own health. That Tkachenko also pointed out that deviations from the project of plant "B" of plant No. 817 and insufficient participation of the supervisor (i.e. Kurchatov) in the Reconstruction of the plant may lead to its early shutdown and pollution environment. They did not listen to Tkachenko and eventually received an environmental catastrophe.

I do not know the fate of Tkachenko after the death of Beria, but I know that the year of his birth is 1910, and his death is 1955. And, most likely, he shared the fate of his boss, whose modest and honest employee was for long and turbulent years in a great era.

And NOW, without a direct connection with the previous one (although this is how you look!) I intend to to give the reader two debts, which I have owed to myself since the "military" chapters of this book.

I mean the theme of "forcible migration of peoples", the main culprit who is usually called Beria. Sometime after all, it is necessary to say at least a few words about her.

September 1, 1942 in the name of a member of the GKO Beria and the commander of the Transcaucasian Front Tyulenev left the request from the General Staff:

"Urgently. Beria and Tyulenev.

Maslennikov (commander of the Northern Group of Forces. - **S.K.**) and the Chechen Ingush Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ask the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command permissions:

1. Transfer the national Chechen-Ingush cavalry regiment and cavalry division to operating units of the Northern Group of Forces.

2. To allow the recruitment of volunteers into the Red Army... At the same time, Maslennikov informs:

a) Ingush and Chechens want to fight the

Germans; b) there are more than 45,000 conscripts in the republic, who are sent to the Red The army is not called up, and considers it necessary to deploy among the Chechens and

Ingush movement for their voluntary entry into the Red Army ... Comrade. Stalin ordered to ask for your opinion on these issues.

Beria was skeptical of such an idea, and he was right. Border Guard General Maslennikov, with whom the reader is already familiar, had the open soul of a soldier and imagine himself that a whole nation is capable of betraying the Motherland, he could not. Plus get in the heavy days replenishment under fifty thousand people was a tempting business for the general. But Beria knew and understood what sometimes only experienced doctors and experienced doctors know and understand. counterintelligence

officers ... Chechens were a thorn in the body of still tsarist Russia, and the course of military events proved Beria was right: it was impossible to trust Chechnya! Therefore, when the military situation allowed, the Chechens were evicted from Chechnya.

OK! Suppose Stalin and Beria showed injustice to the people as a *whole* by deporting all Chechens in a row in 1944 to the interior of the country ... But why

1991, this "innocently injured" people is the people as a *whole*, although not all of them guilty - has become one of the factors of the decomposition of Russia?

I think, honestly reflecting on this question, the reader himself will find the answer to the question is - did Stalin and Beria have reason to do what they did? Moreover, the real KGB operation in the Caucasus was carried out without those excesses that are now full of its "democratic" descriptions. As for the Crimean Tatars, I will cite a document that was kept in the 60s in

archive of the Crimean regional party committee (fund 151, inventory 1, file 17):

"List of dead partisans in the Yalta detachment from 26.III/42: 26.III. - When attacking a dignity. dugout of the former 3rd group killed
opponent: Sergeev, Ptashinsky, Goremykin, Kazachek, m / s Nikolaev.
28. III. - The fighter Godin died, the cause is illness, influenza.
2.IV. - Afonin died - heart disease.
2.IV. - Killed by a traitor - Smirnov, Vyaznikov, Ageev.
5.IV. - Kachalov died, the reason is exhaustion.
7.IV. - Dolgov died, the reason is exhaustion
10.IV. - Garbuzov died, the reason is exhaustion
12.IV. - Died tt. Bolotin, Shostik, Borshinov... Zibarev. From hunger.
13.IV. - Comrade Grebenshchikov died. Hunger.
14.IV. Gardas died. From hunger.
18.IV. - A. A. Zuev died. From hunger.
21.IV. - Sokolsky, Mukhin died. From hunger.
24.IV. - Rastorguev died. From hunger.
19.V. - Shutenko died. From hunger.
21.V. - Grishko died. From hunger.
21. V. - I. P. Doroshenko died. From hunger.
20. V. - Alekseev died. From hunger.
21.V. - Ponomarenko is killed.
30. V. — Orekhov died. From hunger.
6.V. Timokhin died. From hunger.
10. V. - Korenyuk died. From hunger.
May 15 - Kravchenko died. From hunger.
17.V. - Loboda died. From hunger.
22. V. - Zagosa D.V. died of starvation.
26. V. - Kuzerin died. From hunger.
26. V. - Died Kondratenko V. A. From hunger.

This is the result of the fact that the Crimean Tatar guides gave the Germans practically all food bases of partisans in the Crimean mountains. There were dozens of prisoner-of-war camps in Crimea - the Germans wanted to make Crimea

impregnable, and fortification work required labor. The guards of the camps are Tatars. If among the prisoners there was a Red Navy sailor (a piece of flannel, a vest, a pinned anchor), then death for such a Slavic guy from the Smolensk region or Poltava region became a deliverance after standard abuses: carved stars, stripes of a "vest", gouged out eyes, cut off genitals... Read, read, dear reader, and let the "democrat" read it. I didn't intentionally I cite here digital data, although they say that the percentage of Crimean Tatars loyal to the Soviet regime did not exceed 20 percent. But only on May 9, 1945, it became known that the war ended on May 9, 1945, and ended in our victory. The Germans did not consider themselves defeated even in January 1945 and had reason to do so - the Reich was still strong and delivered powerful blows to the Russians in area of Lake Balaton, by the allies in the Ardennes. And already in 1944, many in the Reich (whatever they didn't write otherwise) were sure that failures were a temporary phenomenon. So could Does Russia allow itself the luxury of having in 1944 in its rear potential centers of uprisings in the Caucasus and Crimea, supported from outside? And again, let's look at the current situation. What brought the return to the Crimea "repressed Tatar people"? Blood, growing ethnic conflict. AND its source is the people "innocently injured" by the "executioner" Beria.

I was distracted by plots that, at first glance, are far from atomic, but in fact are connected with them by the fact that any plot associated with Beria is like a nut the shell is covered with a strong crust of petrified mud. But if this crust is broken, then we we get the "core" of the truth about Beria. And this truth about his pre-war, military and post-war activity proves the huge human scale and human viability who carried it out. As a

statesman, he was neither kind nor evil, he was adequate to the historical situations. And what more can we ask of prominent statesmen? But how he was never a ruthless and soulless statesman. He wasn't like that the beginning of life, so that cruelty and butchery grow in his soul.

Throwing a bridge from the topic of "repressions" to the "atomic" topic, I will introduce reader with the letter I already mentioned to P. M. Zernov to B. L. Vannikov from the same February 12, 1949, when Zernov allegedly waved at Beria with either a candelabra, or a paperweight, or a club carved from a spreading cranberry. Zernov wrote:

"... over the past eight months, a completely abnormal environment. By

decision of the Government in 1947, to ensure security on object ... from the zone were resettled all persons who had in the past criminal record or other compromising data (500 people were resettled, including family members, with the provision of new housing and loans, with the payment compensations, etc. - **S.K.**) ...

However, things changed radically for the worse, starting with April 1948. Released from

custody construction department No. 880 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs The USSR ... began to be left at a construction site as civilians. As a result of such more than 1,750 people have accumulated in the zone ...

Among those released from the camp and now living freely in the village a lot of hooliganism, theft, robbery and there were cases of murder ...

There are always crowds of former prisoners in public places. Scientific and engineering and technical workers (this is about the elite of the Atomic project. - **S.K.**) cannot get into the cinema, they began to be afraid to walk the streets in the evenings and at night ...

Three times I submitted memorandums on this issue addressed to Comrade Beria L.P., but since there are no decisions, I don't know if they were reported to him?

Knowing the level of the "mode" directly within the walls of KB-11, in a similar collision *next to they are hard to believe!* But that's the way it was. And today, those who worked at "atomic" construction sites in the camp padded jacket are written exclusively as "victims of the regime." And involuntarily you regret that in public places filled with that "criminally advanced" crowd "victims" of the "executioner" Beria, it is impossible to transfer the assets of "Memorial" and others for at least half an hour "denouncers" of Lavrenty Pavlovich's "crimes". Perhaps then gossip and insinuations around his activities would have diminished ...

And also about the "atmosphere of fear", allegedly hovering around everything related to Beria's activities. On March 8, 1947, Zavenyagin wrote to Beria:

"The First Main Directorate is guarded by watch guards, staffed by civilians. Despite systematically applied disciplinary measures ... have

place sleep on duty, desertion and a number of other serious misdemeanors.

Experience has shown that watch guards are completely unreliable, not ensuring the safety of the secret documentation of the First Chief management".

This is also hard to believe. But that was it too! Now let's think if *the then* popular rumor attributed to Beria some kind of "butchery", the watchmen would have behaved so irresponsible? And what is the fate of these negligent watchmen? Erased 'in the camp dust'? Sent to the "slavery" of the Gulag? No, Zavenyagin just asks to transfer functions protection to the Ministry of State Security.

Minister of State Security Abakumov refuses on the grounds that the Ministry of State Security is guarded only by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Minister of the Interior Kruglov refuses in the same style. Then on March 24, 1947, N.A. Borisov from the State Planning Committee also wrote to Beria. And on March 25, the signed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the transfer of protection of the buildings of the CCGT under the Council of Ministers USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

But Beria would not have been Beria if, at the same order, he had not instructed Zavenyagin and Borisov in connection with the transfer of the guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "to reduce the staff of the commandant's office and protection", installed almost a year ago. Beria knew how to be not only operational, but also economical - "in a big way" and in small things.

And one can only wonder how he managed to do both with an ever-increasing circle entrusted to him the most important issues of state life. After all, Atomic his tasks were not exhausted by the project ...

Chapter 19

BERIA + KUKSENKO = "BERKUT"

NO, dear reader, Beria in this formula bore the name not Lavrenty, but Sergo. Although Lavrenty Beria was directly involved in the birth of this formula.

And before starting the story about the Berkut system and the Third Main Directorate under Council of Ministers of the USSR, I will offer the reader a saying. In the summer of 1941 the front steadily approached the capital. And, as the aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev recalled, at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command It was decided to hold a military game to repel an air raid on Moscow.

The game was held in that mansion next to the People's Commissariat of Aviation industry, where the Headquarters was located, while the Kremlin was preparing for it bomb shelter. Stalin, Air Force Commander-in-Chief P.F. Zhigarev, his deputy I.F. Petrov, People's Commissar of Aviation industry Shakhurin, his deputies Dementiev and Yakovlev, aviation generals.

The commander of the air defense of Moscow, Major General Gromadin, and the commander air defense fighter aircraft Colonel Klimov. Perhaps Beria was also

there, since, as a member of the State Defense Committee, he was also responsible for questions of the Air Force, but

history, as well as Yakovlev (aircraft designer), are silent about this.

Yakovlev writes:

"Throughout the entire exercise, Stalin carefully observed everything and listened, but did not utter a word. When the game was over and, as expected, the attacks of imaginary enemy aircraft were repulsed, he silently walked around the table. One got the impression that the options played out did not convince him ... Finally, lighting his pipe, he said as if through his teeth: - I don't know, maybe it's necessary ...

Then he silently went into the office, inviting

Shakhurin, Dementyev, Zhigarev, Petrov and me ... Just as on us, this war game did not produce a serious

impressions: somehow everything is schematic and paper.

However, Moscow's air defense was already far from being a "paper tiger". A. G. Fedorov, author of the 1975 monograph "Aviation in the Battle of Moscow", reports that, according to According to the GKO decree of July 9, 1941, the Moscow air defense zone had 585 aircraft, 1044 anti-aircraft guns (and Soviet anti-aircraft guns were very good!), 336 anti-aircraft machine guns, 618 searchlight stations, 124 barrage balloon posts and 702 VNOS posts (air surveillance, warning and communications).

For comparison, it is also reported there that London was covered by 452 guns of a large, medium and small caliber, Berlin - 724.

Here we must also add the first 8 domestic radar stations of the type "Redoubt" and

RUS-2. Moscow was covered powerfully - it was not overnight that it was assembled and equipped here such strength! The Moscow air defense system was built as a circular one, the distant frontiers of the VNOS were assigned to 200-250 kilometers from Moscow, and this allowed fighter aircraft meet the enemy at ranges starting from 150-200 kilometers from the city, and fight to the outer border of the anti-aircraft fire zone (28-32 kilometers from the city center). Last fighters were forbidden to enter the zone, with the exception of cases of pursuit of the enemy, begun outside the zone of action of anti-aircraft

guns. And yet, as we see, Stalin doubted, although the Moscow air defense actually worked not bad - in the first raid on the capital on July 22, the Germans lost 12 aircraft shot down air defense fighters, and 10 from anti-aircraft fire. Only single individuals broke through to Moscow bombers. At the same time, anti-aircraft artillery units of the 1st Air Defense Corps used up 29 thousand shells and about 130 thousand machine-gun cartridges.

In total, over the two-month period of repelling raids on Moscow, 471 thousand shells, while the average consumption per reflected aircraft was 2775 shells. This pleasure is not cheap - a downed plane.

But then already in the air defense system there were, as it was said, radar stations. So, when using the RAS, the average consumption of shells per reflected aircraft was a total of 98 shells. And one anti-aircraft artillery shell then cost a couple of chrome boot.

When the Germans withdrew from Moscow, measures to protect the capital did not weaken. By On April 5, 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front was created by the GKO decree, which was transformed in July 1943 into the Special Moscow Air Defense Army. Front all the more moved to the west, things were getting better, and at some point even theoretical threat of raids.

German raids ... However, immediately after the war, Stalin again began to occupy Moscow air defense problem. After all, with the advent of atomic bombs in the United States, this problem has changed fundamentally. Even a single plane over Moscow could now provide Russian the capital was the fate of

Hiroshima. But after such a "telling" you can lead the story itself ...

ACTUALLY, I am relying here on evidence, in particular, of such a competent expert, as Major General, Doctor of Technical Sciences Alexander Pavlovich Reutov. A prominent scientist and designer in the field of radar, after graduating in 1950 he Air Force Engineering Academy named after N. E. Zhukovsky began in that KB-1, which laid the foundation for the modern air defense of Moscow. He cites the

story of the founder of KB-1, Major General Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, also a prominent scientist and radio engineer, about how one of the nights of 1950 Kuksenko called Stalin to him and said that the last enemy plane had flown over Moscow on July 10, 1942, and it was a single reconnaissance aircraft. And then Stalin said that now it is necessary to build such an air defense system in Moscow, which even in the case of a "star" (then is from all directions) of a massive raid would not have missed a single one to the capital aircraft capable of carrying an atomic bomb.

To Stalin's question - what kind of air defense should be, Kuksenko replied that a promising air defense system should be built on the basis of a combination radar and guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Stalin questioned Kuksenko

in detail, according to Reutov, because the problem was fairly new to him. But I do not rule out that Stalin simultaneously experienced a fifty-two-year-old specialist, because the meaning of radar became clear to him even before the war, at least - after his conversations with Admiral Axel Ivanovich Berg (father - Swede, mother - Italian, Berg himself - a thoroughbred hare).

In order for the reader to understand that we did not slurp cabbage soup in "totalitarian" times, I will inform you that the first serial Gneiss-2 airborne radar developed by V. V. Tikhomirova was created in July 1942 and was installed on a bomber "Pe-2" in the version of the interceptor. A Council for Radar at the GKO, Deputy Axel Berg became chairman, was formed in July 1943. Chairman Council was, by the way, Malenkov, but here, as a competent manager, he "technocrat" did not excel. In the end, and radar - as an interested person in top leadership - supported by Beria.

Kuksenko, during the war, with the rank of captain of the GB, was the chief engineer of the license plate Research Institute of the NKVD of a radio engineering profile, and Beria, of course, knew him. In 1947, in at the age of 51 (born in 1896, died in 1980) Pavel Nikolaevich became a doctor technical sciences, and a year before that he received the Stalin Prize for the development of a new bomber sight. It is very likely that it was Beria who "brought" him to Stalin.

One way or another, Stalin told Kuksenko that it was necessary to immediately begin the creation of Moscow air defense, designed to repel a massive raid from any directions. Soon Design Bureau No. 1 (KB-1) of the Ministry of armaments - a large design and research and production concern for development of radio-controlled missile systems. At the head of KB-1 were Professor Kuksenko and young Sergo Beria, who graduated from the Academy of Communications in Leningrad.

Grigory Vasilievich Kisunko - in 1946, a teacher at the academy, and later - one of the veterans of both KB-1 and missile defense works, Hero of the Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, lieutenant general, in 1996 published the book "Secret zone". Kisunko's book in terms of assessments, especially political ones, turned out to be shallow, but valuable descriptions of the factual side of the case.

About Sergei Beria, he writes that he was not distinguished by arrogance, was brought up and tactful, and "his head cooked well" ... Kisunko also reports that Stalin, convinced that Kuksenko was able to provide an effective air defense system, "no longer considered it is necessary to call Pavel Nikolaevich for personal conversations, leaving the Berkut to the full care of L.P. Beria. So, the

rocket business fell on the same person who was already in charge of the atomic business ...

FOR THE FIRST TIME Beria encountered them at least three years before the war, about which Almost no one remembers now. And he immediately went to such a powerful "rocket" personality, like Sergei Pavlovich Korolev. Yes, at that time Korolev was convicted and was in prison. But I can inform the reader that the Journal of Visits to the Kremlin Stalin's office recorded the appearance of Sergei Pavlovich in this office in October 1938 (October 15 from 22.15 to 23.40). It was a long conversation with the participation of Voroshilov, who entered Stalin at 21.50 and left him already at ten minutes to two on October 16th.

So the stories that the future chief designer of astronautics for years kaylil breed, you can give Antonov-Ovseenka. The Queen had, of course, a hard time, but Beria was not to blame - they arrested the Queen before the arrival of Lavrenty Pavlovich to the Lubyanka. But after Beria arrived there - among the many cases of direct, so to speak, the profile of his "office" - he carefully got acquainted with the rest.

One of the founders of GIRD - the Jet Propulsion Study Group - in the Rocket Since 1934, the Korolev Research Institute has been engaged in guided cruise missiles: 201, 212, 216, 217 ... The 212 ground-to-ground missile was launched using a powder rocket catapult from rail guides, and its first flight took place on January 29, 1939.

Then, when Korolev was a "prisoner". And already on April 3, 1939, he again appears in Stalin's office, this time with Beria!

And the three of them sat there from 18.00 to 18.35. A little over half an hour, but they were half an hour of a personal conversation with the head of state! And the conversation, most likely, was about how best organize the work of the Queen, how Beria can and should help ... And since all three the interlocutor were people of action and chatter was not tolerated, then in half an hour everything was discussed.

But, apparently, Stalin was also interested in purely technical details, because on The next day, Korolev was brought to Stalin again. And they were already talking in private hour - from 18.00 to

19.00. In the book of Boris Evseevich, an undoubtedly outstanding figure in Soviet rocket science Chertok "Rockets and People" states that Stalin was "usually reported" about all news in the field of weapons, but about "land (for a professional, the term is actually strange. - S.K.) until 1941, Stalin had no information on rockets. As you can see, he had.

Moreover, we

note, here is the innocently convicted Korolev before Stalin. We have long a familiar tale of sighs: "Oh, if only Stalin knew!" But Stalin knows... He doesn't may not know *where* a young talented rocket scientist *is brought* to him . Well, so what this rocket man does not fall on his knees and ask: "Have mercy on me, comrade tsar-sovereign! Not ruin your soul!"

No - there is a business conversation, and both understand that there was some kind of sin, and that it is necessary work it out with deed, and that it will be worked out, and this will be followed by honor, and awards, and ... And, most importantly, new tasks and tasks. New exciting job!

After all, they all lived by it then - the new Soviet people ...

And Korolev.

And Stalin.

And

Beria. And already on February 28, 1940, test pilot V.P. Fedorov completed the first flight on the RP-318 rocket plane designed by Korolev, based on his own glider "SK-9", with working liquid propellant rocket engine. And in 1942-1943 Korolev leads development of an aircraft rocket booster for the Pe-2R aircraft, for which in 1945 he was awarded with an

order. After the war, Korolev, among others, worked in Germany, studying the richest experience German rocket men, and there his paths crossed with General Zernov, who then also, as an authorized representative of the Special Committee under the State Defense Committee, was related to the "missile"

searches.

Beria was aware of all these issues and at the turn of 1945-1946 he became one of those who signed a memorandum to Stalin with a proposal to organize work on rocket technology in the USSR and in Germany (the Nordhausen Institute was deployed there). It was signed, besides him, by G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Bulganin, N. A. Voznesensky, and also Minister of Armaments D. F. Ustinov and Chief of the GAU Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev.

On April 14 and 29, 1946, two meetings were held in Stalin's Kremlin office this topic, and on May 13, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1017-419ss "On issues jet weapons. Under the Council of Ministers, a Special Committee on Reactive technique consisting of: G. M. Malenkov (chairman), D. F. Ustinov and I. G. Zubovich (deputy chairmen), N. D. Yakovlev, P. I. Kirpichnikov (the reader should remember from work in a group under the member of the GKO Beria during the war), A. I. Berg, P. N. Goremykin, I. A. Serov (him, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov, Chertok in his memoirs he stubbornly calls him Beria's deputy), N. E. Nosovsky.

Beria was not a member of this Committee No. 2, but here is the assessment of P. I. Kachur, the author of the article "Missile technology of the USSR: the post-war period until 1948" in No. 6 of the Russian magazine Academy of Sciences "Energy" for 2007:

"In fact, rocket science was led by L.P. Beria. G. M. Malenkov dealt with organizational and production issues and was a formal chairman of the committee...

B. E. Chertok, whom I mentioned, also confirms that Malenkov, like Bulganin, who soon replaced him, "did not play a special role in the formation ... of the industry. Their a high role was reduced to viewing or signing draft resolutions, which prepared the apparatus of the

committee. Everything was repeated, as in the case of the "aviators" Malenkov and Molotov during war. They presided, Beria pulled the cart. Also this one. But again I draw

the reader's attention to the name of Kirpichnikov. Beria and in the rocket The Special Committee had a reliable assistant, experienced by him during the war years.

At first, the same approach was adopted in the development of rocket technology as in uranium problem, - the reproduction of the German prototypes V-1 and V-2. initiative this is usually attributed to Stalin, but B. E. Chertok reports that on the exact Ustinov insisted on reproducing the German V-2, about which *"more than once I had Korolyov serious conflicts"*. Copying then, however, was reasonable way out - the Germans in rocket work went as far ahead of the rest as the Yankees - in atomic.

But their own research and development were also actively conducted - in 1947 in the Design Bureau Korolev passed full-scale tests of experimental rockets. An employee of the Design Bureau since 1946, A. N. Volfitsin, recalled in the eighties that some launches "rather resembled a demonstration of aerobatics" - almost immediately from the launch of the rocket instead of vertical flight, they turned into intricately curvilinear.

In 1948, a meeting again met with Stalin, where Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev (another "innocent" victim of Stalin and Beria) spoke out sharply against the adoption of the missile technology into service, motivating the failure by the complexity and low reliability of missiles, as well as the fact that the same tasks are solved by aviation. Korolev just as sharply spoke "for" ...

Our first ballistic missiles were really imperfect. But their appearance in the troops would be a serious impetus to the improvement of technology, and at the same time, the military would gain operating experience. Stalin spoke out in this spirit, noting that Comrade Korolev needed to make such a rocket in order "not to upset our military" ...

By the way! To those who are trying to present the matter in such a way that our rocket men, squeezed

Stalin's instructions, in the early years they only reproduced German samples, it would not hurt to know that already in 1948 Korolev invited a cockpit layout specialist to his design bureau aircraft - engineer A. V. Afanasiev from the Yakovlev Design Bureau, to study the project manned ship. Then this project "did not go", but Afanasiev subsequently took an active part in the development of spacecraft "Vostok" and "Soyuz" ...

In Special Committee No. 2, the Minister of Armaments Ustinov decided a lot, but Beria's "rocket" significance can be understood from one conversation from the time of 1952, described G. Kisunko.

Then there were problems with one of the KB-1 designs, and Ustinov assembled interdepartmental meeting at which Kisunko met Korolev for the first time. At the end of the meeting, Kisunko asked Korolev to give him a ride on Pobeda, and already in machine reproached a colleague for not supporting KB-1 in the best possible way, a representative whom Kisunko was at the meeting...

I am not a supporter of quoting direct speech from memoirs, since this is always something if not fictional, then not reliable, but the answer is the Queen as presented by Kisunko I will give:

"- And if I went too far, then this is also understandable: I have my own minister (Ustinov. - **S.K.**), and you have your own bosses, who even at his request did not want to take part in the meeting, where representatives from the LP itself ... I had to shift the emphasis a little towards KB-1 ... You, for LPs are your own: you can do nothing more than scold "...

Kisunko has a negative attitude towards Beria (father), and therefore is especially convincing look in his presentation such words of the Queen, which show a respectful attitude to the LP of Sergei Pavlovich. Rocket and nuclear scientists have such abbreviations ("SP" - Korolev, "YUB" - Khariton, etc.) were used only in relation to those whom respected.

BACK, however, to the air defense of Moscow. In 1950, according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426ss / op of August 9, the air defense system Moscow received the name "Berkut". The exact origin of this name cannot be established today, but KB-1 veterans agree that it was formed from the initial syllables of the names of the main designers of the system - Beria and Kuksenko. And for ensuring the development, design and manufacture of means included in the air defense complex system "Berkut" on February 3, 1951, the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 307-144ss / op was the Third Main Directorate was formed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR under the leadership of V. N. Ryabikov with direct subordination to the Special Committee, that is, Beria.

Ryabikov was transferred to TSU from Special Committee No. 2, but in acute situations, Beria also connected Vannikov to it. Moreover, Vannikov - according to the testimony of the same Kisunko - sometimes spoke very harshly, for example: *"I ... am going to report LP, that all of you here have forgotten what responsibility is ... You are spoiled and think that everything is allowed to you. You were given everything you asked for ... And now that's enough, now you let's" ...* However, as even Kisunko admits, they managed *"without searching ... goats absolutions"* .

Now, as chairman of the Special Committee, Beria oversaw: • The First Main Directorate, headed by B. L. Vannikov; • The second main department headed by P. Ya. Antropov, which was in charge of mining and processing of uranium raw materials into concentrate, and also carried out production and technical management of uranium mining from deposits developed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, and control over exploration for uranium and thorium;

• The Third Chief Directorate for Guided Missiles and Air Defense Systems, headed by

V. N. Ryabikov.

S.I. Vetoshkin became Ryabikov's deputy, and academician A.N. Shchukin became the supervisor of TSU. And KB-1 was included in the TSU. Kuksenko and Sergo Beria had the status of the Chief Designers, the only Deputy Chief Designer was appointed future academician and Hero of Socialist Labor A. A. Raspletin, creator central guidance radar B-200, which provided simultaneous tracking up to 20 targets. Radars of the first American anti-aircraft missiles Nike-Ajax complexes, in contrast to the multifunctional sector locator Slasher could only accompany one target. The chief designer of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) of the Berkut system was famous aircraft designer Semyon Alekseevich Lavochkin. Rocket Lavochkin received index B-300. The

head of the design bureau, in fact the head of pilot production, Beria chose Hero of Socialist Labor Amo Sergeevich Elyan. During the war, General Yelyan was director of the head artillery plant for the production of the most massive field and medium-caliber tank guns (100,000 guns were fired by Victory Day). AND at the same time, Yelyan entered Beria's sphere of influence as an experienced and skilled manager. As in "atomic" business, Beria saw the key to the success of "rocket" affairs in competent personnel and therefore transferred Yelyan, who had previously worked in the PSU system, to the system of the new Third GU.

If in the uranium problem the "first violin" was played by physicists, whose problems could understand in full a very small number of physicists, then in the rocket problem everything was clearer, more tangible. And dynamic teams quickly grouped around it young rocket enthusiasts, engine engineers, creators of ground and airborne systems management. And as the same Kuksenko later recalled, the work unfolded with unimaginable speed. In 1951, the stage of manufacturing prototypes began.

In November 1952, the first launch of the V-300 SAM against an air target took place. On April 26, 1953, a specially redesigned - remotely controlled unmanned - bomber "Tu-4", used as a target aircraft, was shot down. And in May 1953

the first stage of the launch program for real radio-controlled aircraft was completed. Here are two later assessments of the contribution of Beria Sr. to these achievements. General M. I. Naumenko:

"He repeatedly visited the Kapustin Yar training ground, where, by the way, he participated in tests, his son Sergei ... During the construction until 1953, while Beria was responsible for the implementation of the project, there was not a single failure from the very started..."

Lieutenant General, Academician A. G. Basistov (the value in Soviet works is already Missile Defense Outstanding):

"In August 1952, I reported to Lavrenty Beria on the state polygon sample of the Moscow air defense system. Beria came to our facility ... He spoke calmly, respectfully ... On that visit, he solved the problem for us nutrition. We worked for 18 hours, and there was really nowhere to eat. And after his visit all at once appeared ... "

I will interrupt the quotation of Anatoly Georgievich Basistov to acquaint the reader with the "evidence" of some nameless (even in 2000) "commander of one of air defense missile bases near Moscow", taken from the "investigation" by E. Zhirnov, published on June 6, 2000 in Kommersant Vlast under the heading "They dissolved Beria in alkali. According to the author, this *"combat officer who passed Patriotic war from the first to the last day, and decades later began shake your knees when you remember meetings with Beria "*... The reader himself will compare this

"revelation" with the memoirs of Basistov, and I will only remind you that by the time of Beria's arrest there were no air defense missile bases near Moscow - the Berkut system was then experimental, and the army did not exploit it. Zhirnov, by the way, cites another statement of this hardly whether the existing "officer" that the corpse of Beria after the execution was allegedly dissolved in alkalis, - hence the title of the quoted magazine libel.

Returning to the assessment of Beria by the Basistovs, I will give its final part:

"He didn't know much about technology, but at the top level he was strong, perhaps it was not stronger at that time ... "

A restrained assessment "I didn't understand too much ..." from the lips of a high professional is worth other enthusiastic. And it is especially valuable against the background of the statements of one of the well-deserved veterans of KB-1 and NPO Almaz Karl Samuilovich Alperovich. Laureate of Lenin and State Prize, having the Order of Lenin and the Red Banner of Labor, Doctor of technical sciences, professor, in September 2007 (then he was in his eighty-sixth year) gave an interview to the weekly "Military-Industrial Courier", where it is extremely negative spoke about Sergo Beria, condescendingly - about Kuksenko, and regarding the role of Beria in the creation of the Moscow air defense said this:

"The special position of Lavrenty Beria in the leadership of the country and his special "character" (and here is a false allusion to the fact that Beria headed de "pompous department", although the heads of the special services were then Kruglov and Ignatiev. - **S.K.**) ensured the attraction of unlimited material and human resources ("nuclear scientists", it turns out, did they get "leftovers" from rocket scientists? - **S.K.**). When we, for example, addressed our requests to any ministry, we never got a refusal - no one wanted to feel anger on themselves Lawrence. That is, being under the auspices of this person allowed our managers to resolve any issues without delay (but the problem of nutrition For some reason, only Beria decided the engineers at the training ground. - **S.K.**). As for the essence of the problems we were solving, then Beria had no idea about them had and actively did not want to get acquainted with them even at the most simplified, "murzil" level, because he did not have such abilities. Recent attempts to present Beria as an effective manager, have no basis. He was simply not capable of being him ... "

In such an assessment, only indestructible, blind, metropolitan "elite" malice is seen through attitude towards the "villain" "Lavrenty" ... By the way, Alperovich blamed his son for the fact that "with the arrest of Lavrenty Beria ... Sergo stopped visiting the enterprise altogether" ... Sergo then he was actually arrested, and then expelled from Moscow, but even under these conditions, through over the years, he gained quite a worthy professional status - unlike another rocket scientist, Sergei Khrushchev. It is interesting, by the way, how Alperovich relates to this former colleague who drove off to the States, while the son of Beria served his country?

As for Alperovich's accusations against Beria Sr., they prove the complete Karl Samuilovich's misunderstanding of the essence of Lavrenty's "managerial" activities Pavlovich. It was Khrushchev who could "favorably" delve into the technical details of specific problems at the "Murzil" level and **at the same** level to take already **managerial** solutions! And Beria - as Zavenyagin complained about him at the July plenum of the Central Committee (I will say this) - on the contrary, he scolded the managers subordinate to him for trying to get into details. "You are the organizers," Beria emphasized and demanded the ability to organize a business, and not utter "profound" sentences like Zavenyaginsky - according to the scheme of hydrogen bombs. This proposal of theoretical physicists was immediately ironically dubbed the "candelabra" (not did Beria "swing" at Zernov with this "candelabra"?).

Lavrenty Pavlovich therefore did not want to "get acquainted" with the "being of those who dared"

Alperovich problems that, being a high management professional, he saw **his** the task of providing Alperovich and his colleagues with everything necessary to solve these problems **by**

them. And Beria always solved this problem

brilliantly! Here are a few more words on the topic ... "Democrats" from science complain about the clamp cybernetics in the USSR in the 40s, but in reality at the end of the 40s, in accordance with government assignments Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation started organizing the design and production of computational and analytical and mathematical electronic digital machines. Minister P. I. Parshin (well acquainted with Beria on the mortar commissariat during the war) reported this to Lavrenty Pavlovich April 29, 1949 and asked PSU to take part in the preparation of technical specifications for ECM design. Such machines were needed both for calculations of thermonuclear charges, and for air defense systems.

The Berkut system was developed shock for many reasons, the main of which there was a real threat of US nuclear aggression. But the fact that it was developed quickly was also explained by the leadership of Beria - by the beginning of the 50s, he had already acquired such knowledge about economy, about the possibilities of the country and such experience that all his undertakings were doomed to

success. In the "rocket" Beria plot there is another dimension - a purely human one, and the comparison here suggests itself. I already touched it above. And the son of Beria

Sergo and Khrushchev's son Sergei became rocket men. The

son of Lavrenty Beria lived as a rocket scientist and died as a rocket scientist. And although after the death of his father his service career was cut short rudely and unfairly, he entered the history of missile technology as one of its pioneers. And despite all the obstacles, remained true to his profession for the rest of your

life. Nikita Khrushchev also "put" his son "into rockets". And I think he did so not only because it was, as they say now, prestigious, but also in defiance of Beria, whom Khrushchev certainly hated quietly, secretly and enviously - how capable mediocrity in relation to talent. After the

death of Beria, they tried to throw his son out of his beloved business, even changing his surname to his mother's - Gegechkori. But Sergo was deprived only of the chair, and not abilities. And over time, he even grew administratively. But from the pinnacle of power fell Khrushchev, and Sergei Khrushchev was also thrown out of his chair in Chelomey's missile design bureau. However there was no return to the former place.

Colleagues remembered Sergo Beria many years later. And Sergei Khrushchev was firmly forgotten, so just as new generations will increasingly forget his dad. But Father Sergo Beria, Russia, if it has a future, will begin to remember more and more loudly! Finally, let's take into account

the fact that the son of Beria's "international intelligence agent" died in his native land, without going anywhere from it in search of happiness. And his antipode, son "Faithful Leninist" Nikita Khrushchev, drove off to live in America.

And this is very revealing! Nikita

Khrushchev saw only an external effect in the development of rocket technology, and for the sake of realizing his rocket and space ambitions, he neglected the development of other types promising technology.

Lavrenty Beria saw a broad prospect for the development of the country's defense in interconnections of various systems of modern weapons.

They were antagonists here, as in everything else ...

The role of Beria in the formation of the rocket industry of science and technology was all the more significant that, besides Beria himself, she had only one in the top leadership of the country influential supporter - Stalin. Aviation designers, excluding Lavochkin, to rocket technology was treated, to put it mildly, with restraint. As, however, at first and to

jet aviation. According to the same B. E. Chertok, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev *"he was unfriendly to ... work on BI (Bereznyak and Isaev's missile interceptor with liquid rocket engine Dushkin. - S.K.) and to the works of AM Lyulka on the first domestic version of the turbojet engine"* and even published a sensational article in Pravda, where he characterized German work in the field of jet aviation as *the agony* of Nazi engineering.

And Beria immediately supported the rockets. Actually, the fact that rocket business was originally began to supervise the People's Commissar of Arms Ustinov (who to some extent can be considered "Beria's man"), and not the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin (who to some extent can be considered "Malenkov's man"), immediately reveals the influence of Beria. It was with Ustinov that he established working contacts during the war, and the appointment Ustinov into "rocketeers" could hardly have happened apart from Lavrenty Pavlovich. In a letter from his cell, Beria wrote on July 1, 1953 to Malenkov:

"I should especially note our joint active long-term work in Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on the creation of atomic weapons, and later, according to the Kometa and Berkut systems - guided missiles.

According to the Berkut, the tests were completed successfully. Now it's all about providing production in series and related personnel, and in this area is done very many relevant ministries. Most importantly, based on the "Comet" and "Berkut" there are enormous opportunities for further improvements in the field guided projectiles, both in terms of accuracy, and in terms of speed and range. A special report is being prepared for the government. This weapon must be moved forward, this is the real future, with which it is necessary to arm the army of our Country. The United States and Britain attach exceptional importance to this. I repeat, all this achieved because the Party and the Government wanted it, but wanted to say, and Here we worked together..."

As for Beria, he worked, but Malenkov, rather, "jointly" met, but I think Beria wrote this not only because he was sitting in a bunker, but also because he was always a man of the "team" and shared his laurels with others without greed. As

far as I understand, his son Sergo was the same. However, readers familiar with book by Sergo Beria, perhaps they noticed that I did not bring here from it either lines, although one of the founders of KB-1 wrote things about the history of the Berkut quite interesting.

Nevertheless, I am critical of the book of the son of L.P. Beria, especially in terms of pre-war, military and post-war history. Nor do I refer to his positive father's assessments - they can be perceived by someone as biased. In addition, Sergo Beria did his father not the best service by trying to describe him in contrast to the figure of Stalin, who committed crimes in which his father allegedly had to participate as fatal executor of Stalin's will.

But neither Stalin nor Beria had anything to do with villainy and Machiavellianism. They were busy building their state all their "Soviet" life and lived on this construction. That is why Russia's successes were so significant, because she - for all the costs of the real historical process - led *wisely*. And people always feel it.

AS Beria Sr. wrote, by the summer of 1953, things were going well for Berkut. But here Beria is arrested. And how events unfolded further in relation to KB-1, I will report, based on the information of G. Kisunko. Two positions of Chief Executives were abolished designers of KB-1, who were occupied by the founders - according to Kisunko - this organizations Kuksenko and Sergo Beria.

"Sergo," wrote Kisunko, "after a short detention under arrested was sent to live and work in Sverdlovsk under a new name (maternal - Gegechkori. - **S.K.**) and even with a changed middle name. To me had a chance to read the circular letter of the Higher Attestation Commission on the cancellation of the award to Sergey Lavrentievich with the degree of Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences.

Kuksenko - "one of the elders of domestic radio engineering", according to the same Kisunko, - was declared a "protege of Beria", but they were not arrested, but only interrogated in Prosecutor's Office of

the USSR. And the Berkut air defense system became known as the S-25. The chief designer of the S-25 was appointed Raspletin. Kisunko states:

"Berkut, like Sergey, was changed not only his last name, but also his patronymic, yes they also appointed a stepfather.

The S-25 was finally accepted and put on guard in Moscow in May 1955 and subsequently modernized several times. So this brainchild of Beria was also sued long life - unlike Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, who gave the rocket business a lot of his own vitality, and besides, he gave his own son into it ...

UNFORTUNATELY, the "rocket" Beria is "documented" immeasurably more poorly than Beria "atomic". And this topic is still waiting for its researcher, because to this day no published those documents, without which serious work is impossible. And this should be right reproach our rocket scientists, aviators, electronics engineers, and other gunsmiths! IN unlike nuclear scientists, they did nothing significant to declassify information of the 40-50s, which makes it possible to objectively highlight the role of Beria in the formation integral military-industrial complex of the USSR, which provided the country with a reliable nuclear missile shield and priority positions in many pioneer areas of scientific and technological progress. Or aircraft construction ...

Perhaps, only from the fifth edition (Politizdat, 1987) of the notes of the aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev, one can judge the degree of Beria's influence already on aviation affairs. And it is clear that Beria was also firmly connected with them. Yes this and not surprising, given that the problem of Moscow's missile defense was interconnected with the problem of new aviation manned interceptors (what today is called "air interception complex"). Yakovlev does

not have the slightest sympathy for Beria ... And his behavior on that meeting with Stalin, where the problems of creating a long-range heavy air defense interceptor aircraft were discussed, Yakovlev describes in extremely negative tones, exposing Lavrenty Pavlovich as an intriguer, discrediting the development of his design bureau in favor of Lavochkin's design bureau. Yakovlev also reports that the Yak-25 proposed by him (and went into series) allegedly had the flight duration and range are twice as long as those of the MiGs.

But it is not so. The Mikoyan Design Bureau prototype I-320 (R-2) had characteristics similar to the Yak-25 in terms of speed and range, but instead of two 37 mm cannons, the Yak-25 had he was armed with three such guns, and his ceiling was higher. The same can be was to be said about the Lavochkin La-200 aircraft patronized by Beria, which has there were fewer structural problems than the I-320. Yes, such

an authoritative specialist as the author of the "History of Aircraft Design in USSR "V. B. Shavrov, finishing the story about the I-320, wrote that this aircraft (like the La-200) was not accepted for serial construction, because "the Yak-25 was put into series ... superior to both the La-200, so is the I-320. But it's a fact that over time, all modern aviation interception systems gave the country Mikoyan and Sukhoi design bureaus, and not Yakovlev.

Lavochkin then conceived a supersonic fighter-missile carrier La-250 with a purely delta wing and plumage - a powerful, pioneering machine, the development of which

turned out to be burdened by a number of failures, but which promised breakthrough qualities, if only ... If at first it were not for the death of Beria, which could not but affect the position of Lavochkin, and then, in 1960, the death of Lavochkin himself. But this, dear

reader, is not all ... The following systems

were included in the Berkut air defense system as components: A-100 - target detection radar; B-200 - radar station for targeting; V-300 - anti-aircraft

guided missile developed by Lavochkin Design Bureau; **G-400**

is a fighter-interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles. The fourth system, the G-400, was never brought to the series, and it had to

refuse. And, most likely, because Yakovlev "interrupted" the order for an interceptor from Lavochkin, and the La-200B and the development of the idea - La-250 were just supposed to become elements of the G 400. After all, Lavochkin made the missile defense system for the Berkut, and therefore he is also an interceptor aircraft would develop taking into account experience in missile defense.

However, Yakovlev took over the work on the aircraft. That is, it turns out that Yakovlev, very likely, disrupted such an air defense architecture, into which already in the early 50s would be built in as an integral part of the system of the aviation interception complex.

And Beria saw the problem in a complex way. So, with a careful approach, it turns out that and here we are not dealing with the intrigues of Beria, but with a tendentious description of his position, on in fact, it is quite justified precisely from the standpoint of the interests of the state.

Chapter 20

RESOLUTIONS OF BERIA AND LETTERS OF KAPITSA

BERIA was a master of management, and, I think, for the reader of this book such a statement is already trivial. Even people who are prejudiced against him are forced to admit that Although Beria was a "villain", he was an outstanding organizer and "knew how to work."

But with my book I strive to show and prove also a large purely human the scale of Lavrenty Pavlovich, who - I am now convinced of this - was not just an outstanding personality, but also a morally wealthy personality!

Above, I have already cited, as it seems to me, evidence-based examples on this subject, but I have something else to say about Beria, a man and a citizen ... Let's say, Julius Borisovich Khariton cites a characteristic episode that became known to him from General A.S. Alexandrov, who headed KB-11 from 1951 to 1955.

Through the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Beria oversaw, among other things, the fuel industry, and in 1946 a decision was made to divide the Ministry of Coal industry into two ministries - the coal industry of the western regions and eastern regions. The first was to be headed by the former "general" minister V. V. Vakhrushev, the second - D. G. Onika. Beria, calling them to him, offered to share everything, including personnel and the social sphere, amicably. After the appointed time, he called again and asked: are there any mutual claims? Vakhrushev said no (actually, he there were, of course, more opportunities during the division), and Onika protested - they say, Vakhrushev he took the best personnel for himself, and sanatoriums.

Beria's decision was instantaneous and systematically accurate: if so, let Vakhrushev take a ministry intended for Onika, and Onika - "Vakhrushev's" ... And this decision can be cited as an exemplary example in textbooks on management, because the logic of Beria indestructible:

a) if the division was fair, then no one remains offended; b) if Vakhrushev cheated, he will pay for it; c) if Onika was capricious, now he won't even dare to hint that he had bad "starting" conditions.

Yes, and everyone else was taught a substantive lesson about what is more profitable under Beria

be honest than dishonest!

And here is a description of another meeting, given by one of its participants, and a person who treats Lavrenty Pavlovich extremely negatively. This is Grigory Kisunko, who at the end of February 1953 was called to Beria from the training ground "Kapustin Yar" ... A year before this, Kisunko's paths had already intersected with the paths of the LP, but in absentia. Then, in February 1952, having invited Grigory Vasilievich to his office, the chief engineer of the 8th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Armaments, Sergei Nikolaevich Savin, put before him on the table a folder with a "cart", which began like this:

"To the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Generalissimo of the Soviet Union
Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich
DEAR IOSIF VISSARIONOVICH! I can no
longer remain silent about, to put it mildly, sabotage actions
leaders of the development of the Berkut system, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Kisunko. By inviting Grigory Vasilyevich and Candidate of Technical Sciences Mikhail Zakson
Borisovich ... "

etc.

In the upper left corner there was a resolution:

"TT. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan. Understand and report. **L.**
Beria.

Savin suggested that Kisunko himself should write Minister Ustinov's reply to this "cart", which he did. It all ended in nothing. Moreover, Kisunko did not understand that Beria deserves respect even if only for addressing the denunciation for trial exclusively to technical management, without including here the department of the Minister of State Security Ignatiev. But father Kisunko was shot in 1938 as dispossessed in 1930.

A year had passed, and now a face-to-face acquaintance was coming, but Kisunko did not know for what exact reason. Kuksenko brought him to the Kremlin in his ZIM. And

besides them, the head of TSU V. M. Ryabikov, the minister of armaments D. F. Ustinov, "locator" Professor A. A. Raspletin, "radio operator" V. D. Kalmykov (future Minister of the Radio Industry of the USSR), Ryabikov's deputy for scientific and technical part of Academician A. N.

Shchukin. Also present was Beria's assistant Sergei Mikhailovich Vladimirovsky (his Kisunko defined a polite smile when inviting guests to Beria's office as "a grimace that is part of the stencil of courtesy") ... In

Kisunko's description of the appearance of Beria, Grigory's examination of Vasilievich of some unsuccessful photographs of Beria, published in the "catastrophe" time. But in the fact that he is not devoid of panache (and even poses - all the more, he wrote poetry, and even and with "feelings") Kisunko accurately remembered Beria's clothes, I believe: "magnificent, with pins and needles suit made of soft dark fabric, a snow-white shirt with an exquisitely tied a tie in the neckline of a single-breasted jacket "... Kisunko seems to reproach Beria for his style clothes, as if it would be better if the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers great power appeared to people in a worn jacket with short trousers, a shirt with a dirty collar and a "eternal" tie with an elastic band that has gone off to one side ...

Exactly the description of Beria's huge writing desk, "lined with telephone apparatuses" ... Well, a huge desktop is a necessary, albeit insufficient condition for the efficient work of a very busy person. These tables usually do not *manage*, but really *work*, conveniently laying out a lot of papers so that everyone keep them in sight, etc. When

everyone settled into their chairs, Beria ...

However, at first I confess that I quote Kisunko further with one correction: those

words from the mouth of Beria, which he gives with a "Caucasian" accent (thinking, obviously, that will cause additional negative feelings in the reader), I cite in the usual normative transcriptions - for the convenience of the reader ... So:

"First, let's get acquainted with one document," Beria began, rising from his chair (I am extremely grateful to Kisunko for this valuable detail, because she proves that Lavrenty Pavlovich was a well-mannered person, and not bossy boor who, lounging in an armchair, utters "deep" instructions subordinate "ruffian". - **S.K.**) and taking a folder from the table. - I give it to you now I will read: "Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you that anti-aircraft launches missiles of the Berkut system cannot be launched against real targets due to the fact that The antennas delivered to the test site by plant No. 92 turned out to be of poor quality. The plant reacted irresponsibly to its work ... and the representative of KB-1 Zaxon arbitrarily authorized the shipment of antennas with these deviations. We ask for your instructions. Kalmykov, Raspletin. Who

wrote this encryption? Beria asked. - We, Lavrenty Pavlovich, - rising in a military way, answered Kalmykov and Raspletin. - We are together.

- How is it together? Who was holding the pen? (Personally, the accuracy and "juiciness" of this question delighted me! He immediately, "at the vine", cut off the opportunity to let fog, plant turuses on wheels, etc., but set the atmosphere concreteness. - **S.K.**). - The

text was discussed together, and I wrote in the notebook with my fountain pen, - Kalmykov explained.

I realized that the cipher read out was a surprise not only for me, but also for all those present (Kisunko inaccurately expressed: for Raspletin and Kalmykov was only a surprise that Beria was so straight and immediately read their libelous encryption in front of all honest people! - **S.K.**)... That's what, it turns out, the authors of the encryption were doing secretly from me and Zaxon on training ground ... It's scary to work with such people ... - And

now let's read one more document, - continued Beria. "Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you that the antennas A-11 and A-12, manufactured by serial factories with deviations from specifications (technical conditions. - **S.K.**), fixed by military acceptance, according to the accepted our solutions are shipped for installation on combat facilities of the Berkut system. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Kalmykov, Shchukin, Kuksenko, Raspletin, Kisunko.

What document would you like to believe? Beria asked. - At the training ground antennas are unusable, and for military objects the same antennas turn out to be fit? Explain this paradox to me, Comrade Ryabikov. - Lavrenty Pavlovich,

apparently, comrades Kalmykov and Raspletin got excited and, without consulting anyone, hurried with encryption. We consulted with the chief designers and we believe that the antennas are suitable, - Ryabikov answered.

- Or maybe they didn't get excited, but they were pressured in Moscow and forced to sign this other document about the shipment of antennas to objects? A where will we ship from there? To the landfill?.."

Any person who has ever done business, not chatter, and accepted participation in meetings, already by the way Beria began this meeting, he will understand, firstly, how strong a manager he was, and secondly, and how he will treat a person with respect. So talking and "wrapping up" the matter will only be humanly bright and good personality!

Beria also asked a number of specific clarifying questions, listened to the answers of Kisunko, Kuksenko, and then ...

"After a pause, Beria summed up:
"I am convinced that the matter here is not simple. We need to sort out the special commissions. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan, Kuksenko. "And Shchukin," Ryabikov added. - Good ... Report the results of the commission's work to me on March 6, at Monday".

And this time everything for Kisunko ended in "nothing". He sees the reason for this not in objectivity of Beria, and in the death of Stalin that followed almost immediately after the meeting. However, this death did not violate the usual order of work either in the First, or in the Second, or in The third main department, and the order of work of Beria himself changed only to short time (as evidenced by the documents). So after March 5, 1953 Beria, if real sins were revealed for Kisunko, he would not be forgotten. Yes and the apparatus of Lavrenty Pavlovich (not repressive, but managerial) was not such that lose sight of serious issues, especially personnel.

Alas, malice is blind, and Kisunko remained a hater of Beria Sr. for life. But his only contact with him Kisunko, in terms of the actual, described reliably and objectively confirmed (unwittingly) not only the managerial class of Lavrenty Pavlovich, but also his high human qualities. And let's

see how they behaved - from the standpoint of the highest state interests - some of those who are presented as an "innocent victim" of the "executioner" Beria ... For example, aircraft designer Tupolev ... On

November 1, 1949, Zavenyagin reports to Beria in writing that during the flight of our then only carrier of nuclear weapons - the Tu-4 aircraft (similar to the Boeing 29), at an altitude of 10 kilometers, the temperature in the leaky bomb bay drops to minus 50 °C. And such a temperature will cause the appearance of cracks in the structural elements of RDS 1.

The actually heated Tu-4 bomb bay turned out to be a strategic problem. importance. Without it, the then Soviet atomic weapons turned out to be almost empty! And here is what Zavenyagin reported:

"... negotiations were held with TT. *Tupolev* and *Arkhangelsky* about the possibility bomb bay insulation ... But tt. *Tupolev* and *Arkhangelsky* at the last discussion of this issue in September this year. said they were overworked of special importance (here's how: "Don't come to us, don't come to us, otherwise we will refuse!" - **S.K.) and, in general, this work has nothing to do with aircraft construction has** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.) ... "**

Dear reader! The author's respect for Tupolev (exactly as a person!) During work on this book has already been severely tested. But after reading of the above arrogant response to maintain the same respect for Andrey It became even more difficult for the author Nikolaevich. This is necessary: no work for aircraft construction has nothing to do with it! And to ensure security, to **ensure guarantees of the existence of the country** has? So every day spinning in a wild squirrel wheel, oh they should be worried about the "executioner" Beria, and Academician Tupolev is a being of a higher order. He is "overloaded with works of special importance", not like this sexy de maniac Beria, who is only concerned with the satisfaction of his sex exaggerated from idleness. needs at the expense of innocent tenth graders!

And how does this "monster", this "murderer" react to an irresponsible, to criminal, anti-state, in fact, refusal of Tupolev? That's how:

"Tov. Zavenyagin! Together with Comrade Khrushchev (Minister of Aviation industry. - **S.K.)** and Tupolev (this is the absence of "t." before the surname Tupolev at scrupulous Beria is very eloquent! - **S.K.)** immediately accept

necessary measures. Report the result.

L. Beria. November 2, 1949".

For the first time, the question of heating the Tu-4 bomb bay was raised by Zernov and Khariton in letter addressed to Vannikov on October 7, 1949, which means that they asked Tupolev about this much earlier, because the "ties" of KB-11 with the Tupolev Design Bureau have been going on for a long time.

Given such details, Tupolev could be safely and without any exaggeration to blame in sabotage. However, in 1949 it was possible to do otherwise: on November 5, 1949, Khrunichev, a meeting was held, where his deputy P. V. Dementiev, deputy Tupolev were A. A. Arkhangelsky, and from PSU: A. S. Aleksandrov, P. M. Zernov and N. L. Dukhov. Eventually work on the insulation of the Tu-4 bomb bay was entrusted "to the chief designer of the aircraft comrade Tupolev A.N. ", and the work plan by November 15, 1949 had to be reported to Beria.

Work began no longer on the creation, but on the improvement of atomic weapons and its bearer. And this difference was, of course, qualitative, "significant".

YES, A TURNING year for the Soviet Atomic project, 1949 was ending and soon ended. The main backbone of the nuclear industry was available.

And Beria ...

No, he did not get the opportunity to devote himself at his leisure to the production of violins, like a marshal Tukhachevsky, or searching for rare stamps, like President Roosevelt, or at least writing watercolors, like Prime Minister Churchill (although Beria was once fond of watercolors).

Lavrenty Pavlovich was only able to switch from work to a greater extent defense for national economic work. Not completely, I emphasize, but to a greater extent least! Although defense work acquired a new quality.

But after all, the national economic problems did not bypass Beria all these years! On September 6, 1945, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the formation of two operational Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. One, headed by Molotov (Voznesensky - deputy, members Mikoyan, Andreev, Bulganin and Shvernik), was in charge of "issues of work NPO, People's Commissariat of the Navy, Agricultural and Food People's Commissariats, People's Commissariats trade and finance, as well as committees and departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Second, at the head with Beria (Malenkov - deputy, members Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Kosygin), was in charge of "issues of the work of industrial people's commissariats and railway transport."

And this work only intensified as the economy developed! Moreover, on March 20, 1946, two operational bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars were brought together into a single bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR under chaired by L.P. Beria (deputies - N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin). The system of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers then underwent reorganization more than once, on February 8, 1947 eight branch bureaus were formed, of which Beria had the Bureau for fuel and power plants with additional supervision of construction issues multi-storey buildings in Moscow and the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the MGB was monitored separately, according to line of the Politburo, and it was led by the Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Kuznetsov).

However, already on February 21, 1947 - three weeks later - Beria's bureau (for fuel and power plants) was merged with the Kaganovich Bureau (for transport and communications) into one Bureau for fuel and transport under the chairmanship of Lavrenty Pavlovich. But for any In the management structure, Beria's duties in the Council of Ministers have long been paramount. So, on March 28, 1946, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 674, duties between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stalin and his deputies. Stalin watched only the Ministry of Armaments, and the ministries and departments between his deputies were distributed differently. And Beria was assigned twelve ministries - more than anyone else! Even Voznesensky had several less weighty and responsible "gentleman's set". Voroshilov had, it is true, seventeen positions, but only five "ministerial" ones, including the Ministry cinematography. Kosygin also has twelve with ten "ministerial", but Kosygin

was a pure "business executive". Andreev oversaw agriculture, Mikoyan - in mainly food "block", Kaganovich - two major ministries and the Committee for architecture ... Molotov was "registered" by the Ministry of Justice, the Committee for Higher School, Committee on Radio and Broadcasting and TASS.

On March 18, 1946, Beria finally became a full member of the Politburo - the Plenum of the Central Committee introduced him to the top party leadership at the same time as Malenkov (Bulganin and Kosygin then became candidates for members of the PB).

Since December 1945, Beria was also a member of the narrow commission on foreign affairs at the PB. (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Zhdanov). There is an

interesting document - "Extract from the Protocol No. 81 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee VKP (b) on the distribution of working time L.P. Beria.

Here is its full text:

"March 15, 1951

Top secret

Decision of March 15, 1951. 1.

Questions of the Council of Ministers of the

USSR. 4. Tov. Beria to oblige half of his working time to give to case No. 1,

2 and 3.

Secretary of the Central Committee.

"Case No. 1, 2 and 3" - these are the duties of a member of the PB of the Central Committee of Beria on the 1st ("atomic"), 2nd (uranium mining) and the 3rd (work on the missile defense of Moscow) main directorates under the Council of Ministers THE

USSR. "Case No. 3" as a separate one has just taken shape (decree of the Council of Ministers on the formation of TSU is dated February 3, 1951), but Beria also oversaw it earlier as part of work at PSU.

And we already know about all these "cases No. 1, 2 and 3". And these cases should officially were to occupy only HALF of Beria's working time.

And only case No. 1 and case No. 2 had a capacity of 2/3 of the decision or order Council of Ministers of the USSR per day with a thirty-day working month. Plus - current papers and problems.

And the responsibilities for all "cases" were not formal, but at the same time - considerable. Necessary had to be decided concretely, moreover, in very heterogeneous scientific and technical fields. The well-known rocket scientist B.E. Chertok in his book of memoirs calls Boris Vannikov the "marshal" of the atomic theme, and one can agree with this comparison, given clarification - the chairman of the Special Committee himself was still the commander-in-chief here.

On March 21, 1950, Admiral I. S. Yumashev, Minister of the Navy, precisely Beria writes about the expediency of research and design work "to create experimental power plant with a uranium boiler for submarines, and in further and for surface ships. But such work is already underway. And in a separate Makhnev notes on March 25 that *"an experimental ship is being developed."* However, already much more is being developed, which was only in the plans not so long ago. In the second half of 1949, the world's first VVR was manufactured - a pressurized water reactor with a capacity of 10 thousand kilowatts, in which water serves as a moderator and coolant, and on February 11 1950, a decision was made to start construction at the Laboratory "B" at A. I. Leipunsky in Obninsk nuclear power plant. And in the same place, near Leipunsky, design work began on studying the prospects of industrial fast neutron reactors. On May 5, 1951, two

resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted at once: No. 1464-733ss on work plans with the use of preparations "P" (radioactive isotopes) "in the field medicine, science and technology", and No. 1474-743ss/op on the work plan of PSU for 1951. Last thing the resolution gave a powerful picture of the development of atomic science, technology and industry and for the first time set the task of obtaining a controlled thermonuclear reaction for the purposes of

energy.

DEVELOPED and nuclear weapons work ... The second explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb was fired on September 24, 1951, at 16:19 local time, on Semipalatinsk test site. As Beria

Kurchatov, Khariton and Zeldovich reported, the power of the bomb turned out to be higher than provided by the calculation, and amounted to 38,000 tons of TNT against 27,000 tons estimated. The report ended with:

"The test of 09/24/51 showed that the government's task to increase the power of the atomic bomb and lightening its weight is done. Bomb with full TNT equivalent of 38 thousand tons and a total weight of 3.1 tons was created "...

And on October 18, 1951, the commander of the crew, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Isaakovich Urzhuntsev took off the Tu-4 with a new combat product. In that On the same day, a message addressed to Beria went to Moscow:

"October 18, 1951. To Comrade Beria L.P. We report: on

October 18, at 9:54 Moscow time, an explosion was carried out an atomic bomb with a charge of plutonium and uranium-235. The atomic bomb was dropped from a Tu-4 aircraft from a height of 10,000 meters and exploded at an altitude of 380 meters above purpose. Tests have shown that the detonated bomb has great power; its full TNT equivalent is about 40,000 tons. During testing, it was found that Tu-4 aircraft can be used for transporting and dropping atomic bombs. The task of the government on the creation of an atomic bomb of increased power with using uranium-235 was completed by...

Zavenyagin

Kurchatov

Khariton

Shchelkin.

And reports to the same addressee on a wide range of "atomic" issues were common. And the last time a detailed note addressed to Beria left the gunsmiths the day before the arrest. Lavrenty Pavlovich - June 25, 1953. A. P. Zavenyagin, I. V. Kurchatov, A. S. Aleksandrov, and Yu.

problems, a member of the Politburo worked as Chief Technologist. To make what is said More specifically, I will give a short fragment of it, characteristic of the style and content of the note:

"On June 23, a second pressing of a hemisphere of tritide-lithium-6 deuteride was performed, and the amount of material was reduced by 5%. At the second pressing, the part turned out to be close to the tolerance in the bottom, and in height 0.8 mm over tolerance. Attempts to bring the part to drawing dimensions by increasing the pressure to 3900 atmospheres did not give positive results. Cracks formed on the parts after pressing out.

The note dated June 25 dealt with the details already for the first Soviet thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb RDS-6s. And on June 26, 1953, Deputy Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR L. Beria signed the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532-rs on the project the assignment for the construction of the SU-3 plant (for uranium enrichment. - S.K.) at the plant number 813. Below the typewritten signature was the distribution: "tt. Zavenyagin A.P., Zverev A.G. (Ministry of Finance of the USSR, V. A. Makhnev).

On the same day, June 26, Beria was arrested, and soon, at the July Plenum of the Central Committee of 1953

year, was deleted from the life of the country. And since July 10, 1953, the theme of the meaning of activity Beria for the development of the country was banned. Moreover, the injustice attitude towards the "atomic" role of Beria immediately manifested itself in the form of a tragicomic.

The first test of the Soviet thermonuclear weapon - the "hydrogen" bomb RDS-bs took place on August 12, 1953. A week before this day - August 5, Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR Malenkov at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proudly " *The American imperialists are frightening us with a superweapon—the hydrogen bomb. But we should not be scared, we not only know the secret of the hydrogen bomb, but also created it* . Behind a month before that - on July 2, at the plenum of the Central Committee, the same Malenkov as an example of "criminal anti-state actions" cited the decision of Beria (a member of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) "without the knowledge of the Central Committee and governments ... to organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb .

Later I will say more about this, but I cannot fail to notice at once that the brilliant the manager Beria was always disgusted by the unprofessionalism (including purely managerial) of the leading figures of the "Central Committee and the government." Partocratic idle talk, he really does not complained.

On the other hand, Malenkov blamed Beria for such actions that should be was only to approve! After all, it would not have been for these actions, it would not have happened in such a short time and tests of the RDS-6s, which means there would be nothing to boast about on August 5! In

addition, the RDS-1 test was also not formally authorized by the document (Stalin did not sign the draft resolution on the test). And what would the sanction of the Central Committee give and governments "organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb"? By 1953 on the current state nuclear work was fully aware, in fact, only Stalin and Beria. So Beria's neglect of the bureaucratic side of the matter was fully justified.

As for the sincerity of the general atmosphere of the Plenum "according to Beria", which did not even cross it out, but blackened it out of the creative history of Russia with solid black paint, then about her (about sincerity) can be judged by the next episode ...

ON A DECISIONAL DAY FOR THE FURTHER FATE OF RUSSIA, June 26, at a meeting Presidium of the Central Committee (during which Beria was arrested) it was decided to replace the Special committee to form the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR as part of the 1st and 3rd GU (2nd GU was included in PGU even earlier).

And now the freshly minted "atomic" minister Malyshev, speaking at the plenum, declares:

"I ... worked under the guidance ... of Comrade Molotov, and Kaganovich, and Beria. I must say that every time you go to report on some question to your comrades, you go with a different feeling. With one feeling you go to Comrade Molotov, about whom we know that he is a strict leader, demanding, but always, when you go to him, you know that there will never be hasty decisions, adventurous decisions... you will not be under blow ... Beria is another matter. We, the ministers, knew that you were going to the office minister, but you don't know how you will go back ... maybe to prison you get there ... Roughly speaking, Beria's leadership style is dictatorial, rude, non-partisan."

In fact, both during Beria's membership in the GKO, and during his tenure at the head "atomic" affairs from the summer of 1945 to June 1953 (including work in the Council of Ministers) none of the leaders of any link who were in Beria's field of vision did not go to prison. Yes and no he removed and appointed people's commissars and ministers ... And since 1946, Beria did not lead the "power" ministries. Suffice it to recall that he did not even have the sole right to order Abakumov and Kruglov to take the PGU building under protection - the decision had to carry out through the Council of

Ministers! But the most interesting thing here is the legitimacy of the given by Vyacheslav Malyshev

parallels "Molotov - Beria" ... In the book of Yu. B. Khariton and Yu. N. Smirnov "Myths and reality of the Soviet atomic project" (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16, 1994) says:

"The ground for various conjectures appears even when the truth is hushed up because of political attitudes ... as ... in the case of L.P. Beria. No truth today means that there will be myths tomorrow... It is known that in the beginning the general V. M. Molotov was in charge of the Soviet atomic project. Style it guidelines and consequently the results were not particularly effective. IV Kurchatov did not hide his dissatisfaction.

With the transition of the nuclear project into the hands of Beria, the situation is radically changed ... Beria quickly gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism. This man ... possessed ... great energy and efficiency. Our specialists, coming into contact with him, could not fail to note his mind, will and purposefulness. We made sure that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to bring things to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria ... knew how, according to circumstances, to be polite, tactful and simply a normal person. It is no coincidence that one of the German specialists N. Riehl, who worked in the USSR, had a very good impression from meetings with Beria.

The meetings he held were business-like, always productive and never dragged on. He was a master of the unexpected and the unusual. decisions ... Beria was quick at work, did not neglect site visits and personal acquaintance with the results of the work ... "

Summing up, Yu. B. Khariton wrote:

"According to the impression of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the nuclear the project remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would be difficult to count on rapid success in carrying out such a grand scale of work.

Do I need to comment on these lines in detail?

BETTER, I will once again touch on the topic of Beria's resolutions on the documents of the Atomic Project. Yu. B. Khariton could over-praise L. P. Beria, someone could denigrate him, and the documents impartial and accurate - if they are preserved and if not falsified. But who after June 26, 1953, would have falsified documents testifying in favor of Beria? And among the documents of the Atomic Project there is not a single one representing Lawrence Pavlovich from the unsightly side. But there are plenty of examples to the contrary!

Here is such a detail. November 1949 ... Since the successful explosion of RDS-1, two month. The production of at least a few new atomic bombs is a question for the USSR vital importance. And the protocol of the meeting of the Special Committee signed personally by Beria No. 88a states:

"1. Note that the storage of RDS-1 parts from amethyl (code the name of the plutonium. — **Approx. S.K.**) at plant No. 817 delivered unsatisfactory. Details of the RDS-1 were placed in damp underground rooms that do not provide their surface from oxidation.

It would seem that comments are unnecessary - the management of the plant can be easily (and, alas, not without reason) to accuse almost of a state crime! After all, plutonium time is the main factor, which is more precious than any gold! However, in the "organizational conclusions" of Beria and close there is no "execution" shade:

"2. Indicate to the head of the plant No. 817 t. Muzrukov and the chief engineer comrade Slavsky on the inadmissibility of such an attitude to the storage of products from amethyl.

3. To the deputy chief of combine No. 817 for the regime, comrade Ryzhov, who was responsible for the storage of amethyl and gave the wrong order to laying RDS-1 parts in a damp room, reprimand. 4. To oblige the head of plant No. 817, t. Muzrukov, within 3 days establish uninterrupted ventilation of the storage, ensure thorough dry it and equip it with devices to control humidity and temperature. T. Muzrukov to personally systematically check the state of the repository ... 5. Instruct ... t. Meshik to check the execution on site of this decision."

Another, earlier example. June 1947 ... Newly appointed to the plant under construction No. 817 Slavsky reports in an extensive memorandum addressed to Beria outrageous things. Let's say:

"The pace of work ... is extremely weak ... the most complex object ... it was entrusted to build a road construction regiment, which does not include a single construction specialist industrial facilities ... Housing construction is a complete failure ... Workers sit for a very long time and no one forces them to work ... Out of 41 thousand workers ... only 5,700 people work at industrial facilities, and the rest are scattered in various auxiliary enterprises and auxiliary work"

etc.

Beria's resolution:

"T. Kruglov, comrade Vannikov and comrade. Zavenyagin. 1. We urgently need to strengthen leadership... Release T. Rapoport for health reasons. Nominate in as a n-ka construction of Tsarevsky. 2. Consider the memorandums of Comrade Slavsky and Comrade Tkachenko and take action on them. Report on the measures taken. 3. T. Chernysheva send on a business trip for 2-3 months to take all necessary measures to ensuring the completion of construction and installation work in the installation. government deadlines. 4. Urgently contact Comrade Khrulev regarding the provision of assistance to the building of engineering and technical. works. **L. Beria.**

We go down the time scale even lower. October 2, 1946 ... Pervukhin, Malyshev, Zavenyagin, Antropov and Kurchatov tell Beria:

"Until now, no definite decisions have been made regarding where the receipt of clean plutonium metal in the amount of 100 grams per day from the sludge obtained at plant No. 817, and pure metallic uranium-235 in the amount of 140 grams per day from uranium hexafluoride-235 at plant 813 ... "

Of the five authors of the letter, four are the largest organizers of industry with great experience, and one of them - Antropov, from 1941 to 1945 was an assistant member of the GKO Beria. The fifth is a prominent scientist, obliged to give the first four recommendations for optimizing the layout of at least Mill No. 817, where he is a research leader. However, they turn to Beria, who on October 5, 1946 year writes:

"TT. Pervukhin, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin. Provide more specific suggestions - where to place these workshops?

L. Beria.

But something is not going well with Kurchatov and the "leading guys", and on April 10, 1947 (!) Beria writes on the same document:

"TT. Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov. Why the choice of location and you are postponing the construction of the workshop. This matter cannot be dragged on any further. Urgently deal with this issue and, within a week, present specific offers. ***L. Beria.***

However, even after that, things were moving slowly, all the ups and downs of history begin with plant No. 817, which are already known to the reader, and Beria has to go to building yourself. But even there he didn't erase anyone into the "camp dust". And he didn't even threaten erase - he didn't even have such an expression in his lexicon.

We continue to move to the origins of nuclear work. November 12, 1945 P. Ya. Antropov reports to Beria on the results of his business trip to the Tajik SSR, to plant No. 6 (7 mines and 5 plants for the extraction and processing of uranium raw materials). Position joyless ... And two narrow (~ 1/6 A4 format) strips of paper with resolutions are pinned to Antropov's report:

"Tov. Chernyshev, comrade. Zavenyagin. Understand and report why the funds allocated for the plant number 6 were used for other purposes. Guilty must punish. November 15, 1945".

"Tov. Vannikov B. L., comrade. Borisov N. A. 1. Urgently develop measures to ensure a sharp increase in the extraction and processing of ore at the plant. 2. Take the necessary measures to restore order immediately. results report back. November 15, 1945".

And here the tone is exclusively businesslike. And this approach is not an accidental "whim", but a style! This is proved not by anyone's memories, but by documents! Although the memories - too! For example - the memoirs of the same Slavsky (three times Hero of Socialist Labor, ten orders of Lenin!), Not very loyal to Beria (but what about - he is Yefim Pavlovich "filmed"). But

this is what Slavsky recalled in 1998 (!) ... For the first uranium-graphite The reactor needed graphite with practically no impurities. Responsible for this people's commissar color metallurgy Lomako and his deputy Slavsky. Alas, the graphite they supplied in PGU and considered conditioned, turned out to be a marriage. Lomako and Slavsky were summoned to Special Committee:

"Lomako and I are standing in the waiting room, waiting to be called, and thinking: "Well, that's the end of everything ... What will happen to us?"

Chairman Beria turns to Malenkov ... and says: "George! So Lomako and Slavsky reported and promised that they ... would do everything right. What do you think, will we agree?" He, and after him the others, nodded: "We will agree." And we left the meeting with the feeling that we were born again: as if

We were standing on a chair with a noose around our necks... And then... they removed the noose, and we went to work."

And the noose was removed by Beria. And, excuse me, it doesn't happen that today a person in relation to subordinates - a boor and a jerk, and tomorrow he is polite and in his behavioral reactions is correct. Scream - yes! After all, with a huge personal responsibility, with overloads, you can sometimes break loose. But no unfair

"consequences".

I will give one more resolution of Beria on the memorandum of the head of KB-11, General A. S. Alexandrov dated May 12, 1952, beginning with a very dramatic statement:

"I report to you that if urgent measures are not taken, then we are on the eve of a breakdown preparation of RDS-4 and RDS-5 products for testing at test sites No. 71 and No. 2.

The reasons were exclusively bureaucratic red tape and indiscipline PGU apparatus. On December 4, 1951, KB-11 issued information about its needs, but at the beginning of January 1952 discovered that from the plan for 1952 positions for 33 items of parts and assemblies of two new products, the tests of which were scheduled for this autumn, inexplicably dropped out.

On March 10, Aleksandrov drew Zavenyagin's attention to this. However, even in May KB-11 was forced to "literally beg for 2-3 knots" at manufacturing plants. AND On May 15, Beria addresses a note from Alexandrov to Zavenyagin and N. I. Pavlov (the first Deputy Head of PGU):

"1. Understand and present an explanation of who is to blame for what the components and parts required for KB-11 were not provided in advance.

2. As you can see, the department led by Comrade Zernov does not work well, because he was unable to if there are 46 employees, ensure within six months of training proposals for providing experimental work to design bureaus. Restore order in this department and report on the measures taken.

"T. Zernov" - this is the former head of KB-11 P. M. Zernov, transferred in 1951 head of the department at PSU for health reasons. That's when Beria could remember Zernov - if the "incident with the candelabra" really took place - an unsuccessful "terrorist act" with the help of a "paperweight-candelabra", prevented by Beria with the help of "browning with a gold cast handle." After all, the RDS-4 is a prototype the first serial aviation bomb, which was supposed to go directly to troops! And the disruption of the planned test dates turned out to be no joke.

However, punishments followed in the form of reprimands, etc.

Moreover! After all, Slavsky about the "noose around the neck" simply spun! And he spun maliciously, portraying Beria, in fact, all the same "villain" who could allegedly stick Yefim Pavlovich into noose, but now - he didn't put it in, according to his master's permission. But it wasn't like that! I intentionally did not immediately illustrate Slavsky's "memoirs" with documents. But now I have them present to the reader! Moreover, here we are dealing with a significant "clouding of memory"! On April

17, 1946, Kurchatov sent a letter to one of Makhnev's assistants, N. I. Korobkov, about the short supply of graphite blocks to ensure the construction installation "F-1". The F-1 installation is just our first uranium-graphite the reactor that Slavsky spoke about, which was being built on the territory of laboratory No. 2 and was launched on December 25, 1946.

By August 1, 1946, the Moscow Electrode Plant was supposed to supply Kurchatov 1000 tons of graphite, of which 340 tons - by March 31, 1946. And he delivered only 107.9 tons. Kurchatov sounded the alarm, Korobkov reported to Makhnev, who, on April 18, reported to Beria this:

"The reasons for this situation are: firstly, the lack of control over side of the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy at the work of the Moscow electrode plant, as a result of which the employees of the plant and the Soyuzelektrod trust for a long time supplied to the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy fraudulent information about the implementation of the plan, counting in the finished

semi-finished products;

secondly, non-fulfillment by the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and Ministry for the construction of fuel enterprises Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars USSR dated September 14, 1945 on the commissioning of the first stage electrode plant No. 523 (this is how the plant for the production of graphite reactor blocks. - **S.K.)** by March 1, 1946".

On the same day, Beria gives the order:

"TT. Pervukhin (convocation), Vannikov, Lomako, Zademidko (Minister for construction of fuel enterprises in the USSR. - **S.K.)**, Slavsky. 1. Urgent look into this issue, take the necessary measures to ensure timely delivery of graphite blocks and early commissioning plant number 523. 2. Vol. Lomako and Zademidko submit reports on supply of blocks and construction of plant No. 523. 3. Those responsible for disrupting the supply and construction delays must be held accountable. **L. Beria. April 18, 1946**".

As you can see, Beria orders to bring the perpetrators to justice by Lomako himself and Slavsky. So, one wonders, did he order them to flog *themselves*? So it's unlikely Slavsky then trembled right up to May 7, 1946, when the 20th meeting of the Special Committee with the participation of Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky and others, where item VI of the agenda was Lomako's report on the progress in the supply of graphite blocks and construction of the first stage of plant No. 523, and point VII - the question of measures to construction of the second stage.

On point VI, the minutes of the meeting stated:

"1. Take note of Comrade Lomako's report that he: a) brought to justice those responsible for disrupting the plan production of graphite blocks for Laboratory No. 2; b) measures have been taken to ensure delivery by August 20 of this year. 600 t high-quality graphite blocks for Laboratory No. 2; 2. Take note also of the message of TT. Zademidko and Lomako that they have taken measures to ensure the commissioning of the first stage of plant No. 523 at the end May this year
3. Oblige comrade Lomako to establish control ... "

etc.

Under paragraph VII, it was decided *"to instruct Borisov (convocation), Lomako and Slavsky in the 5th one day to finalize the draft Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... "*, etc.

Well, where is the "loop" and so on? According to Slavsky, it turns out that he and Lomako entered the meeting of the Special Committee and left **almost immediately** - with the noose removed ... In fact there was a completely businesslike approach of the leaders of the state to a serious, but rectified failure with **the hearing of** those responsible for the rectification of state figures.

Engineer Tremasov, physicist Golovin, manager Slavsky, unnamed "commander missile base near Moscow "and other" memoirists "in their" memoirs "sometimes depict the era and the behavior of Beria as if everything happened almost in a gang. But pardon, we are talking about the state work of serious statesmen! And in memoirs of the same Slavsky Beria **at a meeting of the Special Committee under Council of Ministers of the USSR** behaves like the chairman of a seedy collective farm, dismantling the sins of the brigadier on a spree: they say, how, Georgy, will we forgive the guys? ..

But why did Slavsky even half a century after those events need to condense paint so as to stain Beria in "graphite dust" and create the impression that Beria is in

any moment "could deal with us"? That's it, dear reader! All, all the then elite after 1957 was tied with **a triple state a crime ... In 1953,**

she betrayed Beria with her head to Nikita Khrushchev. **In 1956,** she allowed him to throw mud at Stalin. And **in 1957,** the same elite betrayed Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, who suddenly realized: "What are we doing?"

And now, for the rest of their lives, the elite had only one thing left to do: *keep quiet* and receive compensation in the form of armchairs, cottages, Stars and other things. Assenting (even with his silence) to the slanderer Khrushchev in his insinuations about the "tyrant" Stalin and the "executioner" Beria. However, on They themselves willingly slandered

Beria. **But those who are engaged in the documentary history of PSU do not mark a single the fact of the massacre of Lavrenty Pavlovich with any of the guilty ...** But there is there are many documents with his instructions to encourage in every possible way those who worked hard. In including Slavsky himself.

But he himself, at least morally, was not very encouraged. And even decades later appreciated on merit. For example, when asked about the role of Beria, Slavsky was completely "Democratic" 1998 answered condescendingly:

"Beria did not interfere with us. He did not understand scientific and engineering issues, therefore he always listened to the opinion of specialists (remember how Malyshev argued the opposite. - **S.K.**). As for organizational problems, mobilization of people and resources, then ... he helped to carry out all necessary solutions."

Here it is impossible not to notice this ... An analysis of the style of Beria's work with heterogeneous documents PSU convinces that he was just versed in special issues on surprise is not bad - in the part that concerns the right management decisions. And what what else was required of him?

Slavsky claims that Beria, they say, "*helped* put into practice all the necessary solutions". However, it is perhaps more correct to assume that, *on the contrary*, such specialists like Malyshev, Kurchatov, Slavsky, Khariton, Kikoin, Muzrukov, Zernov, Tsarevsky, Komarovskiy and dozens of others helped Beria create and strengthen the nuclear industry! And he -

yes, he helped them in turn! And not only them. In one way or another, he oversaw many sectors of the economy, even taking part in determining the directions for the development of the Navy in as a whole (not only its emerging atomic underwater component). But how inadequate some treated him even then!

AMONG the documents now declassified, there are two letters from P. L. Kapitsa to Stalin and one is Beria. The first letter to Stalin dated November 25, 1945, Kapitsa wrote about organization of work on the problem of the atomic bomb, as he saw it, and about his release (more precisely, self-elimination. - **S.K.**) from work in the Special Committee and Technical Council of the Special

Committee. The general tone of the letter (to Stalin!) is rather arrogant, with teachings and reasoning. For example, in a letter there are in principle true, but in the context of the letter inappropriate maxims about the role of atomic energy in world culture, etc.

Kapitsa saw a "general plan of action" in the development of a two-year training plan industry, in parallel scientific research, in the rise of higher education and in "improving the well-being of our scientific workers." And completely ignored the simple fact that the bomb had to be made **quickly**. And before you do it, you need to "make" a new industry that can make a bomb even faster.

Kapitsa wrote that *"the correct organization of all questions is possible only with one condition that does not exist, but without creating it, we will not solve A.B. fast... It's the condition is that more trust is needed between scientists and statesmen"...*

Pyotr Leonidovich was right here too, but, as life itself showed (the bomb was made quickly), however, there was trust in those scientists who not only reasoned, but also acted! And they acted quickly. Like, say, Kurchatov.

In the first letter to Stalin there are also curious assessments by Kapitsa of Beria (and not only him):

"Comrade Vannikov and others from the Technical Council remind me of that a citizen from a joke who, not believing the doctors, drank everything in Essentuki mineral waters in a row in the hope that one of them will help. Comrades

Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky behave in the Special Committee as supermen. In particular Comrade. Beria. True, he has a conductor's baton in hands. This is not bad, but after him the first violin should still be played by a scientist. After all, the violin gives the tone to the whole orchestra (a direct hint that it should be the great Kapitsa, whom everyone should obey - after all, the conductor himself does not plays. - **S.K.**). Comrade Beria, the main weakness is that the conductor must not only to wave a stick, but also to understand the score. With this, Beria is weak.

Weakly or not weakly, Comrade Beria had an understanding of the "score", soon showed life. And the same life proved: Beria behaved not like a "superman", but like reasonably confident person. But comrades Malenkov and Voznesensky behaved "like superhumans" in vain. Their bossy ambitions did not really match theirs. business potency (later, regarding Voznesensky, I will cite a certain fact **most striking**, almost improbable, but which took place). Kapitsa wrote and So:

"I personally think that Com. Beria would have coped with his task if he had given more time and energy. He is very energetic, perfectly and quickly orientates himself, well distinguishes the secondary from the main, so he does not waste time in vain, he certainly has a taste for scientific questions, he grasps them well (here even how! - **S.K.**) formulates his decisions precisely.

But he has one drawback - excessive self-confidence, and the reason for this, apparently, is ignorance of the score. I tell him directly: "You don't understand physics, let us scientists judge these questions," to which he objects to me that I I don't understand anything about people. In general, our dialogues are not particularly kind. I told him offered to teach him physics, to come to my institute ... "

What can be said here? If Beria "learned", then maybe he would become PhD, but what about the uranium problem then?

And the arrogance of Pyotr Leonidovich is growing and is already capable of amusing ... And his "recommendations" cross every line, causing a polite smile and at the same time desire to resort to profanity. Thus, he writes further:

"Our ingenious merchants-patrons of the Tretyakovs, Shchukin and others, because they they were well versed in paintings and saw great artists before others; they were not artists, but studied art. Beria, if he were not so lazy (n-yes. - **S.K.**), then, having worked with his abilities and "knowledge of people", undoubtedly, he could then understand the creative processes among people of science and technique to become a first-class conductor of A.B. For example, he should..."

And here I will interrupt the quotation and emphasize that the following are the lines of Peter himself Leonidovich:

"... one should get acquainted with the primary sources (and not in the popular presentation), how the transatlantic cable was laid, how steam turbine, etc. He would have seen the general regularity of these processes and would have used this experience in order to understand what is important and necessary in the development of works on A.B. ... "

To offer such "technical education" to a person who pulled along with Stalin the main strap of the organizational efforts of the Great War, could only narcissistic and blinded by narcissism (and therefore, ultimately, limited) man! Which, alas, Kapitsa was. And he serenely offered this:

"It should be that all leading comrades like Beria give feel to your subordinates (I wonder what methods of persuasion meant Academician Kapitsa? - **S.K.**) that scientists are leading in this matter, and not auxiliary power...

How the academician saw the organization of work at the same time can be seen from his letter dated December 1 1945 already directly to Beria:

"I propose the following. Establish... a number of technical committees for each of the important terms of reference... Establish a body that could be to name the Council of Chairmen of the Technical Committees... The task... is to observe, approve, coordinate the work of various committees and select their personnel workers (that is, cadres not of workers in a new industry, but cadres of workers committees, i.e. officials. - **S.K.**). In this formulation of the question, the Council chairmen... will grow as new assignments become available, when in accordance with the instructions of the Special Committee, the number of committees."

So, as Mayakovsky wrote about those who were "sitting": "Oh, at least one more meeting concerning the eradication of all meetings!"

At the same time, Kapitsa (December 1, 1945!) built the priorities of "certain problematic issues" of atomic energy no more responsibly:

"a) the use of A.E. for peaceful purposes of cultural development; b) the destructive power of A.B..."

etc.

Not only that, in 1945, it was not a patriot who could prioritize, but a cosmopolitan in the exact meaning of this word ... Kapitsa did not even think about the potentially peaceful, *restraining* role of the "destructive force of A.B."! And Beria, it seems, was thinking. In any case, by 1953, already being confident that Russia would soon receive thermonuclear "superbomb", thought not about the unrestrained development of nuclear arsenals, but about reasonable reduction (more precisely, optimization) of public spending on nuclear weapons! He stood in positions, so to speak, of defensive sufficiency. And he will still be blamed for this that plenum, where they will defame him in absentia!

Alas, on the topic "Beria and scientists", citing facts that are not very advantageous for the reputation a number of scientists, one can talk a lot (one story about how Professor Fok publicly defended his scientific views with references to the authority of Beria what is worth!).

But I will only speak about academician Sergei Arkadyevich Vekshinsky. Pskovite, born in 1896, from 1914 to 1916 he studied at the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, in 1916 he was sent by the Main Artillery Directorate to the USA. And returning (returning!) in the years of hard times to that Russia, into which Kapitsa was hardly able to pull out

from Cambridge already in relatively prosperous years, he enters the chemical faculty of the Don Polytechnic University, and since 1922 begins to work at the Leningrad plant "Svetlana".

On December 15, 1945, Vekshinsky, already a recognized scientist, addressed a letter to Malenkov. As far as Kapitza's letters are mediocre in practical terms, so practically valuable are the ideas of Vekshinskiy's letter, which Malenkov sent to Beria with resolution:

"Personally Comrade Beria L.P. Please read this letter. I know Vekshinsky as a serious worker. 27/XII".

Here is the letter:

"Dear George Maximilianovich! I have been informed by Comrade Makhnev that my laboratory attracted to participate in the work on the creation of electromagnetic mass separators. If it is necessary, it is necessary, and I am ready to make every effort to facilitate the implementation this task. I understand its meaning.

Two meetings of the Technical Council at Comrade Vannikov, to which I was invited, convinced me, however, that in the formulation of the problem there is such logical and organizational confusion that one cannot count on success. The thing is that in order to create practically working mass separators, it is necessary to solve 95% engineering and technical tasks and 5% fundamentally physical.

Now physicists are gathered around this case and only the organization of physical research takes attention. <...> It is assumed that later (when?) the factories will do everything. This is fundamentally wrong, and the golden eggs laid by the cuckoo in empty nests will go rotten sooner than a single chick hatches from them.

To physicists, all this seems to be a trifle, long known and achieved. It seems to me that physicists (although I myself am a physicist, but "spoiled", "factory") are people who know too much to be good at anything. TO Unfortunately, our engineers do too much to know well what is new in physics. <...> This means that an organization should be created where there would be merged into one team and masters, and physicists, and engineers.

As a temporary measure, it is necessary to take the organization of research works in different places, but you need to immediately start creating and equipping such a scientific and technical center, where in 8-10 months it would be possible to conduct work for real. Academician Kurchatov's proposal for urgent construction Institute with a strong technical bias, in my opinion, is not only justified, but absolutely necessary. ***With communist***

greetings, sincerely yours, Vekshinsky.

On December 31, 1945, Beria addressed a letter from Vekshinsky to Vannikov and Pervukhin and writes:

"I ask, with the participation of Comrade Vekshinsky, to develop and submit to approval of the Special Committee of the proposal on Comrade Vekshinsky's laboratory.

This is how the ideological foundation of the Central Vacuum Laboratory was laid. Narkomelektroprom, in 1947 transformed into the Scientific Research Vacuum institute. But at the same time, these same ideas finally prompted the decision to the formation of KB-11 in Arzamas-16, which grew in the USSR into the largest diversified scientific and engineering "combine", mediocre and ingloriously dying in the current "Russians".

Kapitsa, in terms of his selfish nature, was closer to bureaucratic partocracy, so he

and did not agree in character with Beria. But Vekshinsky was a man of deeds and honor. AND therefore, his ideas were immediately accepted by Beria and accepted by him for immediate implementation.

IN LITERATURE one has to meet statements that Beria was sometimes called "father of the Soviet atomic bomb". In any sense, it is not. But here is the father of the Soviet nuclear industry, it is not only possible, but should be called by right, if we want stand on the basis of historical truth. In the "era of Beria" was created, in fact, the entire material "atomic" infrastructure, which after Beria only developed.

But he never emphasized this role in any way even before advertising (about self-promotion no conversation at all!) I didn't want to. After his arrest, the manager of affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Pomaznev, in a note to the Central Committee dated July 2, 1953, wrote:

"Beria considered high-rise buildings to be his brainchild (and had everything grounds. - **S.K.**). Once I heard him speak, others already ten times We would take pictures against the background of these buildings, but here we are building, and nothing."

So, even the disloyal Pomaznev involuntarily noted Beria's personal modesty. But this also confirms such, say, a document as "Materials for a collection of history Mastering Atomic Energy in the USSR", which was being prepared since September 1952 in secretariat of the Ad Hoc Committee! All of its chapters were personally reviewed by Beria, and it seems that he wanted to publish an open Soviet analogue of the American government report on development of the atomic bomb in the United States. The collection never saw the light of day, because with the arrest of Beria the idea was buried, and the country never knew in real time what she accomplished a great deed, nor the names of the heroes of the atomic epic. The consequences of this foolish super-closedness we disentangle to this day. After all, the country did not understand: what is it the value is its nuclear gunsmiths and what their feat meant for Russia ... But I didn't understand last of all, because in real time I did not know about this feat.

So, in bulk (pages 806-912 in the book of the 5th volume II of "Documents and Materials Soviet Atomic Project") draft "Materials" the name of Beria is mentioned only three times in purely official phrases. Here they are:

1) "Based on the special nature of the task assigned to the country, the leadership of all work on the atomic problem, Comrade Stalin (by the way, the name of Stalin there is also very rare and out of place. - **S.K.**) instructed his faithful and closest colleague Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. Comrade Beria L.P. was appointed Chairman of the Special Committee.

2) "From the very first days of its activity, the Special Committee, under the leadership of Comrade L.P. Beria on a wide front led work on the organization and construction of new scientific institutions, design bureaus and experimental installations and expansion of work previously involved in solving the nuclear problem organizations."

3) "On the progress of construction (of the first reactor. - **S.K.**) to Comrade L.P. Beria reported daily, measures of assistance were taken immediately.

This is all!
ALL!!!

But in the "Materials" very complimentary assessments are given to others: "the nearest associate of Comrade Stalin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Soviet Union Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov", "the country's largest scientist in

nuclear physics academician I. V. Kurchatov", "experienced business managers and talented engineers B. L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin, M. G. Pervukhin, V. A. Makhnev", "an experienced engineer and a wonderful organizer ... E. P. Slavsky", "energetic, knowledgeable engineer and good organizer A. S. Elyan", etc. Dozens

of names were mentioned in the "Materials...", including the names of the Germans Hertz, Barvikh, Steinbeck, Volmer, Schütze, Thyssen, Ardenne, Riehl, Wirtz... A separate section was devoted to personnel training, and Stalin's thought organically entered the text:

"Russian revolutionary scope is that life-giving force that awakens thought moves forward, breaks the past, gives perspective. Impossible without it no forward movement."

Yes, it was a collective documentary portrait of the Problem and the Epoch, but by no means portrait of one of the main figures of the Problem - Lavrenty Beria. And what a temptation it was!

Although ... If there had been a temptation, then the "Materials" would have been written differently - "under Beria." And they are written "under the collective."

So these pages, which were not taken into account by Beria's biographers, perhaps most weightily prove that Lavrenty Pavlovich not only did not suffer from anything resembling megalomania, but, on the contrary, was sincerely, organically modest.

How much during the work on this book I had to read "memoirs", "memoirs", "testimonies" and transcripts of speeches, where Beria's assessments were given as stencil: "chameleon", "irrepressible careerist", "despot, blinded by thirst personal exaltation", etc. But here is the

DOCUMENT. It was written and worked out under **the personal** editorship of Beria. And where same here "thirst for personal exaltation"? But this is

a litmus test for the essence of personality. Khrushchev, having reached power, immediately hung the Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor in 1954, by 1961 having already become a "Hero" three times. By his seventieth birthday, this is truly a thirst for personal exaltation became so acute that he blasphemously hung on himself the Star of the Hero Soviet Union.

And Beria was content to light - like stars - the fires of new construction sites powers.

He really was not hungry for awards, and for all the "atomic efforts", as I already reported, was flagged once. But from especially important and top secret documents of that time, an attractive appearance of an outstanding state figure: smart, organizer with an excellent reaction, able to quickly enter the course previously unknown problems and adequately solve them, a person inclined to manage due to the effective setting of the case and the selection of personnel, and not repression, and besides, it is extremely attentive to the needs of the working masses.

Speaking figuratively, he guided the method not of an ax, but of a precise directive, and sometimes, yes, and strong fist.

But wasn't this method in relation to the negligent or slow-moving the only justified one? And shouldn't it be used at all times in the sphere top government leadership? After all, kindness to thieves, slobs and corrupt officials turns evil towards the people.

BERIA was removed from the active life of the country on June 26, 1953, however gunsmiths still lived in the rhythm they had previously set. In the hassle of preparing for testing the first hydrogen bomb RDS-6s flew the weeks of July and August. Finally, the day came on August 12, 1953 ... On the

Experimental Field, the center of which was a 40-meter tower with a charge, towered (or, on the contrary, it was buried in the ground) 308 structures: buildings, bridges, dugouts ... 1300

measuring, photographic and filming instruments, 1700 indicators - everything is the same as before. AND everything for the first time, because the political price of the success or failure of a "hydrogen" explosion in 1953 was almost the same as the "atomic" explosion in the year 1949.

The State Commission for the test was headed by the Minister of Medium machine building of the USSR Malyshev, and for this unprecedented event - the expected power the explosion was supposed to have a TNT equivalent of 400 thousand tons of trinitrotoluene! - a lot of big figures gathered. It is enough to give a number of surnames from the approved Kurchatov list of persons "representing personal observations" about the explosion ... There were three academicians - M. V. Keldysh, M. A. Lavrentiev and A. D. Sakharov, future academicians M. A. Sadovsky and future "members" D. I. Blokhintsev and L. A. Galin, V. P. Dzhelepov, B. S. Dzhelepov, lieutenant generals I. F. Chukhnov, S. Roginsky, I. S. Glebov, Rozhdestvensky, Major Generals M. N. Kochergin and Voskresensky ...

Hour "H" came at 7:30 local time (at 4:30 Moscow time). The temperature of the luminous zone determined by the "fireball" method is significantly exceeded the solar, that is, the test command post from a distance of several for some time a small man-made star burned for a while! A huge glow of red-orange color was visible from a distance of 170 kilometers. The full TNT equivalent was estimated at 400 ± 50 kilotons. It was a success! And which success! On August 20, Pravda published the "Government Report on the Tests hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union.

But all this was already without the one who, two months ago, the nuclear scientists and rocket scientists called among themselves simply LP. As I understand it, by this time and generally no longer was alive, although officially there was only an "investigation" in his "case". However, my story about the "atomic" life of Beria is not over yet...

Chapter 21 LAVRENTIY FOR LAVRENTIEV

MARCH 11, 1946 director of the 2nd Scientific Research Physical Institute Moscow State University Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences D.V. Lavrenty Pavlovich" with a request *"to give instructions on the need to demobilize from army and speed up the return to Moscow State University for the retraining of physicists who graduated earlier Moscow State University, and former senior students according to the attached list.*

The motivation was as follows: *"delay in carrying out the requested order will lead to the disruption of the entire task in terms of graduating specialists in physics atomic nucleus in 1946 .*

Skobeltsin's anxiety was understandable and understood: on March 12, Beria addressed his letter to Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin, who on March 18 reported:

"Comrade Beria.

In pursuance of your order dated 12.3.46 on the issue of dismissal from Red Army military personnel for the training of specialists in physics atomic nucleus, I have given the attached order.

The order was given to the head of the Main Directorate of Personnel, Colonel General F. I. Golikov, and he fulfilled it, but on April 18, 1946 he turned to the secretary Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Malenkov G. M. with a memorandum:

"Reporting:

Coming towards scientific research institutions working on problems of atomic energy, Main Directorate of Personnel of the Armed Forces returns from the army a significant number of former students of physical university faculties.

At the same time, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that ... the selection of those recalled from armies of physics students are produced too one-sidedly. So, from a list of 20 people on April 13 this year. Professor D. V. Skobeltsin asks to fire 16 people. Jews.

Earlier, on March 11, out of 10 people, Professor Skobeltsin, half of the people (5 people) selected the same nationality".

On April 20, Malenkov addressed this report to Beria, and on the same day Makhnev In turn, he gave Beria a certificate:

"The clarification showed that Comrade Skobeltsin, when compiling the list used oral recommendations of familiar teachers, physicists and students, since MSU did not have a record of senior students drafted into the army.

Judging by the efficiency of Makhnev, the question seemed interesting to Beria, but how was further, the documents are silent. However, the above information reflection" will serve as an appropriate introduction to the further story.

FULLY the reader can get acquainted with this story in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the Bulletin on Atomic Energy, but it is unlikely that the departmental publication of TsNIIAtominform found in many public libraries.

I immediately warn you that although everything below is presented mainly in the third person, in fact I am very concisely retelling what I wrote *in the first person* in this "Bulletin ..." about himself, about physics and about physicists of the early 50s, Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, whose fate turned out to be connected with the fate of Beria is also symbolic. And so it is impossible not to talk about it.

For more than half a century, Oleg Aleksandrovich has been living in Kharkov, being an employee famous UFTI - Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology of the Academy of Sciences. working over this book, I got through to him, and after my presentation we had a like a phone call...

- Oleg Alexandrovich, as far as I know, you met with Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. -

Yes, I had one meeting with him ... By the way, I was with Sakharov. — When was that? - In 1951 ...

- Well, what are

your impressions of him? — Good

impressions... First of all, he was an excellent organizer... — I know that, but he interests me as a person... What can you say about this?

Whatever you want, then say ... What impression did he make?

- Good impression ... Firstly, he left the table, he has a large table was ... He came up, shook hands, said: "Hello", invited me to sit down ...

Lavrentiev's voice is a muffled bass, and his manner of speaking is unhurried and detailed ... He pauses and continues: - And his

very first question stunned me ... He asked: "Do you have a toothache?" ... I was surprised - why? Nothing hurts! And he asks: "Why is the cheek swollen?" - "And they are always plump with me ..."

Anyone who sees a photo of young Lavrentiev, the question of Lavrenty Pavlovich is not be surprised - then Oleg Alexandrovich's cheeks were really like those of a hamster ...

And one more thing ... Both in the published memoirs and in a telephone conversation with me Oleg Aleksandrovich recalled that Beria addressed him as "you". But how often in reminiscences of others (at least - KGB General Sinitsyn) Beria boorishly "pokes" the interlocutor ... So, let me not believe it! To those who have already firmly entered his circle, he

could, of course, comradely address to "you" ("empty "you" with a heartfelt "you", she, without saying a word, replaced") ... But "you" as the norm? No and no again! And that's

why I'm so categorical... In 1951, in front of **the Marshal of the Soviet Union**, a member of the Politburo, a mature man, after all, sat a twenty-six-year-old sergeant Lavrentiev!

Exactly - a sergeant ...

How he got into Beria's office, the reader will soon find out. But what matters now is that Lavrenty Pavlovich came out from the table to shake him by the hand and seat him in armchair! And then he immediately carefully asked about his swollen cheek ... Yes, this one detail refutes all the vile things heaped over the memory of Beria over the past half century since too much!

- Well, then what? I asked my telephone interlocutor. "Then I started asking about my parents. My father was in prison then... - And then? - Well, then he wrote a good note to Vannikov,

Zavenyagin and Kurchatov. - And then? - Then everything was fine too ... They gave me a room in

Moscow ... They gave me money ... I received a Stalin scholarship - as an excellent student ... I got a job with Kurchatov

accepted... We prepared the program... Silence

on the phone... Pause... — And

then? I can't stand it. - Then Beria

died, and all the bumps fell on me ... Although I was the only one with met him. Another

pause, and then I hear: - Yes, all

this is published ... - Where? - In

the

"Atomic Energy Bulletin", I think, in the summer issues for 2001 ...

The MEMORY of the old physicist did not disappoint, and further on I state everything as I warned the reader at the outset...

In 1941, Oleg Lavrentiev, a seventh-grader, read a book that had just been published. the book "Introduction to Nuclear Physics", the author of which he later forgot. And he has a blue dream was born - to work in the field of nuclear energy.

The war began, at the age of 18 Lavrentiev volunteered for the front, fought in Baltic, and after the end of the war was transferred to the Sakhalin military district, in the 221st anti-aircraft artillery battalion. There he became a radiotelegraph operator and a sergeant, on sergeant's rubles, through Posyltorg, he was able to order books from Moscow on physics and subscribe to the journal "Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk". In addition, the part was not bad library. And

systematic and serious self-education began, especially since the command part of it encouraged. Surprisingly, it is a fact - without formally even having an average education, Lavrentiev already then thought like a serious physicist, already in 1948 having independently come up with the ideas of thermonuclear fusion and a hydrogen bomb based on lithium deuteride. Thinking about the use of thermonuclear reactions for industrial purposes, he formed the idea of electrostatic traps for plasma ... In fact, Sergeant Lavrentiev was a potential physical genius, because a genius is not only ability, but also work. And life taught him to work. In September

1948, Oleg entered an evening school, despite the ban on attending her military personnel. However, political officer A. Shcherbakov convinced the division commander Lieutenant Colonel I. Plotnikov that an exception must be made here. In May 1949, having passed three classes in a year, Lavrentiev received a matriculation certificate. The

newspapers were full of reports that President Truman was setting the task of creating

hydrogen bomb. And Sergeant Lavrentiev knew how to make it! And wrote a short letter

Stalin, and a few months later - in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Soon came from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk lieutenant colonel of the engineering service Yurganov - look at Oleg, and at the same time find out if everything is fine with his psyche. A few

days later, the command of the unit received an order to create a sergeant Lavrentiev conditions for work, and in a guarded room at the headquarters of the unit, he began to write his first work on nuclear fusion. In July 1950! Professor

Skobeltsin's protégé

at that time was happily nibbling on the "granite of science" in Moscow State University, periodically interspersing this "menu" with products from Moscow restaurants.

But even Lavrentiev had Moscow ahead of him ... Documents were already sent to the reception commission of Moscow State University, and on July 21 - without any professorial petitions - honest Soviet people carried out early demobilization of a talented Soviet guy. Your work on

he finished the fusion, and on July 22, 1950, she went by secret mail to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to head of the department of heavy engineering I. D. Serbin. Oleg himself went to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

And

there ... And there it turned out that near Vladivostok the rains had washed away the path, to land in It's pointless for Korsakov to go to the steamer - you'll get stuck on the mainland anyway. In the then Russia - according to Stanislav Pestov and Antonov-Ovseenka - were in the midst of "totalitarian" times, when everyone was "spying on each other" in order to push their neighbor into "Slaves of the Gulag", and when "people were not considered people", calling them "cogs". But what surprising - in this "totalitarian" power, Lavrentiev did not come up with anything more smart how to go to the regional party committee. And there...

And there the secretaries for science and industry, already familiar (!) With the work of a sergeant (!), Helped him buy a plane ticket to Khabarovsk and introduced him to G. Smith's book on Manhattan Project USA. He devoured the book, and it gave him a new impetus for ideas. on the hydrogen bomb.

Arriving in the capital on August 8, Oleg was included in the group of latecomers, and after a successful passing the entrance exams became a student of the Faculty of Physics. In September he met Serbin, who offered to maintain contact (the head of the Central Committee department and a student!) and communicate any new ideas. Oleg wrote another work, through the expedition of the Central Committee sent it to Serbin, but there was no answer ...

And suddenly, on January 3, 1951, in a hostel on Stromynka, Oleg was informed that his looking for and asked to call on such and such a phone. He called. subscriber on another At the end of the wire, he introduced himself as Makhnev and, despite the late hour, offered to come to Kremlin.

Student sergeant!

There was only one person at the window in the pass office at the Spassky Gate, and when he heard the name "Lavrentiev", then peered carefully and followed. It turned out that they were going to the same place, and when the fellow travelers got to Makhnev, he introduced them to their friend. to a friend: "Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev" and "Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov".

On Makhnev's desk lay Lavrentiev's beautifully designed second work, and The secretary of the Special Committee asked Sakharov if he knew her? Sakharov replied that he did not, but that he had read Lavrentiev's first work, and it had made him strong impression. Makhnev recommended reading the second work. I remind you: Lavrentiev was then a first-year student. A few days later, also late in the evening,

Lavrentiev again visited Makhnev, as Sakharov. Makhnev said that they would be received by the chairman of the Special Committee, but that they would have to wait - he has a meeting now. After a rather long wait, we went to the neighboring the building of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and after multiple checks of documents, all three ended up in the "dressing room" of the Beria office.

At first, Sakharov was summoned to Beria. After 10 minutes, Oleg was also invited to him. AND the conversation that I described above took place ...

VERY soon the circle of high acquaintances of the student expanded. And at whose expense! Vannikov, General Pavlov, Kurchatov! But most often Oleg dealt with Pavlov ...

““Rolling” my ideas,” writes Lavrentiev, “he arranged meetings for me with scientists, followed with interest our discussions, which sometimes took place pretty stormy. Then for me there was only one authority - science, and if I was sure of something, I defended my point of view, regardless of how...”

Once Pavlov said that the “master” called him and was interested in the affairs Lavrentiev. Today, the “leaders” of “Rossiyaniya” do not find time for academicians, but Beria was interested in a talented student! Yes, actually, no longer a student, but a promising one young scientist!

The circle of acquaintances expanded: the physicists Blokhintsev (Oleg knew him only in absentia textbook of quantum mechanics), Golovin (the future anti-Beria “narrator”), mathematician Samarsky ... Kurchatov offered to graduate from the university in four years, and Oleg quickly jumped from the first year to the third, and soon he was invited to work in laboratory No. 2 (the future Institute of Atomic Energy named after Kurchatov).

Everything was fine, but ... But suddenly, with surprise, Lavrentiev learns that Sakharov and Tamm also deal with the issues of plasma confinement - due to the magnetic field, about which Sakharov Oleg did not speak. And there was a reason for this - as Lavrentiev found out only in 1968, his the first Sakhalin work was reviewed by Sakharov, a recent graduate student of Tamm, and Lavrentiev's ideas, apparently, launched a “chain reaction” of Sakharov's thoughts...

In mid-May 1951, Oleg received a permanent pass to laboratory No. 2, also called LIPAN - the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the Academy of Sciences. worked a lot, the arrival of Beria was expected, who himself wanted to look at the experiments ... Lavrentiev met Lev Artsimovich - the head of the experimental program on controlled thermonuclear fusion, the largest value. It turns out that Artsimovich also read his first work and appreciates it highly. And then Oleg gets acquainted with Budker, the future director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences THE USSR. Budker also read the “sergeant's” work of a graduate of the evening school youth and treated its author very kindly. At this time, Oleg was

already living on the Maxim Gorky embankment (there was built several imposing residential buildings for CCGT employees). And everything seemed to work out would be great! At the end of June 1951, he was in his office at PGU on Novo-Ryazanskaya Street accepts Zavenyagin, asks about life, plans for the future, offers a ticket. Meetings with Pavlov and Makhnev are not uncommon - Oleg wanted to realize a modest own experimental program (Makhnev called it due to the insignificance the required funds “penny”) ... But something stopped. In

October 1951, a detailed discussion of Oleg's idea of electromagnetic trap.

“At the discussion,” writes Lavrentiev, “another person was present. He sat quietly in the corner, listening attentively to my explanations, but there were no questions. asked and did not interfere in our conversations. When the discussion was coming to an end, he quietly got up and walked out of the audience ”...

Only later did Oleg realize that it was Tamm. Half a century later, Lavrentiev will write: “The reasons that prompted him to attend our meeting incognito are incomprehensible to me.”

Although the reader may already begin to understand something ...

By JUNE 1952, Lavrentiev issued a report with the calculations of his trap and parameters of the plasma contained in it. The report was sent for review to academician M. A. Leontovich, and on June 16, the first meeting of another largest value in physical science and a chubby stubborn man who accepts the authority of scientific truth alone.

Leontovich began with compliments, but then began to convince the author of the report unrealizability of both his idea of traps and the second idea of a reactive plasma engine for use in outer space (later such engines will be used practically, but ...). Lavrentiev did

not give in, but politely said that he would think about it. And then Leontovich in front of him, he called someone on the phone and said: "Everything is in order" ... Even the naive Oleg these words jarred, and he mentally added to them: "Your task is completed." I would like to know - whose?

Leontovich "cut down" Lavrentiev's report, but their meetings continued, and Leontovich I even wanted to take him to graduate school, but ... But here are the words of Lavrentiev:

"The conclusion of M. A. Leontovich delayed the start of experimental research on electromagnetic traps for almost five years. It was a great loss not only for me, but for our entire program controlled thermonuclear fusion.

And what about a young Russian guy with the makings of a genius, but without ambition and without appearance genius, in contrast to the "brilliant" Landau or Leontovich with his very expressive face! Schemers from science brought down bigger figures! For example, in 1946 in ZhETF - "Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics" - an article was published V. L. Ginzburg, L. D. Landau, M. A. Leontovich and V. A. Fok, which began like this:

"Recently (in 1944-1945) a number of works appeared in the press A. A. Vlasov ... Consideration of the indicated works of A. A. Vlasov led us, however, to the conviction of their inconsistency and the absence of any results of scientific value..."

Anatoly Alexandrovich Vlasov was a professor at the Physics Department of Moscow State University ... In 1988, during France, in Corsica, an international conference was held, named at the suggestion of a number of US scientists "Vlasov Plasma" ... But Vlasov himself was not alive for a long time - he went down with crazy and

died. Oleg, on the other hand, was a guy with strong nerves, and although he wondered why Sakharov conversations evades the topic of that part of Lavrentiev's "Sakhalin" note, where a "real" hydrogen bomb was proposed, but out of the rut the silence of Sakharov the artillery reconnaissance observer was not knocked out. And it was quite understandable ... For example, the idea of using lithium deuteride in a thermonuclear charge is dated in the USSR 1948 - there are **seemingly** indisputable documents in Arzamas-16 on this subject. But her authorship was disputed by the "luminaries" themselves. And suddenly admit that this boy, devoid of intellectual grace, and even promoted by "this" Beria, found everything this on his own, wearing sergeant's epaulettes... No, it

was unbearable for the "luminaries"... But he had to endure, hiding his irritation... Moreover, on the one hand, the obstinate ideas, but on the other hand, he needed an eye and an eye ... Leave him unattended, and he, you see, for pennies will be able to do what the academicians did not do for millions. And how then to explain to the "luminaries" with L.P. Beria?

But Academician Leontovich, on his 50th birthday, which is coming on March 7, 1953, received the most wonderful - as he himself declared to "his" - gift: the death of Stalin ...

How is it necessary to hate the country in which one was born in order to treat someone who, according to Churchill, accepted Russia with a plow, and left it with an atomic bomb?

On June 26, 1953, all the all-Union bastard receives another gift - arrest Beria.

And it started!

Lavrentyev is deprived of both his pass to LIPAN and his work permit. And he starts diploma practice and it is necessary to write a diploma. They also deprive him of an increased scholarship (absolutely illegal, in violation of government decree) and turn out the fee for training for the whole year. Oleg finds himself without a livelihood, and when he breaks through into the office of the new dean of the Faculty of Physics, Fursov, he hears: "Your benefactor dead, what do you want?"

HOW did the young physicist believe in Soviet power, if immediately after that he writes letter to Khrushchev. And a few days later, Oleg ... summons a scientific Khrushchev's referent Panasenkov. A physicist himself, Panasenkov quickly grasped everything, and how it turned out that Artsimovich confirmed at the highest level the importance and value of ideas Lavrentiev. In

short, the scholarship was returned, but there were many obstacles on the way to defending it, and only in May In 1955, the defense took place. And it took another six months (!) for the talented physicist to Lavrentiev received a diploma and a qualification in physics. A

year ago, everything was clear: they were waiting for him in LIPAN. But now they give him from the gate turn - including the same Golovin.

Academician Artsimovich rather coldly reports that this question is not in his competencies ... As a result, Lavrentiev ended up in Kharkov, where he remained for the rest of his life. But also Before his arrival, Director of the UPTI Sinelnikov received a phone call from someone from LIPAN who informed him that "a brawler and an author of confused ideas" is going to

him ... Moscow ordeals have been replaced by Kharkov ones, but the talent cannot at all be success. The first installations were assembled, the first results were obtained. started the work of many years ... However, even the publication of articles in Moscow for Lavrentiev turns out to be impossible. It is published in the "Ukrainian Physical Journal" - in Ukrainian language, and his articles are beginning to be read ... in the West. And they immediately make a "stand" on them.

In 1968, at the Novosibirsk Conference on Plasma Physics, foreign scientists they get to know Lavrentiev personally ... Lavrentiev is quoted, referred to ... However, Moscow does not send him abroad, ignoring even direct invitations sent to Oleg Alexandrovich. Even those that express willingness to pay expenses at the expense of the inviting party. Only in 1974 did he go abroad for the first time - to the GDR for a conference on low-temperature plasma (in 1975 he was also "graciously" released to Lausanne). But more often than not, Lavrentiev was denied travel — not like his classmate and former neighbor in the hostel on Stromynka Roald Sagdeev, who made a brilliant career in the Brezhnev USSR and then "crowned" it resettlement in the "stronghold of freedom" across the ocean.

In 1968, in Novosibirsk, Budker said to Oleg Alexandrovich: "They ruined good guy." Recalling this, Lavrentiev wrote:

"My vague guesses after these words took on a real shape. Me they just "ruined", and when they "ruined", it turned out that I did not use high patronage, did no harm to anyone or anything.

And here he was wrong.

LIKE BERIA at his level as a statesman, Lavrentiev at his level physics caused "harm" to very many by the very fact of its existence! He wanted to live in a *family* of physicists, and there were only *clans* - if we mean those who made up

"Olympus".

Beria was to blame for the fact that so many people just wanted to "eat", and he forced them to work as he worked himself, at the limit of his strength. So after all, Lavrentiev was to blame - on your level - IN THE SAME! He wanted to work, not shine.

Beria loved the Motherland in himself. His ideological antipodes, and above all Khrushchev, loved themselves in the leading chair. Lavrentiev

loved physics in himself. And all these Leontovichs and Landau with Artsimovich, and Sakharov, and Tamm, and Kapitsa, loved themselves, their exclusivity, their "chosenness." AND therefore, not only to love - to endure next to them the one who did not pose as the chosen one, but was him, they could not. How much

Sakharov in his memoirs did not spare black paint for Beria. Yes what there the "monster" Beria, who at one time treated with attention and interest not only Lavrentiev, but also to Sakharov himself! "The conscience of democracy", Sakharov, even a modest Vasily Alekseevich Makhnev, who did not serve a single day in the "organs", is head of the "camp in Kolyma" - in his article about Leontovich, published in the collection 2003 "Academician M. A. Leontovich. Scientist. Teacher. Citizen "... This is in public ...

But when on April 5,

1989, Lavrentiev came to Sakharov at his Moscow apartment and the owner, "hanging his head", led the guest past the noisy people all over the house home-grown "democrats" and foreign mentors into the kitchen, then in the first minutes he remembered not something there, but *a meeting with Beria*.

She sunk, it means, into the academician's soul and memory, but not with the atmosphere of "fear" - her That meeting wasn't even close. But there was a keen interest in him outstanding statesman. After all, Sakharov was older than Lavrentiev by only five years, an older peer, in fact. And in 1951, he also got to the LP for the first time, although, unlike Oleg Alexandrovich, and not for the last time. So it was *the bride for the ADF ...*

"We drank tea," Lavrentyev testifies, "with a pie and remembered past. He was still under the impression of our meeting with L.P. Beria, and his first words were about her ... "

What were these words that Sakharov recalled? I don't know, but Oleg Aleksandrovich does not remember - at least, he said so in response to my question. But what, however, could say then Sakharov, walking, *bowing his head*, into the kitchen through the ranks of jubilant destroyers of Russia? After all, he, it seems, then began to understand that Russia, not without him assistance, lead to the slaughter ...

It was 1989 - the year of the bacchanalia of the Gorbachev congress of "people's deputies", which buried the state. And then, in the era of Beria and the late Stalin, the state turned out to be at the crossroads. There were two paths: either to new glory, or to infamy. Or -

to indestructible power, or - to decrepitude. Or - to the flowering of genuine, that is, Soviet, democracy, or - at first to patocratic, and then to oligarchic totalitarianism. Or - to natural world

leadership in a world of increasing justice and freedom, or - to unnatural death in a world of increasing inequality and global suppression of freedoms...

There was a choice. And the country was at a crossroads.

chapter

22

In 1946 or 1947 Einstein published in one of the American magazines

an article with the title, characteristic of those years, "Why is socialism needed?". I emphasize - not "Is socialism necessary?" and "Why is socialism necessary?".

Diplomatic figure of the times of Khrushchev - Brezhnev - Gorbachev Georgy Kornienko mentioned it in his book Cold War. Testimony of its participant. The path of the author, who graduated from the Higher School of the NKGB shortly after the war, and to the era "catastrophe" who reached the highest posts in the Foreign Ministry, is quite typical for representative of the elite that betrayed the state. Specifically, Kornienko, in the words "remained faithful socialism", but what do we care about his words now!

In their youth, people like him did not read Lenin very carefully, and even more so Stalin, but they imagined themselves to be a thinking public. Then they quickly climbed up, thinking that their participation in big politics is explained by their talents, while it was provided the successes of Russia under Stalin and Beria.

They occupied ever higher positions in an ever more powerful state and were sure that the power of the state is growing thanks to them, while this power grew on that base, which was laid by the works of the era of Stalin and Beria.

The time has come, and this elite, who believed in their chosenness (and in fact, everything only petrified as a certain specific substance), fearlessly and without any internal struggle, which, however, she was not capable of even in her early years, surrendered the state mediocre and close-minded rogue with the seal of Cain on his forehead. And it gradually raised to the pinnacle of power the darkest and sinister forces.

Why did this happen? Why?

There is

an answer, and I will try to give it. At one time ... Kornienko

admits that Einstein's judgments influenced his de worldview (it turns out that he, who lied to Gorbachev (!), had it) more than Stalin's Questions of Leninism, which he studied at the same time. And this too significant.

Let us return, however, to Einstein. In the article cited above, he concluded that preference and greater justice of socialism - not Soviet precisely its model, but socialism as a social system. The most famous physicist of the 20th century wrote:

The economic anarchy of the capitalist system, in my opinion, is the true root of evil ... Production is carried out not for the benefit of people, but for profits ... Capital is concentrated in a few hands, and the result is capitalist oligarchies, whose gigantic strength is incapable of to control even a democratically organized state... I am convinced that there is only one way to fight this grave evil - **the introduction socialist economy together with the education system** (highlighted me. - **S.K.**) aimed at the benefit of society "...

For the world of private property, this was a kind of ideological knockout. However, in a huge (with a page portrait-insert) article about Einstein in the 48th volume of the second publications of the TSB about this, it would seem, such an important and advantageous work for the USSR Einstein was not even mentioned, although his philosophical views were mentioned. I think it was not a review of the editorial board, but an exact calculation - the 20th Congress had already passed, and some began work on the future dismantling of socialism, so take in its defenders famous physicist, these forces were useless. One way

or another, but ten years before the publication of the 48th volume of the TSB, Einstein compared two system, their advantages and disadvantages, and issued a historical verdict on capitalism as *scientist*, as a result of *scientific* analysis.

He, by the way, spoke about the depletion of natural resources, provoked capitalism, noted that the United States, with a population of 5% of the world, consumes 30%

of the world's energy resources, often simply throwing them into the wind. And the USSR consumed a little more, but had huge development potential and huge reserves natural resources. The

United States increasingly robbed the outside world, and the USSR in the future could mutually beneficial to share with him their wealth. But after the war there were new problems, and the future of real socialism depended on whether they were solved, and means - in accordance with the conclusions of Einstein - and the future of the planet.

TO BE more convincing, I will refer to another piece of evidence from the New Sveta. The original American artist Rockwell Kent was also interesting a writer, and his autobiographical book "It's me, Lord!" is best known. And so what we find in it:

"Arriving in Paris (in 1950 for one of the international events Western supporters of peace. - **S.K.**), I barely had time to wash in the hotel: it is necessary I had to go to the Chamber of Deputies ... Following this speech, I was invited to go to Moscow as part of a delegation. Moscow! This fabulous capital of the forbidden countries!.. And if we want peace, where else can we defend it, if not in the main strongholds of his enemies, what is this city supposed to be? So we fly to Moscow ...

Moscow appeared before me as a great city full of people, people well-dressed and actively participating in the nationwide struggle for peace. I saw the cleanest city in the world, even cleaner than Stockholm and Copenhagen....

Every evening we were taken to the opera, ballet, theater or cinema. The halls were crowded. No one in the audience stood out enough to be call rich or poor..."

"Stalin-Beria" Potemkin village "", smirk about these lines "democrat". And he will be as mistaken as only "democrats" can be wrong. For this is what follows:

"... One night, returning home, I got lost. Looking for policeman who would show me the way, I passed countless Moscow quarters. So without meeting a single policeman, I had to turn to a passerby who turned out to be very friendly ... "

This is how it was in the supposedly "totalitarian" Moscow of the 1950s. How are things now in "democratic" Moscow, it is hardly worth saying ...

Yes, by the beginning of the 1950s it had already become clear to all honest people in the world that Russia turns into a mighty, but at the same time a peace-loving power. In the forties half the country lay in ruins. Many lived hard, but the prospects gave hope quite justified. Nevertheless, there were grounds for concern.

What happened in the USSR had no precedent in world history. For the first time such economic and state colossus was so centralized, and her life so comprehensively planned. And it successfully functioned and developed. But thanks to what? In such a

huge country *with such a history*, such success could only have two terms: 1) the efforts of the people and 2) adequate to them, competent management.

The management of the Soviet Union had a twofold character: party and state. The Party and its supreme body, that is, the Politburo of the Central Committee, should in principle were to provide moral, spiritual guidance to society. The state and its

highest executive body, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, must were to provide economic, economic leadership.

At the same time, the party was obliged to understand the economic problems of socialism, and

the government had to deal with them. But who was to be in charge? This question appeared objectively. And even if it were brushed aside, it would not disappear, but only escalated.

Stalin understood that now that socialism had survived the war, party organs should not convince people of the advantages of Soviet power - they were obvious, but to practically develop and strengthen these advantages. But if, say, at some factory if a particular member of the party is better than others able to direct the work of the plant and its development, then who should he be appointed - the party organizer of the plant or the director?

And if in some city a particular member of the party is better than others able to decide questions of the development of the city, what he should lead - the city committee of the party or the executive committee city council? The answer in both the first and second cases, it would seem, was clear.

But if the most competent people in the field of management had to be sent to bodies of Soviet and economic management of the city, then the right of a decisive vote in the city should have had them. Is not it? Like so.

And in the
region? And in

the republic? And
in the Soviet Union? That's
just it ... There

was another sharp moment in all this. In order to tell the director of the metallurgical plant how best to cook steel, a party member who is part of the leadership of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy had to go through many stages of professional growth. But a party member, yesterday's director school, if he was elected secretary of the city committee in the city where the metallurgical plant worked, acquired the right to give instructions to the director of this plant, and the director of the dairy plant, and the rector of the university.

Socialism is a directive system, and in principle there is nothing vicious in that. Not bad a directive in itself, but an incompetent directive. But who and how should develop and issue competent directives? As socialism

developed, everyone thought about how and to whom to organize its development. Even such a little thought person as Khrushchev ... Already after he got rid of both Beria and the "anti-party group of Malenkov - Kaganovich - Molotov", speaking on November 1, 1957 at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow Regional organizations, Khrushchev blurted out (he generally blabbed there) interesting things! I will bring his words according to an uncorrected transcript published in the collection of the Democracy Foundation "Georgy Zhukov. Documentation":

"... take Beria. Beria after the death of Stalin in which direction did he become act? He began to strengthen the Ministry of Internal Affairs and weaken the party (Khrushchev twitched, because Beria began to strengthen, first of all, the Council of Ministers, but party talkers really started to ignore. - **S.K.**) ... This means cutting the party ... This, comrades, was a campaign against the party, to defeat the party and to strengthen personal role, it would lead to the restoration of capitalism. This is only enemies can.

Now look, if you take Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, then what a dispute there was again with Molotov. Well, Beria and Molotov are, of course, different people are completely different. But Molotov and I had a big argument, as soon as Stalin died. He said that the role of the Soviet organs should be strengthened. We (who "We"? - **S.K.**) said: no, it is necessary to strengthen the role of party organs ...

Who is able to crush the enemy in the party? The consignment. Therefore the question of the role of the party is the main thing. If the party could not cope with Beria, where would we go then?"

And really, where?

Where we went with Khrushchev, we know.
And where would we go with Beria?
And where did we go after the war with Stalin?

IN 1945, the future Chief Designer of the nuclear weapons center at Urals, and later - the deputy head of the weapons department of the Minsredmash, Major General Leonid Fedorovich Klopov, was twenty-seven years old, and he had just been enrolled as a student of the Air Force Engineering Academy named after N. E. Zhukovsky. On June 24, as part of the Consolidated Regiment of the Academy, he stood on Red Square - almost straight in front of the Mausoleum, waiting for the start of the Victory Parade. And I saw well how they climbed the tribune of the Mausoleum members of the Politburo headed by Stalin.

"I saw Stalin up close," L. F. Klopov wrote in his memoirs, "during the funeral of M. I. Kalinin on Red Square in 1946. I was then in the calculation of the cordon of the place of movement of the hearse with the coffin of M. I. Kalinin. I. V. Stalin walked directly behind the hearse alone, and the members of the Politburo walked three or four steps behind. Earthy complexion, sparse gray hair, not quite a confident step showed his fatigue and old age. Even after his death in 1953 in the Mausoleum, Stalin seemed to me younger than seven years ago on funeral."

I don't know about the reader, but I appreciate such small details as much as I do documents. The fact that Stalin was already aging and tired by the end of the forties can be read on hundreds of pages from dozens of venerable memoirists. But the impressions of the young officer, of course, forever etched into his memory, valuable as an old photographic film, where in an instant signs of the era are documented.

Yes, Stalin was aging, although in 1946 he was only sixty-seven years old. But what years! In addition, 1946 is the year when the United States became more and more aggressive, and the rest of the world wavered. Stalin, Molotov and Beria knew the mood of the Western leadership not from newspapers - consolidated into a single Committee of Information (CI) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR Soviet intelligence services were stacking on their tables so first-class and accurate data about the plans of the West, which Stalin, unlike Western leaders, saw the true picture of world politics. And she was worried... Here is a fragment of a typical message from the KI station in April 1948:

"For the past two weeks, there have been secret Anglo-American negotiations. The first stage of negotiations ended on April 1 this year (The following was a detailed description of the essence of the negotiations, where plans for the creation of NATO. - **S.K.**)

Anglo-American-Canadian staff talks will be held over the next few weeks, which may represent more interest than the talks just concluded in Washington.

The military staff talks will be aimed at working out combined plans: a) For

an unknown indefinite event, namely, in case of war in over the next few weeks or months; c) In case of war in

1955-1956. The Anglo-Americans believe that by that date the Soviet Union will have atomic bombs in sufficient numbers and can knowingly take risks war..."

Moreover, both in 1940 and in 1948, the primary object of an atomic attack not even Moscow was supposed, but Baku and the surrounding oil regions. Oil all

more and more became the nerve of the politics of the West. But in April 1948, we still did not have any one atomic bomb, while the United States was rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal, moving from double digits to triple digits. There was reason to have

a "not quite confident step" for Stalin in 1946. But after successful test of the RDS-1, the tension subsided somewhat. October 29, 1949 Stalin signed Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 5060-1943 "On the development of the nuclear industry in 1950-1954". The first paragraph approved the plan for "manufacturing finished products from plutonium" in the amount of 153 items, including: in 1949 - 2 units; in 1950 - 7 units; in 1951 - 18 units; in 1952 - 30 units, in 1953 - 42 units; 1954 - 54 units. So everything worked out? All but not all...

On January 3, 1947, Abakumov sent the following report to Stalin:

"At the same time, I present a certificate of the recorded operational equipment
On December 31, 1946, Gordov's conversation with his wife (Tatyana Vladimirovna. - **S.K.**) and a certificate of Gordov's conversation on December 28 with Rybalchenko.

These materials show that Gordov and Rybalchenko are clear enemies of the Soviet government. I thought it necessary to once again ask your permission to arrest Gordov and Rybalchenko.

Colonel General Vasily Gordov, born in 1896, a native of the village of Matveevka Menzelinsky district of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, was then a typical - according to his biography - general Soviet army. Called up in 1915, fought, senior non-commissioned officer of the old Russian army, in the Civil - the commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment ... Then - courses "Shot", Frunze Academy, in 1940 - chief of staff of the Volga military district ... In

the war, Gordov first rose to the post of commander of the Stalingrad front, and here in the summer of 1942 it mediocly failed, and as a result, the Germans broke through external defensive contour of Stalingrad. His failures were corrected by a returnee from China Vasily Chuikov, who later noted Gordov's aplomb and arrogance. Demoted to

the position of army commander, Gordov fought better, in 1945 he became a Hero Soviet Union. After the war, he was appointed commander of the Volga military district, and General Rybalchenko becomes his chief of staff (they served in such "bunch" during the war).

So, the real level of Gordov's incompetence was the position of commander army. However, this former peasant son, raised by the Soviet government to the "golden" starry heights, was "offended", which was recorded by Abakumov's technique.

I quote Gordov's conversation with his wife in part, but - for the convenience of the reader - without ellipsis designation of the released text.

"Proud. You keep saying - go to Stalin. So go to him and say: "I'm sorry, I made a mistake, I will serve you honestly, faithfully." To whom? meanness I will serve, savagery? The Inquisition is solid, people are just dying! (Just in These days marked the anniversary of the day when Generals Muzychenko, Potapov, Lukin left the Lubyanka after a special check. - **S.K.**).

T.V. They broke such a spirit as Zhukov ...

Gordov. He still won't get fired. Now they are only clearing those who have Zhukov was more or less in confidence ... And Zhukov would be supported for a year or two, and then also - in a mug, and that's it! I missed out on a lot. What did I break my head on? At that. what broke such people - Uborevich, Tukhachevsky ... (taking into account the fact that in 1933 Gordov was the chief of staff of the Moscow military infantry schools, these words are very interesting. -

me: **S.K.**). . When Zhukov was removed, you immediately told

everything was dead. **T.V. Gordov.** So I had to tremble, slavishly tremble... I can't! What

I was ruined by the fact that I was elected a deputy. This is where my death lies. I went around the districts, and when I saw everything, all this terrible, - then I completely reborn... And it went like a platform. I'm talking now, I have such belief that if collective farms are removed today, then tomorrow there will be order, there will be market, everything will be ... Let people live, they have the right to life, they have won own life, defended it! **T.V.** _

Now no one aspires to live for society. **Gordov.** There is no society. **T.V.** Even if there is - a handful, but it is not interesting for her to live. **Gordov.** And it's a pity to die too. **T.V.** I want to see life. Whatever they get to. **Gordov.** This scum?"

Madame Gordova with her disappointment in life in a Moscow environment (except for Kuibyshev) of the general's apartment reminded me very much of the classical a provincial fool with pretensions to high demands, who "do not want" to understand all sorts of Stalins and Berias...

General Gordov, who undertook to judge problems above the general's boot, is no more sympathetic to me. Behind all this "let live" talk was just the mug of a tradesman, unsatisfied in his conceit... But this tradesman had general's epaulettes, as well as that of another "guardian for the people", General Rybalchenko, who talked with Gordov at his apartment while traveling from Sochi to Kuibyshev. And here's what the conversation was about:

"Rybalchenko. There are no essentials. They literally became beggars. lives only the government, and the broad masses are begging. I'm wondering, right? Stalin does not see how people live?

Gordov. He sees everything, knows everything. **Rybalchenko.** Or is he so confused that he doesn't know how to get out? The first year of the five-year plan has been fulfilled - well, what's the point of throwing dust in your eyes? ..

Gordov. They eat cats, dogs, rats. **Rybalchenko.** We used to get help from abroad. **Gordov.** Lived up, now they give nothing. And we have nothing. **Rybalchenko.** And no prospects, complete isolation."

These conversations were recorded. First they arrested Rybalchenko, then - and Gordov (in 1950 they were shot, but in 1956 - which is significant - they were rehabilitated). However, not everything was recorded! And the figs in the pocket of the power that gave birth to it, part of the Soviet elite showed more and more often - even after the country moved towards prosperity. And the reason was not some "platforms" with which he tried cover up your grumbling Gordov. What there "platforms"! It all boiled down to the fact that they they wanted to live and eat *now*, but the country could not immediately give them the opportunity to do so.

The former peasant boy lordly denied us the right to society, and his "madame", justifying her own worthlessness, declared that no one even aspires to live for him. Actually, the situation that arose after revolution and the Civil War, when one of the fighters rolled up their sleeves for peaceful work, and someone ... "For all the battles, for all the

hardships ..." Well, then the reader, I hope, understands ... Especially since I used to talk about this topic in the book already expressed.

AND OUTSIDE the emerging circle of the new Soviet elite, ascended war on worldly (life - I can't write) heights, a huge country lived. Lived not easy, but with hope and work. Factories were restored, cities were rebuilt, new discoveries were made, new varieties of winter and spring crops were bred,

domestic electron microscopes and walking excavators, started towards the goals
air defense

missiles ... Sergeant Lavrentiev was considering on Sakhalin (on Sakhalin!) Pioneer physical ideas, he subscribed scientific journals for sergeant's rubles ... And ahead of him he had a meeting with Marshal Beria. And

I think - what if, with his ideas, the sergeant turned not to Marshal Beria, but to General Gordov? Yes, this brave "supporter of the market" would have wiped him into dust! Not in the camp on the parade ground ... I would have driven the sergeant into the

ground with one obscene language. The marshal-general, confident that he had surpassed everything - that was one threat developing socialism. The second, and not eliminated, threat was partocracy. If the generals were sure that the general could not be a fool, then the party bureaucrats were We are sure that the secretary of the Central Committee cannot be a fool. The third threat was the "elite" intelligentsia. First of all - serving and "creative", but to some extent - and scientific, especially at the professorial and academic level.

Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky classified the intelligentsia as follows:

"1) People with a patchwork worldview sewn from scraps of newspaper and magazine. 2) Sectarians with confirmed commandments, but without a way of thinking and even without the ability to think. 3) Slivers floating downstream, with some words and appetites.

Klyuchevsky traced the problem from pre-Petrine times and concluded surprisingly topical to this day words:

"... the proud Russian intellectual found himself in an awkward position: what he knew, it turned out to be unnecessary, but what was needed, he did not know. He knew lofty legend about the moral decline of the world and about the transformation of Moscow into The Third Rome, but artillery, fortification, mining, medical knowledge was needed to save the Third Rome from the fallen world.... An educated Russian person knew Russian reality as it is, but did not guessed what she needed and what he should do "...

Many years have passed since these bitter words were written, and in Russia a whole social stratum of educated Russian people appeared, who knew and Russian reality - as *it is*, and who knew what she needed and what to do ...

Do!

They were confident in the state and in themselves, because they had knowledge of both artillery and fortification, and mining, and medical, and knew how to use them, making case! They were people of action, they wanted and loved to do it! And the era of Stalin and Beria provided them with every opportunity for this ... However, why the hell were these possibilities of partocracy? Or - to the nascent regulars of "kitchen" discussions about "lack of creative freedom"? The

partocracy and the "creative" intelligentsia were related by the inability to do business and propensity for idle chatter. Partocracy and generals made related hypertrophied self-confidence that they already know how to run the country. And it was deadly. Of course, in the country of Stalin

and Beria there were then many excellent party and Soviet workers - one twice Heroes of the Soviet Union Alexei Fedorovich Fedorov-Chernigovskiy and Sidor Artemovich Kovpak were worth something! I'm not talking about war-formed cohort of brilliant economic leaders, a natural whose leader was just Beria. And there were beautiful, honest, busy building new army generals and even marshals - one Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky how good it was! And there were scientists devoted to the truth ... And creators devoted to art

art treasures...

It was thanks to them that things went well, and year by year everything got better. prospects brilliant ones were outlined, and by 1952 a lot had been done.

Generals Gordov and Rybalchenko themselves chose their fate and could not see country in 1952. And by 1952 it had a qualitatively different look. This year we produced 34.4 million tons of steel against 12.3 million tons in 1945; coal - 300 million tons against 149 million tons; electricity - 119 billion kilowatt hours against 43.3 billion.

By 1950, infant mortality had halved compared to 1940, and the number of doctors had increased from 155,000 in 1940 to 265,000 in 1950. In 1945, the country produced

292 thousand tons of vegetable oil and 117 thousand tons animal. And in 1950 (when Gordov and Rybalchenko were shot) - 819 thousand and 336 thousand. Sahara - 2 million 523 thousand tons against 465 thousand tons. That, dear

reader, was a feat! But they did something not for Uncle Sam, not for the oligarchs, but for themselves! That's why it's so powerful done! But all this had to be organized. Stalin's party and organized. The party of partocrats used it. And the country? The country has been on the rise so far...

ONE of the anti-Stalinist (and therefore anti-Beria) myths is as follows: we are lagging behind in field of electronic computers, because cybernetics was declared pseudoscience. But such a student of the history of Soviet science as Lauren Graham admitted that *"Soviet hostility to cybernetics was exaggerated outside the USSR"*.

Still would! The reader is already familiar with the note by Minister Parshin Beria on the work on computers. And here is an illustration to it from the "other" side ... In his book "I am a mathematician" Norbert Wiener, "the father of cybernetics", wrote:

"My research ... was in close contact with the work of several Russian mathematicians ... Khinchin and Kolmogorov, two of the most prominent Russian specialist ... worked in the same field as me. For over twenty years we stepped on each other's toes...

And I have no certainty that Kolmogorov himself will not found ... the possibilities of applying these methods known to me ... he probably simply did not manage to publish his work in the open press ...

When I started working for the US War Department... the question is whether anyone abroad is interested in the same problems as me. I said then that ... if anyone in the world is now doing the same thing as me, then most likely it is Kolmogorov in Russia "...

Luzin's student, Andrei Kolmogorov, at the age of 36, in 1939, became an academician, in 1941 - a laureate of the Stalin Prize, during Stalin's lifetime he received two Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Alexander Khinchin became a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences USSR in the same year as Kolmogorov, but at the age of 45. In 1941 Khinchin became a laureate Stalin Prize, and by 1953 - also a holder of the Order of Lenin. Sergei

Alexandrovich Lebedev, creator of our first high-speed computer electronic machine BESM and its modifications, in 1934, thirty-two years old, already published the 2nd (!) Edition of his book "Stability of Parallel Operation electrical systems", in 1946-1951 he headed the Institute of Electrical Engineering of the Academy of Sciences Ukrainian SSR, and since 1953 became the Director of the Institute of Precision Mechanics and computer technology, where BESM-1, BESM-4, BESM-6 and others were developed pioneer computers.

In the 4th volume of the 3rd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia about machines of the BESM family

there is an article written by Lebedev himself. This is 1971. But in the 4th volume of the Big Russian encyclopedia, published in 2006, there is not a word about BESM. Still, what if someone pays attention to the fact that the first BESM worked already in 1953, and doubts that the "tyrant" Stalin was the persecutor of modern areas of scientific and technical progress.

However, our computer technology had its own ideologists already in the 40s. and own creators. Sergo Beria wrote about this well:

"I once told my current colleagues that at my institute
There were more computers then than today! Eleven! Yes, large in volume, still the first generation, but - there were! Domestic, by the way, technology ... It is strange that all this is forgotten. But the main developers were
in Kiev and Kharkov ...

Professor Lebedev, a number of other scientists created these machines ...

Although it was then that the party crushed the pseudoscience of cybernetics ... Its Central Committee, the apparatus, as always,

were far from real things ... Their chatter did not interfere with us, because such serious things, How nuclear, missile projects, party workers were not allowed to come close. IN other sectors where they had the opportunity to interfere, they, of course, interfered great ... And Stalin was interested in the case. He knew the price of the Central Committee apparatus, believe me ... He needed it for control ... "

I will immediately invite the reader to compare this assessment with another one just given.
appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building Vyacheslav Malyshev

Antiberia plenum of the Central Committee:

"Beria's leadership style is dictatorial, rude, non-partisan. By the way, about partisanship. I worked during the war, led the tank
deeds ... he never had a party membership. He somehow set up or pushed not directly, but indirectly, that the party organization should provide services (to whom - Beria or the country? - **S.K.**) ... you do one thing, do another. There was no provision for him to teach us, he asked the party organization help organize party work, and so on. He considered secretaries regional committees of the party dispatchers ... "

And who else could the secretaries of the regional committees in the regions producing weapons, if not dispatchers of the State Defense Committee? Turner Anya Lopatinskaya from Uralmash gave 300 (three hundred!) percent of the norm ... When she was asked how she succeeded, she answered: "I stand on tiptoe." To get control levers a large machine, Anya, who lacked height, "stood on tiptoe" for an eleven-hour shift! So, in front of such people, the secretaries of the

regional committees had to portray themselves as "party leaders", "agitate" them, and not coordinate them in a businesslike way
production activities - like dispatchers? Yes, in front of this

fifteen-year-old girl, "standing on tiptoe" in the name of Victory, they
it was not a sin to get on your knees!

Malyshev was an engineer. And in the same 1941 at Uralmash, he was very tough demanded from the management of the plant to reduce, for example, the installation time of the sub-frame tank from forty-eight hours to three to five ... That is, **ten times!** Boss tyranny? Illiterate arbitrariness? No! The rigidity of Malyshev did not intimidate Uralmashevites, but showed in all nudity: HOW the front needs tanks. And after some time the tanks went on stream.

Beria behaved just as harshly when the situation required it. Eventually the front received from the rear what ensured victory. This was the partisanship of Lavrenty

Beria and Anya Lopatinskaya, because they were members of Stalin's party. And Generals Gordov and Rybalchenko, despite their lamentations about the starving people, were in the party of partocrats, and in this party - the party of Khrushchev, they transferred now people like Vyacheslav Malyshev. Alas ...

Here is

another accusation of alleged "non-partisanship", expressed in writing to Lavrenty Pavlovich by the manager of affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. T. Pomaznev after Beria's arrest. Pomaznev explained to Malenkov and Khrushchev that since he "failed to get the floor at the Plenum of the Central Committee", he would like to supplement the characterization of the "hardened intriguer, treacherous and provocateur" Beria a number of facts and wrote:

"...7. Beria was intolerant of party and public bodies, workers and events. He cultivated disrespect for the apparatus of the Central Committee. Participation in public events was considered idleness. When I had to be present at the party committee, at a meeting or meeting and at that time there was a call from Beria, there was always a scandal. He said many times that this can only be allowed bums."

Well, one can only admire such behavior of Beria and such assessments of him. In during the war for socialism it was necessary not to agitate, it had to be defended. After the war all the more, there was no longer any need for empty "agitation". It was not necessary for socialism agitate, it had to be built and strengthened! And the country by 1952 knew how and could much...

Oh, how much we could already then! And how much of what we could we owe organizational and managerial talent of Beria, who knew how to talentedly use "human factor" at its best. Now sometimes they write about the tandem de "technocrats" Malenkov and Beria. But there was no real "tandem", and if prone to partocratic methods, Malenkov and clever Beria often sat on the same "bicycle", then Beria turned the "pedals" with might and main, and Malenkov, at best, did not slow down movement.

AND HERE I will say once again about the untenable statement of various political scientists, about widely propagated thesis about supposedly constant intrigues in the highest leadership of the Stalinist USSR.

I do not want to say that there were no intrigues at all. But I want to say, first of all, that they were not the same as they are described, secondly, they were not so personified and, thirdly, that Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria did not deal with them. Alexey, whom I mentioned more than once Toptygin, who often wrote intelligently and accurately about Beria, unfortunately did not understand much of him. Nevertheless, Toptygin wrote, for example, as follows:

"Beria, who had previously dealt with national economic issues tight enough, becomes a "pure" business executive, but not only ... He promoted to the forefront of the leaders of the military-industrial complex. Stalin did not let go of the reins of the military-industrial complex until the end of his life. Beria in this system - the second most important figure ...

... But at the same time, he does not play an active role in those political battles that are played out around the figures of Voznesensky, Kuznetsov - everything that received the name "Leningrad case" ... But Lavrenty Pavlovich is more than vigorously trying to catch on the so-called. Mingrelian case - in essence, it directed against him..."

I note that the "Mingrelian case" mentioned by Toptygin - despite the fact that Beria was a Mingrel, despite the fact that after the death of Stalin, Beria participated in the closing of this affairs, is an ambiguous fact in the history of the late Stalinist USSR. Suffice it to say that

this allegedly exclusively anti-Beria "case" was spoken of as a falsification on Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, after the arrest of Beria. Although it seemed to have to strengthen the meaning of this "case" of the accusations against Beria. So I warn you in advance reader that he does not intend to analyze this "case" when my story reaches 1953. It is too important to be limited to a brief summary of it.

consideration.

Let us return, however, to the topic of "intrigue" ... In 1996, in the publishing house "Gaia", for the first time memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov came out (it is significant that Gaia printed responsibility for the accuracy of the facts presented in them). And there Sudoplatov reported that in the late 40s he met Anna Tsukanova, deputy Head of the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee, actually Deputy Malenkov. And Tsukanova allegedly opened Sudoplatov's eyes to the fact that Stalin's policy is a chain of intrigues ... Like, in a small group of his closest associates (Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Beria), Stalin in every possible way "contributes to inciting rivalry" ... He permanently moves high-ranking party leaders and officials state security, not allowing them to stay in the same place for more than three years in a row, etc. etc. What

can be said here? The

very admission of one of the leaders of the special services that his eyes on the situation allegedly discovered in the late 40s, raises doubts that intrigues took place be. Here is a systematically similar case... In the collection of the Democracy Foundation Georgy Zhukov. Documents" contains a recording of the alleged memoirs of the marshal, allegedly made in 1963-1964 and transferred to the Russian State Military Archive in 1995 (!) The authenticity of these "memories", which also refers to the arrest of Beria, for me is more than doubtful. But there is a phrase, in any case, curious:

"Then they did not yet know about the extent of the evil that Stalin inflicted in 1937–1938 to the Soviet people "...

How is this to be understood? If someone inflicts, say, a wound on me, then I will know about it. straightaway. And what is this terrible evil inflicted on the Soviet people by Stalin in 1937, if the people learned about it only in 1956 from Khrushchev's messages and Khrushchev's writings scribbler? So, perhaps, in 1937, Stalin did harm not to the people, but to the enemies of the people - as Was it announced right away? The people did not notice this evil, but the enemies of the people remembered it and they couldn't forget, just as they couldn't forgive Stalin and

forgive him ... Sudoplatov's statement that he, already experienced in Moscow life to a person, only at the end of the 40s it was discovered that the life of the Kremlin is full intrigue. So maybe they weren't as extensive and ubiquitous as Tsukanova told Sudoplatov? Moreover, she, perhaps, nothing to Sudoplatov didn't say that...

Let's look, however, at the statement about Stalin's constant shuffling of the leadership special services of the USSR. Did it really take place? The same Viktor Abakumov was on one actual place from 1943 to 1951. Sergey Kruglov was on one actually place from 1943 to 1953. Ivan Maslennikov was Deputy Minister of the Interior USSR from 1948 to 1954. Vasily Ryzanov was Deputy People's Commissar and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs cases from 1946 to 1953. Ivan Serov was the first deputy minister of internal affairs USSR from 1947 to 1954. Nikolai Stakhanov was the head of the Main Directorate border troops from 1942 to 1952. Lavrenty Tsanava was People's Commissar Minister of State Security Byelorussian SSR from 1943 to 1951. Vasily Chernyshev was Deputy People's Commissar Minister Internal Affairs of the USSR from 1937 to 1952 (he died in 1952). As you can

see, at least in relation to their information, either Tsukanova, or Sudoplatov, or the political correctors of his memoirs, was not entirely accurate. More precisely -

not at all accurate.

But does this mean that in the Soviet post-war leadership there was no intrigue? For a correct answer to this question, one must have a correct understanding of the collective appearance of this leadership, but first to see who has been in it since 1945.

July 7, 1945 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin gives in the Kremlin, a dinner "in honor of the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Marshal Choibalsan". From the Soviet side were present: V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Voznesensky, N. A. Bulganin, and further: V. N. Merkulov, A. Ya. Vyshinsky, Lozovsky and others ...

On July 13, 1945, Stalin gives a dinner "in honor of the Chairman of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Mr. Song Ziwen. From the

Soviet side were present: V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Voznesensky, N. A. Bulganin, A. N. Kosygin and further: V. N. Merkulov, V. G. Dekanozov, Lozovsky and others ... On August 13, 1945, Stalin gives a dinner "in honor of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

From the Soviet side were present: V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Voznesensky, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, N. A. Bulganin and further: A. Ya. Vyshinsky, B. L. Vannikov, A. I. Shakhurin, D. F. Ustinov, other marshals and generals ...

Already from here it is clear that the main post-war "clip" looked like this: Molotov (born in 1890, in the party since 1906), Kaganovich (born in 1893, in the party since 1906), Mikoyan (born in 1895, in party since 1915), Beria (born 1899, in the party since 1917), Malenkov (born 1901, in the party with 1920), Voznesensky (born 1903, in the party since 1919), Bulganin (born 1895, in the party with 1917) ...

Khrushchev (born 1894, in the party since 1918), absent from the "dinner clip", like Zhdanov (born 1896, in the party since 1915).

But Khrushchev is in Kyiv, Zhdanov is in Leningrad, although both are members of the Politburo full members (Beria and Malenkov will be approved as members of the PB only on March 18, 1946). What united

these people? And above all, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, and even Mikoyan? The last group was united primarily

pre-revolutionary party experience. Their very young years, when the personality is formed, passed under the sign of a pure idea. When they came to the party, this did not mean privileges, but dangers, exiles, prisons, the underground... Under such conditions, not schemers grow up, but professional revolutionaries. Beria,

Malenkov, Zhdanov, Bulganin, Voznesensky did not join the party "creamy" times, fertile for intrigue. However, Voznesensky and Malenkov (especially the last one) immediately "walked" along the hardware line, with live management of special cases not having. And it was easier for them to acquire the skills of certain "games" in the apparatus than in the people's commissariat. I already said that in Stalin's USSR a higher level of power meant, first of all, more high responsibility and high workload. But above all it is true in relation to those who were engaged in such activities, the result of which was material. But the apparatchiks... The

reader must have already noticed that I didn't say anything about Khrushchev, but he leadership of the Stalinist USSR turned out to be a unique, very special figure. Only he was a born intriguer and a hypocrite, and therefore only he, of all the rest of his colleagues of that time can be defined as the system undertaker of the Soviet power.

But in the 1940s, that was far from it. The country developed, won the war and entered the first row of world powers. And the situation in all spheres began to change. more and more power became synonymous with blessings and pleasures. Not exactly synonymous, but still...

In addition, after the war and the nature of being the closest Stalinist environment

has changed. No, the tension and the great load from this being did not disappear, but they acquired more calm, planned, so to speak, character. In addition, Stalin began to age.

When the work is over the top, there is no time for intrigue. The less work, the more likely occurrence. And therefore, even in the immediate Stalinist environment from the beginning of the 50s *the germs* of intrigues began to appear, which developed after the death of Stalin.

The first powerful reception for foreigners was arranged by Molotov in the People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the Red Army on February 23, 1944. Beria, and most of the rest of Stalin's associates, like Stalin himself, was then not up to tricks. Beria - unlike the rest of the "lunch clip" - was not even on dinner given by Stalin on March 28, 1945 in honor of the President of Czechoslovakia Benes, first appearing at such an event only on April 11, 1945 - at a dinner in honor of Broz-Tito. However, Beria was not a hunter before such actions; he was in Yalta and in Potsdam kept in the background. And

what about the rest of his colleagues in government? Back in 1944, it was hardly possible for all of them, who then wore military or paramilitary uniforms, to imagine imagine an almost continuous series of ceremonial, official dinners in which they would participated. Dinner gleaming with gold, crystal, drinks, delicacies, flowers, expensive suits, epaulettes... And now... Now the position of not

only the state, but also those who led it, was changing. A also - and the position of those who surrounded the leadership of the state! This position became less and less responsible and more and more comfortable - especially for those who provided giving instructions, not executing them.

The entourage plays the king... And who "played" now the Great Soviet Power? Not the one whether Wednesday, which in official reports of visits and receptions was called "... and persons accompanying them"; "... as well as scientists, writers, artists, representatives of the Soviet print"; "... responsible employees of the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Defense"; "... And other"? Not to mention "and other responsible employees" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the CPSU and Council of People's Commissars - Council of Ministers of the USSR ...

But there were also national Central Committees and Councils of People's Commissars, ministries and their apparatuses, mutually connected with the central apparatuses! This environment, even in modest pre-war times, dressed in khaki paramilitary tunic, had in its ranks those who - neglecting the danger of any repression - managed to intrigue and "spin" in order to "live". After all, the psychology of the waster tenacious at all times, and it was accurately formulated by one of the most senior embezzlers of all times and all peoples Louis XV: "After us - even a flood!"

So isn't it in this environment, starting especially from the second half of the 40s, intrigues really began to become a feature of its existence and a guarantee of its survival?

And this environment began to have an additional corrupting, demoralizing influence on their higher "bosses". And the less the "responsible employee" was responsible for concrete work, the more he developed the desire to imitate activity, hiding behind "party spirit".

Not without reason, on March 28, 1947, at the initiative of Stalin, the Politburo approved Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On courts of honor in the ministries of the USSR and central departments. The courts of honor were entrusted with: *"consideration anti-patriotic, anti-state and anti-social acts and actions committed by leading, operational and scientific workers of ministries of the USSR and central departments, if these acts and actions are not subject to punishment in the criminal order ... "*

From April to October 1947, the courts of honor were formed in 82 ministries and central departments. In September 1947, a court of honor was created in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and in April 1948 - in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. These courts could declare

public censure, public reprimand or transfer of the case to the investigating authorities to be sent to a criminal court.

But Stalin's plan was everywhere "quietly" "released on the brakes", although several trials under the control of Stalin took place. Did the courts of honor need those who or never did not have it, or was preparing to exchange it profitably for a satisfying life with high authorities and etc.? Not without reason, in the very first years of the Khrushchev "leadership", these ships were completely forgotten and forever.

In all its vile power, another factor arose. Diplomat, spy and political scientist George Kennan, a man who understood far from everything in Soviet Russia, but who understood something by the 70s of the XX century, then suddenly became worried about the fate of the USSR, without which Kennan prophetically did not envision a stable world. And one of the factors of decay he considered the "lack of purpose in life in the children of

the elite." I have already written about the son of Commissar Shakhurin. And now I will give another illustration of how dubious fathers gave birth to absolutely worthless sons. Known in Soviet history the names of two Troyanovskys - father Alexander and son Oleg. Father born in the family officer in 1882 and the officer himself, joined the RSDLP (b) in 1904, in 1909 he was exiled to Siberia, fled, since 1914 he was a Menshevik defencist, in 1917 he returned to Russia, in 1923 he joined the RCP(b) and, being in various, mainly diplomatic, positions, he lived until 1955, having died at the age of 73. His son was born in 1919, became a well-

known diplomat and in 1997 published memoirs, named very accurately - "The History of a Family". For "diplomat" Oleg Troyanovsky, the son of the "less" - "Bolshevik" Alexander Troyanovsky, and after 1991 nothing has changed, or rather, people like Troyanovsky-son *pretend* that nothing has changed. Well, just think, there was the "tyrant" Stalin, then there were the "voluntarist" Khrushchev, the "stagnant" Brezhnev, there were incomprehensible Andropov, Chernenko ... Well, and then, after Gorbachev, everything got a little confused, Yeltsin came here ... Not really, of course, everything is fine, but Moscow is in place, and still it is the capital of their homeland (with a small letter) ...

And in place of their capital apartments, and "Russian diplomacy" is functioning, and even they publish memoirs - like all decent ones. Personally,

this kind of audience disgusts me. They lived their lives in the country, not serving her, but being just highly (and not by talent!) Paid employees workers. The concept of an idea has not existed for them since their youth. No wonder in the famous IFLI (Moscow Institute of Philosophy, Literature and History), where he became a student Troyanovsky-son, was taken on the way to the pre-war May Day demonstrations in in a certain place to shout: "Long live Boris Leonidovich Pasternak!"

Not Aristotle and Democritus or there Hegel - among philosophers ... Not Pushkin and Mayakovsky or there Heine - with poets ... Not Karamzin and Klyuchevsky, or at least an academician Tarle is with historians, and the poet of chaotic talent... The cheap front in the center of the emerging great power from the side of its future supposedly intellectual supposedly elite... This is indicative, my dear reader!

Just as it is significant that, talking about Stalin, buttons from a shabby tunic which the father and son of the Troyanovskys, taken together, are not worth, the son did not find anything better than to declare that for him, de Stalin is not a devil or an angel, but just a politician from among those standing at the very top of the political pyramid, and to quote (Troyanovsky-son thought that to place) a letter from Harry Truman to his daughter, where this ordinary US politician spoke arrogantly:

"To be a good president, you need to combine the qualities
Machiavelli, the French king Louis XI, Caesar Borgia and Talleyrand, to be a liar, a traitor, a crafty
churchman (Richelieu), a hero and more
unknown by whom."

If Oleg Troyanovsky, in response to such a statement of his, had heard that Stalin was

Bolshevik-Leninist, who lived all his life with the idea of a great and mighty Russia for free, developed and educated (and therefore free) people, then the "diplomat" son of the "diplomat" dad would shrug his shoulders. After all, if not for dad, then for the son - for sure, this was, after all, an empty sound. They lived, as it should be "civilized people", ultimately family.

These "fathers and sons" arose in the country not as a consequence of Stalin's power, but in spite of it and its spirit, for it was the spirit of creativity and creation, and they lived in the spirit of consumption and serving for a tasty morsel.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the forties, there was a legend about how a certain "server" there (such always do not work, but "serve") the head of the economic department, who had four or five children, in response to the annoyed remark of the First Deputy Minister Vyshinsky: "You don't know how to do anything except children," answered "boldly": "But you have this it doesn't turn out in the best way, Andrey Yanuarievich, that's why you're angry." "Daredevil" was father of the future president of the Central Bank of the Yeltsin "Rossiyania" Gerashchenko ... How we see that dad-Gerashchenko did not manage to make good children.

But they knew how to get settled. The reader should remember how they could settle, according to the description of the apartment of Professor Vinogradov - one of the "doctors of pests." And they really were pests! And also intriguers ...

IF you get acquainted with the history of the USSR at the turn of the 40-50s according to the works of many current "researchers", then the key words for this period will not be "restored Dneproges, Stalingrad, Sevastopol", "Berkut system", "BESM", "RDS-1" and "RDS-6s", and "doctors' case", "Leningrad case", "Mikhoels case", etc. P.

I will not go into the study of this second series - Beria had nothing to do with these "cases", giving half of his time to the well-known reader "cases Nos. 1, 2 and 3", and the second half to the management of the national economy. But I will bring one a curious fact, when the activities of the curator of the Atomic Project L.P. Beria intersected with "activities" of one of the future "heroes" of the "case of doctors" Professor Egorov. At the end of 1947, Makhnev wrote to Beria:

"The head of the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, Comrade Yegorov, said that by decision Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is reducing the contingent served Kremlin clinic. At your request, several scientists, for whom, due to the specifics of their working conditions, more qualified medical care. As Comrade Yegorov said, these scientists are subject to detachment from the Kremlin polyclinics. Academician Sobolev L.S. has already received a notice of dismissal. Scientists ask that they and their families retain the right to use Kremlin clinic. The list of scientists is attached. **December 26, 1947 V.**
Makhnev.

Judging by the decision of the Central Committee, Yegorov "specially served" so many bureaucratic ruffraff that had to reduce the number. And on whom is the head of the Medical and Sanitary Department Kremlin decided to save?

Here is the list attached by Makhnev to the letter:

1. Kurchatov I. V., Academician
2. Sobolev S. L. -"- 3.
- Alikhanov A. I. -"- 4. Semenov
- N. N. -"- 5. Khlopin V. G. -"-

6. Kikoin I.K. - cor. USSR Academy of Sciences
7. Khariton Yu. B. -" 8.
Artsimovich L. A. -" 9.
Alexandrov A. P. -"

It was the scientific "head" of the Atomic Project, the significance of which was not only in its purely intellectual potential, but also in the fact that these people carried out interaction, knew the connections between the individual parts of the work, etc. Their health, their strength in that moment they no longer belonged to them - their health was a state value of particular importance.

Scientists were attached to the "Kremlin" at the request of Beria. This was, by the way, a characteristic manifestation of the LP's concern for those who, according to the slanderers, "he needed", and in fact, about those who were needed by the country. But Yegorov unfastened them, and this is taking into account time and the fact that Yegorov was aware of the significance of the work of scientists, it is quite possible regarded as the most real sabotage. And in the light of the above document charges against doctors like Egorov and Vinogradov look very earnestly.

Beria reacted on the same day, attaching a typewritten note to Makhnev's letter to Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshv:

"Tov. Poskrebyshv A.N. Please keep for those listed in the list
scientists the right to use the Kremlin polyclinic. **L. Beria.**
December 26, 1947".

Here everything was safely settled in real time, but it also happened
otherwise.

How Zhdanov was "treated" the reader knows. And here is how Kalinin was "treated" ... About him "treatment" told the attending physician Kalinina with fright during the investigation on the "doctors' case" January 1940 to June 1942 - S. E. Karpay. With fright, not because she is in the MGB knocked out her teeth, but because the charge of killing Kalinin was first brought against her, and she, "washing herself", reported amusing facts.

In June 1942, Karpay proposed a thorough examination of Kalinin, who complained of pain in the intestines. And then the chief therapist Lechsanupra professor Vinogradov: 1) limited himself to prescribing an enema, diet and drug treatment; 2) *replaced Kalinin as the attending physician.*

Only on June 10, 1944, Professor A. D. Ochkin performed an operation on Kalinin, which revealed stomach cancer in a very neglected state. Ochkin tried his best, but only delayed the inevitable - in June 1946, Kalinin died. After the

arrests, the leadership of Lechsanupra was also accused of "healing" 44-Summer Secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Shcherbakov. And this is very similar to the truth. Especially if take into account, as Khrushchev already denigrated Shcherbakov in his "memoirs", also Beria here adding, - they say, "Beria ... said that Shcherbakov died because he drank terribly" ... No, perhaps Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov died because he interfered with the realization of desires partyocracy and elites to ensure their comfortable existence. And superfluous confirmation of this is the "Leningrad case".

THIS concept combines several trials of 1950 in the cases of the former First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Kuznetsov, Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N. A. Voznesensky, former chairman Leningrad City Council and the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee P. S. Popkov, former Presovmina RSFSR M. I. Rodionov and others. In total, up to one and a half thousand party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers Leningrad and region.

"Democratic" sources indicate the figure even up to 2 thousand, but the real figures are available in the note of the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov and his deputy Serov addressed to Khrushchev dated December 10, 1953, are as follows: 23 people were convicted by the Military Collegium to execution, 85 people - for terms of 5 to 25 years, and 105 people were deported for a period of 5 to 8 years. Of the total number of convicts, 36 people worked in the Leningrad regional committee and city committee, and also in the regional executive committee and the Leningrad City Council, 11 people - in other regional committees and regional executive committees, and 9 people - in the district committees and district executive committees of the Leningrad Region.

Basically, the "repressions" were limited to release from work. Beria had nothing to do with these cases, even though at the 20th Congress Khrushchev accused him of organization of these affairs, although Beria could not influence the MGB in this regard, led by Abakumov. But in 1956 it was possible to put into circulation any anti-Beria "fools" at the highest level, which is what Khrushchev did.

Nevertheless, it is impossible not to say about the "Leningrad case" ... Kuznetsov, Voznesensky, Popkov, Rodionov were charged, among other things, with the intention to separate the RSFSR from USSR, making Leningrad the capital of the new state. Without going into an analysis, I will simply say that, in my opinion, formal accusations and actual guilt are not always here. coincided in content, but in no way - not in severity, because Stalin and Stalin's case, that is, the case of Soviet power, and hence the Soviet Union, convicted under The "Leningrad case" was changed.

They changed it by the fact that they gradually moved from Stalin's party to the party of partocrats. No wonder the "Leningraders" were not in the first rehabilitation "clip" after death Stalin and the question of their "rehabilitation" arose later, when Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites strengthened.

Born in 1905, Kuznetsov was already fully formed in Soviet times, when at the age of 19 he went along the Komsomol-party apparatus path. That's who was pure "apparatchik" is Kuznetsov. Malenkov at least almost graduated from Moscow Higher Technical School, in Civil was the commissar of a squadron, regiment ... Zhdanov served in the old army, fought in the Civil, was the commissar of agriculture of the county Council, editor regional newspaper. And how did Kuznetsov become the secretary of the Orekhovsky volost in 1924? Committee of the Komsomol, and "secretary" until his arrest as secretary of the Central Committee.

He, like Nikolai Voznesensky, is portrayed as the largest and most innocent victim of the "late Stalinist terror", but both of them had a dark nature and a dark fate people who overestimate themselves. Psychologically, I would bring them closer to the general Gordov - they were also sure that they would have done everything better than Stalin. And at the same time they thought not about how they will serve the country after Stalin left, but about how they will serve it *edit*. Not to serve her interests, but to rule, satisfying her ambitions. Here is Voznesensky's assessment given by one of his colleagues:

"Very many members of the Politburo did not respect Voznesensky because he was boastful, rude, treated subordinate people in a boorish way ... "

This is from the transcript of Nikita Khrushchev's speech at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on May 7, 1957. Khrushchev, however, made a reservation that he was supposedly convinced that in spite of everything, "Voznesensky was an honest and intelligent, but wayward man..." the result of the activities of the "Beria gang", although Beria has nothing to do with this case

had no relationship. But the fact that even in such a situation even Khrushchev could not restrain himself, speaking of the "unfortunate" Voznesensky, shows the appearance of the latter quite definitely.

Without dwelling on the "Leningrad case" in detail, I will cite a few interesting, in my opinion, details. And I will do it because Beria is credited with the initiative to revise after Stalin's death both the "case of doctors" and the "Leningrad business, which I doubt.

So, the promised details ... In

1946, the commission of the Central Committee, chaired by Alexei Kuznetsov, considered activities of the USSR Ministry of State Security and Minister Merkulov, ridiculously accusing him of During the war, the persecution of the Trotskyists was stopped. Merkulov was removed from his post, and he was, perhaps, a more suitable figure for the MGB than the one who replaced him Abakumov.

More... Professor Egorov until the spring of 1947 was the chief therapist Leningrad Military District, and the chief therapist of the Medical and Sanitary Directorate The Kremlin became on the recommendation of Alexei

Kuznetsov. In the summer of 1947, on suspicion of transferring to the Americans information about our atomic works arrest the director and founder of the Foreign Literature Publishing House B. L. Suchkova. In 1955, Suchkov was released, but I am inclined to believe that he was not tried on empty place. Suchkov was well acquainted with many physicists, in particular with M. Leontovich, who could very well blurt something out to Suchkov, but he intellectual inability to keep his mouth shut, he could blurt something out to acquaintances from the number of

Americans. A certain supposedly illegitimate "Stalin's son" (and perhaps, at the same time, the son of Lieutenant Schmidt) K. S. Kuzakov, in No. the real reason for Suchkov's arrest was the "fight under the rug" between Beria and Zhdanov, but LP then there was nothing to do, as soon as intrigues to some Suchkov to build. However, the arrest Suchkov, who was patronized by Zhdanov, is interesting in that he caused some activity Alexey Kuznetsov. On September 23, 1947, the Politburo decided to create in the Central Committee a "court honor", and on September 23-24, the former Deputy Head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee ... K. S. Kuzakov and ... Head of the Press Personnel Department of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee ... M. I. Shcherbakov. He was a "public reprimand" was issued, and both were expelled from the party. It was a blow to Zhdanov, and according to Malenkov. A blow from the side, including Alexei Kuznetsov.

Yes, intrigues in the top leadership began in the late 40s, but without the participation of Beria. AND while he dealt with atomic, missile and general economic problems, in the top management really formed a hardware intrigue, formal the first figures of which were then, most likely, apparatchiks Zhdanov, Malenkov and Kuznetsov, as well as the "business executive" Voznesensky.

And now, from general reasoning, I will move on to that amazing fact regarding the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Voznesensky, who promised to inform reader for a long time.

At first, however, a little chronology ... On March

1, 1949, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky (he had to sign willy-nilly), Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Saburov, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kosygin and Malyshev, sent Stalin a report on the results consideration of the note of the State Supply Committee of the USSR on the plan for the production of industrial products for the 1st quarter of 1949. The author of the note was M. T. Pomaznev, then the first deputy Chairman of the Gosplan of the USSR Kaganovich. Both Pomaznev's note and the report of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers thoroughly and substantively (with numerical analysis) proved that the State Planning Committee of the USSR works, to put it mildly, weakly and

incompetently. As a result, on March 5, 1949, the Politburo adopted a resolution approving Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the State Planning Committee of the USSR". The main personnel moment was release of Voznesensky from the duties of chairman of the State Planning Commission and appointment to his place of Saburov.

On March 7, the Politburo "satisfied" Voznesensky's request "to provide him monthly leave for treatment in Barvikha. But the "vacation" dragged on... July 4 Secretary of the Central Committee Suslov third of the report on the errors of the editors of the Bolshevik magazine (chief theoretical organ of the Central Committee) devotes to criticism of the laudatory reviews of Voznesensky's book

"The military economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War", and on August 17 Voznesensky turns to Stalin "with a great request" - "to give ... the work that you find possible"... *"It is very difficult to be away from the work of the party and comrades,"* complained the ex-deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

However, on August 22, 1949, the authorized representative of the Central Committee for personnel in the State Planning Committee of the USSR E. E. Andreev sends a note to the Secretary of the Central Committee Ponomarenko. And here is the chronology ends and begins almost almost fantastic, but documented documented crime. Andreev reported:

"The Gosplan of the USSR concentrates a large number of documents containing secret and top secret information of the state value, but the preservation of documents is not satisfactory ... The lack of proper order in the handling of documents has led to the fact that in the State Planning Committee of the USSR in 1944 55 secret and completely secret documents, in 1945 - 76, in 1946 - 61, in 1947 - 23 and in 1948 - 21, and in just 5 years 236 secret and top secret documents..."

etc. - on seven sheets of typewritten text.

I will give the name of only some of those mentioned by Andreev and "lost" Voznesensky's subordinate documents:

- State plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1945, on 209 sheets;
- US cash purchase of equipment not delivered Americans, on 15 sheets; • on the organization of production of radar stations, on 6 pages; • information about the need for Donetsk, Kuznetsk and Chelyabinsk coal for individual brands and grades for 1947 according to Minaviaprom, on 1 sheet;
- a statement of fuel oil stocks in the state reserve, on 1 sheet, etc. And where these "lost" documents went, no one in the State Planning Committee could say. The fact, I repeat, is amazing, for anyone who knows firsthand what work "with secrets", implausible, but ... But - a fact!

And these data are absolutely reliable, because they are taken from the collection of documents "Politburo Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-1953", published by the ROSSPEN publishing house with a circulation of one and a half thousand copies in 2002 in the series founded by Franko Venturi "Documents of Soviet History" (Chairman of the Scientific Series Michael Confino, Managing Editors Andrea Graziosi and O. V. Khlevnyuk). It won't be so a representative team of anti-Sovietists to falsify documents of the Soviet history in order to confirm the accusations against the "victims" of Stalin, right?

The wordy excuses of Voznesensky, sent by him to Stalin on September 1, 1949, make a pitiful impression and by no means paint us the figure of an outstanding statesman. Returning to the

chronology, I will inform you that on September 11, 1949, the Politburo approved the proposals of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the issue of "On numerous facts of the disappearance of secret documents in the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

The CPC recommended:

"1. For violating Soviet laws on the protection of state secrets and the creation of a corrupting environment of connivance in the apparatus of the State Planning Committee of the USSR those responsible for the loss of secret documents Voznesensky N. A. to exclude from composition of the members of the Central

Committee of the CPSU (b). 2. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated

On June 9, 1947, and in view of the special seriousness of violations of the law in the State Planning Committee of the USSR, to bring Voznesensky to trial, as the main culprit of these violations, and also ... "

and then the names of a number of high-ranking "Gosplanovites" Panov were listed, Kuptsov, Oreshkin and Belous...

That's why Voznesensky and his former employees were arrested in October 1949, and he was shot in October 1950, as I understand it, not only for this. In a year it was possible to find out the consequences and much

more ... For those who doubt my last assumption, I can recommend reading in the above-mentioned collection of ROSSPEN, a detailed note by the authorized Central Committee for to personnel in the State Planning Committee of the USSR E. E. Andreeva on the verification and replacement of personnel in the State Planning Committee of the USSR (pp. 301-305). This is not only an honest, but also a smart document, which came out from the pen unconditionally competent worker. And a picture of the situation in the State Planning Commission of the Voznesensky sample is given there not just unhappy in a business sense, but also politically very dubious.

Now I will sum up some results, expressing - as "information to reflection" - a version of the events of 1945-1950, for a full study of which separate efforts must be made.

Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov was a Russian man and, despite his "apparatus" origin and position in the apparatus, was not an apparatchik. He had a wonderful memory, but at the same time he was able to analyze and then **make decisions**, which *he was dangerous* partocracy. In 1925-1930, Shcherbakov worked under the direction of Zhdanov in Nizhny Novgorod regional committee, then at one time - the second secretary of the Leningrad regional committee. He is used to be considered a "young" frame, but this is an erroneous impression - he is simply *killed young*, and so he was only two years younger than Beria.

Zhdanov was married to Shcherbakov's sister, so they were their own people in all relationships. Various "researchers" write about the confrontation between A. Shcherbakov and A. Zhdanov, but this looks like overexposure, designed to play the role of a smokescreen. To me the case looks like this...

Alexander Shcherbakov - as the most consistent representative of the party Stalin in the sphere of ideology and culture - some dark forces gaining strength were removed from 1945. Andrei Zhdanov interfered with the same forces and was removed by them in 1948.

In the future, the reborn elite relied on the Kuznetsov-Voznesensky tandem, but Abakumov became aware of the fuss around this plan and through him Stalin, which resulted in the "Leningrad case".

When the calculation on Kuznetsov and Voznesensky turned out to be beaten, the search for a new option. Actually, one could count on a narrow circle: Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Khrushchev (since December 1949, secretary of the Central Committee and the first secretary of the Moscow city committee) ...

All of them could be used in one way or another, in one way or another "in the dark".

Beria was excluded immediately - he was a quick and sharp mind, and he would have considered the goals of the "well-wishers" at once, with all the ensuing consequences for them. Kaganovich was an emotional and fairly open person, he does not play the role of the main figure of intrigue approached, like Molotov. In addition, both of them were completely devoted to the cause of Soviet power and therefore, they had no inclination to dark intrigues. Mikoyan

was so cautious that he could only be counted on as support for the winner. The figure of Bulganin could not seduce anyone either. remained Malenkov and Khrushchev. The first was not stupid, not without ambition, but inert. The second one was not far off, but cunning and

vile. Here on Khrushchev, I think everything came together. He was a manipulative figure. both intra-union and world "behind the scenes". It suited both for all those who are to the top 50s formed a "party" of partocrats, and for external enemies of Russia, already

introduced into the apparatus and into the metropolitan elite of targeted (so far) agents of influence. on him and it was decided to bet — in the future! And in the future - after one way or another the death of Stalin - it was necessary to quickly remove Beria, because after elimination of Stalin turned out to be the main personal guarantor of further development and fortifications of the

USSR. That is, already a year in 1950, the future confrontation between Khrushchev and Beria. But even in 1951, in 1952, 1953 and subsequent years, Khrushchev, as I imagine I imagine that the "behind the scenes" had no idea about such a choice. I think he went into the coffin, not realizing that *they* were rammed into the fate of his homeland.

I will return to the TOPIC of intrigues, but now I will remind the reader that, in addition to dark intrigues, creative processes were developing in the country at that time, new generations were growing up. And with the right lines in the life of society in this generation of post-war enthusiasts were excellent perspectives!

Much, much effort has been made to present Stalin's socialism as fundamentally barracks, like a System that supposedly was held together by Terror and Fear. A because the severity was determined by the situation. And the main ideologist and practitioner democratization was always Stalin in the country. Here in

front of me is a shabby book ... "V. A. Karpinsky. The Constitution of the USSR. Textbook for the 7th grade of high school. Fourth edition, revised. Moscow, Uchpedgiz. Signed for publication on 3/VI 1953, circulation 2,000,000 copies, that is, two million. Let's turn to page 156 and read:

"The Constitution provided Soviet citizens with inviolability personalities, homes. Secrecy of correspondence (Articles 127, 128). Nobody in the Soviet Union cannot be arrested without a court order or a prosecutor's permission. To enter the dwelling of a citizen without his consent representatives of the state the authorities may only in cases specified in the law..."

Will a political system oriented towards arbitrariness and lawlessness take care about how, in a normative way, teaching it **as a subject in mass school**, instill such thoughts in young minds?

Is it really possible for someone to answer this question with a "yes"? But

I know in advance - it will turn. "Democratic" "intellectual" at least a stake on his head, he will be convinced that "he was a slave for seventy years," even if he was not born over sixty. Well,

here's another quote...

"It is necessary ... to achieve such a cultural growth of society that would ensure to all members of society the comprehensive development of their physical and mental faculties, so that the members of society have the opportunity to receive sufficient education to become active workers social development, so that they can freely choose profession, and not be chained for life, due to the existing division of labor, to any one profession. What is required for this? It would be wrong to think that such a serious cultural growth of members of society without major changes in the current labor position. To do this, first of all, it is necessary to reduce the working day by at least until 6, and then until 5 o'clock. This is necessary so that members Societies have been given enough free time to get comprehensive education. For this, it is necessary, further, to introduce the obligatory polytechnic education ... For this, it is necessary, further, radically improve living conditions and raise the real wages of workers and

employees at least double, if not more, as by direct promotion
monetary wages, and, especially, through further systematic
lower prices for consumer goods. These are the
basic conditions for preparing the transition to communism..."

Will the tyrant strive to ensure that the masses are fully
educated? Educated in such a way that the very concept of the elite disappears, because each member
society is comprehensively developed and, having united with other comprehensively developed
individuals, will no longer allow anyone to pose as the "quintessence", "cream of
society", "servants of the people", "salt of the earth", etc.

But this is Stalin - "Economic problems of socialism" ... 1952. This is what Stalin
came with

this year to that 19th Party Congress, which became its first
post-war congress and the last congress, which was convened by the Bolshevik Party. And
in such a vision of the promising social development of Russia and humanity, politicians
Stalin was one with the physicist Einstein. I remind the reader of the latter's output:

The economic anarchy of the capitalist system is the true
the root of evil ... I am convinced that there is only one way to combat this grave evil
- the introduction of a socialist economy, **together with an education system**
(highlighted by me. - **S.K.**), aimed at the benefit of society ... "

XIX CONGRESS OF THE AUCP(b) was held in Moscow from 5 to 14 October 1952. with reporting
Malenkov made a presentation. According to the report of the chairman of the State Planning Commission Saburov, the congress adopted
directives on the fifth five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955. With a report on
changes in the Charter of the CPSU (b) was made by Khrushchev. Beria also spoke at the
congress. Stalin delivered his closing remarks on 14 October. At
the congress, a commission was formed to revise the party program, consisting of: I. V. Stalin - chairman, L. P.
Beria, L. M. Kaganovich, O. V. Kuusinen, G. M. Malenkov, V. M. Molotov, P. N. Pospelov, A. M. Rumyantsev, M. Z.
Saburov, D. I. Chesnokov, and P. F. Yudin. The presence in the commission of Beria and the absence of Khrushchev
in it is suggestive of the very

in itself, as well as the presence of Molotov in the absence of Mikoyan. But the main ones turned out to be personnel
the results of the congress, which began as a congress of the CPSU (b), and ended as a congress of the CPSU. Then
thought that the party was only renamed, but it turned out that it was at this congress
actually buried. The next, the 20th congress, was no longer a congress of communists of the Leninist-Stalinist
formation, but the first congress of the triumphant partocracy. On October 16, 1952, the

Plenum of the Central Committee elected instead of the Politburo the Presidium of the Central Committee in such
an unprecedentedly numerous composition: V. M. Andrianov, A. B. Aristov, L. P. Beria, N. A. Bulganin, K. E. Voroshilov,
S. D. Ignatiev, L. M. Kaganovich, D. S. Korotchenko, V. V. Kuznetsov, O. V. Kuusinen, G. M. Malenkov, V. A. Malyshev,
L. G. Melnikov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. A. Mikhailov, V. M. Molotov, M. G. Pervukhin, P. K. Ponomarenko, M. Z. Saburov, I.
V. Stalin, M. A. Suslov, N. S. Khrushchev, D. I. Chesnokov, N. M. Shvernik, M. F. Shkiryatov. Candidates for the
Presidium were: L. I. Brezhnev, A. Ya. Vyshinsky, A. G. Zverev, N. G. Ignatov, I. G. Kabanov, A. N. Kosygin, N. S.
Patolichev, N. M.

Pegov, A. M. Puzanov, I. T. Tevosyan, P. F. Yudin.

Together with the candidate members, the Presidium of the Central Committee was expanded to 36 people, and
Stalin proposed such a composition, and there were many young cadres in it (say, D. I. Chesnokov). At the same time,
at the suggestion of Stalin for an operational solution
issues, an extra-statutory Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was created: Beria, Bulganin,
Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Stalin and Khrushchev.

A study of the composition of the Bureau shows that such major figures as Molotov and Mikoyan were absent from it. Stalin seriously criticized them at the October 16 plenum, and criticized for the cause (which, however, by no means meant for them - as they blatantly claim "democratic" "researchers" - some kind of complete fall and repression).

The most important thing for the future was that the plenum also formed "leading five": Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev. Beria stood here on first place, Khrushchev - last. But this was explained only by the order of the letters the alphabet with which their last names began.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee looked like this: Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Malenkov, Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponomarenko, Stalin, Suslov, Khrushchev.

The General Secretary was not elected. Moreover, Stalin expressed a desire to leave secretaries of the Central Committee, but no one agreed to this. Such a move by Stalin is presented by the "researchers" as a Jesuit "test of loyalty" of his comrades-in-arms on his part, but Stalin could not help but understand in advance that no **one will support him in such a desire**. For at that moment no one objectively could not be a full-fledged alternative replacement for Stalin. Even Beria!

Rather, Stalin, by such a statement, intended to increase the chances of accepting another his proposal, which printed sources do not report, is the resignation Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Yes, there is evidence that Stalin wanted to resign from the duties of the Presovmin, and even a certain vote was held, but Beria's candidacy was not considered at the same time, but a very unexpected Ponomarenko's candidacy. But, one way or another, Stalin remained the head of the Council of Ministers. And live for him just over four months left.

Dear reader! My book is voluminous, but the era described in it is immeasurably more voluminous. But how little it has been studied, and how rarely it is examined in good faith ... Here Nikolai Zenkovich "analyzes" the last months of 1952 and the first months of 1953 and declares that many still call Beria the murderer of Stalin. And then to whom just does not refer: to Avtorkhanov, to Svetlana Alliluyeva, to the "arguments" of V.F. Alliluyev, with a nod towards Beria, who claims that it cost Stalin someone to praise, and that de "somewhere" disappeared, because Beria allegedly did not tolerate "competitors".

Not Moscow, but some kind of Sicily!

At the same time, the "denunciator" asks: where are Voznesensky, Kosarev, Kuznetsov, what Zhdanov, Ordzhonikidze? What,

Zenkovich doesn't know that Beria has nothing to do with it? Zenkovich is already in another place, he directly reports that Khrushchev killed Stalin, but this is in another place. What about the rest allegedly killed by Beria ...

Ordzhonikidze committed suicide (he was seriously confused and much confusing) February 18, 1937 ... Beria was still in Tbilisi.

Kosarev was arrested on November 29, 1938. Beria was not yet a people's commissar, although Yezhov was already leadership was removed. But how could the main Komsomol member of the USSR interfere with Beria? Kosarev was shot in February 1939 by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court THE USSR. He was rehabilitated "in party order" by the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU on April 27, 1989, that is, he was not actually rehabilitated.

Zhdanov was killed by the doctors of the "Kremlevka" when Beria was not in charge special services.

Voznesensky and Kuznetsov? Well,

here is a direct quote from No. 2 of Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU for 1989:

"Inflating the case about the illegality of the All-Russian Wholesale Fair (which was nevertheless carried out illegally. - **S.K.**), G. M. Malenkov used and other pretexts for discrediting the Leningrad leaders <...>

February 21, 1949 Malenkov with a group of workers went to Leningrad to holding a bureau and a joint plenum of the regional committee and the city party committee ... on which ... declared that there was an anti-party group in Leningrad

<...>.

March 13, 1949 in Moscow, in the office of G. M. Malenkov ... were arrested
A. A. Kuznetsov, P. S. Popkov, M. I. Rodionov, P. G. Lazutin, N. V. Soloviev.

At the same time, preparations began ... in relation to N. A. Voznesensky. For these purposes, a note
was used by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosplan
M. T. Pomaznev on the underestimation of the industrial production plan for the 1st quarter of 1949 by the State
Planning Committee <...> In

order to obtain ... testimony ... Malenkov personally supervised the course
investigation and took direct part in the interrogations ... "

Why is Beria here? But

on such "accusations" the whole image of the "monster" of Beria is built. lined up
from the time of Musavatist Baku to the day of the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich. And
the image of Stalin's "tyrant" is built just as falsely, in the creation of which he contributed his
mite, alas, and Sergo Beria, and possibly the political correctors of his "memories". Sergo
Lavrentievich claimed that Stalin was destined to replace all his old comrades-in-arms
new people, removing Molotov, and Malenkov, and Khrushchev, and Beria, in order to enter
de history as a pure man who won the war and created a state.

I cite this opinion only because it resonates with the statement
K. Zalesky that if, they say, Stalin managed to complete the "shake-up" of the nomenklatura, then the
"Khrushchev era" would not exist at all, and in this case, people of the "epoch of
Brezhnev", who received power in October 1964. To dismiss this notion as
from a completely insolvent I can't - in the sense that the renewal was possible, although without the "bloodbaths".
Stalin, at the plenum of the Central Committee in October 1952, spoke directly about the need to nominate
young people, especially to the posts of deputy chairman of the council of ministers and ministers. He remarked
that the work of a minister is "a peasant's work," and one must have good health for it. He expressed such
thoughts on October 20, 1952 at a meeting in his Kremlin
office. If

Stalin—let us imagine this for a moment—conceived some
"bloodletting", he would not say that in the presence of the "old guard". But since he himself
started talking about something like resignation, referring to himself, then the reshuffle was clearly planned.
Moreover, Stalin, in full accordance with his vision of the development of Soviet society
intended to concentrate the entire "Areopagus" in the leadership of the CPSU for ideological influence on
society, and to transfer the economic management to the young forces. But under the guidance
experienced business executives.

One bad thing - Stalin, apparently, did not see Beria as an experienced leader
young business personnel. And they could only be Beria. And if this option
realized, the further development of the country would follow the path of comprehensive development
socialism and socialist democracy.

After that, one should not be surprised that Stalin had less than eight years to live.
weeks.

IN THE MEAN, "atomic" affairs went on as usual. Only in the period from January 8 to January 12, 1953,
five extensive resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers were adopted on
various issues: on the separation of the LIPAN Hydrotechnical Laboratory into a separate
laboratory; on the organization in 1953 of revision and prospecting for uranium in the Hungarian
People's Republic, etc. These

documents are published in the "Materials of the Atomic Project of the USSR" according to copies certified
by the protocol part of the Administration of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. wound up in all
documents, Stalin's signature is missing, although this does not mean that he did not sign
first copies. On February

15, 1953, they buried Mehliis, who had long been seriously ill, and on February 13
deceased. The urn with the ashes was embedded in the Kremlin wall. Stalin at the ceremony

it was, just as there was no Beria and Malenkov. However, on February 17, Stalin received the Indian Ambassador K. Menon and had a long conversation with him. According to Menon, Stalin, despite seventy-three years old, looked like a perfectly healthy man.

However, alas, he was no longer such - if on February 6, 1953, under completely by an ordinary order of the Council of Ministers on the mode of operation of plant No. 4 of combine No. 817 in the winter time the signature of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. Stalin was entered, then a significantly more important order on ensuring work at the MP facility (RFT research reactor) was signed on February 14, 1953 by the Deputy Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR L. Beria.

And here we come to another reliable, but extremely mysterious - if not make certain assumptions - a fact! As follows from the book of the 5th volume II of the "Documents of the Atomic Project of the USSR" (text - p. 505, facsimile - p. 506), January 28 1953, on the letterhead of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the strictest (nowhere higher!) Reporting was printed a document of surprising and unusual content, namely:

"No. BP7/217

Tt. Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin

January 28, 1953

Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee No. 7 of January 26

1953

214. - The question of monitoring special work. Instruct the troika as part of TT. Beria (chairman), Malenkova, Bulganina management of the work of special bodies on special cases.

How to understand this document, I can only guess. But I can guess! All defense work went according to plan, and to strengthen their management (and even by whom - Malenkov and Bulganin!) there was no need.

However, I draw the reader's attention to the fact that this special "Troika" was version of the "leading five" (Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev), truncated to Khrushchev. Stalin, of course, does not count, he was implied. He is for this "Troika" in in any case, she would be a "coachman" and she would "ride" where the "coachman" ruled.

But what is the work of what special bodies and on what special cases should was this incomprehensible "Troika" in charge? It seems that there are four protocols for this question. meetings (February 2, 9, 16 and 23) of the Troika, starting from the first, held on February 2, 1953 and determining the day and hour of the Troika meetings (so in the documents, with a large letters) Monday, 2 p.m.

On February 9, at a meeting of the Troika, decisions were made on special work on
• the first (atomic) section (comrades Vannikov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria); • second section (uranium mining) (comrades Antropov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria); • joint-stock company Wismuth (uranium mining in Germany) (comrades Sergeev, Malenkov, Beria); • the Soviet-

Romanian mining society "Quartzite" (comrades Sergeev, Beria); • section "B" ("Berkut" and "Comet") (comrades Ryabikov, Vladimirovsky, Beria); • production of an experimental batch of products 32-B (comrades Beria S.L., Vladimirovsky, Malenkov, Beria L.P.); • experimental design and research work on

products "R" (rocketry) (comrades Ustinov, Korolev, Nedelin, Vasilevsky, Bulganin, Malenkov, Beria). Everything seemed to be going on here in a long-established way, but why all of a sudden "Troika"? For what

to introduce Bulganin into such a narrow composition - issues of the Armed Forces on the agenda Troika meetings were attended by the fourth plan. I think it is

impossible to give answers to these questions on a documentary basis - after the murders of Stalin and Beria, the archives, presumably, were cleaned in earnest. And could there be

Are some important ideas of Stalin documented in writing, if he had them? And they seem to have it!

In any case, the true purpose of creating the Troika could not be exclusively defense work, and that's why ... After the death of Stalin, on March 16, 1953, it was decided already signed by Malenkov Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 687-355cc / op "On the leadership special works", which formed the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers USSR consisting of: L.P. Beria (chairman); B. L. Vannikov (first deputy chairman), deputy chairmen I. M. Klochkov, S. M. Vladimirovsky, members N. A. Bulganin, A. P. Zavenyagin, V. M. Ryabikov, V. A. Makhnev.

The Special Committee was entrusted with *"management of all special work (on nuclear industry, Berkut and Kometa systems, long-range missiles <...>"*

Management of "all **special works**" provided for by the ordinance SM USSR No. 687-355ss / op, and "**management of the work of special bodies on special affairs**", provided for by paragraph 214 of the protocol No. 7 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU were clearly different things. The two formulations are very different both in form and in meaning.

So how can all this be explained? I will make a reservation that there may be "holes" in my version of events ... When we discussed her with such an authoritative expert as Richard Ivanovich Kosolapov (a well-known social scientist, former editor-in-chief of the magazine of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Communist", member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), he noted that in order to fully substantiate such a version one must scrupulously trace the chain of a number of destinies, compare the facts, the chronology of events etc.

And indeed it is. Moreover, the role of, say, Malenkov in the events of recent weeks of Stalin's life may end up being both neutral and negative. However, I will try to build my reconstruction on the data that I have.

So... On

January 9, 1953, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee approves the draft TASS report on the case doctors, and on January 13 it was made public. Many are in a panic, and rumors (and even information) about the formation of the 13th department in the GRU only intensifies the

panic. Events are developing. Minister of State Security Ignatiev, an undoubted creature of Khrushchev (and possibly Malenkov), is also alarmed. He is cut off from events, and he has a stigma in a cannon. At the same time, the management protection (protection of the leaders of the party and government), that is, the protection of Stalin, as well as the selection of personnel for her is supervised in the MGB by a person to whom Semyon Ignatiev can trust yourself. Who it was specifically, I will report later, while limiting a message that by the beginning of 1953, the guards loyal to Stalin, General Vlasik and Kuzmichev were removed from Stalin.

January 26 at a meeting of the Bureau - obviously with the participation of Stalin - a mysterious "Troika".

Formally, this is the same Special Committee with purely "technocratic" goals, but in fact , **the Troika immediately looks like a kind of political superorgan capable of instantly become the leading triumvirate under the supreme supremacy of Stalin.**

Beria - Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB and the national economy. Malenkov - party apparatus and propaganda. Bulganin - Armed Forces.

In fact, this "Troika" replaces the leading "five", throwing out Khrushchev from a trusted leadership. Moreover, the chairman of the Troika is Beria. And he doesn't just formally the first, out of the three he is the only person of action and action with a quick reaction. And all this promises some cardinal changes not in the course of work on

defense projects. Now

Khrushchev is also in a panic. And he does everything to restore his confidence Stalin, fawning and fawning with might and

main ... Ignatiev has long been "engaged", and Stalin's guards have been chosen by him so that Stalin can be quickly eliminated. At the same time, the panicking Khrushchev is still "blindly" incited environment from the "fifth column".

Molotov and Mikoyan are in disgrace, and Khrushchev can count on them - no, not support in the elimination of Stalin, God forbid, but for support *after* (oh, what a grief!) The death of a comrade Stalin.

February 1953 is the preparation for the elimination of Stalin (there is evidence that on in the attic of the Stalinist dacha there were cups with mercury).

The patron is Khrushchev.

Responsible executor - Ignatiev. Direct executors

- employees of the Security Department of the MGB,

led by...

No, who led it, I will tell you a little later. And events are

accelerating ... On Monday, March 2, 1953 - here I rely on

Yuri Mukhin's statement - Stalin appointed a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (and this is 36 people!) To consider the issue of merging the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security into one ministry with Beria's appointment as minister.

If Y. Mukhin's information about just such an agenda is correct, then the picture further is clear in *principle* : between February 28 and March 2, 1953, Stalin began kill. This inevitably follows from the above reconstruction of the situation.

How exactly it was eliminated, I leave it to others to investigate. The important thing is that it was eliminated. And he was eliminated because he lost his true personnel instinct and did not constituted Beria as his direct successor - right at the plenum of the Central Committee on October 16 1952, insisting on his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The appointment of Beria as chairman of a special "Troika" can be regarded as the beginning insights of Stalin. But Khrushchev was quicker.

YES, PLEASE, by the beginning of 1953, Stalin had reached, if you use the concepts the Peter principle, which I will talk about later, the level of their incompetence. For his life he made two major mistakes, each of which cost Russia and humanity

golden age.

The first was an underestimation of the prospects and opportunities for strategic partnership with Germany against the Anglo-Saxons after the conclusion of the 1939 Pact.

The second was the underestimation of the capabilities and potential of Lavrenty Beria as the only one adequate to the requirements of the era of its successor. Stalin

was exactly twenty years older than Beria. It was formed as professional Marxist revolutionary, driven by the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" and, together with Lenin, believed in the European and world revolution. From all the leaders of the revolution - as the most sober of them, he understood before others that Russia one can hardly count on "brothers in the class" in developed countries. But he understood the fact that Russia is completely self-sufficient in order to grow into a mighty power in which there is no place of private property and selfish interests, and in which the free development of each become a condition for the development

of society. And now it, having passed the test of war, has become such a power.

And Stalin ... Well, it's hard to say what played a fatal role - whether gradual aging, loads war, or the habit of three decades of taking everything upon oneself and being, in the final analysis, the last resort (it was not without reason that this allegory his - "Instance"), the weakening of the defensive reaction to the doxology ...

But it is safe to say that Stalin, as *the all-embracing* head of state exhausted its resource by the end of 1952, and Beria, on the contrary, accumulated such a vital and managerial state experience that could fully use it, only being at the head of the state.

Beria, although he came to the revolution as a young man, but almost immediately from a revolutionary and an underground worker turned into a state manager, into an organizer. ideas of the world revolutions did not fascinate him. But the idea of an active restructuring of life in Russia on collectivist principles carried away for life. In the course of career growth, he received more and more managerial opportunities and now he was ready for the leadership of Russia by the socialist (I emphasize this!) "technocrats". The building of communism was for him not an ideal, not a slogan, but specific, complex, but solvable problem.

From the mid-1930s, Stalin sought to reverse the role of the Party and the Soviets. AND in 1952, a completely favorable moment came for this ... many young cadres, the reorientation of the tasks of the party from the economic management to ideological, which was already evident from a comparison of the Charter of the CPSU (b), adopted XVIII Congress in March 1939, and the Charter of the CPSU, adopted by the XIX Congress. Charter of 1939:

"The Party is the guiding nucleus of all organizations of the working people, as public and state, and ensures the successful construction communist society.

Charter of 1952:

"Now the main tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are is to build a communist society ... to continuously improve material and cultural level of society, to educate members of society ... "

Moreover, if earlier the Politburo of the Central Committee was called upon to organize "political work", and the Party Control Commission supervised "the implementation of the decisions of the Party and Central Committee ... party organizations and Soviet economic bodies, "now The Presidium of the Central Committee was supposed to organize the current work of the Central Committee, and the Commission of the Party control under the Central Committee was given the function of control of purely intra-Party affairs.

And if, immediately after the 19th Congress, Stalin, having retained the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, transferred his powers to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Beria, then in this way he would have saved both his life and indestructible posthumous glory.

Most strikingly, in my opinion, Stalin's incompetence that first appeared manifested itself in a number of those "grand" construction projects, on the cancellation of which Beria became insist immediately after Stalin's death. I will say more about them.

Alas, Stalin did not dare to give the future of the country into the hands of Beria, which meant that after Stalin's death, the question of a successor, of a leader, will inevitably arise. And from the one who will become - a member of the party of Stalin or a member of the party of partocrats, the further fate depended huge country. Yes, and peace.

SO by the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953, the country had two fundamentally different way. One path led to the inevitable degradation of the country, the other to its no less inevitable flourish.

The symbol of one was a functionary - narrow-minded, ignorant, ambitious, not not only incapable, but also not striving to optimize the social life of the country, personally lazy and incompetent and therefore generating laziness and incompetence as next to him, and at lower levels of power.

The symbol of the other was a manager - far-sighted, educated, energetic, respecting those who are worthy of respect, by the very essence of nature striving to make life society is better. A manager who loves and knows how to work, is competent and therefore in every possible way encouraging and bringing good, competent employees closer to him.

The functionary did not know the matter, but had the audacity to teach everyone without learning anything, for he believed that he knows everything in advance *and so*, because he is the secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo.

The manager, if he did not know something and faced a new business for himself, studied, understood new things for himself and then could make meaningful decisions.

The functionary in the future gave the USSR into the hands of the same functionaries as he, just a lower rank. And they were capable of one thing - to bring the country "to the handle."

In the future, the manager gave all rights to professionals and specialists in the USSR management, science, production, education and culture, which would certainly bring country to a true, unshakable by nothing and no one greatness. The

functionary in the future reduced the masses to the level of cattle - unreasoning, accustomed to a primitive semi-vegetative existence. The manager in the future provided the masses with a comprehensive development, allowing everyone who wants to reveal all their abilities and live cheerfully, smartly and for a long time.

The functionary loved himself in the state, and not the state in itself, because the great people belonging to the power, he was simply not needed. The

manager could not help but love the power in himself and lived for the power already because only in a great power, he could be most fully realized as a person. The logical outcome

of the "activities" of the functionary was the death of the Soviet Union and the subsequent degradation of all mankind. The

logical outcome of the manager's activities was such a Soviet Union, which could, by right, not only strong, but also fair, stand at the head of all healthy

the forces of the planet.

And in the top leadership of the country by 1952 there was such a bright (if we can talk about brightness of an ordinary personality) expressed, complete functionary - Nikita Khrushchev, so and a pronounced, outstanding manager - Lavrenty Beria. Stalin did not

throw his enormous authority onto the scales of Beria. And that meant that the scales will fluctuate and everything can be decided by chance.

The confrontation between Beria and Khrushchev was inevitable, and only one could win it.

Khrushchev, as an intriguer and egoist, understood this, prepared in advance for a fight and figured out how to awaken base passions in colleagues in power and attract them to your side.

Beria, as a "hard worker" and a collectivist, was deeply and innocently sure that his obvious business superiority will automatically give him leadership. And although he understood Khrushchev's worthlessness, could not even imagine that for the sake of personal well-being he can arrange reprisals against a comrade and colleague. Beria

measured by himself. But

Khrushchev also measured by

himself. It's just that their measurements were different.

Chapter 23

Stalin's "Strange" Death

The official date of Stalin's death is March 5, 1953. And the official diagnosis of a whole synclite from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Health and elite doctors is quite decent, without a hint of any medical incomprehensibility. By the way,

about the synclite... On March 4, the first government message about Stalin's illness, which said that on the night of March 2 he had cerebral hemorrhage and that "the best medical

strength." What were these forces? The most detailed bulletin on the state of Stalin's health, published in Pravda on March 5, 1953, was signed: by the Minister of Health USSR A.F. Tretyakov, Head of the Medical and Sanitary Department I.I. Kuperin, Chief Therapist of the Ministry of Health, Professor P.E. Lukomsky, Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences N. V. Konovalov, Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences Professor A. L. Myasnikov, Professor E. M. Tareev, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences I. N. Filimonov, Professor I. S. Glazunov, Professor R. A. Tkachev and Associate Professor V. I. Ivanov Neznamov.

"Lights", as we see, was enough. But the story of Stalin's death is dark, like an abandoned underground dungeon. After all, Stalin was clearly killed. And obviously with the sanction of Khrushchev, or even with Khrushchev's personal participation in the final act of poisoning. Actually, according to the "historian" Nikolai Zenkovich, Khrushchev himself let slip at the end of his reign that he eliminated Stalin.

However, Zenkovich is an unreliable source. For the former "internal chronicler of the Central Committee CPSU", as his annotations to his books put it, he too often, instead of analyzing collects gossip. But what gossip! What is worth, for example, retelling them Ilya Ehrenburg's story, given in Zenkovich's book of the 2005 edition "Perjury, falsification, compromising evidence"! Ehrenburg,

allegedly with the sanction of the Khrushchev Kremlin, allegedly told the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre that it was like this ... The

meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee took place on March 1, 1953, and Kaganovich support of all members of the old Politburo (except for Beria) demanded that Stalin create an objective commission to investigate the case of doctors and the abolition of Stalin's orders for the deportation of all Jews to a remote zone of the USSR. Stalin

allegedly burst into public abuse, but Mikoyan allegedly stated that if they (in fact, the conspirators) will not leave this room free in half an hour, then the army will occupy the Kremlin. After that, Beria also left Stalin, and Kaganovich tore to shreds his ticket as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and threw it in Stalin's face. After which Stalin was struck stroke, he fell unconscious, and at 6 o'clock in the morning on March 2, they called to him, already dying doctors.

Dear reader! This nonsense is not nonsense, but a presentation of the contents of pages 180–181 of the mentioned book by N. Zenkovich. True, he is directly quoting another "chronicler" - Avtorkhanov, but he quotes seriously, and not as an example of historical paranoia (which Avtorkhanov attributes to Stalin) ...

Kaganovich himself wrote in his memoirs that Stalin died "unexpectedly". However, according to the testimony of Felix Chuev, to which Russian "historians" are so fond of referring, Kaganovich, after more than thirty years, to the remark of Felix Chuev: "It seems to me that They killed Stalin, "answered: "I don't know

"... Then Chuev objected: "Molotov was inclined to this, "and then continued: "You know that he told me?" "What?" Kaganovich replied. "At the Mausoleum on May 1, 1953, the last time Beria was, he told Molotov: 'I removed him.'"

Chuev, however, immediately made a reservation that, according to Molotov, Beria "could purposely talk to yourself in order to give yourself weight "...

It is unlikely that Beria could thus try to increase his value - it was already so almost nowhere higher. But Lavrenty Pavlovich could provoke Molotov. Beria certainly knew that Stalin was killed, and the circle of his potential killers was extremely limited. AND for an experienced investigator, such a sounding - how Molotov will react - would be quite natural. And it is characteristic that he did not declare to Kaganovich: "I saved you all," although Stalin's attitude towards Kaganovich has recently been not very warm either.

However, it is not yet a fact that Beria said this to Molotov as well. No, I more or less believe Chuev, but Molotov could, to put it mildly, "rivet" on Beria. Let's remember how he "carefully" transferred his correspondence with Stalin to Istpart, carefully removing - judging by

everything - from her those letters where Beria was mentioned. After all, Beria could be mentioned there only in positive sense.

It is possible, tiring and so, I'm afraid, to bring the weary reader, following Zenkovich and other "narrators", a number of "versions" similar to Avtorkhanov's. Yes, quite they seriously claim that when Stalin fell unconscious, Beria allegedly shouted in delight: "The tyrant is dead, we are free." But then Stalin opened his eyes, and Beria on his knees began ask him for forgiveness. Well, just Shakespeare, arranged by Mikhail Zhvanetsky, and nothing more!

WHAT IS interesting in ALL this nonsense is whether it is real or mythical plans for the deportation of Jews as a reason for the elimination of Stalin, firstly.

Secondly, the recognition of the fact not of the natural death of Stalin, but of the fact of one or another eliminating it.

Thirdly, the fact that even in the delusional versions of Beria is somehow separated from the rest as a person who was not directly involved in the conspiracy against Stalin.

In the light of the "fairy tales" of Avtorkhanov - Zenkovich and Co. (and the fairy tale is a lie, but there is a hint in it), my version of Stalin's death, which largely coincides with the version, for example, of Yuri Mukhin, looks more and more reliable. By the way, and Ehrenburg, and Avtorkhanov, and Zenkovich were too lazy to look at the old calendars and "appointed" a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee for **Sunday**, because March 1, 1953 was exactly Sunday. But information Y. Mukhin that an acute meeting of the Presidium was scheduled for Monday, March 2 The Central Committee indirectly confirms his correctness in

general. By the way, even on March 1, the Presidium of the Central Committee could not proceed as it is described in Avtorkhanov - Zenkovich, simply because a large and younger part of *the then* numerous Presidium would not allow anything like the one described in any case! Not without reason, immediately after the death of Stalin, on March 6, 1953, the Presidium instantly "shrank" to the size of the Bureau, quantitatively from 36 people to 10 people. From the Presidium were brought out like kids from the table, almost all of his young members, elected to October 1952 plenum of the Central Committee. And this, of course, was not done on the initiative of Beria.

But the new Presidium included Molotov and Mikoyan (in fact, this was a precedent establishment of a party gerontocracy).

BUT MORE! As I said, Zenkovich, sorting through the "versions", on page 193 directly thumped that the mystery of Stalin's death was not whether he was killed, but how happened.

Zenkovich reports that on July 19, 1964, at a rally in honor of the Hungarian party government delegation, Khrushchev openly admitted to the violent death of Stalin and said that in the history of mankind there were many cruel tyrants, but they all died like this but from an ax, as they themselves supported their power with an ax ...

Like this!

However, Zenkovich smears the entire Politburo, including Beria, with the blood of Stalin, arguing that faced with an alternative: who to die, the "tyrant" or the "old guards", "comrades-in-arms" chose the death of Stalin. And if you remember the name of the mentioned above Zenkovich's book, we can say that his "collective compromising evidence" should classified as false evidence and falsification. No, not all of

Stalin's comrades-in-arms have his blood, but only Khrushchev. But here's the mud, soon clinging to Stalin - in the hands of all of them, except for Lavrenty Beria. Elena Prudnikova called him "the last knight of Stalin", and I can only congratulate her on such an accurate definition.

How specifically Joseph Vissarionovich was killed, I am now of little interest. AND it doesn't even matter who authorized his death.

It is important - for what reasons was destroyed so carefully, it would seem, guarded

Stalin?

I think that we already have answers to some of these questions, but there is more to it. say ... I promised the reader to tell who in the MGB under Minister Ignatiev led the In 1953, the Directorate of Security (protection of the leaders of the party and government) ... So, he was led by himself ... Semyon Ignatiev. Back in 1952,

the Main Directorate of Security was headed by Lieutenant General Nikolai Vlasik, who founded it in 1946. However, on May 23, 1952, the GDO was transformed into just the Security Department (UO), Vlasik was removed and transferred to the deputy head labor camp in the city of Asbest, Sverdlovsk Region (interestingly, there manager of the trust "Soyuzasbest" was exiled after the June plenum of the Central Committee of 1957 Kaganovich).

And instead of Vlasik, Ignatiev became directly in charge of Stalin's security. IN In the light of what follows, I am sure that Vlasik was simply "set up" before Stalin (the sins of there were generals, but a shake-up would be enough to bring him back to normal, and he is faithful to Stalin was).

On December 16, 1952, Vlasik was arrested and, after a strangely long investigation, in 1955 he was sentenced to 5 years of exile. But already in 1956, his criminal record was expunged. I I am sure that Vlasik was temporarily eliminated by the forces behind Ignatiev, and then he just went to an agreement with the Khrushchevites, also agreeing to cast a shadow on Beria.

But the story with Vlasik is more or less well known. But the name of Major General Sergei Fedorovich Kuzmichev (1908–1989) is practically unknown. But in vain ... In 1946, with the formation of the GUO, the 1st department of the GUO (Stalin's guard) was headed by Kuzmichev. IN In 1948-1949, he was authorized by the USSR Council of Ministers for the resorts of Sochi - Matsesta (Stalin's resting places). In 1949–1950, Kuzmichev again directly at the Main Educational Observatory on that the same position, but in 1950 he was transferred to the deputy. head of the UMGB of the Bryansk region. IN 1952 even more demoted to deputy. head of the Dubravny camp of the Ministry of Internal Affairs USSR, generally withdrawing from the MGB system.

Around the same time, Vlasik was also taken out of the MGB. And in January 1953, Kuzmichev, like Vlasik, was arrested, finally taking him out of the rapidly developing world around him. Stalin situation. It is

significant that in March 1953, having come to the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB, Beria immediately released Kuzmichev and appointed him head of the Main Security Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, instructing to him the protection of the government (later Beria and this will be blamed at the "anti-Beria" plenum). It is also indicative that the very next day after the arrest of Beria, he was arrested and Kuzmichev. He was released in February 1954, and since then this full of strength, who lived to At the age of 81, a person drops out of active life. It looks like the Party of Partocrats paid him this way. for silence. And it's hard for me to judge him. He already knew that after the fall of Beria and due to the fall of Beria, the fall of the USSR is only a matter of time. Having said

this, I will remark again: **it is simply amazing how much "researchers" "lose" the obvious fact that from January 1946 to the very death of Stalin, it was not Beria who was in charge of Stalin's guards and his maintenance, but others!** Moreover, since August 1951, Ignatiev, the representative and protege of the party, was in charge of it. partocrats and personally Khrushchev.

After all, this is a cliché: Beria, through his people, poisoned Stalin, etc. But Stalin Ignatiev's people surrounded! And it was Ignatiev who first cut off Kuzmichev from Stalin's guards, and then Vlasik.

And Ignatiev, in the last months of Stalin's life, isolated them - those two people who were best acquainted with the organization of Stalin's guard and with the people, his guarded. Otherwise, Vlasik and Kuzmichev could either pay attention themselves for strange moments and unreliable people in the guard, or give someone else qualified expert assessment of what is happening. They interfered with this, being on freedom, both to Ignatiev and to his "customers".

Pavel Sudoplatov recalled that at the end of February 1953, a few days before Stalin's death, he noticed in the behavior of Ignatiev "growing uncertainty".

Valuable evidence!

Sudoplatov also reports that after the death of Stalin, Beria sought the arrest of Ignatiev, but did not receive support from the Presidium of the Central Committee. Sudoplatov links Beria's initiative with participation of the MGB in the case with doctors, but clearly misses the mark. Conduct this case, which was on Stalin's control, Ignatiev was forced one way or another.

Beria wanted to arrest him, obviously in connection with the desire to investigate the death of Stalin. And he immediately ran into such resistance that even Beria had to retreat.

The death of Stalin did not plunge his comrades-in-arms into deep sorrow. However, she needs was from the top leadership only to Khrushchev. Nikita Khrushchev could not be loyal to Stalin for several reasons. Former

Trotskyist (and Trotskyism is like syphilis - you can only heal, but not cured), he was not close to Stalin's party politically.

The father of a son doubtfully missing at the front, he could not forgive Stalin (himself who lost a worthy son in the war) refusal to participate in the fate of his beloved child. ABOUT Khrushchev's hatred of Stalin in connection with this refusal was told by F. Chuev Molotov, about her the former deputy head of the 9th department of the KGB, major general, wrote a lot M. S. Dokuchaev in his book "Moscow. Kremlin. Security". But the

main thing was that Khrushchev understood: if Stalin still makes Beria presovmina, then Beria, already during the life of Stalin, quickly disavows those who speak their tongues partycrats like Khrushchev and replace them with working socialist technocrats like Beria himself and his associates. And then, already during the life of Stalin, the fate of Nikita Khrushchev will be unenviable.

Therefore, it was necessary to remove Stalin first - physically. Then it was necessary deal with Beria - first politically, and then - physically. And these are purely selfish Khrushchev's interests overlapped very well with that policy of the West and the Golden Elite Peace in relation to the USSR, which began to take shape after the end of the Second world war and which led the USSR to collapse.

Chapter 24

ONE HUNDRED AND TWELVE DAYS...

STALIN died... And
we had to live without him. How?
To a

certain extent, this was answered by the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 6, 1953. The very fact such a joint meeting was extraordinary, but the occasion was the same. The meeting was held the day after the official death of Stalin and authorized "a number of measures to organize the party and state guides"...

On March 15, the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened, which approved the decisions adopted on 6 March and gave them the force of law.

Voroshilov replaced Shvernik as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,

"recommended" by the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, his first deputies: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich.

A number of current "historians" of that era, describing the first days of mourning, see Beria's cunning move is that he, they say, was the first to propose to elect the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov, and he, in gratitude, named the name of Beria first, suggesting candidates

their first deputies. And this de ensured Beria's primacy among equals.

But all such explanations are from the evil one, although in order for this to be fully understand, I had to sit out the evening over the Pravda file for 1953. And from the newspapers it can be seen that the 4th session was opened by the chairman of the Moscow Council, Yasnov, and then the first to speak Khrushchev, proposing to elect Voroshilov Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council. And it was purely "technical" performance. The following speech by Beria, who proposed to appoint Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers was the same.

I think that a week before the session - on March 6, Beria's proposal about Malenkov, expressed in the circle of top management, was also quite "technical", without a hint intrigue.

Yes, in fact, who else could really head the Council of Ministers then, except for Malenkov or Beria? And who else could Malenkov offer to the "workhorses" of the Council of Ministers instead of Beria, who even under Stalin was in the top leadership of the main such "horse"? Another thing is that Malenkov could immediately offer Beria instead of himself, but this it would be too much for him. Intrigues are not intrigues, but now, after Stalin's departure, Malenkov's ambitions have begun to bulge.

Yes, and he was not the only one ... Beria had no ambitions - he had ideas and initiatives. But about this - a little Later. And now I will repeat that in the days of Stalin, his inner circle was not accustomed to intrigue and fight for power, because then power gave not so much "Pies and donuts", how many "bruises and bumps". And even the late Stalin, contrary to According to the statements of "political scientists", he deliberately did not push his foreheads against any of his associates - allegedly in order to maintain his position. And it was not in Stalin's nature that this was, and not in the spirit of the then government. And besides everything else, Stalin's position was then so firmly and unshakably that ...

In short, it is clear that ...

The reader should remember the Moscow historian Yuri Zhukov, the author of the book "Another Stalin." In 2007, another of his books was published, continuing the first one, Stalin: Secrets of Power. And just like the first, it produces a dual impression. Embracing period from 1939 to 1954, Zhukov reports a lot of interesting and new information, based on most often on previously closed archives. At the same time, he clearly maintains his old thesis: everything vile, corrupting and destroying in the USSR is the result of the activity of a decaying and often self-serving partocracy, which neither Stalin nor ... Malenkov could cope with after Stalin's death.

On the whole, I have not the slightest need to argue with this thesis - I have been convinced of this for a long time. But Yu. Zhukov, with no less consistency, all explains by intrigue and clannishness, but one cannot agree with this in any way, if one has sight of most of Stalin's inner circle, and above all - Beria!

In addition, many details are surprising ... Alas, in Zhukov's book you encounter strange confusion of the principle of approach to sources. That doctor of science Zhukov relies on "iron" archival data, then enjoys almost rumors. Particularly strange Y. Zhukov looks like an approach to describing the last pre-war and first war days 1941. Almost all of the initial impulses to mobilize top management for organization of the war, including the idea of the State Defense Committee, Zhukov attributes to Molotov, who allegedly also involved Malenkov and Beria in the action. Moreover, the latter already on June 30, 1941, with the living People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov, leads Zhukov "state security". Molotov

allegedly needed the allies insofar as, according to Yu. Zhukov, "was to be removed from power (as it is written! - S.K.) or very significantly limit the powers not only of Voznesensky, Zhdanov, but also of Stalin. Moreover, Molotov, allegedly "like no other experienced in the Kremlin behind-the-scenes intrigues, perfectly understood the danger of such an enterprise, knew that alone

can't do anything"... That's why he turned to Beria and Malenkov.

Molotov, Malenkov and Beria look to Zhukov as a kind of triumvirate who played in the first days of the war in relation to the allegedly confused Stalin, the role of the foremen of the Cossack "kosh", who say to the elected ataman: "Take power, son of a bitch, while they give it to you!" Zhukov claims that the fact that in the narrow leadership "there were desperate people", "certainly encouraged Stalin, finally brought him out of prostration (even so! - S.K.) ..." I hope that I have

sufficiently introduced the reader to the schedule of the first military week Stalin and with some general chronology of those days, so that, to put it mildly, Zhukov is wrong was seen quite clearly. Let me remind you that in the first six days of the war, only that working Stalin's time, which was "selectively" reported by General Gorkov, amounted to a total of 55 hours, for which several dozen people were taken ... Good "prostration"! Yes, a little later, a moment of approximately daily depression with Stalin most likely took place. But this is with his load - purely physical, not to mention psychological, and not surprising.

That's why I dwelled in such detail on Yu. Zhukov's description of the beginning of the war, because I want once again note the following: such an unlawful approach leads Yu. Zhukov to explanation and processes in the period shortly before the death of Stalin and shortly after his death is nothing but exclusively "intrigues" of various "groups".

Multi-way intrigues and a lust for power, not fundamental considerations explains Yu. Zhukov and the behavior of Lavrenty Pavlovich.

However, having in mind not only Yu. Zhukov, I will object that although the intrigues on Wednesday top leadership with the departure of Stalin and came, their character is maliciously distorted, and the scale is inflated. Of course, in general, on changes in the personnel leadership group and the redistribution of responsibilities that occurred on March 6, 1953, both the objective needs of the situation and personal sympathies or antipathies affected. And, intertwined, objective and subjective factors programmed, alas, yes, the appearance in in the future in the top leadership of some business "blocks".

So, it was quite logical that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were again merged into one The Ministry of the Interior is under Beria's hand. But now Molotov again became a minister Foreign Affairs instead of Vyshinsky, who replaced Molotov in March 1949. Such Molotov's "renaissance" was more or less justified, but the fact that Vyshinsky was now moved to the post of First Deputy Minister with the appointment to hell in the middle of nowhere - Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, was already a manifestation of personal antipathy. TO word, Molotov just, not having the nature of a burnt intriguer, could be in intrigue, according to a number of reasons, drawn in one of the

first. Bulganin replaced Marshal Vasilevsky as Minister of War, who was moved to the first deputies, and Marshal Zhukov, returned from the Urals, was appointed the second deputy.

The Ministries of Foreign Trade and Trade were merged, and the Minister again became actually dismissed by that time from the affairs of Mikoyan. For him, the death of Stalin too turned out to be a political revival, which I would call, alas, a revival now political.

Saburov, an expert in economics, was transferred from the chairmen of the State Planning Commission to ministers formed from several ministries of the super-Ministry of Machine Building, and its place occupied by Grigory Kosyachenko, who neither before nor after himself particularly recommended. The authorized representative of the Central Committee for Gosplan, Andreev, known to us in 1950, in an official

In his report to the Central Committee, he wrote about Kosyachenko as follows:

"Tov. Kosyachenko... in political terms... he is not a sharp person, he does not show any activity in eliminating shortcomings in the work of the State Planning Commission, as the organizer is absolutely useless ... Authority among the members of the State Planning Commission and comrade Kosyachenko does not use the staff of the apparatus, does not pass a single party meeting without serious criticism (this is in the times of a "tery,

assurances of "democrats", totalitarianism"! - **S.K.)** in his address ... "

As for the party leadership, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee was abolished, but ... the Presidium itself was actually abolished. He, as I said, "shrunk" to the size liquidated Bureau of the Central Committee and even smaller ones! Now the Presidium was made up of its members Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, and candidate members Shvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Bagirov.

The secretariat of the Central Committee also sharply "shrank" and turned gray: 1) Ignatiev (former MGB, "Moor", already April 28, 1953 withdrawn from the Central Committee); 2) the "theorist" Pospelov and 3) Shatalin (this we'll still get it). About

Khrushchev, the joint resolution stated the following:

"Recognize it necessary that comrade. Khrushchev N. S. focused on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in this regard, release him from his duties First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

That is, Khrushchev became the secretary of the Central Committee. So far - "just" a secretary. How did this "schedule" take shape?

To assess the situation, I will perhaps use a quote from an essay by Konstantin Simonov, placed in the politizdat "anti-Beria" collection of 1991. At For all the libelousness of this essay, something can be gleaned from Simonov, at that time a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

"Why was Beria interested in Malenkov becoming the heir Stalin precisely in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the post of Stalin in The secretariat of the Central Committee would be occupied by a person, from the point of view of Beria, a secondary scale - Khrushchev, whose personality and character Beria never figured out until the day of your fall? And it's very simple. Beria's idea was to ensure that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers played the main role in the leadership of the country.
and his deputies...

Two pieces of evidence are valuable here: 1) Beria really thought in the spirit of Stalin's ideas about the changing role of the party; 2) a man with a double soul was not Beria, but Khrushchev ...

And Simonov did not understand one more thing; he, wanting to denigrate Beria, brought here an argument in his favor! After all, the motives for the activity of Lavrenty Pavlovich Simonov called not selfish, but state considerations! Simonov, however,

correctly determined that the "nerve" of the situation was not set by the lines of "Malenkov—Khrushchev" or "Malenkov-Beria", and the line "Khrushchev-Beria". Around the relationship of two the latest figures heaped up so many lies (the starting points of which were set by Khrushchev right at the plenum of the Central Committee after the arrest of Beria), which I can explain in detail there is no possibility now. However, something - for illustration - must be communicated to the reader. For example, it is considered commonplace that it was Beria who initiated the revision of the "case Mikhoels" or "cases of doctors". In the collection of the Democracy Foundation "Lavrenty Beria. 1953 "documents are filed in such a way that Beria really looks like a liberator of doctors from unfair accusations. On April 1 (first), 1953, he signed (but hardly written by him) a note to the Presidium of the Central Committee "on the rehabilitation of persons involved in such called the Pest Doctors Case. But here is what he writes in his book "Moscow. Kremlin. Protection "General Dokuchaev, a person aware:

"After Stalin's death, by releasing doctors from investigation and **declaring amnesty mainly to criminals** , Khrushchev (highlighted everywhere by me. - **S.K.)** appeared before everyone as a hero who is remembered with gratitude, exalted and raised to the shield as a great democrat"...

Dokuchaev is by no means a supporter of Beria. Moreover, he does not disdain obvious lies on his address, arguing, for example, that "at the end of the forties, a wave of Berievism poured out in the so-called "Leningrad case" ... ", that" Beria hated Stalin, wanted to get rid of him..." etc. But the more valuable is the information of this high rank of the Brezhnev-Gorbachev KGB! And here is Khrushchev himself at the "Anti-Beria" plenum:

"If you take late questions - doctors, this is a shameful thing for us, this is linden ... I consider it a shameful affair with doctors ... We, the members of the Presidium, among ourselves several times they said, **I said** (highlighted here by me. - **S.K.**) Lavrenty ... "

So, the initiative in the case of doctors came, most likely, from the Khrushchevites. And relatively there are interesting details about this ... After the arrest of Beria, he came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs - as the first Deputy Minister, while remaining secretary of the Central Committee, a certain Shatalin. It was he who was entrusted to confiscate the papers of Lavrenty Pavlovich, which were immediately former associates of Stalin destroyed.

Shatalin at the "anti-Beria" plenum spoke a lot of vile things about Beria (something I'll give my time), but about the "doctors' case" he said this:

"... take the case of doctors. This, I think, is even the general opinion of what happened the right decision in the end, but why was a communiqué needed Ministry of the Interior, why was it necessary to decline this case in print etc. Why did it need to be published? This was done in order to raise - that's what kind of contender he is ... "

That is, according to Shatalin, it turned out that Beria was not very good for the rehabilitation of doctors and involved, more, they say, stuck ... Yes, and advertising the Ministry of Internal Affairs and created for himself in the press

The last one was a direct slander! Shatalin, like **all participants in the Plenum**, could not not to know that the "communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior" and "the decline of this case in the press" were needed because on April 3, 1953, the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee was adopted "On the falsification of the so-called case of pest doctors", paragraphs 2 and 7 of which read:

"2. Approve the attached text of the message for publication in central print. 7. This resolution ... to be sent to all members of the Central Committee of the CPSU ... "

To all members of the Central Committee of the CPSU! And now the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Shatalin from the rostrum of the plenum brazenly lied in the eyes of **everyone** members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and not a single member of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed the slightest surprise (I'm not talking about indignation).

But maybe he initiated Beria's communiqué - for self-promotion. no, text the communiqué was quite dry, and in the press this matter, in general, was not "inclined". In any after all, the hype was useless.

There is a LOT of obscurity in the story of the 1953 amnesty that stuck in the teeth. General Dokuchaev attributes it to Khrushchev's initiative, but it is often stated that this allegedly "thanks to Beria", an uncontrollable muddy wave of bandits allegedly poured into the country and etc.

But on March 26, 1953, Beria proposed amnesty for about 1,000,000 people from number of very specific categories of prisoners. Namely: convicted for up to 5 years; convicted regardless of the term of punishment, for official, economic and some

military crimes; women with children under 10 and pregnant women; minors under the age of 18; elderly men and women and patients suffering from severe incurable ailments.

At the same time, the "disposition" of the million meant by *Beria* included: • those convicted of official crimes, etc. (collective farm chairmen, foremen, business leaders, etc.) - 30,000 people;

- women - pregnant women and with children, up to 400,000 people;
- elderly, terminally ill and minors respectively 238,000; 198,000 and 31,181 people.

In sum, this gives almost 900,000 people who are unlikely to be able to immediately some disorder. Moreover, all of them ended up in the Gulag system not under the People's Commissar Beria, but under Minister Kruglov. And the LP suggested how, in principle, to mitigate the criminal legislation regarding economic and other less dangerous crimes, and show mercy towards that part of specific prisoners who do not presented dangers due to the very nature of crimes not related to violence against people.

Could such a contingent of the liberated give rise to some kind of powerful "wave of violence"? Personally, I doubt it, although there could be some excesses, and that's why ... Beria submitted a note from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU as a *working* document, where it was not required legal polishing of wordings. And a day later, March 21, 1953, without consultations with the Prosecutor General's Office, with the Ministry of Justice and other Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Voroshilov and Secretary of the Presidium Pegov signed a decree on amnesty. Their haste (obviously prompted by Khrushchev) and led to a number of costs - not so much, as I guess, significant. Anyway Beria is not to blame for them, and the theme of the 1953 amnesty is still waiting, as they say, for its researcher.

Beria had a lot of really *his* initiatives in all spheres of life. AND now it seemed that the top leadership of the country could not get away from activity and ideas the most active member of this leadership. He's been getting better for a long time now. others, and even better and deeper than Stalin - if we were not talking about questions of theory social processes. Beria had

his own, and optimal for society, views on economic priorities. He

was faster than other colleagues in those specific issues, to solve which he was related to, and decided everything without unnecessary verbiage, ridiculed and Lenin, and Mayakovsky. At the "Anti-Beria" plenum, his former deputy for To the Special Committee, Zavenyagin, in condemnation of Beria, reported: "And when we were engaged in any question, he said: to hell with this business, you are the organizers.

Zavenyagin further asked: "*How can work be organized without understanding the essence of affairs?*" not realizing that Beria understood the essence of the matter, but precisely *as an organizer*. Otherwise, Zavenyagin, reporting to Beria on the progress of certain works, would not have finished each times: "I ask for your instructions ..."

If Zavenyagin played it safe like that, he was a reinsurer, and this is not a position most deserving. If Zavenyagin really needed instructions, then did he have the moral right to blaspheme Beria's organizational style? Beria is

better than any other head of state from the Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU also knew the problems of the national economy. Here with him on an equal footing could only that Kaganovich, Saburov and Pervukhin, but the first one is already very middle-aged, and the last two had lower state status than Beria, and did not have his influence.

He was well aware of the promising areas of scientific and technological progress. Had an accurate view of a rational foreign policy. And at the same time he understood and pressing issues of domestic politics.

In addition, accustomed to saving from childhood, he from everyone with whom he worked, always and in everyone demanded savings - not a penny, but thoughtful. And that also made him stand out from everyone. other members of the Presidium of the

Central Committee. But, doing a huge amount of work, he, in comparison with others, was less than public mind. Such were his occupations. Who, say, in the country knew that nuclear the weapon is Beria?

Before the war, Kaganovich held public rallies of leaders in various industries, and Beria always dealt only with the top management of these industries.

"Voroshilov shooters" in pre-war youth were millions, but Beria's tens of thousands became snipers in the war. And Lavrenty Pavlovich was known in the country less than Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Khrushchev ... But he is better The "old guard" knew the country itself, its capabilities. I think for

a long time he wanted, perhaps a little naively, that Comrade Stalin would finally appreciate him in full measure and make him his successor. Beria, after all, was suitable for this more than anyone else.

Of course, over the years, he could not help developing a demeanor that At first glance, she seemed overconfident. But how could he manage to do so much in different spheres, if, as they say, "bred turuses on wheels"? He could say in hearts, on the phone, that is, in fact, face to face, to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia and at the same time to the Minister of Food Industry of the GSSR Bakradze: "You are a canner, not politician", or to the general of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who gave in to the party bosses: "You are an official in uniform", but this just spoke of the rare ability to give an accurate and juicy assessment when he said how printed. He

was always quick in word and deed. Moreover, the word was in place, and the deed was "on business". And now he could count on the rapid advancement of his ideas, because that only he - of the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee - had them.

Their!!!

But almost immediately he ran into the same opposition of the partocracy, to overcome which so much wanted, but even Stalin could not.

Shepilov's grandson, journalist and orientalist Dmitry Kosyrev, reports things that are amusing both in style and in meaning. It turns out that Shepilov believed that *"for the throne* (rarely wrong expression! - S.K.) *Stalin grabbed two of the bloodiest Stalinist executioner - Beria and Khrushchev. The one who managed to shoot first won* . Well, this one the phrase characterizes both the grandson and the grandfather well.

The grandson further exclaims: "Khrushchev is Stalin's executioner! Is it possible? Regarding Beria, the grandson has no doubts: "executioner." Certification as executioner Khrushchev embarrassing grandson. But in vain! Just Nikita Khrushchev was a bloody executioner, if not directly sense of the word, then in the political sense - completely! This is confirmed by his provocative, executioner policy and when he was the first secretary of the Moscow city committee, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. And Beria? He was not involved in the central repressions of 1937-1938 - as a figure of the level Khrushchev. Arriving at the end of 1938 in the NKVD, he reduced the scope of the repressive policy to historically necessary (not to blame him for the Katyn fake or deportations!). A since January 10, 1946, Beria had nothing to do with the repressive special services as figure influencing their politics. Yes, in fact, since 1943, its capabilities and functions in this regard were minimized after the allocation of internal affairs of the USSR to separate departments of the People's Commissariat of State Security, headed by Merkulov and counterintelligence SMERSH headed by Abakumov.

True, Beria is credited with supervising the special services after the war, but I remind you: **with March 1946 to February 1949, the bodies of justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were previously in charge of**

total secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and at the same time head of the Personnel Department
Central Committee comrade. A. A. Kuznetsov! The same one, "Leningrad", "victim Stalinism"...

On September 17, 1947, Kuznetsov's powers were confirmed by the Decree Politburo "on monitoring the work of the Ministry of State Security" (point 218 of the agenda). Moreover, the decision was made on the basis of Molotov's note.

And Kuznetsov's influence was so great that he could achieve removal from the post of minister Merkulov, a longtime associate of Beria. And the crimes of Kuznetsov (since we are talking about *crimes* of that period) are attributed to the NKVD of Beria, although Beria at that time the organs of the State Security Service did not **supervise!** Isn't it time for gentlemen "democrats" if it's not an honor to know (if it's not there, then nothing to know), then at least a measure?

And now about the one who - using Shepilov's terminology - "managed to shoot first"...

Consider the situation. Let's say the "throne" really *seized* power Khrushchev and

Beria ... One is prone to laziness, rude, weak as an organizer. Doesn't know how to win people over does not want. In addition, the protection of the country's leadership is both beyond its competence, and (after the departure of Ignatiev from the post of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after the death of Stalin) is beyond his influence. This, of

course, is Khrushchev. The second is energy itself, an excellent organizer, knows how to select and encourage personnel and since March 1953, he has been the head of the department responsible for protecting the country's leadership. This,

of course, is Beria. If both expect to "shoot first", then which one of them will shoot first? The answer is perhaps obvious. However, Beria did not "shoot". Did

not have time? Nonsense! If he expected to "shoot", then why did he have to delay? He's not all The "old guard" should have been removed, but only Khrushchev. He's *with him*, according to assurances Shepilov, *grabbed* ... And

since Beria never "shot", it is clear that he was not going *to capture* supreme power! In the simplicity of his soul (yes, yes!!) he assumed that one of the two options. The

first option ... If Beria is formally the second or third, then in any case he will be recognized informal leader - due to his obvious intellectual and business superiority over the rest. The

second option ... For the same reason mentioned above, colleagues will still pass on him even formal leadership. He himself thought he deserved it. And on this account there is exemplary evidence. Already after the end of the "Anti-Beria" plenum defeated Beria decided to bite and Poskrebyshchev, submitting to the Central Committee the text of his failed performance (this did not help Alexander Nikolayevich, and he soon retired). Acquaintance

with this document convinces that Stalin held Poskrebyshchev not by the mind, but for memory. As a result, pouring dirt on Beria and his tub of mud, Poskrebyshchev said a lot such that, with a correct look at what was reported, testified in favor of Beria as statesman and man! Here is one of these passages of the former secretary Stalin:

"Beria tried in every possible way to occupy Comrade during his lifetime. Stalin's place First Deputy Comrade Stalin according to the Council of Ministers, believing that he alone is real successor to Comrade. Stalin.

When the decision to approve Comrade. Bulganin first deputy comrade. Stalin according to the Council of Ministers (in April 1950. - **S.K.**), then Beria was

very dissatisfied with this decision, characterizing Comrade Bulganin as weakly trained and unable to cope with this work ... "

Firstly, since Beria's dissatisfaction with Stalin's decision (!) On a real scale time Poskrebyshev knew about what kind of "servility" of Lavrenty Pavlovich before the "leader", about supposedly fear of him, can we talk? And how many lies about this! And was Beria wrong in assessing Bulganin? And

secondly, didn't Beria have the right to be sincerely offended by Stalin, didn't he seeing the obvious solution? And not seeing, perhaps not because Beria slandered someone, but because *someone* slandered *Beria* before Stalin.

Beria clearly did not know how to pretend (please do not confuse it with the ability to create in the interests of cause a self-image that is different from the true!). But Khrushchev owned the art pretending to be perfect. And since Stalin did not know how to pretend (please do not confuse with the ability to create, in the interests of the cause, an idea of oneself that is different from the true!), then Khrushchev could circle him around his finger.

It was with Churchill that Stalin always kept his eyes open and the gunpowder in the powder flasks dry. A Mykyta had *his own* ... And not only for Stalin, but also for Beria. Yes, and Stalin, and Beria, like all workers, were somewhat indestructible idealists and believed in comrades in the party and leadership of the country. Because Beria and Khrushchev believed. In every case, despite all the doubtfulness of the circumstances of Stalin's death, it is unlikely that Beria could to suspect a direct betrayal of the interests of the case by one of the members of the Presidium

Central Committee

In 1998, in No. 5 of the New and Contemporary History magazine, Professor Naumov asked the question: "Was there a Beria conspiracy?" And even the "historian" - "democrat" could not give this the question is answered in the affirmative in the light of the documents "discovered" for the first time. But he tells a lot of interesting things about Khrushchev's anti-Beria conspiracy.

Directly about this, such a "servant of all masters" as Fyodor Burlatsky, a neighbor Khrushchev's referent. Burlatsky refers to the memoirs of his patron, who immediately after Stalin's death, "it sunk into the consciousness that the first thing to do was to remove Beria" ... And then I believe both Khrushchev himself and Burlatsky. And

Beria ... Yes,

if Beria, having returned to the united Ministry of Internal Affairs, was a cynic and intriguer, then from the very first days he would really be preparing a coup and, I repeat, would carry it out quickly and effectively. And he did it in such a way that outwardly it would not look like a coup. Just Khrushchev's overnight, say, he would fall ill ... And soon he would be buried with honors on Krasnaya area.

And the presiding minister Malenkov would suddenly die of a nervous shock after death of such an outstanding leader of the Soviet people. The sequence of "great losses" could would be, however, and the opposite.

Why not assume such a development of events - if Beria was already "recognized cannibal and intriguer", striving for sole power? And then the performer duties of presiding minister Beria, with the help of, say, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee Pervukhin, Saburov and Mikoyan, would quickly convene a plenum of the Central Committee, having previously notified all the expelled from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the 1952 model, that he intends to expand the Presidium again to the previous limits. And the same 47-year-old ex-member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, secretary of the Central Committee Mikhailov, who July plenum spread about the "vile, provocative activities of the enemy of the party and the people of Beria", would praise Comrade Beria for his attention to young promising personnel. And it would have been in a hat, which of all the then leadership wore only Beria.

Beria did nothing of this, however, the party krait Shepilov, even after he was dismissed by Khrushchev, bent his own:

"Khrushchev's great merit is that, on his initiative, he was neutralized

Beria is a terrible man, whose hands are covered in mud and blood.

And it is clear why - Shepilov was a charming person, but politically dishonorable. Beria did not seek to charm anyone, but he had the honor. And so they Shepilov were antipodes, but Shepilov was "of the same blood" with Khrushchev. Professor Naumov wrote that after the arrest of Beria, "officials were no longer afraid of arrest, which, with Stalin was possible for each of them at any moment. Party-Soviet the nomenklatura began to feel freer and act more relaxed"...

Responsibility for the truth of the statement regarding the threat of arrest "at any minute" I lay solely on V. Naumov, but about the one who loosened her belt nomenclature, I completely agree with him, but with one clarification regarding very, alas, many: "... more relaxed in satisfying selfish interests." And Naumov let slip something without noticing it, but I will draw the reader's attention to his mistake ... Professor Naumov said that *the party-Soviet* began to feel freer nomenclature, but there was also a *national economic nomenclature*. And she is after Beria's arrest, on the contrary, was emboldened by incompetent "partocrats" clamped down.

Need an

example? Please! Moreover, this is evidence of a person who is not disposed to Beria, the famous rocket launcher B.E. Chertok. In his major work *Rockets and People*, he reports that Minister Ustinov, having taken up rocket affairs, by 1949 understood de "absurdity" of the structure of the leading research institute of the industry - NII-88, but the reorganization is not ventured, because over him stood the "omnipotent" apparatus of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Ivan Serbin, who had

the nickname "Ivan the Terrible." Without Serbin's sanction, no changes, incentives, etc., were possible, and Chertok recalls that he had the opportunity to see for himself more than once: the ministers of this the partocrat was "afraid" and "never risked" arguing with him. But in

the nuclear and air defense industries, everything was, according to Chertok, fundamentally different, and he even reports with some sadness that where Beria was in charge, all personnel decisions, for example, were made by Vannikov, coordinating them with Kurchatov presenting Beria for approval. And the "small apparatus of the Special Committee No. 1" was preparing draft decrees on appointments that Beria gave Stalin for signature.

Chertok, knowing "atomic" life from the outside, is not accurate in everything, and already "personnel" resolutions Beria, cited in my book, show that this most important aspect of the Beria case is did not give the full ransom to anyone. But in general, Chertok described the situation correctly. And if so, one asks: did the leaders of non- *Party committees* of factories, institutes, design bureau of defense industries, and their directors, chief engineers and chief designers "feel freer and act more relaxed" after the "executioner" L.P. Beria was replaced by the party crat Serbin?

It would be

in vain labor. Shepilov died in 1995, and if he were a person, and not political nonentity, he would have snatched from life with his teeth the right to publicly curse and Gorbachev, and Yeltsin, and capitalization! Teeth, threatening public self-immolation on Red Square! And he "denounced" Beria to the end, although all the Gorbachevites and Yeltsinoids did not worth (and not worth!) one piece of glass from his broken pince-nez ...

ZATO "LP" BERIA was not only the largest state figure, but also a good person! And here is another example of this. Stalin died. The "near", Kuntsevo dacha was left without an owner, or rather, without the main tenant (the dacha was state!). And, of course, the question arose - how to dispose of it? In the collection "I Shepilov, who joined them, "candidate of historical sciences Alexander Shefov reports:

"After the death of Stalin, Beria, bypassing the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, made a decision according to which the security of the dacha was dispersed (? - S.K.), and their functions were transferred

watchmen from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (actually, since March 53, employees of all special services have become employees of the united Ministry of Internal Affairs. - **S.K.**). In May the dacha was given Ministry of Health of the USSR to accommodate a children's sanatorium there.

What is the style of A. Shefov! "Bypassing the secretaries of the Central Committee", "the guards were dispersed" ... Yes, unlike the current "free Russians", Lavrenty Beria is for collective irresponsibility did not hide. And did not spend the people's money and effort experienced air security officers. After all, when the head of state lived at the dacha, it was an object of special importance and a KGB security company was required there. And now it was possible to get by with "watchmen".

Moreover, Shefov managed, as it were, to reproach Beria even with the fact that they wanted to give the dacha to the kids, because he goes on to say:

"After the arrest of Beria, the question of the Blizhnyaya dacha again arose, and it was decided transfer to the Central Museum of V. I. Lenin as a branch, in order to create a museum of I. V. Stalin there.

The hint is clear - Khrushchev, who "neutralized" the "monster" honored Stalin, but the "monster" Beria did not honor the memory of the leader. So he thrashed him. "Logic" worthy of Eliza Doolittle, not yet educated by Professor Higgins.

But the fact is that Shefov is in favor of Beria, dear reader! Is not it? From one hand, what is this Stalin Museum on the far outskirts of the capital? On the other hand, for the children's sanatorium is very suitable. Yes, and the memory of Stalin would be so honored by the best and in the most human way. Today,

some liberals claim an "objective" approach to the "phenomenon Beria". For example, Oleg Khlevnyuk, editor-in-chief of the Gorbachev-Fund magazine, Svobodnaya thought", in No. 2 for 1995 of this journal published an article "Beria: the limits of the historical "rehabilitation". I will return to it later, but the name speaks for itself.

And such Khlevnyuks and Naumovs are now inclined to consider Beria as "pragmatics", allegedly striving for the depoliticization and de-ideologization of the Soviet society. This, of course, is nonsense!

Beria was a convinced Bolshevik ... How often, talking about nature Bolshevik Party, today they see in it the party of exclusively destroyers of the old peace. Even Elena Prudnikova is convinced:

"Extreme oppositionists, fighters against the regime, that is, according to psychological type destroyers, there were very few creators"...

Alas, this is nothing more than a delusion, skillfully formed in the last fifteen years ... But the party anthem "Internationale" reported: "We will destroy the whole world of violence to the foundation, and

then ... "This" then "is overlooked, and then it goes:" ... we are ours, we are a new world let's build"! So, sorry, the Bolshevik party was the party of builders, why ideas and attracted the builder by nature Beria immediately after the fall of the autocracy.

Before February 1917, the Bolshevik Party had up to 60-80 thousand members, and most of them were neither professional revolutionaries nor "extremals", but in this party there were many conscious and developed workers. Actually, the whole intellectual, so to speak, the color of the working class of Russia was by 1917 bolshevized. As for

the goals of the Bolsheviks, I will refer to the opinion already once by me cited by Lauren R. Graham, MIT professor institute. He wrote in 1987 that the original promise of the Russian Revolution to those who supported it was the **rational leadership of society** and that

The Bolsheviks saw the 1917 revolution as a decisive breakthrough towards social transformation, which is the key to progress. As you can see, here exclusively about creation, and even on an unprecedented scale. Not a single capitalist the concern could not give Beria the opportunity to create on the scale that he gained on service to Soviet Russia! No wonder he, in a conversation with the manager of the affairs of the Council of Ministers Pomaznev proudly remarked about the high-rise building of Moscow University that "this building equal to the capital of Dupont and other American billionaires.

And this directly echoes the line of Vladimir Mayakovsky:

"The Soviets have their own pride! We look down on the bourgeois..."

Yes! From the height of the Mikhail Lomonosov Moscow State University! No, Beria was a convinced Bolshevik. But, being a smart and businesslike person, he understood that:

1) society is ideologically strong not when it wears portraits at demonstrations "leaders", and when these leaders live "alive" in the name of those ideas that they proclaim, then they don't roll around mountain resorts and don't chase money, but are constantly busy problems of development of society;

2) the strength of the political system in the mode of its normal, and not extreme, functioning is determined by the level of optimization of its economic basis and the level scientific, technical and technological development of the productive sphere as a basis for the growth of the well-being of the people;

3) a multinational state is united when the policy of the central government really knocks out the nationalists ground for any of their propaganda efforts.

In this sense, Beria was really a pragmatist and began to act immediately after Stalin's death. His initiatives were impressive both for their potential, and coverage of all, in fact, aspects of society. He had specific

proposals in the field of: a) public administration, b) economics, c) defense policy, d) internal nationwide and national politics, e) foreign policy.

In the SPHERE of public administration, he took a clear course to transfer the center management of economic and economic activities, including large-scale defense projects, from the Central Committee to the Council of Ministers. Actually, all the most promising defense work was already carried out within the framework of the activities of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but rest...

Different views on the priorities of power appeared already at Stalin's funeral. Then on Three people performed at the mausoleum: Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. All three speeches were quite similar very colorless officialdom - there were no special passions and bright places in them.

However, Malenkov repeatedly used the formula "The Communist Party and Soviet government", Molotov also emphatically used the formula "Soviet state", practically without mentioning the party, and Beria spoke even more insistently about "Soviet government", without denying, however, the party the right to be the "leading force Soviet society". The

leader is not the leader and guide. And Beria's emphasis on the Soviet the government was quite eloquent. And this was just what led to and Stalin. After all, during Zhdanov's lifetime, in response to the latter's remark that long ago there was no party congress, he said something like this: "That the party ... the party turned into an assembly of hallelujahs." And then Stalin admitted that the war proved that there were fewer anti-Soviet elements in Soviet society than "we were reported" ... And

at the same time, Stalin suggested: "We must repent" - before the people, of course.

Silence was his answer, only Zhdanov and Voznesensky supported him. (it cost nothing to the latter, he did not organize repressions). However, if Stalin Beria also supported, then it's impossible to get into later memories - even oral ones could.

It was possible to repent publicly only when Stalin was alive - this would add respect and authority among the people for both him and the party. To repent after his death meant would indirectly undermine that authority. Khrushchev did so later, without repenting, of course, but blaming everything on the "tyrant" Stalin, but what can be taken from a party crat, except for duplicity and falsifications?

Beria preferred to correct distortions and mistakes with deeds. However, political the reform of the organization of social life was a difficult long-term task. But in the economic sphere, Beria's new initiatives appeared immediately and quite clearly. He always he thought big, his managerial decisions every now and then "cost" millions, tens, hundreds of millions of rubles. On the other hand, he always demanded to spend no more than necessary. And this trait of his was especially pronounced six days after appointment as First Deputy Prime Minister.

On March 21, 1953, Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with proposals to stop the construction or liquidation of 20 large facilities, the construction of which "in the near future is not caused by urgent needs National economy". Everything was explained by the fact that Stalin, from the beginning of the 50s, succumbed to a certain gigantomania, and this affected the development of a number of ambitious projects. For example, in September 1950, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers on the construction of the main canal of the Amu Darya - Krasnovodsk, on the irrigation and watering of the southern lands regions of the Caspian Plain of Western Turkmenistan, the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and the western part desert Karakum.

Initially, the cost of the Great Turkmen Canal was estimated at several billion rubles, but then it turned out that it would really be necessary to spend thirty billion. With projects like the Main Turkmen Canal in mind, Beria wrote:

"Cessation or liquidation of some construction projects is also expedient due to the fact that these construction projects require significant quantity of metal, construction and other technical materials, equipment, as well as labor... I consider it necessary to stop or completely eliminate the construction ... with a total estimated cost of 49.2 billion rubles ... "

This is both the Volga-Ural gravity canal and the railway tunnel under the Tatarsky the strait from the mainland to Sakhalin, and the Chun-Salekhard-Igarka railway, and Kirov Chemical Plant...

Moreover, Beria links economic proposals with domestic political ones. AND what! On March 17, in a note to the Council of Ministers, he proposes:

"... to transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of other ministries the main production and economic departments, construction departments, industrial enterprises with all industrial and construction departments, office premises, ancillary farms, research and design institutions, with material resources..."

"Other ministries" are the ministries of the metallurgical industry, coal industry, power plants and electrical industry, industry building materials, oil industry, chemical industry, ways

communications, sea and river fleet, timber and pulp and paper industry, agriculture and harvesting.

And among the organizations and enterprises transferred to the sectoral ministries: the Main Directorate of the Gold-Platinum Industry, the Norilsk Combine of Nonferrous and rare metals, Stalingradgidrostroy, Kuibyshevgidrostroy, amber plant in Kaliningrad region ... And other, and other, and other ...

It looks like the actions of a power lover and a selfish person who dreams (as in libel L. Mlechin) to drive the whole country into the Gulag?

Ministers Tevosyan, Zasyadko, Pervukhin, Yudin, Baibakov, Tikhomirov, Beshchev, Shashkov, Orlov, Kozlov receive huge new values, personnel, resources in their departments, but ... But also new responsibility - too ... Including responsibility for the implementation of those planned national economic tasks of 1953, for which the Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible.

And it didn't make everyone happy. Historian Yuri Zhukov in the book "Stalin: Secrets of Power" in Beria's similar reforms sees, however, some kind of cunning double bottom - they say, Beria simply got rid of "unnecessary" worries and responsibilities. Well ... Someone sees stars in a puddle, and someone only sees a cloudy water.

And the Minister of the Interior, **Beria, also refuses the Gulag** - he is in his charge received by Minister of Justice Gorshenin. March 28, 1953 at the suggestion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs adopted the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR corrective labor camps and colonies." Only special camps and prisons remain for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where "especially dangerous state criminals sentenced to imprisonment: spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyists, rightists, Mensheviks, socialist-revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, white émigrés..." Dear reader! How much has been written about the "sadist" Beria, who revels in omnipotence in the "slave empire of the Gulag". In the "materials" of the "investigation" on the "case of Beria" there is an alleged confession of Sergei Goglidze that Beria allegedly "gave instructions to beat arrested *before being shot!* And what remains of this lie after such a step by Beria?

But Lavrenty Pavlovich also initiated and achieved the adoption Resolution of the Council of Ministers "On the abolition of passport restrictions and regime areas"! On May 13, he submits a voluminous note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where, in addition to other things, it said:

"T. Malenkov G.M. <...>
At present, in the Soviet Union, passport restrictions extend to 340 sensitive cities, localities, railway junctions, as well as to the border zone along the entire border of the country with a width of 15 to 200 kilometers ... Thus, if you look at the map of the USSR, you can see that the entire the country is full of secure cities and various restricted areas where it is forbidden to live for citizens who have a criminal record and have served their sentences.

Under the current situation, citizens who have served their sentences in places imprisonment or exile and thus atoning for their guilt before society, continue to experience deprivation and are doomed to ordeal ... "

If you quote this text without a message of authorship, then the note "democrat" is more likely of all, he will define it as a "samizdat" of that time, exposing the "oprichnik" Beria. A this is a note from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, comrade L.P. Beria, to the highest party "Areopagus".

And on May 20, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a resolution was adopted, which approved the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, developed by Beria and removing passport restrictions.

And this is a "monster", "sadist", "geek", "ghoul", "devil"? Moreover, after
"even more closely rallied around the Central Committee
CPSU "former associates of Beria dealt with him, January 21, 1954 by a resolution

The Council of Ministers of the USSR the entire GULAG from the USSR Ministry of Justice was transferred back to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. However
"hands in blood to the elbow" our increasingly going crazy, having reached the "mark" in
three hundred thousand annual violent deaths, society to this day counts as
Lavrenty Pavlovich. But

Beria not only knew the price of human blood and therefore always sought
get by with a minimum of it when it was impossible to do without it. Beria was economical and
in spending the wealth of the state. He organically did not tolerate
extravagance, and after the most necessary expenses for the Atomic project, including the development of
thermonuclear weapons, were made, he began to demand from
leaders of the nuclear weapons complex to engage in savings.

During the period of "storm and onslaught" nuclear scientists were given funds and materials in those amounts, in
what they asked for. At one time the country sat without medical thermometers - mercury
needed by the Atomic Project. Now Beria demanded to fit into the estimates. And this is for him
also (!!!) blamed at the "Anti-Beria" plenum by none other than Zavenyagin! A
"democrats" and "Russian" "researchers of the mechanisms of political power in the USSR" explain -
following the participants of the "anti-Beria" plenum - such activity of Beria
solely by the desire to create cheap popularity for himself and facilitate the seizure of power.

And at the same time, the same "democrats" denounce the exorbitant appetites of the Soviet military-
industrial complex. But the principle that has not been implemented in its activities
Lavrenty Pavlovich wanted to instill in the military-industrial complex "money loves an account"!

LAST major, quite systematically developed, but never implemented
Beria's idea was the intention to reorganize the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

After Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested, "offended" and reduced by him to
the post of head of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Lviv region, General Strokach
accused the LP of being at one of the meetings after his return to the Ministry of Internal Affairs
said, turning to Meshik: "We need good workers, Chekists, and not people who only know how to chat from
the stands:" Lenin - Stalin "".

The typical partocrat Ignatiev flooded both the central and
peripheral devices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And now Beria was cleaning the "Ignatiev" "stables".
For example, he was later blamed for a mass recall of legal residents of foreign countries from abroad.
intelligence. But very many of them did not know not only the language of the host country, but in general
one foreign language! Yes,

many things needed to be changed. The
draft "Regulations on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR" helped develop
Minister General Boris Obruchnikov. It was a long-term deputy head of the special services for
personnel (from 1941 to 1952 and from 03/12/53 to 07/03/53 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and from
07/05/52 to

March 1953 in the MGB). July 3, 1953 - as a personnel (in both senses) employee of Beria - Obruchnikov
will lose his post, and on March 5, 1954, on the day of the anniversary of Stalin's death, he will be fired
49 years from the Ministry of Internal Affairs "on the facts of discrediting the organs of the State Security" (in 1955 they will also be deprived of the title
"lieutenant general"). After the arrest of Beria, Obruchnikov retreated from him, but he knew the matter, and
therefore, the final project of the reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was worked out carefully.
And - impressed.

Having got rid of production activities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to Beria's plan, should
was to become an effectively functioning integrated law enforcement agency for the protection
state and public security, the protection of the state borders of the USSR, the protection of public order, the
fight against criminality, while maintaining
duties on fire safety, registration of acts of civil

state, state geodetic control, etc., including "implementation special assignments of the government of the USSR.

The list of all the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took up almost the entire Russian alphabet from the letter "a" to the letter "f", and the task of "selection, training and retraining of operational personnel, education of all personnel of the Ministry in the spirit of selfless devotion the cause of the Lenin-Stalin, high honesty truthfulness And party of discipline"... Such a

Ministry of Internal Affairs could, in its natural development, become a structure, very effectively serving the interests of society, something like that has not become a serious force Rabkrin, whose active work Lenin dreamed of. Sergo Beria is rarely possible regarded as a source of reliable information, but I believe him when he claims that his father "as a specialist ... believed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ... inform ministries and departments, to help them in solving certain specific issues.

Sergo Beria writes:

"Having colossal opportunities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republics could become analytical bodies and work in the interests of the national economy. Party an apparatus that always knew everything, never gave a complete picture what is happening. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs was capable of such an objective analysis.

"You don't have to chase with a gun, but think with your head," my father said.

This is very similar to the truth, because it is reasonable. However, the very first false the official accusation that was made against Beria is "an attempt to put Ministry of Internal

Affairs over the party. Moreover, the fact that the party placed itself *above the people*, in the eyes of Beria's accusers was not a crime. And that's what happened more and more often. Election of a specialist released party secretary was increasingly perceived by him and those around him not as a new level of duties, but as a new level of rights - at best. And at worst (and more and more often) - a new level of privileges. For such a "party"

secretary and his apparatus, honest information "upstairs" about shortcomings and failures was impossible. And for whom such information was not only direct duty, but not threatened with trouble? Of course, for local "authorities". At the same time, the very fact of such information was not publicly disclosed - which was also important.

Beria did not appreciate the talkers from the Central Committee, but this does not mean that he did not understand the significance of the party and the role of its Central Committee. The falsity of Beria's accusation of ignoring the Central Committee is already visible. from the fact that information about the situation in Lithuania, Belarus, Western Ukraine, which on his behalf, local Chekists collected and provided him, Beria immediately reported Presidium of the Central Committee! And on all three "national" notes, resolutions were adopted party organ—we shall see that shortly.

But after the arrest of Beria, his notes were removed from the minutes of the Presidium of the Central Committee! The victorious party of partocrats did not need either the "analytical" Ministry of Internal Affairs of Beria, or himself L.P. Beria.

Mikoyan at the July plenum will accuse Beria of all sins, starting with double-dealing in Musavat Baku (although Mikoyan knew that this was not the case). However, Mikoyan involuntarily said an interesting thing (I quote from the uncorrected transcript of his speech):

"When he (Beria. - **S.K.**) spoke on Red Square over the coffin Comrade Stalin, then after his speech I said: in your speech there is a place for guarantee every citizen the rights and freedoms provided for by Constitution. This is not an empty phrase in the speech of a simple speaker, but in the speech of the minister internal affairs is a program of action, you must carry it out. He me answered: I will fulfill it ... "

The LP did indeed make such a statement from the highest public podium.
powers. And he really began to fulfill the promise! Khrushchev in early

July 1953 will accuse Beria of dividing the people's commissariats of internal affairs and state security before the war - they say, it is clear that one must have one ministry. And on February 10, 1954, he himself will allocate a separate Committee from the Ministry of Internal Affairs State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And is it by chance the Decree of the Presidium The Supreme Council on the organization of the KGB was marked March 13, 1954?

But why weren't Beria's ideas, his notes, proposals rejected? What, Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were afraid of him? Of course not! Just these notes were so precise that it was impossible to dismiss them. At least as long as the author of the proposals was nearby, in the upper management. Moreover,

Beria did not ignore the Central Committee of the CPSU in those cases when officially, according to existing situation required the sanction of the Central Committee. This was the case, for example, in the case of personnel appointments in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Khrushchev at the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 slandered him in this. Not speaking of the fact that no appointments could have been made without the consent of the Central Committee, Beria the next day (!) after his last arrival at the Ministry of Internal Affairs sends a note to the secretary

Central Committee to Khrushchev:

"In connection with the unification of the bodies of the former MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I ask you to approve ministers of internal affairs of the republics, heads of regional and regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (followed by a listing of names and positions. - **S.K.**).

In the future, it may be necessary to make some changes in this composition, regardless of this, the comrades represented must approve.

L. Beria.

The list of newly appointed includes hundreds of names, but we have to approve it - Ignatiev heavily clogged the MGB with party functionaries, and now in the leadership Beria's special services returned personnel Chekists, previously relegated to the second and third roles. And, accordingly, expelled incompetent workers. So, Beria immediately got rid of the typical "partocrat" Epishev (he later, heading from 1962 to 1985 The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army will caricature the entire political work in the Armed Forces), taken by Ignatiev as deputy for personnel. And so on ...

"Companions" had

to agree with Beria - his proposals were businesslike, specific and well-reasoned. But latently Beria started them all, like me

I understand annoying. Before they had time to breathe deeply the air of freedom from responsibility to the strict "uncle" Comrade Stalin, and then his equal, *Lavrenty*, climbs and climbs with unpleasant truth, with troublesome proposals, he stirs, pushes, makes you think and decide ... And this is only the beginning! Well, how could Lavrentiy Beria and his old "cadre"

Pavlo Meshik, who was

appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine instead of Tymofii Strokach, like the leadership

Ukraine, if on May 8, 1953, Beria sends another note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, prepared according to Meshik. And on May 26, 1953, the Presidium of the Central Committee strictly secret decree "On the political and economic state of the western regions Ukrainian SSR". Later,

the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Kirichenko at the "anti-Beria" plenum will accuse "political provocateur and adventurer" Beria that the note was drawn up allegedly "according to dubious agents without deep knowledge of the state of affairs on the spot" ... Kirichenko will argue that *"Ukrainian (? - S.K.) ... peoples are a single family and there are no western Ukrainians and eastern Ukrainians in it ... "*

First, why then did the plural appear in Kirichenko's speech? Secondly, Beria was proven right by life itself: instead of fighting nationalism, the Khrushchevites they just drove this disease inside ... At first - in the underground of bunkers - "cache", and then - in the "underground" showers. And today we are reaping the results of Khrushchev's hypocrisy and Kirichenok...

WHAT ABOUT the note by Beria - Meshik, then at that meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, during whom it was considered were both Kirichenko and the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Melnikov, and Malenkov, Khrushchev, Korotchenko, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Ukrainian figures Korneichuk and Korniets ... And if Beria was wrong, there was someone to explain this. However, the note, as always with Beria, hit "on the mark"! Here are some extracts from the decision of the Presidium CC on it:

"The Central Committee of the CPSU notes that the political situation in the western regions of Ukraine continues to be unsatisfactory. <...>

In just three months in 1953, military censorship confiscated about 195,000 letters addressed abroad from the western regions of Ukraine, in which contains negative statements about the actions of local authorities (as we see that these and other data are not undercover, but quite official origin. - **S.K.**) ... Serious

discontent among the population of the western regions of Ukraine is caused by the facts of a gross distortion of the Leninist-Stalinist national politicians ... almost all leading positions in the party and Soviet bodies are occupied by workers sent from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR and other republics of the Soviet Union. So, for example, out of 311 executives regional, city and district party bodies of the western regions of Ukraine only 18 people from the Western Ukrainian population.

Particularly painfully perceived by the population of Western Ukraine indiscriminate distrust of local cadres from among the intelligentsia. For example, out of 1718 professors and teachers of 12 higher educational institutions of the city of Lviv, to Only 320 people belong to the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia...

It is necessary to recognize as an abnormal phenomenon the teaching of the overwhelming most disciplines in higher educational institutions of Western Ukraine on Russian language. For example, at the Lviv Institute of Trade and Economics, all 56 disciplines are taught in Russian..."

etc.

The nationalists in Western Ukraine were a tough, cruel and real force, but eight years after the end of the war, the fight against them could only be effective if dominance of political methods. Khrushchev, Melnikov, Kirichenko fancied themselves politicians. So they would go to Lvov and would have conversations with the intelligentsia there, would convince them in a word, and the "Western" masses in deeds. But the same Melnikov cannot stick his nose into Lvov wished. Not to mention Khrushchev.

And what about Beria?

And could the "executioner" and the "sadist" claim - as he did - that the "stupid the use of repressions (in Western Ukraine. - **S.K.**) only causes discontent population"?

I draw the reader's attention to the wording "stupid use of repression"...

necessary. But - not *stupidly* total, but targeted, sensible! Pavel Sudoplatov, who

knew nationalism like the back of his hand, after Stalin's death was involved by Beria in the preparation of analytical notes with a detailed analysis of errors party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against nationalist underground in Ukraine and Lithuania. And Sudoplatov later wrote that Beria believed: on

leadership positions should be placed local, and visitors should be appointed as deputies. "... He was concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for which socialist ideals would be truly close," Sudoplatov reported in 1997.

Socialist! This alone proves not just the pragmatism of Beria, but his Bolshevik pragmatism!

The situation in Lithuania was also difficult - the "forest brothers" were as active there as Bandera in Ukraine. And on May 16, 1953, Beria submits to the Central Committee a note on Lithuania, which was prepared by General Sazykin, who came to Lithuania on his behalf almost incognito, Sazykin collected a lot of specific data, and they were for the Lithuanian killer guides! In the Vilnius regional committee of 16 heads of departments and sectors only 3 Lithuanians; out of 22 lecturers of the Central Committee and regional committees of Lithuanians 6; out of 87 bosses district departments of the MGB - 9; out of 85 heads of regional police departments - only 10; out of 92 directors of state farms, only 27 are Lithuanians; out of 132 directors of MTS - 53 ...

Office work in the Lithuanian language is absent in the republic (!!!), and this "distant power from the masses." And

the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU again has to consider this note and on the same meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on May 26 to adopt a resolution on Lithuania - after discussion notes of Beria-Sazykin with the participation of the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania Snechkus, chairman Council of Ministers of Lithuania Gedvilas, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan.

And these are the results of mediocre "work" not only by Snechkus, but also by the chairman Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for

Lithuania in 1944-1946 by Mikhail Suslov. Snechkus and Gedvilas arrange a personal meeting with Beria, and Snechkus asks him to help score "all transmissions of enemy stations in Lithuanian". And Beria replies that he is preparing proposals to eliminate the "blockage" that already exists.

"What kind of help is this in liquidating the bourgeois nationalist underground?"

- Snechkus shrugged at the July 1953 plenum. But Beria's answer is the answer an ideological man, a Bolshevik, who understands that ideas must be fought with deeds and ideas same. The enemy is making propaganda – make counter-propaganda. The enemy pokes in the eyes of your people mistakes and shortcomings - correct them!

Khrushchev, Snechkus, Brezhnev, Andropov, with their "jammers" achieved just that effect that the West needed. And they resorted to "jammers" because they did not know how to to work for the masses, nor to convince the masses.

But Beria knew

how! And "tov. Snechkus" **nine years** after the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania from 13 thousand communist Lithuanians (per republic with a population of 2.7 million people a considerable force - if they are communists!) failed to recruit 75 people for positions heads of district police departments - just something! Failed to grow from national personnel of 65 directors of state farms ...

When Peter Kondakov, Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, could not clearly answer

Beria's questions about the state of the apparatus of the Central Committee and regional committees of the Communist Party of Lithuania and found it difficult to give characteristic of their secretaries, Beria got angry and told Kondakov that he was not a minister, but an officer in uniform, does not provide the assigned area of work and will be released.

Beria was right here too! And he managed to remove Kondakov on June 23 - with the appointment Head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Bryansk region. And what is significant - after "revelations" of Beria The 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania did not bother to return to the republic such a "valuable" "frame" expelled from it by Beria. Snieykus

at the July plenum falsely stated that the underground "president" of Lithuania, illegally elected in 1949 as chairman of the presidium of the "Union of Struggle for liberation of Lithuania", Captain Zemaitis was caught "without the help of Beria".

In fact, Zemaitis (whom Abakumov and Ignatiev could not catch for 9 years) was captured on May 30, 1953 alive in his underground bunker in the forest near Kaunas in

as a result of an undercover-Chekist operation carried out by the joint operational group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR and the 4th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And Beria immediately orders deliver Zhemaitis to Moscow and have a long conversation with him, using him as interpreter of the Deputy Minister of the Interior of Lithuania Martavičius. And offers Zhemaitis to lead an already *dummy* nationalist organization.

The Soviet Chekists have long worked out the technology of such operational measures. to perfection: the operations of the 20s "Trust", "Syndicate" ... Yes, and Beria himself in the OGPU Transcaucasia knew how to do this well (remember his actions to decompose the Georgian bourgeois-nationalist underground). Moreover, this approach was not only effective, but also humane - why destroy when you can use it?

And Beria analyzes the state of affairs already in Belarus - after all, there are also "special", western, regions there. And even in Belarus, not everything is safe, and there in power structures disproportionately few indigenous Western Belarusians. And on June 12, 1953, the Presidium The Central Committee with the participation of Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Beria accepts strictly secret decree on the Byelorussian SSR, which, among other things, the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee CPB Nikolai Patolichev (another "notebook" partocrat) is released from his responsibilities.

And in place of Patolichev, 39-year-old party worker Mikhail is recommended Zimyanin, who worked in Belarus from 1940 to 1953 and had just been transferred to the Foreign Ministry. But the implementation of the paragraph of the decree on Patolichev dragged on until the arrest of Beria, and he remained in the republic until 1956, then "switched" to foreign affairs, and from 1958 to foreign trade, having created the USSR in the MVT by the time he retired in 1985 (at 77 years old) a powerful apparatus of the future marauders of socialism ... It is clear that in July "Anti-Beria" plenum Patolichev receives the floor and reports that "cunning and dangerous enemy of the party and the state "Beria was preparing a complete replacement for the Belarusians of all personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Belarus "up to and including the district police officer." That's what he said, the bastard, - "to the district policeman"! What is significant! At the "Anti-Beria" plenum, Khrushchev declared:

"After all, these notes on Ukraine, on Latvia (Khrushchev was mistaken, it is necessary "by Lithuania". - **S.K.**), in Belarus. It is a fact that they are not gathered through regional committees, not through central committees, they are gathered through employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although these all the materials are available in the Central Committee..."

Okay, so be it! But why, then, are those questions that the Presidium of the Central Committee considered on the initiative of Beria, were not put before the Presidium by the secretaries of the Central Committee, the same Khrushchev? After all, Beria spoke the case, according to his notes, decisions were adopted the same Presidium! Why,

and Khrushchev's reservation was not accidental, because on June 12, 1953 The Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution not only on Belarus, but also on Latvia, and an impartial note on Latvia to the Presidium of the Central Committee was presented by none other than ...

Khrushchev! That is, at the plenum, Khrushchev seized himself, moreover, as one of those who set in motion notes of Beria, and ... the author of a note on Latvia. Where a horse with a hoof, there and cancer with claw. Therefore, Khrushchev "also" poke his head into national problems. And then everything fell on Beria.

According to the "logic" of the party bureaucrats, Lavrenty Pavlovich national policy However, it shouldn't have been done.

After all, the Ministry of the Interior was not "instructed" to do this, as he liked to say Mikhail Suslov.

But Beria, as a statesman, as a responsible person and civic, **like a man, not an inkwell**, finally, could not be inactive when he saw that he could do something. But he could! He even formally now the second person in the state, and only in terms of his personal and business qualities -

definitely the first. And

in his one hundred and twelve days after the death of Stalin, he worked as always so hard that it's not easy for me to even tell about his activities - no matter how short the story, he still appears to be voluminous. And still there is no convenient reason to touch on the topic of supposedly Beria's "love affairs", therefore, I will not touch on her for now. Just a note: if since I still can't wedge this topic into my story, it's unlikely that the LP had time to those "glamors" that he so willingly and vilely attributed to him at the beginning at the July plenum 1953 Secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin, and only then - everyone who was not too lazy to slander Beria, "hanging" on him dozens of only failed mistresses, allegedly sent to them for intransigence at the stage. But I still cannot touch these insinuations. premin.

But I will not dwell on the position of Beria in the "Yugoslav", "Korean", "Hungarian" and other issues. I'll just say that for all of them, in fact, Beria was right. As for the "Yugoslav" question, the irony of history was also expressed in the fact that in

In 1957, Khrushchev accused Molotov of blocking the improvement of relations with Tito, an attempt to establish relations with which in 1953 Khrushchev and Molotov filed as a crime of Beria. I will

confine myself to one "Hungarian" quote from Beria's "bunker" letter to Malenkov, where he wrote:

"Suggestions about Nagy Imre should not have been made by me or someone else, but by you I had to do, and then I jumped out idiotically, in addition, along with the correct remarks, I took liberties and swagger, for which, of course, I should warm up hard."

Beria had in mind the meeting of the delegations of the USSR and Hungary, which took place on June 12, 1953 in Moscow. The lively tone of this quote speaks for itself. Moreover, this was written by a man who was unexpectedly thrown from the pinnacle of power into a concrete basement. And in this position he I thought about the cause, about the state, and not about my own skin!

Doesn't this speak of the very high spiritual and human qualities of our hero? As speaks of them and the fact that on June 15 Beria turned to the Presidium of the Central Committee with a note about a sharp restriction of the rights of the Special Conference under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. But if Lavrenty Pavlovich was the sadist, the maniac that his haters portray him as, then extrajudicial right to dispose of human destinies and lives would be for him especially attractive and enjoyable.

BERIA, as always, was busy with many things at once, but far from Russia, something that forced him to urgently get ready for a long journey - June 16 in Vostochny In Berlin, a mass strike of construction workers began. She quickly developed into powerful demonstration, and the next day strikes and demonstrations began in 14 more cities GDR ... Rostock, Leipzig, Magdeburg were seething ... In Berlin, the Government House was seized. During June 16-20, 430,000 people took part in strikes, and more than 330,000 in demonstrations.

Such events do not arise from scratch and do not begin on their own. Undoubtedly, unrest began on the direct orders of the West, but their root cause lay in the unintelligent behavior of the leadership of the GDR and the USSR. After the formation of the GDR, it was thoughtlessly taken there course towards building socialism, and on July 8, 1952, Moscow and Berlin (Vostochny) decided even force it. Forced

cooperation in agriculture, a hungry resource regime for medium and small private capital (large was nationalized), irrational tax policy, deprivation of private entrepreneurs and freelancers ration cards, excessively repressive policies have fueled the widespread German discontent. From January 1951 to April 1953, 447 fled to West Germany

thousand people, including over 120 thousand people in just four months of 1953. The data are taken from the appendix to the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 2, 1953 No. 7576-rs, so you can trust them.

Facts are stubborn things, and although Soviet leaders were often stubborn, they were no more stubborn than facts. After all, they all then went through the school of Stalin. Therefore, it was clear that the policy needed to be changed. At the "Anti-Beria" July plenum, Malenkov admitted:

"We were obliged to soberly face the truth and admit that without the presence of Soviet troops, the existing regime in the GDR is not stable. Political and The economic situation in the GDR is currently extremely unfavorable.

And so, shortly before the June events in Germany, the discussion flared up in The Kremlin is serious. Most were inclined to temporarily abandon construction socialism, Molotov agreed only to the rejection of forced rates.

Beria's position was, as always, deliberate - it was not for nothing that his secretariat received from he was ordered to find an expert on the economy of the people's democracies. That's why The "German" document of the USSR Council of Ministers dated June 2, 1953 was informative and specific - quite in the style of Beria. This style also consisted in the fact that when developing complex specific problems, the LP determined the general direction, and the development of measures and left recommendations to experts. Accordingly, the analysis of the situation given in the appendix to by order of the Council of Ministers, revealed a good knowledge of German realities (for example, there are even recommendations on the line of conduct in relation to ordinary members of the youth religious organization "Junge Gemeinde", etc.). Therefore, the

recommending part was reasonable: • curtail collectivization, limiting itself to joint processing land; • make car rental stations a lever of influence on the village; • abandon the policy of crowding out medium and small private enterprises and, on the contrary, to provide them with loans, raw materials, energy;

• revise the five-year plan of the GDR in favor of a wider development industry group "B" for the production of consumer goods; • take measures to strengthen the rule of law and eradicate bare administration in all spheres of life in Germany, including in relation to the church and the clergy; • set the task of political struggle for the restoration of national unity Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In the ideology of this approach one can feel the exact pragmatism that was characteristic precisely for clever LP. And the real "foreign policy" Beria was the same far from the image of the "monster" and "executioner", how far was the real "domestic" Beria.

Moreover, in terms of the idea of a united Germany, he had a certain authoritative like-minded, although he could no longer support Beria. I mean, of course, Stalin. On April 7, 1952, he signed the draft note of the USSR government corrected by him to the US government on the issue of a peace treaty with Germany. Earlier, in a note sent on March 10, 1952 to the United States, Great Britain and France, the USSR proposed to work out peace treaty "with the direct participation of Germany in the person of the all-German government" after free all-German elections, with the guarantee of subsequent Germany's neutrality (that is, the non-entry of a united Germany into NATO). The Soviet note ended like this:

"The issue is currently being resolved. Will it be restored Germany as a single independent peace-loving state, part of the family peace-loving peoples of Europe, or the split of Germany and the associated with this the threat of war in Europe."

The West did not need a neutral Germany, and the split, on the contrary, intensified. At In this regard, the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany were much more determined than even Molotov, and the increase in production rates undertaken by the government of the GDR became immediate cause for concern.

One has to face the assertions in the literature that both strikers and their Western "curators" were inclined to believe that the Russians did not support the Ulbricht government and strikers will not be suppressed with weapons. I don't know how anyone could have guessed that. Any government, if it was formed with the influential involvement of the leaders of the 1953 uprisings, it would not just anti-socialist (that would be half the trouble), but anti-Soviet. Therefore, about what detached Soviet position in the conditions of the presence of Soviet occupying troops could not be thought! And since the unrest began, they had to eliminate quickly, before the Anglo-Americans and the French had a chance to intervention.

Well, Beria knew how to do this too - if he was objectively forced to do so. Like I'm no longer once emphasized, was not by nature cruel, but life taught him to be - with necessary - as *tough* as the situation required. He is from childhood taught himself to save everything. And just as carefully he treated the shedding of blood: if necessary, then you must be ready to shed it, but you must do everything to shed it as much as possible less if it cannot be avoided.

A number of sources claim that on June 18, Beria went to Germany in person. But This is not documented - oddly enough. Although the fact of departure of the first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers outside the state, it would seem, should easily be installed. However, Beria's biochronicle is a special thing, here we can always face fraud. What can be considered reliable is that in Germany then his people were sent, including Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya, as well as head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Goglidze.

However, I am inclined to believe that Beria was in Germany for some time, which indirectly is confirmed as the decisiveness of actions in a situation where it was necessary to act already decisively, and its relative bloodlessness. As early as June

17, the commandant of the Soviet sector, Mayor General Dibrov, by his order introduced martial law in Berlin. Troops were sent to Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, Dresden, Frankfurt an der Oder, Gera and Potsdam. Fire to kill was opened in exceptional cases, but in the end, about thirty were killed and about four hundred people. General Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs, however, that they died "thousands of people". Although thousands did not die.

Beria's principled position on Germany was as follows: the Soviet Union is unlikely to whether an unstable socialist GDR is needed, completely dependent on our support, and it is better to go for a united democratic bourgeois Germany, but at profitable conditions for us. It was a promising approach! And treat it as something the betrayal of our friends in the GDR was unlawful. Really the process of even negotiations about the unification, and even with our initiative, would be multi-step, but we could to win at every stage and provide a number of guarantees both to East Germany and to itself.

We could leave united Germany only after the conclusion of a peace treaty. But on his conclusion from Germany had to leave and the allies. Moreover, by becoming the initiators unification, Russia would secure for itself the loyalty of all sensible Germans. A instead of the burdensome financing of socialism in the GDR, we would, on the contrary, receive considerable benefits from the development of economic ties with Germany, for Russia traditionally useful and important.

There was one more moment ... The thermonuclear era was about to begin, and few people of the politicians of the world knew this as well as Beria. And this gave the state

focused on internal development at the expense of its own resources, previously impossible opportunities to exclude external encroachment on it. With the right look at thermonuclear factor, the threat of external aggression against Russia was quickly reduced in fact to zero, and the military presence of the USSR in Germany, in the center of Europe, from a promising point of view no longer had a decisive influence on our military security. In addition, we now had a "buffer" along the line "Poland-Czechoslovakia-Hungary-Romania". So Beria's position also had a good geopolitical potential. However, the "German", like all other "post-Stalinist" ideas of Beria, failed to materialize. "But

what about the fact that today we have a single Germany?" - perhaps someone will ask. Indeed, one sometimes has to read that Beria de in the "German question" (and in the rest - too) was almost the forerunner of Gorbachev. Oh no! Unrealized single Beria's model Germany and the real united Germany of Gorbachev's model are phenomena completely different character in every respect, except perhaps the same in both variants of the contour of the state borders of Germany.

So, if Beria went to Germany, he quickly returned to Russia. And he was left to be free of just nothing - a few days. He didn't know about it, of course. But others knew. And while he is still a statesman, and not a prisoner of a concrete bunker, I will say something more than significant about his one hundred and twelve days.

MAY 1, 1953 in Moscow, as always, columns marched along Red Square demonstrators. And standing on the podium of the Mausoleum Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and others could admire hundreds of their own portraits, which waved over the sea of heads. Watched my own replicated swim over Red Square once again and Lavrenty Pavlovich, but his thoughts arose when this is supposed to be contradictory. In any case, next week after holidays, at the very first meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he made a proposal, and the members Presidium - oddly enough - he was accepted! And it was hard not to accept it, because the veneration of portraits established in the country in some ways looked like icon veneration. and May 9 1953, a decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the design of columns demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state solemn holidays." The resolution instructed the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to two weeks to submit a draft Resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, based on next:

"... refuse to decorate the columns of demonstrators with portraits, as well as buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state holidays... abolish the practice of proclaiming from the government rostrum appeals addressed to the demonstrators.

And this step by Beria can in no way be regarded as an attempt to win additional popularity for yourself! Refusal of praises to the leadership, rejection of guiding greetings, to which the masses were supposed to joyfully shout "Hurrah!", popularity and they would add authority to the

authorities, yes. But — power in general! Which of the millions of Soviet people would know that this proposed by Beria? So Lavrenty Pavlovich here also thought in a stately way. However, he and this proposal will soon be blamed. This will be done at the Plenum of the Central Committee by the most colorless of all the then leaders of the country - Andreev, and the accusations of him will be expressed in the style of a bad anecdote - we will see that!

Lavrenty Pavlovich will also be blamed for his other brilliant idea! I am running go ahead, talk about it, using the uncorrected transcript of a speech by a longtime colleague Beria - Mir Jafar Bagirov, at the same "anti-Beria" plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953. Then the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Bagirov, also betrayed Beria, calling him

a chameleon, the worst enemy of the party and people, a double-dealer and a scoundrel (this is not for Bagirov helped, and he survived Beria only for three years: he was arrested in March 1954, shot in May 1956). And on July 3, 1953, Bagirov said:

"Bagirov. ... Beria calls me and says: "You know that I am preparing a question about orders. I tell him: "How do you cook this?" He recovered and said: "We We want to establish new orders." I think the issue of orders is not an easy one... This is the function of the Central Committee of the party, the government (as if

Beria was not the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. - **S.K.**), This question of politics, how can he prepare this question.

Pegov. Moreover, this is not the business of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ... "

Here I will interrupt the quotation in order to notice: how vividly in the remark of Nikolai Pegov, who lived a long and gray life as an apparatchik, that mediocre, clerk's attitude to the matter, which received its classic conclusion in the famous phrase another all-Union seriatin - Suslov, who said: "We were not instructed" ...

From the words of Bagirov himself it followed, as we have already seen and will see again, that in the country the personal irresponsibility of the "leaders" gradually began to triumph - they talked about the Central Committee as a living being who must always utter "We" ... You involuntarily remember Beria's question to Kalmykov and Raspletin: "Who held the pen?" about their response: "We wrote"... I also remember how, in response to the question of the discouraged hero of the sketch, Arkady Raikin: "Who sewed the suit?" he was also answered: "We." Alas, this universal "WE-changing" had already become ubiquitous then. And Bagirov led further:

"Bagirov. And even more so, it does not happen that even for the smallest questions ... did not call from the apparatus of the Central Committee ... or the apparatus of the Council of Ministers. How As a rule, they always say: I am calling on behalf of the Central Committee ... He has only one self. **Malenkov.** What orders? **Bagirov.** Orders of culture, union and republican orders of culture. **Malenkov.** For what category of people? **Bagirov.** For artists, theater workers. **Malenkov.** For example, what orders? **Bagirov.** You ask him... **Malenkov.** Orders can be someone's name. **Yusupov** (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR. - **S.K.**). Called me on on his instructions, his assistant Ordynstev, that Beria is making a proposal to establish two groups of orders: the first ... - allied, the second - republican; then establish the orders of national great men republics ... He (Bagirov. - **S.K.**) Nizami, the Uzbeks - Alisher Navoi ... ".

But that's great! This is smart national policy! Here's an example... Ukrainian Pavel Meshik, sent from Moscow, caused a shock at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine when addressed those present in Ukrainian and advised that Russians working in Ukraine, including 1st Secretary Melnikov, should learn it. He was supported only playwright Alexander Korneichuk, but Meshik was right! And he did so because went through the school of Beria, that is, he was a person who chooses a line of behavior that is optimal to ensure the interests of the area of work entrusted to you.

When Meshik proudly told Sudoplatov about this, the latter remarked to Meshik that he, they say, is a fool if he "comes into conflict with the local authorities" (as if Meshik himself was not power!).

In this answer, Sudoplatov immediately shows the depth of the difference between him and Meshik as social figures. Meshik was a "personnel" frame of Beria, he was arrested immediately after Beria, and shot in one "case". And they shot because both of them entered into

conflicts with the "local" authorities - Meshik in Kyiv, Beria - in Moscow. Of course it's easier it was necessary to turn such people into cremation ashes, rather than respond to their proposals, reckon with their criticism and work, work, work ... First Secretary of the Lviv

Regional Committee Serdyuk (this one will also be noted among speakers at the July plenum) chose a mansion for housing, which housed kindergarten of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Meshik prevented and posted guards there. Secretary of the Kyiv Regional Committee Shelest (the future "owner" of Ukraine) took a fire supervision boat for hunting and did not return, and Meshik reported to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Ukraine.

People call it honesty and integrity. Partocrats have stupidity and a penchant for squabbles. But Beria and Meshik were people, not partocrats. By the way, the veterans of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with whom the author of the book "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?" A. Sukhomlinov, unanimously speak of Meshik as a person dedicated to the work that he was entrusted with.

Why, L.P. Beria was the same. And I did not expect special "carpets" from life for this. AND therefore, he did not understand how others could be eager for them ... So it is not surprising that in opening day of the "anti-Beria" plenum - July 2, 1953, manager of affairs Sovmina Pomaznev submitted to Malenkov and Khrushchev a memorandum-denunciation of Beria (very much Pomaznev wanted to be among the speakers). Personnel

apparatchik Pomaznev accused Beria of sabotaging the "most important" cause - the preservation of party, trade union and Komsomol workers of advantages and benefits established for the most important sectors of the national economy, if they were nominated for Party or Komsomol work from industry. *"This question was considered many times and was eventually withdrawn due to unwillingness to solve it and protests from Beria,"* wrote Pomaznev.

Beria reasoned simply and sensibly: benefits were associated with certain work ... The head of the site at the mine received "underground" because he worked in harmful conditions underground. But, having become, for example, an instructor of the city committee, he is no longer underground have worked. So what is he paying for now? No job, no benefits. Besides But what kind of ideological professional fighter for the ideas of the Party is this, if he counts rubles? All the more so since, going over to party work, he does not remained...

However, the "elite" lusted more and more for benefits, privileges, "exquisite" life ... One hundred ten apartments in the commissioned section of a high-rise building on Kotelnicheskaya embankment was filed one and a half thousand applications!

Beria then ordered Pomaznev to make a certificate for each request, after which report to him. Well, of course, you bastard!

WENT the first months of life without Stalin.

April ...

May ...

The irritation of Beria's "colleagues" accumulated. Khrushchev was dissatisfied with the fact that Beria did not put the apparatus of the Central Committee above what this apparatus deserved. Molotov was hurt by the activity Beria in the foreign policy sphere, which he considered his diocese, although independent I've never been a figure here. Malenkov was undoubtedly stung by the fact that he, the "Prime Minister", was losing in comparison with Beria, even in his own eyes. Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan had their own claims - not businesslike, but what's the difference if they were ...

June 26, 1953 Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria as Deputy Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR signed his last government document - the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532-rs on the design assignment for the construction of the SU-3 plant of the plant No. 813.

SU-3 is a plant for the production of "2% tin-115", that is, without code

"tricks" - a plant for the primary enrichment of uranium. And, perhaps symbolically, Beria put his last state signature under the construction document new enterprise. After all, he wanted to build all his life! And built - until June 26 1953. On

the same day he was arrested. And immediately after him or a little later were Generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Bogdan Kobulov, Sergey Goglidze, Pavel Meshik, Vladimir Dekanozov, Lev Vlodzimirsky and Vsevolod Merkulov, close to him, were arrested. The last, already inglorious stage began in the fate of Beria, and another in the fate of the country. But, as it turned out, also in the end inglorious.

Chapter 25

ARREST ET CAETERA

TODAY there is no doubt that the initiative to eliminate Beria came from exclusively from Khrushchev. Another question is how and when he decided to stage such a interrogation in front of colleagues. And did he decide at all - if we mean the majority Presidium of the

Central Committee. However, a number of details suggest that Beria's arrest was prepared *by someone* very long and spontaneous event can not be recognized! And even more so, you can't blame everything on the disclosure of the mythical "conspiracy" of Beria, which never even existed in the plans - neither with Beria, nor with six of his arrested associates. In this book, I

cannot devote much space to the question of the role of the "golden elite of the West" in events of those days and just express an integral conclusion: at least from the second half By 1952, Khrushchev's entourage already had the primary agents of Western influence. They deftly exasperated Khrushchev's bile, played on his ambitions, and on a sense of fear, and on injured self-esteem. They provoked and provoked Khrushchev to active actions first against Stalin, and then against Beria.

For Khrushchev himself, these actions were the key to his personal enduring prosperity at the heights of power. It was important for the Golden West and its agents to thwart opportunity for Russia's sustainable development. I think that's why immediately after arrest of LP, his further fate began to grow not just with rumors, but purposefully created myths, as well as forgeries, falsifications and provocations.

Therefore, the only reliable date and fact in the series of those days can be consider only the date and fact of the arrest of Beria himself. And, for example, to say when they were other of his comrades-in-arms were arrested, I personally will not risk it. I will not risk it because I am convinced that "case" of Beria and in the "investigative cases" of those who were allegedly tried with him, so many forgery, that these multi-volume works should be regarded as a continuous fake through and through.

It is believed that almost immediately after the arrest of Beria, Bogdan and Hmayak were arrested. Kobulovs - June 27. The Minister of State Security of Ukraine Meshik was allegedly arrested on June 30th. Allegedly in Kyiv ... But here is the book of Andrei Sukhomlinov - the only one who wrote about Beria who had access to his investigative file - "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?". The author is a professional lawyer, and I will refer to him more than once. So, Sukhomlinov cites a facsimile of the protocol of the personal search of Meshik Pavel Yakovlevich dated June 30, 1953, conducted "in the premises of the internal prison of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs" at 23:50 on June 30 by Major P. M. Moiseev in the presence of the deputy head of the internal prison Talanova D. A.

So, on June 30, Meshik was already in Moscow. But he still needed it in Kyiv arrest and transfer to Moscow! So

Mexic was arrested between 26 and 29 June. However, the search was carried out "on the basis of an order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. A-109 dated 30

June." Sukhomlinov cites a facsimile of the warrant itself, signed by the deputy Minister Ivan Serov. And there is an entry: "The warrant was presented to me *on July 1, 1953 at one o'clock. 02 min. 45"* and Meshik's signature. It turns out that in Kyiv Meshik was arrested illegally? AND even in Moscow, they were first searched, and only then presented with an arrest

warrant. The arrest warrant for Meshik states that he was issued to Major Medvedev K.N., but in warrant dated June 27, 1953 No. A-92 for the arrest of Bogdan Kobulov, the name of the person to whom ordered to arrest and search Kobulov, not specified.

Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov, a longtime colleague of Beria both in Transcaucasia and in the NKVD USSR, which worked a lot in the foreign affairs department, and at the time of arrest Beria - the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, according to the questionnaire of the arrested person, was arrested June 30, 1953. However, the basis for the arrest is not an arrest warrant, but Decree on the choice of a measure of restraint by the USSR Prosecutor's Office dated July 3, 1953.

The picture of the arrest of the head of the 3rd department (military counterintelligence) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sergei Goglidze, is also cloudy. The questionnaire of the arrested person was compiled in the Butyrka prison of the Ministry of Internal Affairs The USSR seems to be June 27, 1953. At the same time, A. Sukhomlinov reports that in the materials the criminal case is not disclosed, "how the arrest of Goglidze was carried out on the night of 26.06 to 27.06 in GDR" and how it was delivered to Moscow. Goglidze was detained allegedly on the basis of a warrant No. A-98, which chronologically could not have been issued earlier than arrest warrant No. A-92 Bogdan Kobulov, marked on June 27 and signed by the new Minister of Internal Affairs USSR Kruglov. It turns out that only on June 27 in Moscow Kruglov signed an order for arrest, and on the night of the 27th Goglidze was already arrested in Germany. So could he have been arrested? on the warrant allegedly on the basis of which he was arrested?

According to the memoirs of General Sudoplatov about the arrest of Beria, Bogdan and Amayak Kobulovs, Goglidze, Meshik, he learned at a meeting with the new Minister Kruglov in in the middle of the day on

June 27 ... All this is

strange ... The decision of the USSR Prosecutor's Office on the choice of a preventive measure for Goglidze, too dated July 3, 1953 (as in the case of Dekanozov). And the first interrogation of Goglidze Deputy Chief Transport Prosecutor State Counselor of Justice 3rd class G. Terekhov allegedly held on July 2 (without indicating in the protocol the time of interrogation, which was serious deviation from the procedure).

Andrey Sukhomlinov, himself an experienced prosecutor (in 2007 he turned like me understood, 60 years old), drew attention to all these inconsistencies, but explains them by negligence those who conducted the

investigation. I think that it is not only negligence, but also the huge volume falsification, without which the "case" of Beria would not exist. It took too much rig, backdate, etc., and without overlays it was hardly possible even with the utmost care. Although there was no thoroughness - here you can fully trust the evidence on this score of the same Sukhomlinov.

In addition, all arrest documents were signed by the new Prosecutor General of the USSR, Khrushchevite Roman Rudenko. They were urgently replaced in this post by Grigory Nikolaevich Safonov, who was on good terms with Beria and was even considered a "man Beria". Rather, however, he was just an honest man. Sukhomlinov, referring to including the certificate of the former First Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR N. A. Bazhenova, writes that Safonov was soft, good-natured, unarrogant, completely devoid of ambition and bureaucratic ambition. Bazhenov testifies that in the early 60s Safonov, demoted to deputy head of a department in the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office, was the most diligent and conscientious worker in the department, and yet he was then about sixty.

And if we judge Beria by "his man" Safonov, not forgetting also the principle: "Tell me who your friend is, and I will tell you who you are", the personality of LP is additionally covered good light.

The appointment of the Prosecutor General of the USSR is a constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but Safonov was illegally relieved of his duties on meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on June 29, 1953. Then, in his place, he was appointed Rudenko. Thus, that socialist legality, which he allegedly trampled on Beria.

Rudenko and gave a formal sanction for the arrest of Beria - on July 8, after one and a half weeks after the actual arrest. And such a delay, perhaps, is indicative not only with legal point of view. Even Rudenko was afraid, apparently for some time, that events might go in an unfavorable direction for the Khrushchevites. But after a successful one for them the end of the Plenum of the Central Committee, which lasted from July 2 to 8, 1953, the Khrushchevites grew bolder.

Moreover, to officially sanction on paper the arrest of Beria Rudenko, I think, was it's easier that by July 8 Beria was either no longer alive, or his extrajudicial murder was business of the coming days. But that is a separate issue...

The head of Beria's secretariat, Ludwigov, was also arrested (right at the stadium "Dynamo", on football) and the former head of Beria's bodyguard Sarkisov. Last the figure is also interesting in that Beria removed Sarkisov from office three weeks before of his arrest and transferred him as deputy head of the department to the 1st Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And there, apparently, Sarkisov would not have stayed

long. Based on this, General Sudoplatov in his memoirs suggests that either the decision to arrest Sarkisov was made by people who did not know about his resignation, or the decision taken when Sarkisov was close to Beria. The second is not

entirely excluded, but, most likely, everything is explained differently. Who it Sarkisov? Compared to the "whales" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is not even a crucian, but a gudgeon. And so but they arrest him ... Is it because he was very suitable as a figure for fabrication "domestic", so to speak, "accusations" against Beria, and that's exactly what happened later used? That is, an unjust judgment was prepared in advance over Beria.

But by

whom? Khrushchev could not directly deal with the development of "technical" details. and did not work. But someone, it turns out, was engaged? In advance! And on a generalized portrait of this "someone" very clearly visible ears of "gray", or rather - "dirty", "cardinals" of various kinds. Much has been written about the arrest of Beria,

but virtually nothing about the arrest of his associates. In all versions of Beria's arrest, it is reported that he was arrested by the highest military on the orders of either Khrushchev, or Malenkov.

And who arrested Sarkisov? And who are Kobulova and Goglidze? Who are Meshika and Dekanozova? Who is Vlodzimirsky? It wasn't Marshal Zhukov or General Batitsky who arrested them? And on whose orders were these arrests made? Orders, for example, signed renegade Kruglov and Khrushchevite Serov. But who pointed out to them that it was necessary to arrest this particular "six"? Why is

clear. All six were close to Beria in the Transcaucasus, and it was them "testimony" could denigrate Lavrenty Pavlovich, covering, in fact, all periods of his activity. But this once again confirms the existence of a thoughtful conspiracy against Beria, the details of which, in terms of the level of thoughtfulness, simply could not belong to the unsophisticated mind of Khrushchev!

MUST inform the reader that I do not intend to pay much attention to the question of how and by whom L.P. Beria was arrested. In the literature on this subject, you can find a dozen versions - both solid, and dubious, and completely adventurous, including the most extreme "version" of Sergo Beria, according to which his father allegedly died during the alleged assault the mansion in which the Beria family lived.

Reliable same in the history of the arrest of Beria himself, I repeat, the fact of the arrest. And also that

there is no doubt that the arrest was made on June 26, 1953.

The second in terms of extremism after the "version" of Sergo Lavrentievich should be recognized as the version according to which Beria, who was arrested in the Kremlin by a group of senior military men led by marshal Zhukov (with, most likely, the presence of General Moskalenko in it), on the same day was shot in the underground bunker of the MVO headquarters. Yuri Mukhin states in his books that that's pretty much how it all happened, and Beria's letters from the bunker are fake. What

can I say ... The fact that Beria was in the Kremlin before his arrest, and not at home, is confidently documented according to the latest order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532-rs, signed by Beria as one of the leaders of the state, on the construction of a new "atomic" facility at plant No. 813. He could sign it only in the Kremlin and only until arrest. And, therefore, he went to his last meeting in his life from his Kremlin office.

But where did he go? You

can also read different things in different memoirs about where Beria was arrested. However, an analysis of the documents leads to the conclusion that the arrest occurred during the meeting Presidium of the Central

Committee of the CPSU. So, Beria did not die during the storming of his home residence. But how events developed before and after?

Writer Vladimir Karpov, who hates Beria blindly and stupidly, nevertheless a good service to the cause of clarifying the truth about Beria by giving examples of lies in the description of the arrest given by the same person - Marshal Zhukov - in two different publications: the collection "Beria: the end of a career" known to us (1991) and in the book "Zhukov : commander and man" (1988). Karpov cites a number of discrepancies, for example: Bulganin

summoned Khrushchev summoned I went with Bulganin to the Kremlin on the same car I came to the Kremlin on my own at the call of Khrushchev Conversation in the meeting room Presidium Conversation in Khrushchev's office Malenkov sets the task for arrest arrest puts Khrushchev Yuri Mukhin, analyzing these and other discrepancies (they have different there are enough authors), concludes that everyone is lying. And they lie because Beria de immediately shot, etc.

No, they lie, they lie, but for different reasons. First, lie on command criminalists as *eyewitnesses*. That is, they lie not consciously, but because of the peculiarities perception of acute events by human consciousness. But many lie and deliberately. Who - removing the blame from themselves. Who - exposing "custom" "smoke screens". Who - out of habit lies, to double standards, to double-mindedness... A long-term habit - from July 2, 1953, from the day the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee began. But no one

would undertake to shoot the LP immediately after the arrest. And here I propose the reader to reflect together. Imagine mentally how everything could happen ...

Here Khrushchev - alone or together with one of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - invites Zhukov, Moskalenko, and informs him that "there is an opinion" to arrest Beria for such and such such considerations and that the Presidium of the Central Committee entrusts this difficult task to them.

It can hardly be doubted that such a message should have stunned the generals, but it can hardly be doubted that they did not refuse such an assignment. IN after all, the highest authority was the party, and the responsibility for the arrest was top management, not performers.

Zhukov's allegedly widely painted dislike for Beria (Sergo Beria, by the way, denies it) hardly played any role if only because Beria could not collect any "compromising evidence" regarding Zhukov in the forties, relations with the special services not having. I have to remind myself of this over and over again, because misconceptions on this score are very tenacious.

Let's return to the analysis of the arrest. By agreeing to its production, the generals could not insist on the obligation of an arrest warrant. On the one hand, legal order execution of the warrant would create a risk of information leakage, on the other hand, the arrest

was to be carried out in the presence of the leaders of the party and government, and himself the composition of witnesses to the act of arrest ruled out anyone's claims to the military regarding the violation of the laws of the USSR. According to the charter, you must follow the last order, and be responsible for the cancellation of the previous order will be the one who gave this last order. But this is

true for arrest. Arrest is a reversible action: today arrested, released tomorrow. And what about not authorized by law execution? This is an action with irreversible consequences.

Arrest Beria on the oral order of the leadership of Zhukov, Moskalenko, Batitsky and any other - no matter what - could still ... But shoot him without investigation and trial, without court verdict, without at least a direct written order?

No, no one would want to commit such a grave violation of the law. Here required at least some kind of material guarantee, namely, a written sanction Khrushchev, and even several members of the Presidium. But could he give written sanction Khrushchev? Of course not! Therefore, Beria was arrested and after the arrest he was only isolated, and not immediately

shot. But how many "most reliable" stories are heaped up about this day and its evening, and even "documents" not worth the paper they are printed on. And I wonder how so far since from a heap of fables about that day, some brisk writer has not concocted screenplay for a political thriller. There would also appear tank columns on the streets of Moscow, and frozen on the concrete of the airfield "Migalovo" 216 Il-28 bombers of the 56th aviation bomber division under the command of Lieutenant General Aviation Hero Dolgushin of the Soviet Union, and Dolgushin himself, painfully deciding whether to fulfill order of the Air Force Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel-General of Aviation Krasovsky, if he orders to bombard the Kremlin ... And how spectacular they looked panoramas of airfields in Podolsk and Kubinka with Il-10 attack aircraft of the 5th Guards assault division and MiG-15 fighters of the 9th Fighter Air Division! Or three tank regiments of the Guards Kantemirovskaya division rushing along the Kyiv highway ... Various authors, even such a seemingly serious historian as Yu. Zhukov, assure that everything was so. Zhukov, obviously copying someone, also reports on those who entered Moscow along the Kievskoye highway, tanks of the Taman division (actually, a motorized rifle division), and ...

And it is very likely that everything could have been so if Khrushchev and Co. had decided to arrange spectacular show called "Liquidation of Beria's conspiracy." However, in 1953 such shows were not yet in fashion, and I highly doubt that all the thriller details described above are from "memories" of generals and veterans really took place. If in Moscow On June 26, 1953, something similar happened, then the very next day she was paralyzed would be rumors. And they would crawl all over the country. And this was not.

No, General Krasovsky did not order General Dolgushin to bomb the Kremlin, and tanks of the Kantemirovskaya division blocked the exits from the Kremlin, forever disgracing their once battle banners only forty years later - in October 1993, when she was the Soviet power was shot.

I do not exclude, however, that some fuss - with combat alarms, with the withdrawal from places the location of a certain number of tanks on the roads near Moscow, etc. - took place, since it was necessary to somehow stage countermeasures against the "conspiracy".

But if the show took place in expanded form on the streets of the capital, then it is unlikely that the authorities could withstand in the first period after the arrest of Beria such a long information pause, which was sustained. I'll talk about her soon, but before that I can't overlook this...

Dear reader! All of the above about a hypothetical movie thriller I wrote even before I read about filming by a certain Alexei Pimanov of the 8-episode series "The Hunt for Beria". Premiere should take place on March 5, 2008 - on the day of the 55th anniversary of Stalin's death.

These lines of mine are being written on the night of November 17-18, 2007, and I very much assume that

much of the above will be present in Pimanov's movie libel, but I'm talking about Pimanov's "work" as a libel with such confidence because the Pimanovs do not "create" and cannot "create" anything but libel.

And NOW about what the informational pause et caetera was like (and so on and so forth) ... The author of the book "Bandits of the Times of Socialism" Fedor Ibatovich Razzakov claims that it was Beria who stood "at the origins of the de-Stalinization of Soviet society, contributing to the fact that the name of Stalin gradually disappeared from the pages of the mass press." In support of this absolutely untrue thesis Razzakov calculated the number references to the name of Stalin in the editorials of Pravda and stated that since the end of May 1953 until the end of June, when Beria was arrested, there was only one reference to Stalin. But, they say, after the arrest of Beria, in the first week alone, Stalin's name was called 12 times.

This statement by Razzakov prompted me to study the annual volume of Pravda for 1953! So, Fedor Ibatovich considered it not quite right, although the number of references to Stalin according to compared with January-March 1953, for the period "calculated" by him, really sharply decreased. This is a fact that deserves the closest attention and study, but did Beria influence the press line? He has never been his own in this specific area and could not be due to the fundamental difference between his direct nature and flexible natures "fighters of the ideological front of the Central

Committee." In Pravda, after the mourning of March 1953, editorial and ideological articles did not not a single current supreme leader was personally mentioned - strenuously the concept of "collective leadership" was used. Moreover, in such, for example, advanced Pravda, as advanced for May 11, 1953 "The Urgent Tasks of the Komsomol organizations", for June 22 - "The Power of the Soviet System", Stalin really did not mention, which is hard to believe, even with a newspaper sheet in front of their eyes. However most of the advanced of that period are purely industrial, so to speak, in nature, and it was hardly possible to commemorate Stalin in connection with the problems of field cultivation or animal husbandry necessary. In addition, Beria, with his enormous workload, had only worries about immediate "de-Stalinization" to think.

After the arrest of Beria, the increase in the number of references to Stalin in the editorials of Pravda was visible to the naked eye, but here the "collective leadership" made itself straw in a crisis. Already a month or two after the "Anti-Beria" Plenum The Central Committee mentions the name of Stalin in Pravda again infrequently, to the point that on December 21, 1953 - on Stalin's first birthday, celebrated without him, Pravda does not even have a single line did not remind the country why this day is significant! It would seem incredible! But it's a fact.

Returning to the topic of the arrest, I will inform you that, with the "submission" of Razzakov, I also established one curious fact. Not only in the first week after Beria's arrest, but in general for period from June 27 to July 10 (tenth !!) I, to my greatest surprise, never met in Pravda named after Beria!

He was arrested, as the reader remembers, on Friday, June 26th. However, neither on the 27th, nor on the 28th, nor on the 29th, nor on June 30, nor on July 1, nor on July 2 - on the day of the opening of the Plenum of the Central Committee, about the beginning and the work of which the main press organ of the CPSU also kept silent, nor on all days of work Not a word was said about the "agent of imperialism" and "enemy of the people" Beria at the Plenum!

Such a long silence would have been possible if the case with the arrest of LP had not been concocted quickly and *without noise*, so that everything went out of the blue? If on the day of his arrest the cobblestones of Red Square clanged with trucks that were by no means ceremonial armored

calculations? It is

unlikely ... Only on July 10 *did it bang*: in the upper left corner of the front page of Pravda there was an "Information report on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU":

"Recently, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist

parties of the Soviet Union.

Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after hearing and discussing the report of the Presidium of the Central Committee - comrade. Malenkova G. M. about criminal anti-party and anti-state actions L.P. Beria aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests foreign capital and expressed in perfidious attempts to put Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR over the government and the Communist party of the Soviet Union, decided to withdraw L.P. Beria from the Central Committee CPSU and expel him from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state"

The authors of this message did not even notice the absurdity of what was reported! When strictly logical approach, there could be only one conclusion from the message: the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is an organ foreign capital. But was it up to the logic then "to the top"!

BACK, however, at the end of the day on June 26. Sukhomlinov writes that Beria was taken out of the Kremlin at 17:30, and this is in good agreement with the overall picture what happened, as it seems to me. Sukhomlinov also reports that they took the LP first to the garrison guardhouse in the Alyosha barracks, and on June 27 they were transferred to the bunker headquarters of the Moscow military district, on Osipenko street, 53.

On the evening of that Saturday, the Bolshoi Theater hosted the premiere of the renewed opera Yuri Shaporin "Decembrists", which should have been attended by all the highest leaders of the country, including Beria. And only by the absence of his name in the newspaper reports of a visit by the leadership of the Bolshoi Theater, someone could suspect something was wrong. A however ... You never know the reasons for the loss of one name from the leading "clip"! sick the person didn't go to the performance - that's all there is to it ...

Alas, on June 21, Beria was no longer a spectator, but a participant in a vile "performance" in life, and the investigator of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Tsaregradsky, appointed by an unknown person, fills in him the questionnaire of the arrested person. A facsimile of it is also given by A. Sukhomlinov, and his pages books with facsimile reproductions of some documents on the case of Beria and his associates seem to me one of the most valuable.

Here is this questionnaire ... It is supposed to paste a standard prison photo in front of it and in profile. But, of course, there was no prison photographer at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, and Beria photographed only full face and not from the prescribed distance, so the photo turned out large, on it, unlike most prison photographs, details are better visible face, his expression and, most importantly, the sparkle of his eyes are more clearly visible. Sukhomlinov considers this for some reason, the photo is "comic", although it is certainly tragic, not only because it was made in the prison, but also by the "texture" itself - a smart one looks at us from it, a little - not yet deadly - a tired person without the slightest malice and cruelty in his eyes.

The photo came out

strong. It was made a day after the arrest, and it is clear that the first explosion of feelings has already passed. And he, presumably, was ... I write "presumably", because, I repeat, the whole short the period of Beria's life after June 26, 1953 is hardly possible to accurately restore as in main and in details. For example, having access to allegedly authentic documents Sukhomlinov reports the arrest of Beria Sarkisov, **head** of security, although by the time Beria's arrest, Sarkisov had been the **former** chief of his guard for three weeks and had position of deputy head of department in the 1st Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It's also unlikely to be accurate. "the most accurate" - according to Sukhomlinov - his reconstruction of the last day Beria in the Kremlin. Sukhomlinov is clearly unaware of the last "atomic" document signed by Beria, and immediately upon arrival in the Kremlin directs him to Malenkov's office. Sukhomlinov does not take into account the fact that the very day of Beria's arrest became the day formation of the "atomic" Ministry of Medium Machine Building. But this author had the most favorable opportunities for understanding the truth compared to the rest!

But some things can be considered reliable. And these are, first of all, Beria's letters from the bunker. They are genuine - very much psychologically accurate. True, prosecutor Sukhomlinov, who knows what he is writing, reports that "there were investigators in the authorities ... "cutters" and investigators-"writers"" and that the latter "were such masters in literature and in the presentation in Russian of testimony that they would be envied even experienced editors of any publishing house. This message is valuable and important, among other things, because it explains, in my opinion, where the numerous volumes of Beria's "case" came from. However, it is unlikely that there were new Leo Tolstoy or Anton Chekhov. Smoothly concocting "testimony" is one thing ... But in order to write letters from the bunker, one had to either have an outstanding literary talent, combined with knowledge of many details of the activities of higher leadership of the country for many years, or ... Or be Beria. General Batitsky was responsible for the protection of Beria at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. In the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" it is reported that his notes related to conditions for writing the first letter. *"WITH. secret. In the Central Committee of the CPSU. Personally t-schu Malenkov G. M. Received at 19.20 27.6.53. Batitsky"* and *"4 sheets of paper were issued. 2 sheets returned, 1 sheet tore, 1/2 sheet used, 1/2 sheet remained on hand. Batitsky.* There were three letters in total. However, in

accordance with Batitsky's litter, the first the letter was received by him from Beria at 19:20 on June 27, while the first the letter published in the aforementioned collection of documents is dated June 28 (the same the date is also visible on the facsimile of the letter in A. Sukhomlinov's book). So what did Batitsky get "at 19.20 27.6.53" - a letter written on "1/2 sheet" published in the collection documents and reproduced by Sukhomlinov, or something else? It is possible that There were four letters, but the first was subsequently destroyed. On the evening of June 27, psychological Beria's condition was such that he could write something especially inconvenient for the creators images of the "bloody executioner" and "monster".

One way or another, we have three published letters from Beria: dated June 28, July 1, and dated (presumably) July 2nd. With the second letter, dated July 1 - the most extensive - the reader is already familiar, I quoted it at the beginning of the book and further.

As for the first, dated June 28, it is rather short and written with confidence. handwriting, almost without blots and errors, the lines are even:

"In the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade Malenkov

Dear George. I was

sure that from that big criticism at the presidium I would do everything the necessary conclusions for myself and will be useful in the team. But the Central Committee decided otherwise, I think that the Central Committee acted correctly. I feel it necessary to say that there has always been infinitely devoted to the party of Lenin-Stalin, - to his homeland, was always active at work. Working in Georgia, in Transcaucasia, in Moscow, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Council ministers of the USSR and again in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he gave everything he could to work, tried to select cadres on business qualities, principled, devoted to our party comrades. The same applies to the Special Committee, First and Second the main departments involved in atomic affairs and controlled shells. The same position of the Secretariat and assistants in the Council of Ministers. I beg Comrades Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Klementy Voroshilov, Nikita Khrushchev, Lazar Kaganovich, Nikolai Bulganin, Anastas Mikoyan and let others be forgiven, if anything has happened during these fifteen years intense collaboration. Dear comrades, I wish you all great success for the Lenin-Stalin cause, for the unity and solidity of our Party, for flourishing of our Glorious Motherland.

George, please, if you consider it possible to have a family (wife and old mother) and Sergo's son, whom you know not to be ignored.

Lavrenty Beria.

The tone of this letter, as we see, is not tearful and not pleading, and Beria, as it were, even say goodbye to colleagues. His "please... let them forgive..." is not a humiliated request for forgiveness of a naughty schoolboy, but something psychologically reminiscent of a request for forgiveness on Forgiveness Sunday: "Forgive me, Russian people, and I forgive you" ... The last words about the family once again confirm that this is how it is in Lavrenty's soul Pavlovich was.

Yuri Ignatievich Mukhin, on the grounds, in particular, that the letter does not mention The Presidium of the Central Committee, and the Central Committee ("The Central Committee decided otherwise ...", "I think that the Central Committee did the right thing ..."), concludes that the letter was not written by Beria, but in such a mixture of two concepts there is nothing suspicious - for Beria, for his colleagues, and for the rest of the members of the Central Committee The Presidium of the Central Committee was the "Central Committee". No, it was written and signed by Beria. There was no answer, and then LP writes a new letter, the second, the very appearance of which speaks of increasing stress and which begins with the words: "During these ..." And here gotta stop! In the

collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" the text looks like this: *"During these four difficult days for me, I thoroughly thought through everything that took place with my side in recent months after the plenum of the Central Committee of the*

CPSU ...", etc. However, in the book of A. Sukhomlinov there is a facsimile of all three letters, and on the page 29 reads clearly: *"During these **three** difficult days for me, I thoroughly thought over ..."*, and then initially it was *"all my actions both at work and in regard to comrades..."*, then clarifications are inscribed on top: *"personally you and some comrades..."* and *"...everything that has taken place on my part in recent months..."*, as well as: *"...after the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU"*. There are other discrepancies as well. In the collection we read: *fail ... without Comrade Stalin ...*", and the facsimile shows that initially Beria wrote: *"do not fail ... after the death of Stalin ..."* Whether Sukhomlinov cited a draft (the type of facsimile is exactly like this), or the publishers of the letter in the collection of documents cited only its final text, without taking into account inserts and amendments ... Then it becomes clear and the discrepancy in the number of days (the draft version was started after three days, and the white one was completed within a day). I

draw the reader's attention to these details insofar as earlier in the sources they (as far as I know) were not noted, although they are important enough for analysis psychological state of Lavrenty Pavlovich in those days. But anyway July 2nd the Plenum of the Central Committee began, which we will talk about later, and about which Beria hardly knew how not knew about him before July 10 and the whole

country. It is clear that everyone was not up to the prisoner of the bunker, and Beria writes a new letter, which has become last:

"To the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Bulganin and Saburov. Dear comrades, with me they want deal without trial and investigation after 5 days of imprisonment without a single interrogation, I beg you all, so that this is not allowed, I ask you immediately intervene, otherwise it will be too late. You have to notify me directly by phone.

Dear s-schi, I urge you to appoint the most responsible and a strict commission for a strict investigation of my case, headed by Comrade Molotov or Comrade Voroshilov. Doesn't a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee deserve to have his case carefully examined, charged, demanded explanations, interrogated witnesses. This is good for business from all points of view and for the CC. Why do it the way it is done now, they put me in the basement, and no one did anything doesn't ask or ask. Dear comrades, is it only the only and the right way without trial and clarification of the case against a member of the Central Committee and his own comrade, after 5 days of imprisonment in the basement, execute him.

Once again I beg you all, especially T.T. who worked and (this "and" is only in

facsimile in Sukhomlinov's book, but not in the collection Lavrenty Beria. 1953". - **S.K.**) with comrade Lenin and comrade Stalin, enriched with great experience and wise in resolving complex cases, comrades Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. In the name of the memory of Lenin and Stalin, I beg you, I beg you to intervene and to intervene immediately and you will all make sure that I am absolutely clean, honest your faithful friend and comrade, a faithful member of our party ... "

The letter repeats the word "I beg" several times, but this is not a cowardly plea for mercy, but a call for justice and objectivity. Alas, objectivity in relation to Beria already then turned out to be more than a rare commodity. Don't often look at it objectively and many of his contemporary biographers. So, Boris Sokolov in the controversial book "Beria: the fate of the all-powerful people's commissar" wrote a lot of seemingly kind words about his hero, but it is stipulated that Beria is unlikely to belong to the category of people "to do life with someone" ...

Why not? It can be fully attributed to this few human categories! Moreover, if we ignore the tone of Sokolov's book, in it itself one can find enough facts to refute this assertion of its own author. I think Boris Vadimovich, like many others, is brought down here by some sluggish intellectual anti-communism, which makes even smart people dumber than they are. Perhaps that is why, in evaluating the letters from the bunker, Sokolov showed amazing spiritual blindness, writing:

"Placed after his arrest in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, Lavrenty Pavlovich bombarded (? - **S.K.**) colleagues with letters in which he begged spare him."

No, Beria did not ask to be spared - in his letters there is not even a word of this. After all, he knew that he was clean before himself, before the party and the state. He asked to intervene in order to get to the bottom of the situation. He insisted on objectivity. I think publishers letters in the collection of documents about Beria, not by mistake, released one union "and" in fragment "and *with comrade Lenin and comrade Stalin ...*" There were then such in the Presidium of the Central Committee four people, Beria lists them by name just below. Only they **remembered alive** the style of both Stalin and Lenin. But, alas, they did not take their style. And Beria continues:

"In addition to strengthening, the power of our Country, and the unity of our Great Party I didn't have any thoughts. I supported my Central Committee and my Government no less than any other did everything he could. I affirm that all charges will be dropped unless want to investigate it. What a rush, and a very suspicious one at that. T. Malenkov and Comrade Khrushchev, I ask you not to persist, would it be bad if they rehabilitate you. Again and again I beg you to intervene and not your innocent old friend destroy.

Your Lavrenty Beria.

Above, in curly brackets, I have taken the only insert in the letter, added above, and the underlining belongs to Beria himself, and this last detail is once again proves the authenticity of the letter: LP emphasized the key points in documents, but the phrases "*I affirm that all charges will be dropped if you only want investigate it. What a hurry, and, moreover, very suspicious*" he is also from a long time ago habit - he also outlined it in the margins.

No, this letter was not written by an intriguer. The intriguer, among other things, would understand that no - no, my God! - somehow reproach those on whom his fate depends, and even blame them with suspicious haste. Yes, from one such statement, a sincere person is visible,

therefore prone to vehemence, but — HONEST! This letter

has another feature that is characteristic of Beria. Sincere and false letters of repentance were written to the Central Committee and to Stalin more than once, but perhaps only Beria put the question the way an honest and intelligent person should put it. He is not just declares that he is not to blame, but asks and even demands (by the very tone of the letter) to investigate the charges against him. And behind this approach is seen the most experienced professional, Chekist, investigator, who knows all aspects of life and is aware of: the situation difficult, and since he has already lost the trust of his comrades, then he can be restored only taking everything apart

carefully. Alas, it was not the loss of confidence, but the fact that Beria frightened the "comrades" with the prospect of such work for the benefit of the state, which they - for various reasons - conduct no longer wanted. They needed "deserved" laurels, and not the restless Lawrence.

This is what determined everything.

ANDREY Sukhomlinov, in his book about Beria, is generally disloyal to him (later I will say this later) and therefore could write the following:

"Everyone who saw Beria in those days (meaning the period after death Stalin. - **S.K.**), note that he was excited and active ... Even in communication with members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he suddenly switched to "you". And according to the memories colleagues, during telephone conversations in their presence, Beria deliberately ... ridiculed and humiliated members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, working mainly "for the public."

Alas, such, to put it mildly, biased approach to Beria is typical of many who write about him. But what is wrong with a person being active, if he is smart at the same time? And all the members of the Presidium addressed each other with "you" - this follows at least from the statements Khrushchev at the "Anti-Beria" plenum and from other speeches at it (for example, Bulganin) ... The "convicting" "memories of colleagues" are either memories Sudoplatov, or the result of political correction of his memoirs. And the truth in them as much as in the stories about Beria's rudeness towards colleagues. Sukhomlinov writes about Beria and so:

"He should lie low, like Khrushchev, not reveal his intentions, but he went to power for too long and lost caution before last push..."

Well, what do we have here? Is there much sense and truth in the statement, for example, that Beria-de "was going to power for too long"? What does it mean? Supreme power for a long time belonged to Stalin, and while Stalin was healthy, no one, including Beria, disputed neither openly nor secretly, at least in his own thoughts. As for Beria's self-esteem his potential, he did not hide from anyone, including Stalin, what exactly he considers himself the only worthy successor to Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers

THE USSR. But Sukhomlinov accurately defined the nature and essence of Khrushchev! Khrushchev hid for a long time, and now that the lion was dead, the jackal jumped, sinking its poisonous teeth into its prey ... Already in 1989, his son-in-law Adjubey made such an unwittingly revealing confession to his father-in-law:

"Having defeated Beria, Khrushchev immediately pulled ahead ... Khrushchev even outwardly changed a lot, became more confident, dynamic ... Otherwise, more brazenly, even Khrushchev's guards began to behave ... "

To disguise the initiative role of Khrushchev in the elimination of Beria for everyone, not

who want historical truth is not only beneficial, but urgently needed. Let's say in 1998, in the 5th issue of the journal "New and Contemporary History", a well-known reader, Dr. Sciences, Professor, Executive Secretary of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims political repression under the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Naumov reported:

"As Malenkov admitted at the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, the question of what to do with Beria, arose on June 12, after discussing it at the next meeting notes prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and decisions of the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted at based on the information contained in these notes. Separate negotiations with individual members of the presidium lasted more than a week. The organizers of the negotiations were Malenkov and Khrushchev ... By June 26, all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except for Beria, knew about the nature of the upcoming meeting. In fact, it was a conspiracy of the Presidium of the Central Committee against one of its members. All elements of a conspiracy were evident: strict secrecy, secret preparation list of charges, script development, distribution of roles, behind-the-scenes negotiations of the participants in the events, the formation of an armed group of generals and officers who were entrusted with the arrest of Beria "...

I really want Professor Naumov to pass off what happened on June 26, 1953 as collective conspiracy, although collective then was only the complicity of members Presidium to the main and only true conspirator - Khrushchev.

I don't know what Malenkov "admitted at the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee", but in the collection documents of 1999 "Lavrenty Beria. 1953", where Malenkov's report is given, nothing like that reported by Naumov is said! And what fun! The same Naumov is one of the compilers of this collection, on page 410 of which it is said that the falsification of what happened at the plenum began already at the first stage of preparation verbatim report. Moreover, in the uncorrected transcript of the plenum, given in collection, there is no report by Malenkov at all - it is cited only according to that official shorthand report, the falsification of which Naumov himself admits.

Wonderful are Thy deeds, O Lord, but where are they to the deeds of Thy lustful and deceitful creatures! Moreover, Naumov in the mentioned article writes like this:

"Regarding this meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (at which he was arrested Beria. - **S.K.**) there are many versions based not on facts, but on speculation. But there are two reliable pieces of evidence..."

What are these testimonies? And here are some:

"One of them belongs to Khrushchev ... There is also evidence of a group generals and officers of the Moscow Military District who were involved Bulganin and Khrushchev to arrest Beria ... "

Well, the testimony of Nikita Khrushchev, who "sent" Stalin to drink after the beginning of the war to the "near" dacha, can only be accepted as reliable by the one to whom this really want or who benefits from it. As

for the "evidence" of the generals, without even taking into account the obvious lies of these "evidence", proved even by such an anti-Berian as V. Karpov, it should be noted that Zhukov and K° appeared in the meeting room of the Presidium of the Central Committee only at the time of their arrest, so previous circumstances and the course of the meeting could not know.

And such "historians" as Professor Naumov are trying to instruct their fellow citizens who, from the likes of *the Naumovs* , already have a mind beyond reason! Between other things, should inform the reader that Naumov's conjectures regarding "confessions Malenkov, scenario development, distribution of roles, formation of a military group" and

etc. almost textually reproduced (without reference to the source) in his book and Sukhomlinov - on pages 14 and 15. But

what cannot be denied is that his colleagues are irritated against Beria was growing, and it broke through very revealingly at the July plenum. Here, for example, is the transcript of Voroshilov's speech:

"Voroshilov. ... Especially he unbelted ... after the death of a comrade Stalin ... He is in everything and always the first, he offers everything, he foresees everything, he knows everything, he always commands! So it was, comrades? (*referring to members Presidium.*)

Voices from the presidium: "Yes, that's right."

Or Khrushchev, making a remark during Mikoyan's speech:

"Khrushchev. It may seem that we ... sat and trembled before him. There were many cases when we were good at giving and making decisions. A one gets the impression that we were sitting and looking at him ... "

Someone's clear superiority (even if not emphasized) for mediocrity intolerable. And by the summer of 1953, almost the entire Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU had become a collective mediocrity, unable, in modern terms, to cope with the challenges time.

And, frankly, I cannot say that I could cope with them - without Beria - already and Stalin himself, for all his genius, who exchanged his eighth decade.

Professor Naumov is trying to attribute anti-Stalinism to Beria on the grounds that his notes, including the "national ones", denounced the "orders that reigned under Stalin." A few pages further on, Naumov, having forgotten, already calls Beria "Stalin's oprichnik", whose rehabilitation "is out of the question". No, Beria was a student Stalin, but, like any intelligent student, he already went around the teacher, because he had to go further. And it was precisely the leaders of the places - Khrushchev and Melnikov with Kirichenko, Ponomarenko and Patolichev, Snechkus and Gedvilas, not Stalin. If it was Stalin, then why, even after his death, the sore the questions were raised not by the republics, but by Beria?

Someone may object to me: "Why didn't Beria come out with his initiatives during Stalin's lifetime, if it was not Stalin? But that's just it, that by 1952 Stalin was "played" by the environment to a large extent. And this is the environment in case of amplification Beria's activity could collectively shut up the "activist" simply out of instinct self-preservation. Not by intrigue, but by collective ostracism. Which, in fact, was later done. On the other hand, how do you

know? Maybe something similar to what Beria suggested, and should have been the subject of attention of that mysterious Troika, which Stalin never managed to send in a big way?

Yes, even without Stalin, Beria was inconvenient for his colleagues. However, plotting an arrest and even Molotov could hardly **liquidate** Beria. An

obvious myth - and the alleged hidden rivalry between Beria and Malenkov. What means rival? It means trying to be better than someone else. However, Beria the statesman was head and shoulders above Malenkov, and to compete with Malenkov there was no need. So there is no need to talk about rivalry here, although it cannot be ruled out hidden **envy** of Malenkov to Beria. But even envy did not program hatred - there is a long distance from envy to hatred.

However, there is no truth in the statement, for example, by Sudoplatov that Malenkov and Beria were allegedly "in a trusting relationship". Either an aged general, or the political correctors of his memoirs did not see the absurdity of such a statement - if

if the relationship between Georgy Maximilianovich and Lavrenty Pavlovich were confidential, then no one would have arrested Beria! Another thing is that out of the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria objectively, it was impossible not to have the closest relationship with Malenkov. And even without much affection for his colleague, Malenkov could not but see his strong qualities for the cause. But it does not prevent us from getting acquainted with the confession of another colleague of Beria:

"After all, Beria and I walked together, walked arm in arm ... Beria and I had different periods ... of relations, but the best period of my relationship with him, such - do not spill, do not stretch - this is after the death of Comrade Stalin. If I he has not called for a day, then he is already calling and asking why you are not calling. You say that there was no time, there were things. "And you call" ... "

This colleague is Khrushchev. And he said this at the July 1953 plenum. But why it suddenly Khrushchev admitted to the party plenum in such close friendship with him unmasked "enemy of the people"? Or maybe it was the other way around? Maybe it's Khrushchev called Beria - in advance creating a "background" of future accusations?

I'm all about the fact that over the decades, literature has piled up against Beria many different accusations, but their primary source is the materials of two large-scale and coordinated measures to demonize Beria - the "anti-Beria" July

1953 of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the "investigation" on the "case" of Beria. Outcome them: official verbatim report on the plenum and 39 volumes (plus 4 Special folders of the Central Committee) of the "investigative affairs".

And in both cases we are dealing with a historical falsification. Let us ask ourselves again the question - so who, from the very beginning, conceived the physical LP liquidation? Bulganin's speech at the July plenum contained the following passage:

"Bulganin. ... Comrades, the exposure of Beria ... in particular the completion this exposure and the arrest of Beria itself was a difficult and risky business. And here we must pay tribute to comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov (*stormy applause*), who organized this business well and brought it to the end ...

Khrushchev. There is one amendment: and you do not exclude yourself from this. (*Applause.*)

Bulganin. I am very grateful to you, Nikita, for this remark and I declare to you and to all other comrades that I did what everyone should have done decent (? - **S.K.**) member of the party ... "

But Nikolai Alexandrovich, who subtly knows how to keep his tail in the wind, is only here flattered from now on the main rulers of nomenklatura souls. And Khrushchev flattered in response to him - both in gratitude for facilitating the arrest, and in order to better soil Bulganin in the mud of his conspiracy against Beria, where Malenkov and Molotov, of course, did not play an active role.

True, the same Yuri Zhukov uncritically reproduces a crafty hypothetical the version about the supposedly not just leading, but completely proactive anti-Beria role ... Malenkov! Like, he allegedly independently agreed with Kruglov, Serov, Zhukov and Moskalenko, and only then put Khrushchev (!), Bulganin and Mikoyan before a choice: either their support for the impending arrest of Beria, or their immediate arrest right in Malenkov's office. For all

the anti-historicity and absurdity of such a version, it is in circulation, as we see, even in the academic environment. And so let's dwell on something in more detail ...

AS PROFESSOR NAUMOV REPORTED in 1998 in the previously cited article, "*a document of key importance for reconstruction not only of the events of June 26, 1953, but also partially revealing the process*

preparation of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee for the removal of Beria. This document is a draft Malenkov's speech at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and he was published in the collection "Lavrenty Beria. 1953". This is

indeed a draft, and the draft is undoubtedly authentic - its contents speaks so precisely about the essence of the situation that only Malenkov could be the author of the notes.

And from these records it is clear that from the point of view of Malenkov, agreed, presumably, with Khrushchev and Molotov, Beria's main sin was that he ... became a minister internal affairs. Just!

In order for

the reader to be convinced of this for himself, I will give in the most significant fragments the text of Malenkov's draft, which begins like this:

"The enemies wanted to place the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government. The task is to place the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the service of the Party and government, to take these bodies under the control of the Party.

The enemies wanted to use the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for criminal purposes. The challenge is to **eliminate any possibility of repetition** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**) of such crimes ... "

Who does Malenkov mean by enemies? Beria? But then

he would

have written like that - this is a draft of the theses of an extremely confidential

speech. However, from the last phrase it can be understood that Malenkov does not mean Beria, but his predecessors in the pre-war OGPU - NKVD. That is, first of all, Yagoda. Acquaintance with Malenkov's speech at the July plenum finally convinces of

legitimacy of such a statement - he said there, among other things, the following: "... *in*

In the history of our country, there have been more than once attempts by enemies who have made their way into the organs ... to undermine the leadership of

the party ... " As for Beria himself, Malenkov further writes in his theses:

"... The bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occupy such a place in the system of state apparatus where there is the greatest opportunity to abuse power.

The task is to prevent the abuse of power...

controls [the party] and [government] in [.] This is fraught with great dangers if it is not corrected in time, now..."

That is, "comrade B[eria]" is not a conspirator, not a restorer of capitalism, not an enemy people and an agent of international capital, but only a potential source of "big dangers", and even then not for the state, but for its leaders. But even this is speculation. Malenkov, and not a statement of a fait accompli. The first point of accusation is that's what:

"1. Facts – Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia Are these measures necessary? What happened, how did they understand it? The Ministry of Internal Affairs corrected the party and the government of the Central Committee - into the background ... "

Everything is clear here - we mean the "national" resolutions of the Presidium of the Central Committee known to the reader. They caused an ambiguous reaction in the republics - someone began to go too far in the other direction. But if you are the leaders of the country, and not officials, then explain and act in such a way that everyone understands everything as you understand it

You! And having understood, they would have acted accordingly.

As for the claims about the initiatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - this is an obvious communist swagger, hated even by Lenin. Smart person or party, if someone corrects them (that is, correct errors or shortcomings), for this we should only be grateful. It's something one thing is done, the general thing is done, isn't it? But Malenkov's "complaints" make it clear that Beria's "guilt" was not in an erroneous position, but in an active position.

The third and fourth points were accusations of inconsistency in the line of conduct with Hungarians and in Germany, in the "suppression of the collective." Malenkov writes:

"What kind of collective is this?
Permissiveness - end it. We need a
monolithic team, and we have it!"

and so on.

Particularly interesting is the fifth point:

"5. How to fix it: a)

Ministry of Internal Affairs - give a post to another (Kr [corners]) + Central Committee Security Administration -

Central Committee

From morning to evening, don't take a step without control! Our security is for everyone separately, to the one who is being guarded (without denunciations)

T[comrades] are not sure who is eavesdropping on whom

and b) From the post of deputy [of the Council of Ministers of the USSR] - release the appointment of mines [industry] of the oil [industry]
Later!

c) Special [ial] Committee [et] - in the Ministry [of] Saburov and Khrushchev

d) Presidium of the Central Committee - on major issues, decisions - for signature
secretary, chairperson..."

From the theses of paragraph 5 it unequivocally follows that the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, taken as a certain whole, they were not going to arrest Beria. Take him out of control circle and remove from the Ministry of Internal Affairs - yes! True, there is an unclear "Later!" in the notes, but it does not cannot be deciphered as a plan to eventually eliminate LP and physically ... Rather, it is necessary understood as a promise of a chance for a subsequent partial forgiveness ... So, in the

light of Malenkov's draft, Beria's arrest at a meeting in the Kremlin looks like pure initiative solely Khrushchev. Konstantin Simonov was a member "Anti-Beria" plenum. As a writer, he noticed something correctly and later wrote that's what:

"Khrushchev spoke about how Beria was caught ... at the plenum. Word "caught" most closely matched the nature of Khrushchev's story, his temperament and that **passionate pleasure** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**), with whom he told about all this.

From his story ... it followed that it was he, Khrushchev, who played the main role in capture and disarmament of this large beast. For me it was perfect obvious when I listened to him that Khrushchev was the initiator of this capture ... because he turned out to be more insightful, more talented, more energetic and more determined than the rest. On the other hand, this was facilitated by the fact that Beria underestimated Khrushchev, his qualities, his deep natural, purely peasant cunning, his common sense and his strength of character, and, conversely, considered him a round-faced gray-footed fool, whom it is easier for him, Beria, the master of intrigue easy to wrap around your finger. Khrushchev in his speech not without triumph talked about what kind of fool Beria considered him to be ... "

Simonov wrote many talented lines in his life (especially poetry),

but did not meet high human standards, not rising above the general dullness post-Stalinist ruling elite. And this was reflected in his overestimation of Khrushchev.

No, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was not a conspirator, nor was he an intriguer. AND he fell victim to Khrushchev due to the fact that he was by nature - in the final analysis - an idealist, albeit a practical one. And Khrushchev was a spiritual lackey, sincerely not understanding how you can not be mean, if it is beneficial. Khrushchev was a boor who had long imagined himself, but forced for decades to hide this conceit. He was perfectly capable of moral and political mimicry by a scoundrel with really tenacious cunning. He really was energetic, knew how to talk with the people, was diligent and knew how to portray devotion to the cause - due to which he held on. But if the post-

Stalinist situation had received a constructive development, then Beria would be at the head of the country. And Khrushchev would hardly have held out for a long time even in the positions of one of secretaries of the Central Committee. Therefore, in addition to the collective conspiracy, part of the Presidium of the Central Committee on **the removal** of Beria (I do not exclude this) another, my own monoplots on **elimination** of Beria. And in this conspiracy of his, all the rest turned out to be only weak-willed accomplices at the stage of arrest and active accomplices at the stage of the Plenum of the Central Committee. Here is what General Sudoplatov writes:

"Khrushchev's position in the leadership put him in an exceptionally advantageous position. alternate blocking position with any influential member of the Presidium

It was he who, having felt Molotov's wounded ambitions (fu! - **S.K.**) Beria in foreign policy, plotted initially against Beria, and then and against Malenkov.

This opinion is interesting, although far from being true in everything. Let's say how to understand "... with any influential member of the Presidium of the Central Committee"? Which of the members of the Presidium was really influential besides Khrushchev? Only Malenkov - as chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also Beria.

Molotov? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a law enforcement agency, and could one speak of Molotov as about an independent value?

Bulganin? Although the Minister of War, but in reality there is no serious influence in the troops It has.

Kaganovich? Voroshilov? Mikoyan? No, no, no, if you mean everyone in separately.

The personal moral and intellectual influence that the Lenin and Stalin, in the post-Stalin Presidium of the Central Committee, no one possessed. Except Beria. But Khrushchev really had the possibility of blocking with any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except, again, one - Beria, because all the rest, like Khrushchev himself, gradually went over to the party of partocrats. And Beria remained in Stalin's party. In Stalin's party, intrigues did not ensure high posts - Stalin did not intrigue endured. In the emerging party of the partocrat Khrushchev, intrigues became integral feature of the "intra-Party" life of the highest bosses of this party. The one who mastered the art intrigues, survived - like Khrushchev himself, like Mikoyan. Those who did not master this art left circle" - as members of the "anti-party group": Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich ...

Among other things, Khrushchev deftly played on the fear of his colleagues before the possibility of a tough Beria's power. After all, the fear of a high-ranking official to lose his chair is a terrible a thing capable of producing terrible things. And after the death of Stalin, the leadership chair was already no one threatened to turn into a dock, and no one wanted to lose him regardless of whether its owner could claim it objectively.

Khrushchev's intrigues achieved their goal - in the top leadership against Beria in one or otherwise were all set. But I do not rule out that even the Minister of Defense Bulganin Khrushchev did not involve the idea of arrest in the discussion until June 26th. But he enlisted

with the assistance of Moskalenko, well known to him, and also Ivan Serov in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

According to some information, the agenda of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on June 26 included and the question of the Moscow military district. Colonel-General Pavel Artemyev, the commander of the Moscow Military District, close to Beria, was diverted in those days to the command and staff exercises of the Moscow Military District in Kalinin. And Khrushchev could have asked Bulganin to invite a number of military personnel to the Kremlin. including Moskalenko in this group. But from

the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee Khrushchev on the possible arrest of Beria Most likely, he did not consult with anyone beforehand. Just pushed Malenkov and others to hold a meeting "on Lavrentiy", which takes away all the greater will and power.

However, it is possible that on the very last day before the meeting, Khrushchev could intimidate colleagues with false "data" about, say, Lavrenty's intention to arrest everyone for premiere of Shaporin's "Decembrists". At the same time, without going into details, he negotiated with the military loyal to him and disloyal to Beria, not very choosy in terms of honor, but ready to take the arrest itself. It is also understandable

why Khrushchev turned to the generals. First, by involving them in your personal conspiracy "in the dark" (after all, he probably presented the case to them in such a way that they were arrested there is an oral sanction of the Presidium of the Central Committee), Khrushchev, nevertheless, tied the military and their Minister Bulganin complicity. And thus he guaranteed himself support - in which case, the army. Secondly, the

appearance in the Kremlin of a group of top military officers was not suspicious -

you never know what's the matter ... They summoned to the Presidium or there a meeting of the Council of Ministers, so they go!

Thirdly, the very fact of the appearance of the generals in the meeting room could not but produce members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the expected Khrushchev effect. Let's try to imagine psychological picture of what is happening.

There is a meeting, and Malenkov (as agreed) abruptly "rolls" on Beria. The atmosphere is understandably heating up. And suddenly armed generals enter the hall with a resolute look. What could Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others think? The first thought is not even "why are they here?", but "**who are they after?**". After all apart from Khrushchev (and, possibly, Bulganin), he does not know about the upcoming appearance of the generals nobody. And everyone, of course, is utterly upturned!

Everyone is pulled up, except for the one who initiated this parish. Only Khrushchev is calm - now he is in control. And only he knows about it.

Beria is informed of the arrest. And in shock from this, not only Beria himself, but the rest - except for Khrushchev. But now the psychological state is qualitatively different. The question "for whom?" dropped. And everyone starts to instantly figure out if this is a way out of the situation? Lawrence soon he can really take on the first role, and he is an energetic and tough guy ... And he will stir up, and they won't wear portraits, and in general ... So, once *the word* has been said, let them take him away.

And then we'll see.

Khrushchev's calculation was accurate - for this, neither Russian grammar nor higher Mathematics was not required. And having got rid of Beria as a real force, it was not difficult for Khrushchev to convince his colleagues that it was necessary to get rid of him altogether - if there will be no serious objections from the Plenum of the Central Committee, which must be convened as soon as possible quicker.

One could write a separate book about this "Anti-Beria" plenum, but I will have to confine ourselves to one chapter, informing the reader in advance that a careful analysis of *both* transcripts of the July Plenum (genuine, uncorrected, and included in the official verbatim report, falsified) in itself may give rise to doubt in Beria's crimes. Then about

him, who a week ago was actually the first person in the state, it was so many bad things have been said that an objective analyst cannot help doubting

sincerity and truthfulness of the "accusers". They were not true ... As for sincerity, things get more complicated here. Perhaps all the speakers were quite sincere in the manifestation of joy from the fact that they got rid of Beria. But this joy is reminiscent of the joy of schoolchildren about the cancellation of the lesson due to the illness of the teacher. "Hooray! shout the young fools. - We are free!"

Yes, I note, free... From new knowledge... From the work of the mind and soul... And in the end account - from the chance to grow up as

people ... However, not youths gathered in the meeting room of the plenum, and they rejoiced more serious occasion - the last person capable of force the nomenklatura to work not for the sake of their own advancement and prosperity, but for the name of the state and the people.

Chapter 26

THE CC PLENUM WITHOUT A MEMBER OF THE CC PRESIDUM AND THE "INTERVIEW" WITHOUT UNDER INTEREST

THE NEXT day after the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich, June 27, 1953, Khrushchev signed a letter from the Presidium of the Central Committee to members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members Central Auditing Commission to convene the Plenum of the Central Committee with the proposal "be sure to come to participate in the work of the Plenum". And on the scheduled date - July 2, 1953, the plenum has begun.

Today, when a huge work has been done to destroy a great power, begun by at that plenum, you can tell a part of the truth about its essence with a circulation of 1000 copies. And in introduction to the well-known reader of the collection "Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Documents, published Democracy Foundation, you can read:

"The image of a bloody executioner, an agent of international imperialism, a careerist, an intriguer and a power-lover, a boor and a complete libertine, Lavrenty Beria, **created by collective efforts at the July (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee** The CPSU has not undergone any significant changes since then ... "

The emphasis in this quote is, of course, mine. And in general, dear reader, one this quote from a document of limited (circulation) familiarization is enough to declare: "That Beria, who has long been familiar to everyone, is a **slandorous invention** his detractors!" The

Democracy Foundation does not hide the following:

"The falsification of what happened at the plenum began already at the first stages of preparing the verbatim report, when the authors of the speeches edited uncorrected transcript of his speeches ... "

As you can see, with a circulation of 1000 copies, half a century after the crime, you can the fact of total falsification of the appearance of Beria and admit. In

other words, dear reader, there was neither a bloody executioner nor an agent international imperialism, neither a careerist and an intriguer, nor a boor, nor a complete power and voluptuary ... It was not!

There was a man ... Not an angel, but not a villain either. Certainly not a villain.

The villain, moreover, the classic, insidious, dressing up in innocence, was Nikita Khrushchev. And it was he who, realizing that henceforth the master of the country and the support of the nomenklatura - he, on this Plenum simply reveled in the first role that he wrested from life in a matter of days. He tasted the sweetness of **supreme** power for the first time and did not particularly control himself, so sometimes emotional phrases burst out from him, according to the "intellectual" level and

stylistic construction worthy of the mouth of the unforgettable "Gregory" Efimovich Rasputin: "Such an adventurer!", "Wow, what a scoundrel!" and so on.

Especially the feeling of Nikita's triumph manifested itself, perhaps, in the following words:

"... An intriguer and, most importantly, that he considers everyone to be fools, thinks that he great scout, he understands everything ... He thinks that he is a great scout, he understands ... but not such simpletons turned out to be, as he thought.

Khrushchev rejoiced and lied, lied and rejoiced. And, rejoicing, sometimes blurted out about what shouldn't have talked. So, in a corrected, typographically published verbatim report of the plenum, intended for distribution to members of the Central Committee, candidates to members of the Central Committee and members of the Central Committee, as well as to the regional committees, regional committees and central committees of the communist parties national republics, he allegedly uttered the following text:

"Recently, he (Beria. - **S.K.**) entered the Presidium of the Central Committee with a proposal to special meetings. We haven't discussed this issue yet. Decided before Beria plant, and then discuss. **Beria made a proposal on the rights special meeting** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What is special meeting? This means that Beria arrests, Beria interrogates and Beria judges."

And the reader had legitimate grounds to be indignant at the "power-hungry" Beria, seeking to continue to "arrest, interrogate and judge."

However, in reality, Khrushchev blurted out the exact opposite, which follows from uncorrected transcript:

"It is interesting with what proposals he entered the Presidium. We don't have them yet discussed, did not have time, decided to plant him earlier, and then discuss. He contributed a proposal that it is necessary **to liquidate the Special Meeting** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Indeed, this is a shameful thing. What is a Special Meeting? This means that Beria arrests, interrogates and Beria judges.

Like this.

But how was the Special Meeting (OS) really? For the first time, in connection with the end of the war", proposed to sharply limit the rights of the OS in a note addressed to Stalin dated October 1, 1945, the alleged "executioner" Beria.

Let me remind you that in 1938 the Special Meeting of the NKVD was deprived of the right to sentence to capital punishment with the right to decide on imprisonment for up to 8 years. Only on November 17, 1941, the State Committee Defense again gave the OS the right to sentence to death.

Now, Beria, as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, himself, on his own initiative, proposed limiting the OS to the right to sentence to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years with confiscation of property. Such is the "executioner" and "sadist".

Stalin then did not accept Beria's proposal, and after Beria left the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Special the meeting was additionally vested with the right to exile to an indefinite settlement, to imprison in special camps for 20 years hard labor of persons who had escaped from a permanent place of settlement, etc.

Moreover, all this happened at the time of the supervision of the special services by Malenkov and "Leningrader" Kuznetsov! Already they are not Stalin's proposals like Beria's bothered.

But, say, Khrushchev, in a note to Stalin in February 1948, offered extrajudicial order, according to public verdicts of rural gatherings, to evict outside the Ukrainian SSR (in fact - exile) "harmful elements". This proposal was implemented in the Decree

Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 2, 1948, and the idea was quite reasonable. But in systemically, it looked just like ... the idea of the OS: when measures need to be taken, and according to it is difficult for the court to accept them, it is reasonable to accept them in a

special order. One way or another, during the life of Stalin, the question of the fate and rights of the OS was not resolved. And on June 15, 1953, Beria again raised this issue, proposing *"to limit the rights of the Special meetings ... allowing him to consider cases that, for operational or public considerations cannot be referred to the judiciary, and apply penalties ... not more than 10 years in prison ... or exile."*

This is what Khrushchev now blamed Beria, and also distorted about the fact that Beria "arrests" ... Beria could be arrested only with the sanction of the prosecutor (this is Khrushchev arrested him without authorization!).

From the authentic transcript of Khrushchev's speech, one can also extract extra confirmation the fact that the termination of the "doctors' case" was initiated not by Beria, but by Khrushchev, who spoke So:

"If we take the late questions - doctors - this is a shameful thing for us, it's Linden..."

So it is, but the shame was not in the arrest of those who were unconditionally guilty of many sins doctors, but in the fact that such businessmen, dubious in all respects, were entrusted health care of state leaders. And it was profitable to gloss over this shameful fact especially Khrushchev.

IN GENERAL, the plenum opened with a speech by Malenkov, but it could not set the right tone for the court - the Chairman of the Council of Ministers spoke without passion, listlessly. And perhaps that is why there are no transcripts of his speech in the archives. Even edited and its anti-Berian strengthened text in the official report is not impressive: the strongest the expression that Malenkov found for Beria is "adventurer". So from a systemic point

of view, the true starting point of the three-day action was Khrushchev's speech. I say "three days" because the plenum, formally which lasted from July 2 to 7, actually had a two-day break on Saturday and Sunday, 5 and 6 July. And on July 7 it all ended in a couple of hours without performances (only Cheered up, Malenkov delivered a lengthy concluding speech, where, by the way, he briefly but unequivocally condemned Stalin's "personality cult"). With his speech,

Khrushchev set the tone for the entire "work" of the plenum, and already at the beginning he made it clear that no one should be embarrassed either in terms of the choice of expressions or in terms of fabrications - as long as they were addressed to Beria. And

Khrushchev was understood by everyone ... About the one who effectively fought the counter-revolution in the 20th and 30s, who invested a lot of effort in the development of the Soviet Transcaucasia, in the restructuring of the NKVD USSR, in repelling German aggression and ensuring Victory, about who took over huge responsibility for the uranium and missile problems, and after the death of Stalin showed himself to be the most active, enterprising and understanding the essence of the era leader of the state, at the plenum, not only a single good, but minimum objective word...

However, no, Molotov said this:

"... He did a great job, he talentedly worked in organizing a number of business activities..."

However, he immediately stated:

"... but listen, we also use pests, we make them work..."

However, in the official report on the plenum, this part of Molotov's speech looked already more politically correct:

"It is impossible to deny his organizational abilities, which affected organizing and conducting a number of economic events ... "

Yes, Molotov, like Malenkov, did not immediately manage to rise to the desired "degree" denunciations and at the beginning of the speech even admitted:

"When on March 9 (after the death of Stalin. - **S.K.**) the Supreme Council, I called Beria in a comradely way. We were still comrades back then..."

However, then Vyacheslav Mikhailovich gained momentum and said:

"Since Beria arrived in Moscow (that is, it turns out, since August 1938. - **S.K.**), the atmosphere has deteriorated: the plenums have ceased to be held, the congress dragged on for 13 years ... He poisoned the atmosphere, he intrigued ... "

So, back on March 9, 1953, the "scum" and "stinky bug" Beria (the Minister Foreign Affairs of the USSR and such expressions) was a comrade for Molotov. But at the same time even before the war, Molotov knew that Beria was an intriguer, poisoning the atmosphere of a friendly partnership that reigned in Moscow before Beria arrived there ...

Yes, marvelous, marvelous, O Lord, are not Your works, but the works of Your creatures! Khrushchev's speech became a tuning fork, and all the rest tuned in to it ... Moreover the coordinated tone of the speeches of less leading comrades (a level below a member Presidium of the Central Committee) suggests that they are in the apparatus of the Khrushchev Central Committee, if not provided the relevant theses, then the detailed "valuable instructions" are not cheated ... And was it possible to prepare all this three, in fact, three days before the start of the Plenum

Central Committee

No, perhaps everything was not so simple with the arrest of Beria and the conspiracy against him, as and with a conspiracy against Stalin. And not even Khrushchev here, perhaps, was a genuine spring intrigues... Perhaps, here it is necessary to talk about those agents of influence, the number of which in Russia is post-Petrine times only multiplied, which did not disappear in Russia after revolution and who successfully survived the Great Patriotic War, gaining "second wind" in the atmosphere of the "cold war" of the West against the USSR. Let us return,

however, to the conference room in the Kremlin ... Of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except for Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Voroshilov spoke at the plenum ... Four years will pass, and all of them (as well as Pervukhin and Saburov), excluding Mikoyan and, of course, Khrushchev, will oppose Khrushchev's voluntarism. And right there will be labeled as an "anti-party group". And Khrushchev, with the assistance of the nomenklatura launch a new coup d'état. And deal with former colleagues, but already without their physical liquidation. Alive Beria was dangerous even deposed - he was a person. And here are the rest...

To one degree or another, many other "accusers" of Beria will end up ingloriously: the first Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee Andrianov, First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan Mirtskhulava, Arutinov and Bagirov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia Bakradze, secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhailov and Shatalin, Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov.

Some will soon be dismissed, others will be sharply lowered, Bagirov will be arrested in general and will be shot. Especially cool Khrushchev will "thank" the peasant son Sergei Kruglov.

Beria and Kruglov's deputy for personnel, General Obruchnikov at a party asset the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, held after the arrest of the minister, blamed except for Beria, and

a number of generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Sudoplatov, Eitingon, Reichman), but only after decades Sudoplatov learned that Obruchnikov repeated word for word Kruglov's speech at the plenum in the Kremlin. And this proves once again: Kruglov spoke according to the prescribed scheme. By the way, he was so worried in those days that he lost half his weight.

Well, there were reasons for that. Unlike the Khrushchevite Ivan Serov, Kruglov did not have attitude to the conspiracy against Beria and at the beginning of 1956 was removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, occupied tertiary positions, in 1958 (at 51) retired. In 1959 he stripped of the rank of colonel general and evicted from an elite apartment to a simple two-room. And in 1960 he was expelled from the party "for involvement in political repression." After that, Kruglov lived extremely poorly, he was in poverty in 1977, not having lived four months before his seventieth birthday, died under the wheels of an electric train near Moscow ...

Whether by accident or by choice, who knows.

But for now, July 1953 stood over the Kremlin ... Neither Kruglov and the already mentioned speakers, neither the Ukrainian figures Kirichenko and Serdyuk, nor the Lithuanian Snehkus, nor "Belarusian" Patolichev, nor "atomic scientist" Zavenyagin, nor ministers Malyshev, Tevosyan and Baibakov, nor Andreev, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, said nothing specific, incriminating Beria as an anti-state figure. General Sudoplatov later recalled that the speeches by Malenkov and the new Deputy Minister of the Interior cases of Shatalin (about him - a little later) on the party asset of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with an explanation of the reasons for the arrest Beria "for the professionals gathered in the conference room sounded naive and childish helpless"...

"Eitingon, Raikhman (generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. - **S.K.**) and I," wrote Sudoplatov, "immediately realized that there was no Beria conspiracy, there was anti-Beria conspiracy in the leadership of the country ... "

Doctor of Science and Professor Vladimir Naumov, known to the reader, in the collection "I Shepilov, who joined them, states:

"One of the prominent and, one might say, all-powerful figures (in fact, in every historical moment, only one figure can be **omnipotent** , and not several, by definition. - **S.K.**) Beria was surrounded by Stalin. However, authorities state security by 1953, such a dossier was collected, such a number compromising documents, which was more than enough to arrest and physical elimination (? - **S.K.**) Beria.

So, no sensational compromising documents were announced at the plenum did not have! No one! There were plenty of unfounded accusations, but documentary ones. There was no confirmation of any of them. But it was actually a party trial of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. But the defendant himself was absent.

But, you ask, why? Why was Beria not taken to the plenum? It would seem that everything, as they say now, is "captured". There is a new leadership in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it has demonstrated "loyalty to the Central Committee", and Ivan Serov participated in the Khrushchev conspiracy. Army on the alert and on the side Khrushchev Central Committee. No one is trying to free Beria. So why not everyone the condemned "adventurer", "schemer" and "scoundrel" cannot be imagined before menacing eyes party plenum, in order to finally and irrevocably verify the legitimacy of such tough and unexpected measures in relation to the second, in fact, face of the state?

The answer is obvious: very many of those who gathered in the meeting room of the plenum, and before all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, one way or another knew Beria through joint work and in depth souls could not fail to realize that all of them, by their ability to work and control crisis situations head and shoulders below the LP. And if he was "alive" in the "dock", then everything could quickly fall into place! And it is very possible that on this bench here someone from the presidium would have to move.

After all, the speech of the same Khrushchev was so inconsistent, chaotic and unsubstantiated false that Beria would not cost anything to refute Nikita. And also - and all the other "accusers". And among the participants of the plenum there were not only partocrats, but also a lot of business people.

THEREFORE, Khrushchev in his speech took, if not the bull by the horns, then the donkeys by the ears, immediately and Cool. From the very first words, he defined Beria as "adventurers" and "great intriguers", accused him of working for the Musavatists, vaguely and confusedly referring to long-standing suspicions of "i.e. Kaminsky, "and then said:" Dexterity, impudence and arrogance are the main qualities Beria". Well, and then, in general, "let's go" ... There is no way to give all examples of Khrushchev's "logicality", but perhaps one will suffice. Here are two fragments of a genuine transcript of his speech, separated from each other friend for no more than five minutes. This is what was said at the beginning:

"Comrades, Comrade Malenkov reported to the Central Committee of the Party, as members of the Presidium... cherished the preservation of the unity of the collective of members of the Presidium — ... so that this unity ... is transmitted to the entire Central Committee ... "

And shortly after that:

"You, dear comrades, keep in mind that Beria achieved his goal even when life of Comrade Stalin, he achieved disunity among the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee "...

So what was "above" during the life of Stalin - "disunity" or "unity team"? And what were the members of the Presidium worth as individuals, if they could be quarrel with each other with intrigues and sow discord between them? Is it the Bolsheviks or operetta prima donnas? By

the way, it was in Khrushchev's speech that the term "camp dust" sounded ... And I really guess that the writers of the libels about Beria transferred it from this speech to the lexicon of the "bloody executioner" invented by them, these are infamous and hardly Khrushchev the words that came to mind.

It should be noted that the speakers at the plenum were chosen not stupidly - according to understandable principle. What good things could be said about Beria by Serdyuk, Patolichev, Kirichenko, Snechkus, or the Orientally flexible Bakradze, Mirtskhulava, Ketskhoveli, Arutinov, who "suffered" from him? The first secretary

of the Lvov Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Serdyuk, referring to Beria's note and Mexico, stated:

"We wanted to portray that there is no Soviet power in the western regions. During the day, it is still supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and at night, OUN members completely rule (OUN, "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" Bandera. - **S.K.**)".

But later he said:

"At the hands of nationalists, the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people, died on Ukraine, about 30 thousand party workers, bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, soldiers and officers Soviet Army, party-Soviet and collective farm activists.

After all, these data are already post-war ... And they proved that Beria was right: Soviet power in the western regions still does not have a solid status, and the only sure way out is to recognize this fact and use predominantly not forceful, but political measures to position changes.

About how freshly minted "atomic" minister Vyacheslav slandered LP Malyshev, previously a relatively minor figure in the uranium problem, I already wrote. But no less vilely slandered Beria by his colleague in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Special Committee Avraamy Zavenyagin, a large figure in the uranium project.

Even before him, Malenkov, referring to the "atomic" activities of the LP, did not mention him with a word contribution to the success of nuclear work, but stated:

“... and here he isolated himself and began to act, ignoring the Central Committee and the government in the most important questions of the work of the Central Committee. So, without the knowledge of the Central Committee and government decided to organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb. Whether it is necessary talk about the meaning of this fact?

We are talking about our first thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s, which Malenkov publicly boasted a month later, on August 5, at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He then said:

“The American imperialists are frightening us with a superweapon — a hydrogen bomb. But we should not be scared, we not only know the secret of the hydrogen bomb, but they created it.

Moreover, the test took place only on August 12, 1953, and success automatically was not guaranteed. That is, Malenkov once again confirmed that he, unlike Beria - was an amateur in specific atomic issues, whom information about them You shouldn't let them in ahead of time, even if Malenkov is formally admitted to them. However, in any case, Beria was the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the only top management capable of competently resolve nuclear issues. So what kind of ignoring the Central Committee and the government can was to speak?

However, Malenkov and Zavenyagin lied at the plenum - the same about the preparation of the test Malenkov was well informed for a long time and did not express any objections. March 8 In 1952, Zavenyagin sent a letter to the head of KB-11, General Zernov. The letter, in addition to the usual heading "Top Secret (Special Folder)", also had additional stamp "Keep on a par with the cipher. Only personally, "and Zavenyagin wrote in it:

“In pursuance of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 827-303ss / op dated February 26, 1950, I propose: a) by **May 1, 1952** (underlined and italicized fit from hands. - **S.K.**) of the year to manufacture according to the principle proposed by Comrade **Sakharov A.D.** , an **RDS-6s** product with a small multi-layer dressing on ordinary magnesium (as in Lithium was coded for correspondence. - **S.K.**) with the addition of 5 arbitrary units of yttrium (radioactive isotope of hydrogen - tritium. - **S.K.**) and in **June 1952** to test this product to verify and refine the theoretical and experimental foundations **of RDS-6s ...** ”

etc.

And Malenkov read some especially important decisions of the Council of Ministers, so the test RDS-6 with a surprise for him could not be. Zavenyagin, repeating Malenkov's accusation, added it:

“We have prepared a draft government decision. He (Beria. - **S.K.**) ... took him with him to read ... After two weeks, he invites us and begins see document. I read it. He is at home, apparently, read it, begins fix. Comes to the end. Signature - Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov. Strikes it out. Says it's not required. And puts his signature.

So what?! Beria sometimes signed resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR even under Stalin. And it is quite clear that now he could simply be humanly
it's a shame: Malenkov had more than an indirect relation to nuclear development, but
resolution - sign him? No, you bastards! Although, most
likely, Lavrenty Pavlovich was guided here by state
considerations. After all, the draft resolution on testing our first atomic bomb
RDS-1 was not signed. Stalin considered that it was not worth doing this because of the possible
test failures. And Zavenyagin carried:

"I, comrades, worked with Beria for quite a few years and had the opportunity
watch this person. From the very beginning, the main quality was evident
Beria is contempt for people. He despised the entire Soviet people ... he considered
simpletons of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, whom he can at any moment take into
fist and isolate. And he himself turned out to be a simpleton, a blind sheep ...
For Beria, there was nothing sacred ... A very negative quality of Beria
initiative was suppressed. If you come forward with any proposal, they will immediately cut you
off, put you in your place: here is an inventor found ... But from the point
of view of understanding the issue, getting to the heart of the matter - I would
he said, he was a dumb (? - **S.K.**) person. Without flattery (n-yes! - **S.K.**) to members
Presidium of the Central Committee I can say: any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee is much faster and
understood issues more deeply and could figure it out than Beria ... In his stupidity, he
I couldn't get into it..."

Moreover, Zavenyagin also accused Beria of bureaucracy, stating that *"he
fenced off from people, it happened, for weeks, for months he did not receive workers, he
subordinates."* But the workers subordinate to him, including Zavenyagin, practically
every week, together with Beria, they took part in meetings of the same Special Committee ...

Zavenyagin did not shy away from juggling specific details, for example,
attributing to Beria a lack of attention to the use of atomic energy in the marine
fleet: they say that Zavenyagin and Vannikov raised this question two years ago, but he "didn't
resolved ... stale. And here

is a certificate from V. A. Makhnev dated March 25, 1950, according to a letter from the naval
Minister Admiral I. S. Yumashev addressed to L. P. Beria dated March 21, 1950:

"... Comrade Yumashev's proposal (to start developing a uranium engine
for submarines) will be considered by the Special Committee in
resolving the issue of a plan for research work on the use of nuclear
energy for industrial purposes and for engines (draft plan
provides for the development of such an engine) ... "

On the front side of the sheet of litter: *"It was decided positively. Experienced ship
is being developed. V. Makhnev "*, and on the back of the sheet: *" Comrade reported. Beria A.P. 27.III
50 V. Makhnev.* And in light of this, it is not clear: whether Zavenyagin deliberately slandered the LP, or
knew his business so "well" that he did not know about the development of "object No. 627" - our first
nuclear submarine? But

Malenkov could not have been unaware of her, because on April 18, 1953, he, as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1087-445ss / op "On
approval of the tactical and technical assignment for experimental object No. 627. Approved
TTZ is always the result of a lot of preliminary work. And it began with the participation
Beria, but ended, alas, without him ("object No. 627" was launched on August 9, 1957). Separately, it is

necessary to dwell on the following fragment of the transcript of the Zavenyagin

speeches:

"Zavenyagin. ... He had a habit after the death of Comrade Stalin ... to play a game of economy: money is needed, it is necessary to save, industry develop culture, help agriculture, but there are issues in which we could not afford excessive savings. Capacity needs to be developed nuclear energy... Beria says: "To hell, you're throwing a lot of money, fit into the five-year plan... fit into what you have." **Malenkov.** This business will have to be controlled, because there is money spent without control.

Zavenyagin. It is definitely..."

It is interesting here, firstly, how instantly Zavenyagin dodged without hitting "in jet"... I wanted to bite Beria, and Malenkov, not distinguished by such a quick reaction, actually confirmed the correctness of LP. And Zavenyagin, like a weather vane, immediately agrees, although Malenkov said something directly opposite to what Zavenyagin expected to hear. But even more interesting is this point in essence. In the first period of "Sturm und Drang," the nuclear scientists were indeed given everything they asked for. And that's many actually corrupted, with which Beria was already beginning to fight in the early 50s and was right about that! The main production capacities of the nuclear industry have already been created, and now it was necessary to optimize its activities as much as possible.

And at the same time, it was necessary to develop rational military and military-political approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons. Alas, after the elimination of Beria, and even with his hands military, Khrushchev was to a large extent a hostage of the marshall, and instead of optimizing defense activities of the state based on the rational use of nuclear weapons factor, we got an arms race that was fueled not only by obvious external threats of the West, but also marshal-general short-sightedness and ambition. Sometimes the accusations against Beria at the plenum were downright absurd. So, Khrushchev said:

"Comrades, you know that for several years Comrade Malenkov was entrusted oversee agriculture. Beria demonstrates his outward friendship, inseparable, inseparable from comrade Malenkov, ruining agriculture, bringing this economy to the last degree. I can't stand it any longer: there is no milk, there is little meat. They announced the transition from socialism to communism, but we do not sell flour. A what is communism without hot cakes, to put it bluntly ... "

The Bureau of Agriculture, headed by Malenkov, was formed

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 8, 1947, that is, six years before death of Stalin. But in July 1953, Beria was accused of not having hot cakes. H Yes...

Much was spread about the "sabotage" of Beria in agriculture and Mikoyan, although from his lengthy speeches it was not clear - what does Beria have to do with it? Even if he had different from the rest of the point of view on, for example, the purchase prices for potatoes or meat, then after all, he did not decide these issues alone, and not he in the first place. A Mikoyan Beria's accusations even dragged a herring ... I, dear reader, am not joking! Here transcript (not corrected, this nonsense was removed from the official report):

"Mikoyan. ... Or take a catch of herring. Our catch is twice as large, and in the sale of herring is less than under the king. Under the tsar, 280 thousand were imported instead of bread. We press, we press, but the fish industry does not give any more.

Here even Khrushchev could not stand it:

"Khrushchev . One might get the impression that we actually sat and

trembled before him. There were many cases when we gave good teeth and made decisions. And then it seems that we were sitting and looking at him..."

So the question is: who prevented you from "give in the teeth" every time when on an enlightened the look of the "blunt" Beria members of the Presidium of the Central Committee so praised by Zavenyagin was not right?

Alas, reading the transcript of the plenum, I want to paraphrase the famous Krylov line like this: "You are to blame for the fact that we want power" ...

But it was not only a matter of striving to preserve power and privileges! Against Beria at that plenum took up arms both wounded ambitions and mediocrity. Sometimes almost comical (if it were not for the blood) looked, say, the speech of a colorless "old Bolshevik" Andreev.

Immediately declaring that Beria is an enemy of an "unusual type", "an old provocateur, an old adventurer", Andreev went all out:

"All of us, the old Central Committee members, and the new ones too, know what a warm friendship was between Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov ... But then Beria appeared in Moscow - and everything changed radically ... Comrade Molotov became to be subjected to undeserved attacks by Comrade Stalin ...

Everyone knows what Comrade Voroshilov is, what is his share in our party, and everyone knows about the close friendship between Comrade Stalin and Voroshilov. WITH With the appearance of Beria, the situation completely changes, Comrade Voroshilov is wiped out, in fact, for some time without work. This is the work of Beria ... "

Beria "appeared" in Moscow in August 1938. Molotov from 1931 to 1941 was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR. Only in May 1941, in on the eve of the most important events, Stalin took over the Council of People's Commissars, but Molotov remained in Sovnarkom face number 2. In May 1939, Molotov was appointed to the most important post of people's commissar foreign affairs. In November 1940, Stalin trusted him to negotiate with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin. With the outbreak of war, Molotov became Stalin's deputy in State Defense Committee. Good attacks!

Voroshilov ... Until May

1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, removed not by Beria's slander, but by the results of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but appointed after that Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. With the outbreak of war - commander-in-chief North-Western direction, who later retired to second and third roles not because of Beria's intrigues, but because of "service inconsistency." But was the ex-member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the "old Central Committee member" Andreev, really, if it was necessary to flatter himself to current members of the Presidium of the Central Committee?

He surpassed himself, "exposing" the initiative of Beria about the portraits of the "leaders". IN the transcript looks like this:

Andreev. I believe that it was not without his influence that the decision, which we read in the minutes, was made to hold the demonstration without portraits, not to hang portraits (here no longer involved in the highest secrets leadership Andreev got to the very point regarding the authorship of Beria! - **S.K.**). Why? On what basis? The people should know their leaders by their portraits, by their speeches. It was the wrong decision.

*From the Presidium of comrade **Voroshilov.** Wrong decision.*

Andreev. It was a concession to the enemy. *From the Presidium of comrade **Kaganovich.** Andrei Andreevich, this decision was cancelled. (Stormy applause)...*

The people should know their leaders not by portraits, but by deeds! For the leader working people, this is an elementary truth, but ... But what is there! Are spacious comments?!

Andreev also owns the following amusing (if it were not for blood) assessment Beria's activities:

"He certainly did a great job **sometime** "...

And you immediately remember the chorus of the Brezhnev era: "If someone here and there sometimes honestly does not want to live ... "

If carefully analyze and documentary refute all insinuations against Beria, expressed only at that plenum, then a separate book will turn out. So I will limit myself to just one more fragment of the transcript, without which it is impossible to do without.

Secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin immediately after the arrest of Beria was appointed concurrently First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It was Shatalin who was entrusted search of Beria's office in the Council of Ministers, and this is what is reported about his alleged results in the transcript of Shatalin's speech at the evening meeting on July 3:

"Shatalin. While doing this task, looking through the contents of the safes... we came across things and objects unusual for office rooms. Along with documents, we found in large quantities all kinds of, how is it to name, attributes of a women's toilet. Here are brief (?! - **S.K.**) excerpts from the inventory, which I want to announce. I remind and repeat that this is in the office in Council of Ministers, here: ladies' tracksuits, ladies' blouses, ladies' stockings foreign firms - 11 pairs, women's silk combinations - 11 pairs, ladies' silk tights - 7 pairs, cuts for ladies' dresses - 5 cuts, silk ladies' headscarves, handkerchiefs of foreign firms, silk children's combinations, some more children's things, etc., a whole list (in the official In the report, "a total of 29 serial numbers" were added. - **S.K.**). I think that what I have published (published. - **S.K.**) is already enough. Us found numerous letters from women of the most intimate, I would say, vulgar content. We also found a large number of items depraved men. These things speak for themselves, and, as they say, no comments are required ... "

One can imagine with what hidden interest the plenum listened to these alleged "revelations". Yaroslav Gashek, the creator of the immortal good soldier Schweik, wrote about the "zealots" of public morality, who, however, go to public toilets to read obscene graffiti on the walls. And here

there are so many "underwear" at once, but not dirty, but silk! Yes, at the Plenum of the Central Committee! Shatalin, with the experience of a skilled "fighter of the ideological front," added to the rotten "strawberries" and added:

"Nevertheless, for the greater persuasiveness of this side of the matter, I will read the testimony of a certain Sarkisov, who for 18 years worked in the protection of Beria ...

This is what this same Sarkisov showed: "I know numerous connections Beria with all sorts of random women ... I know that through a certain citizen S. (let me not mention my last name) Beria was familiar with girlfriend S ...

In addition, I know that Beria cohabited with a student Institute of Foreign Languages \u200b\u200bMaya ... Beria also cohabited from 18-20-summer girl Lyalya. From Beria she had a child with whom she lived on dacha (in the official report it is added: "at the former dacha of Obruchnikov." - **S.K.**).

While in Tbilisi, Beria cohabited with citizen M., after cohabitation with Beria, M. had a child ... I also know that Beria cohabited with a certain Sophia ... At the direction of Beria, I started a whole list of women with whom he cohabited. **(Laughter in the hall.)** Subsequently, I destroyed this list (in the official report added: "at his suggestion." - **S.K.)**. However, one the list has been preserved, this list contains the names, telephone numbers of 25–27 such women. This list is in my apartment in the pocket of my tunic "... (in The official report added: "The list that Sarkisov is talking about has been found, it contains 39 women." - **S.K.)**".

But that's not all! Shatalin, quoting Sarkisov, further strengthened the effect:

"A year or a half ago, I (Sarkisov. - **S.K.)** definitely found out about Beria's *connections* with prostitutes ... He had syphilis, his doctor treated him polyclinics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs such and such. Signature - Sarkisov.

Then came the summary:

"Here, comrades, is the true face of this applicant, so to speak, to the leaders the Soviet people. And this dirty pug dared to compete with our party, with our Central Committee. This dirtiest man tried to bring discord into the ranks of our Presidium"

etc.

Psychologically, Shatalin's speech became a kind of peak in the "work" of the plenum. Yes, and on account she stood in the middle. And not without reason, *immediately after its completion*, Khrushchev announced break for 15 minutes. "Party comrades" should have been given the opportunity to hot impressions, discuss what they heard and gossip on the topic - what kind of "Objects of a libertine man" was discovered by Comrade Shatalin in Lavrenty's safe?

The protocol of the interrogation of Sarkisov on July 1, 1953, ended at 23:00, is cited by A. Sukhomlinov. Sarkisov was interrogated personally by the Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko (so it is written in the protocol, although Rudenko became him in the constitutional order only a month after the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) and Assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor Bazenko. And from the protocol it is clear that Shatalin quoted the testimony of Sarkisov not exactly. Let's say a fragment about an alleged venereal disease looks like this:

"A year or a year and a half ago, Beria's wife, in a conversation with me, said that in As a result of Beria's connections with prostitutes, he suffered from syphilis. He was treated by a doctor polyclinic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yuri Borisovich, I don't remember his last name.

Professional lawyer A. Sukhomlinov evaluates this protocol as follows:

"If the investigator brought me such a protocol of interrogation of one of witnesses in the case, then this investigator would fly out of my office overnight (I draw the reader's attention to the too energetic lexicon of the minister justice. - **S.K.)**. I grabbed some pieces and fragments, nothing really found out, did not set control questions ... "

But after all, the interrogation of Sarkisov was not an investigative action! Already from his "protocol" the first "interrogation" and from other testimonies of Sarkisov, it is clear why the guard was arrested. The poorly educated Sarkisov was ideally suited to as quickly as possible to concoct the primary "compromising evidence" on Beria. I will bring more later his "revelations", and now I will again refer to A. Sukhomlinov:

“Approximately the same is the case with Beria’s disease - syphilis. This has not been documented. No medical history documents no illness and protocols of interrogation of medical workers...”

But what was the truth to the secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin, if Khrushchev decided to make Beria libertine, accurately calculating that this will provide the effect he needs more reliably than accusations of Beria of provocateurism and other things ... So it happened, by the way, - when the materials of the Central Committee about Beria were read out later at closed party meetings, then ordinary party members for decades remembered, first of all, those places where it was said about the multitude women of the decomposed "enemy of the people".

Actually, to this day, the image is driven into the consciousness of the masses not so much as an "executioner" as "sexual maniac" Beria.

Prosecutor Sukhomlinov devoted an entire chapter to this topic in his book, "Genital Beria's crimes. Actually, he had to quote the second word, because the author of the book himself documented, with legal analysis, proves that crimes did not

have. "Were there women?" the reader may ask. So, there were no women. And to not to return to this topic, I will say something about it now - before we get to "Investigation" on the "case" of Beria.

The same Sukhomlinov reports that Antonov-Ovseenko writes more than two hundred women "presented before the court" and ironically adds that some raise this number to seven hundred (!). At the same time, in fact, according to the evidence A. Sukhomlinov, in the materials of the criminal case there is only "Sarkisov's list". And already this circumstance - regardless of the authenticity of the list - allows you to dismiss as all the slanderous stories about the unfortunate schoolgirls that Beria hunted for streets of Moscow, looking out for them from the "black crow". It's one thing to keep a record of lovers, and the other is the record of victims of violence. No one keeps such lists, and even through bodyguard!

Sarkisov's list cannot include more than thirty-nine women, and who knew why they are required, that is, in these cases (even if they were) about rape is out of the question. In the official indictment, by the way, Beria was charged with only one rape of a certain Lyalya Drozdova, and A. Sukhomlinov substantively shows that this accusation against Beria is not sewn with dirty white thread.

And what fun! On page 112 of his book, Sukhomlinov (!) allegedly from the words of his daughter-in-law Beria Martha Peshkova-Beria reports that Beria allegedly had an affair with a young beauty Lyalya Drozdova, from whom Beria allegedly had a daughter. But in clearly "her" "statement" dictated to this Lyalya by the Rudenkovites about the alleged rape of her Beria, dated July 11, 1953 (facsimile on pages 242–243), about her daughter nothing is said. However, on page 227 of Sukhomlinov's book it is reported that when The mother of this Vali-Lali was interrogated, then she "reported" that "Valentina became pregnant from Beria, but she was placed in the Kremlin hospital, where she had an abortion." Look at all this and you think: "Did Sukhomlinov himself proofread his book after he had written it?" Very she, his book, is distinguished by similar inconsistencies. Yes, it is understandable - to the author and I wanted to arouse the reader's interest by the "objectivity" and novelty of the material, and from the image of the "monster" Beria did not want to go far. And the task is to acquire capital, and to keep innocence is not easy. With

Gorbachev's "drive to power", it became fashionable, and often commercially profitable, to shake the dirty linen of history. However, massive, numbering in the hundreds, "memories" and the interview of the former "tyrant's concubines" never appeared ... Similar claims were made by few old women, although most of those women who were 20-30 years old in 1953, in the 90s years were alive. But even the most persistent in her efforts to stay in bed

Beria, Nina Chermenskaya-Alekseeva (I'll talk about her later) is unlikely to have been there.

But these "hundreds" appeared after the destruction of Beria in the speeches of the highest government figures. So, on May 6, 1954, the Prosecutor General of the USSR Roman Rudenko spoke at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on the occasion of "exposing" another "enemy of the people" - the former Minister of State security of Abakumov, and the name of Beria in Rudenko's speech sounded almost more often than the name of Abakumov himself. The faithful Khrushchevite did not disdain the following gossip:

The former chief of security for Beria, who was arrested by Sarkisov, testified: "Oh moral decay of Beria, I reported to Abakumov. In 1948 or 1949 I came to his office and told him that I no longer wanted to work in protection of Beria. Abakumov asked why I didn't want to work there. I said that I ask you to transfer me to some other place, because Beria is debauched. Abakumov asked: "Does he have many women?" I answered: "Hundreds! In every lane, on every street..."

So, there were neither hundreds, nor even dozens of "sexual victims" of Beria. When on the highest, honor, state level allow themselves to accuse a person of such manner ("... in every alley, on every street ..."), then I dare say: "Not in one lane and not one street!" And when they talk: "Hundreds ...", I will object: "And units did not have!"

By the way, when Rudenko referred to Sarkisov, the former guard was already in psychiatric hospital. It seems that his emotional Caucasian nature could not cope with the psychological burden of the moral betrayal of his boss.

Regarding the mythical "Sarkisov's list", it has long been noted that Rudenko's investigation team seems to have simply used the real list of girlfriends the long-arrested ex-chief of Stalin's security, General Vlasik. The "List of Vlasik" was compiled based on the results of an investigation of Vlasik's sins that took place. A then he (the list) was useful for discrediting Beria. And if someone in real time scale and saw the similarity of the two lists, it was always possible, sorry, to give up from critics that Vlasik and Beria were used by the same cheerful girls.

Unlike "ideologically consistent party members" and "democrats", I am of little interest "sexual theme" in the life of Lavrenty Pavlovich. And to close it in my book, I will bring extracts from an interesting article by T. Koridze, published in Nos. 1–2 of the Tbilisi newspaper "7 DGE" for July 28, 1990 and reprinted in September 1990 by the Kyiv newspaper "24 hours" translated by P. Zgonnikov.

The article is called "I never interfered in the affairs of Lawrence ..." and presents is a recording of a conversation with 86-year-old Nina Teimurazovna Beria-Gegechkori, who then lived "in outskirts of a big city on the banks of the Dnieper, on a green street, in an ordinary "Khrushchev" ... "

This, in my opinion, is a historical document of great power and great persuasiveness. Nino Beria and at the age of 86 retained, as T. Koridze writes, traces of the former beauty, clarity of memory and thoughts. What she said relates to the theme of mythical "Beria's women" only in a small part, but below I will give a lengthy quote from this articles - the material is worth it!

"We lived in Baku for one year, then returned to Tbilisi... We lived in poverty. Time it was like living like a human being was ashamed, they fought with wealth.

In the 31st year, Lavrenty was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia. Before him on Kartvelishvili worked in this post, who beat off one official wife. True, later, when Kartvelishvili was removed, she went to another.

Lawrence was constantly busy with work. Almost no time for family remained. He worked very hard. Now it's easy to criticize, but then there really was a struggle. The Soviet government had to win. Do you remember,

what did Stalin write about the enemies of socialism? These enemies really existed ... Stalin wanted to make a big and strong state, and he did it ... "

The intonation here is very sincere, authentic - after all, this is a person speaking, a lot experienced and wise. He speaks about himself and about his time:

"We moved to Moscow at the end of 1938. By that time, the repressions of the 37th have already ended. When they write about my husband, for some reason they forget about it. So easier: there is a person who can be blamed for everything ... But I am sure that once an objective history will be written, and then everything will fall into place. I will not live to see this time, but you will definitely live, you are young.

I have never interfered in my husband's business affairs. The then the leaders did not devote their wives to their affairs, so I can't say anything about it. The fact that he was accused of high treason is, of course, demagoguery - in something to blame. In 1953 there was a coup. They were afraid, as if after Stalin's death, Beria did not take his place. I knew my husband: he was a man practical mind and understood that after the death of Stalin, to become the head of the Georgian states is impossible. That's probably why he went along the person he needs, such as Malenkov ... "

Malenkov, of course, was needed by Beria not for personal interests, but because Beria hoped to create a truly effective leading "tandem" "Beria - Malenkov" in the interests of Russia. However, Malenkov, alas, did not think as broadly as his active colleague. The real, that is, the active and determined Bolshevik of the two, was only LP, and it is significant how accurately the widow of Beria assessed the events of 1953 in 1990:

"In June 53rd, my son Sergo and I were suddenly arrested and placed in different prisons. At first we thought that there was a coup d'état and power was seized by anti-communist forces.

I was in Butyrka. Every day an investigator came and demanded evidence from me against my husband. He said that "the people are outraged by the crimes Lawrence". I answered him that I would never give information - neither bad nor good..."

As for "women," Nino Beria said this about it:

"One day the warder told me that 760 women had confessed mistresses of Beria (thanks to A. Sukhomlinov, we know that the warden lied. - **S.K.**). An amazing thing: Lavrentiy was busy working day and night when he had to make love with a legion of these women ?! Actually everything it was different. During the war and later, he was in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence. These women were his collaborators, informants, and only with they had direct contact. Lawrence had a phenomenal memory, and he kept in mind everything that concerned his official relations with these women. A then, when they were asked about their relationship with the boss, naturally, everyone said that were his mistresses. And what were they to do? Recognize the charge of undercover subversive work?

This explanation, by the way, is quite plausible! Moreover, it is also understandable why There are no materials about this "legion" in the investigation file. Rudenko and K° were profitable somehow "Light up" the very fact of Beria's contact with hundreds of women, presenting it as "debauchery." And here record the names and personal data of operational employees and proxies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs it was useless. No,

Lavrenty Beria was not a womanizer both by nature and by virtue of a special official position, and because of the maximum workload. Incidentally, folk

USSR artist Lydia Smirnova, already in her old age, with a smile, dismissed gossip about that she was Beria's mistress. True, another actress, T. Okunevskaya, attributed this to herself, which A. Sukhomlinov also innocently believed. However, getting to know him cited excerpt from Okunevskaya's "memoirs" convinces us that we are dealing only with the "high society" dreams of an exalted lady with hypertrophied developed fantasy. In

2004, "Notes of a Mistress" by a certain Nina Alekseeva Chermenskaya were also published, with a not very encouraging indication: "A literary record and compositional construction of Igor Minutko. Former operetta and song ensemble actress and the dances of the NKVD at first glance may indeed seem plausible variant of the subject of LP's passion... She was very similar to the young Nino Gegechkori, her name is the same... Getting acquainted with her "notes", "compositionally built" by Igor Minute, at first I even doubted: maybe this is really a hobby for LP - not the next, but the only one that reminded of youth and beckoned by the past? But after reading decided: "Hardly" ... And the point is not even in the numerous and obvious actual "punctures". In general, the whole story of Chermenskaya does not fit into the fate of LP.

Doesn't fit! How

the story does not fit not only into his fate, but in general into the framework of plausibility another candidate for mistress, already incognito - "citizens K., housewives." He was heard, recorded and told to fellow citizens by the writer Kirill Stolyarov in his book "Executioners and victims" ... Like, once Beria allegedly came to this "passion" directly from the Red square, immediately after the funeral of Zhdanov. Allegedly called her when from the square "still the sounds of mourning melodies were heard" ... And in response to her bewildered questions, supposedly answered: "When you encounter sadness, you strive for the living" ... Stolyarov,

without questioning this story (of course - we are talking about the "executioner" Beria!), further "thoughtfully" remarks: "... The innocence of citizen K. is a separate issue ... And here is Beria's attitude towards Zhdanov ... "etc. But after all, the conscientiousness of the "well-known Publicist" citizen K. Stolyarov is also a separate issue, and it will have to be touched upon. I would like to know how K. Stolyarov imagines this?

The orchestras are still playing mournful melodies, over the grave of Zhdanov has just grown a fresh mound ... Comrade Stalin, who has grown stern, says to his comrades-in-arms something like: "Well, what well, comrades! He rest in peace, and we will go, remember the servant of God Andrei in the old Russian custom" ... And then Comrade Beria, sideways, sideways, strives to move into aside, and to Comrade Stalin's bewildered question, something like: "Yes, Comrade Stalin, when I encounter sad things, I strive for living things ... So why are you going to the wake, but I'd rather go to the women ...

"So does citizen K. Stolyarov imagine this? There is a photograph, most likely from the very beginning of the 50s ... Beria is taken with his wife on it and their secretaries Ludwigov and Ordynstev. Charming, wonderful Nino Beria, who has retained her form, half-embraced her husband and looks at him completely in love with a look. Normal women do not look at adulterous husbands with such eyes!

Fans of memoirs can, of course, remind me, for example, of Kora Drobantseva Landau, who not only calmly treated her husband's permanent infidelities, but just a bed for his adventures in his own bedroom that was not made ... However, is it possible consider this Cora a normal woman? As, however, Landau himself is normal a man?

Here, perhaps, on this I will complete this topic.

Returning to the plenum, it must be said that its final chord was the decision that marked the beginning of a long-term process of demonization of the appearance Lavrenty Beria. And

as a result, the place of a member of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Committee, Deputy Chairman State Defense Committee and First Deputy Chairman of the Council

ministers of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor and laureate The Stalin Prize was replaced by a "ghoul", "sexual maniac" and "executioner", who "hands in blood" either up to the elbow, or up to the shoulder ...

The ATMOSPHERE of the July plenum of the Central Committee was reproduced - taking into account the scale - in various Moscow institutions and organizations associated with the activities of Beria, in including - and in KB-1 of the newly formed Ministry of Medium Machine Building. This the atmosphere was well described by our friend Grigory Kisunko. And yet, again, he did not understand that, in fact, he gave additional psychological arguments in whitewashing hated by him Beria. And Kisunko said the following:

"The head of KB-1 Elyan, the former director of the famous artillery factory, which gave the front more guns than the entire industry of fascist Germany, which became one of the leading the creation of the nuclear industry, and then the creation of the Berkut system.

While I was finishing my vacation (Beria's arrest took place when Kisunko rested with his family in Sochi. - **S.K.**), a stormy party meeting took place in KB-1, at which, as I was told, was branded not so much the enemy of the people Beria as his henchmen, who were called G. Ya. Kutepov (deputy head of KB-1, familiar to us from the leadership of TsKB-29 NKVD, whose chief designer Tupolev was arrested. - **S.K.**), P. N. Kuksenko, A. S. Elyan ...

Elyan got the most. I recalled grievances when he punished for dirt and disorder in the workshops, for defects in products, damage to tools and equipment, for drinking, and all this was attracted by the ears to the fact that he was a protege of Beria. Someone even remembered Yelyan that he did not provide sanatorium tour "our talented scientist Kisunko Grigory Vasilievich", who, because of this, wanders somewhere as a savage in Sochi (in reality, as Kisunko writes, he refused the vouchers, deciding to go exactly as a "savage" with the whole family. - **S.K.**)..."

Ah, dear reader, how the departmental infamy of this "party meeting" in relation to Yelyan, they reflected in miniature the infamy committed at the highest party state level in relation to Beria! And how tragically similar they were in both cases, motives and motives for "denunciations" and "exposures"!

Beria was not given the opportunity to respond to the insinuations against him, but I think if he could say something, his answer would be systematically similar to Yelyan's answer, transmitted by Kisunko:

"In his speech, Amo Sergeevich passed by the demagogic hysteria, said that KB-1 was performing important government tasks, and not Beria's assignments. And we are not Beria's henchmen here, but put on this business party and government. The duty of our team is to honorably fulfill these tasks".

Yelyan was a really bright figure, he was well known to Stalin. During war, one day this happened: People's Commissar Ustinov crashed on a motorcycle and got into hospital (Ustinov was a passionate motorcyclist, and even after the war he was on a plane they drove a motorcycle with a sidecar, on which he moved around the landfills and "objects"). Stalin, enraged by Ustinov's "boyish trick" (the definition is absolutely accurate and Ustinov well-deserved), called Yelyan on HF to receive the people's commissariat. But Yelyan replied that with Ustinov alive, he could not accept the people's commissariat.

This story characterizes both Yelyan's adherence to principles and the nature of Stalin himself, who did not bring down his anger on Yelyan, but understood and appreciated the honesty of his act. And now they openly defame him, and Kisunko, not realizing that he was writing about Beria, about Stalin, wrote about Elyan:

"At the sharp turns of social life, decent people always turn out to be defenseless before the swindlers, catchers of ranks, titles and positions, and now Kuksenko and Yelyan are in this position."

"And Beria in 1953," I will add. "And Stalin in the year 1956," I add again. Psychologically, the fate of Yelyan after the arrest of Beria turned out to be connected with the fate of Beria it is so obvious that the reader needs to get to know it to the end, moreover, from the lips of hater of Beria Grigory Kisunko:

"Soon it became known about the appointment of Yelyan to the position of chief mechanic one of the factories near Moscow. There this talented engineer, connoisseur and production organizer, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Stalin awards, major general of the engineering and technical service, deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR will be responsible for ventilation in the shops, non-standard equipment and rigging work. But

Elyan will not fulfill his new duties for long. Three will follow severe stroke, after which he for many years ... will be doomed to exist in complete helplessness and immobility, with a complete lack of functions consciousness, thought and memory.

Yelyan will be buried without military honors due to his military the rank of major general. Giving honors will be prohibited by the head of the department of the Central Committee of the CPSU I. D. Serbin. Behind the coffin of Amo Sergeevich there will be a small group of people who will have time to notify relatives and friends ... "

And it was highly symbolic! In the rapidly and progressively developing USSR, headed by such outstanding managers as Stalin and Beria, such people, like Hamo Yelyan, knew how to appreciate and knew how to use their potential to the maximum.

In the USSR, headed by an outstanding opportunist, party functionary Khrushchev, such as Amo Yelyan, turned out to be unnecessary and forgotten.

Stalin and Beria needed proactive and extremely honest employees who knew how to work. Khrushchev and the

partocratic Co. needed performers who knew how to serve, who were ready to do anything for the sake of a career and personal gain, for the sake of the nomenklatura "envelope". In such atmosphere got the opportunity to develop and promote already direct renegades, direct agents of Western influence.

And the country, directed by the partocracy and agents of influence along the path of at first systemic and moral, and then - and material, degradation, could not but come in the end to decay, decrepitude and death.

AND NOW we must at least briefly dwell on the investigation into the case of Beria and his group comrades-in-arms, which ended on December 24, 1953 with the publication in Pravda of the message "In the Supreme Court of the USSR".

It reported on the consideration of December 18-23, 1953 by the Special Judicial the presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR "criminal case on charges of Beria L.P. and others", listed the "crimes" of Beria and the other six defendants, announced a death sentence and it was printed in bold: "**The sentence was carried out.**"

One of the most accurate sources of information about the conduct of the investigation today is consider, perhaps, the book of A. Sukhomlinov. It cites volumes of the criminal case (all of them there were 39), records of interrogations of V. Merkulov, S. Goglidze, B. Kobulov, V. Dekanozov, P. Meshik and L. Vlodzimirsky.

A detailed analysis of the book by A. Sukhomlinov is beyond the scope of this book, but my working analysis of it leads - in my opinion - to

integral conclusion about **the total falsification** of the investigation. Moreover, as I understand it, falsification proceeded in two main directions: 1) fabrication of absolutely or partially forged documents without the participation of those under investigation and 2) knocking out the necessary testimonies from six persons under investigation (why from six, and not from seven, including himself Beria, I will explain later). Yes,

prosecutor Sukhomlinov cites abundantly the "testimonies" of six, and often they inconsistency with the truth is established even without comparison with reliable facts biography of Beria or the history of the country - is established by a purely logical analysis of the "testimony". However, I will not bore the reader with numerous examples, but will give just a few. Here, for example, is an extract from the letter of the not yet arrested Vsevolod Merkulov in the Central Committee, written by him (or maybe not written) at the end of July 1953:

"Beria had a strong, imperious character. I have known him since 1923 when he was the deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia. He was then only 24 years old, but ... he strove higher (in fact, then and later, as we know, he strove to study. - **S.K.**).

In general, he considered all people below him, especially those who were subordinate at work ...

I have repeatedly observed Beria in the game of chess, volleyball. For Beria the game (and I think in life) it was important to win at all costs ... any at a price, even dishonestly. He could, for example, like Nozdryov, pull off chessboard opponent piece to win. And such a "victory" satisfied. The

general culture and literacy of Beria, especially during his work in Tbilisi, was not high. Beria then literally could not write stylistically well a few lines..."

At least in part, this text belongs, perhaps, to Merkulov - one can feel both the style and the literary acumen that Merkulov possessed. But precisely literary! After all, the same Sukhomlinov writes about, I emphasize, *the young* Beria:

"A modern psychologist ... should note that Beria's thought expounds correctly, logically and concisely ... Knowledge of the Russian language, general development and literacy is good, handwriting is developed ... spelling and 20-year-old Beria makes few grammatical errors. True, he is fond of capital letters (then many were fond of them. - **S.K.**) ... "

As you can see, Merkulov (or maybe the "editor" from the Rudenko group) "creatively" combined in the letter the truth ("strong, domineering character") with obvious fiction ("could ... how Nozdrev ... ", etc.). However, after the July plenum, in which Merkulov was and even entered the list of those wishing to speak, a former LP colleague could "break down". Fully Vsevolod Merkulov, as I understand it, was sincere in those letters addressed to Beria, where he wrote about his desire to work under the leadership of the LP and only the LP ...

And here is another example... Sukhomlinov, referring to the "atrocities" of the repressions of 1937 in Georgia, uncritically quotes the testimony given to the "investigation" in 1953 by a former political censor of the newspaper "Zarya Vostoka" Vasina, who was arrested on December 7, 1937 and stayed in two months in prison

"... my suffering in no way can be compared with the torture that Saria Lakoba was subjected to... One could write a whole book about her torment... Saria was a beautiful woman, had magnificent hair. One day when she returned from interrogation, I saw that half of her hair was torn out ... Saria **said** (highlighted here and further by me. - **S.K.**) that Tvalchrelidze, Krимyan and Savitsky dragged her by the hair, **broke her jaw** ... The next time she

brought from interrogation with broken ribs ... "

etc. The narrator *with a broken jaw* is, as far as I understand, in medical practice something unprecedented. Trying to pile up as much as possible "bloody details", Vasina and the "writers" from Rudenko's group did not notice that they wrote something like: "The lighthouse is either dead or extinguished" ...

Moreover, if such arbitrariness reigned in the NKVD of Georgia, then how did it survive (and even was soon released) a witness to his wild manifestations Vasina? How to notice, and Sariya Lakoba herself.

Sukhomlinov's book contains supposedly genuine facsimile reproductions orders and visas of Beria about the arrests in 1937. But a comparison of Beria's original handwriting and his signature with the handwriting in which the "bloody" orders, resolutions and with signatures under them, suggests that the "writers" from the Rudenko group did not even they took great pains to forge "executionary" "visas" and Beria's signature in one manner.

And here is what is recorded in the protocol of interrogation of Vladimir Dekanozov dated September 9, 1953 (p. 185 of Sukhomlinov's book):

“Question: For a number of years you worked together with Beria and under his were promoted by management or recommended by them. How can you characterize?

Answer: Back in the period of work in the Cheka-GPU, I developed a negative opinion about Beria as a person. Even then, he showed himself as an ambitious man, hypocrite, intriguer and careerist.... .. he

started intrigues against those persons who worked in office Chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia ... I remember that Pavlunovsky denounced Beria in intrigue against him, and Pavlunovsky announced this to Beria right on meeting of heads of departments, where I was also present ...

Despite the fact that Pavlunovsky was a good worker, he was still recalled, and Beria was appointed chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia ... "

etc.

On page 419, Sukhomlinov cites a letter from Pavlunovsky himself to Stalin. Here it (spelling and syntax preserved):

*To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin

From Beria

In 1926 (in the original, a typo. "In 1936." - **S.K.**) I was appointed to Transcaucasia Chairman Zak GPU. Before

leaving for Tiflis, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the head of the OGPU, summoned me to his office and informed me in detail about the situation in Transcaucasia. Comrade Dzerzhinsky is right there informed me that one of my assistants in the Transcaucasus, Comrade Beria, Mussovatists worked in the Mussovatist counterintelligence. Let this circumstance I am in no way embarrassed or alarmed against Comrade Beria, as Comrade Beria worked in counterintelligence with the knowledge of responsible TT. Transcaucasians and what about it he knows Comrade Dzerzhinsky and Comrade Sergo

Ordzhonikidze. Upon arrival in Tiflis ... I ... went to Comrade Sergo ... T. Sergo Ordzhonikidze informed me that indeed Comrade Beria ... carried out this work on behalf of Party workers and that he, Comrade Ordzhonikidze, Comrade Kirov, Comrade Mikoyan and Comrade Nazaretyan are well aware of this. Therefore, I must treat Comrade Beria with full confidence, and that he ... fully trusts Comrade Beria. During the two years of work in the Transcaucasus Comrade Ordzhonikidze several times told me that he highly appreciated Comrade Beria as a growing worker, that from comrade Beria will develop a major worker and that he, Sergo, reported such a description of comrade Beria to comrade Stalin.

About two years ago, Comrade Sergo once told me in a conversation, but you know that the right deviators and other riffraff are trying to use the fact that he worked in the Mussovat counterintelligence in the fight against Comrade Beria, but nothing will come of it.

I asked Comrade Sergo if Comrade Stalin knew about this. T. Sergo

Ordzhonikidze replied that Comrade Stalin knew about this and that he, too, had spoken to Comrade Stalin about this.

Candidate of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Pavlunovsky, June 25, 1937.

Would Pavlunovsky have written like this about Beria in 1937 (obviously responding to a certain request Stalin), if ten years earlier he had publicly accused Beria of intrigue?

This letter, stored in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation, finally kills immediately several insinuations about Lavrenty Pavlovich, and at the same time proves that either: 1) Dekanozov's "testimony" is false, or: 2) he slandered Beria under strong pressure consequences.

And now I will tell you why I mentioned earlier about six, and not seven (including Beria), under investigation. I am sure that the false testimony of Dekanozov (and other associates of Beria) is explained not only by the pressure of the investigation, but also by the fact that Dekanozov, like the other five of his comrades, he knew for sure that Beria was no longer alive, that nothing would save his good name ... But there was still hope for indulgence in the event of "collaboration" with the Rudenko group.

Yes, I am sure that Beria was killed without trial and without investigation, hardly later than the middle July 1953. And not much later than the end of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which ended on August 8, 1953.

I came to this conclusion at the very beginning of my work on the book, and acquaintance with the book by A. Sukhomlinov (already at the end of the work) finally strengthened me in this conviction, because the most valuable testimony of its author, an honored lawyer Russia, who studied the materials of the investigation, is, in my opinion, the following:

"According to the law, the case must be investigated comprehensively, completely and objectively ... according to the law for the collection and subsequent evaluation of evidence face-to-face bets are held. There is nothing complicated here. Moreover, all those accused of one city. Guards are taken, two people sit in the office opposite each other interrogated, and they are alternately asked control questions. Compiled protocol ... So, **in the case of Beria, there were no confrontations at all** (highlighted by me. - S.K.). Such an investigative action for Rudenko is simply "not there was "..."

A. Sukhomlinov sees in this only a disregard for investigative norms due to the prejudgment of the verdict, but for me **the absence of confrontations with Beria is the last convincing evidence that Beria was without trial and meanly killed.**

And you can't conduct a face-to-face confrontation with a dead person! Until a certain moment, it was for the Khrushchevites to physically eliminate Beria dangerous ... What if someone at a plenum or at a session of the Supreme Court would dare to raise the issue of hearing of Beria himself. But after the final public auto-da-fé at the session of the Armed Forces, on the contrary, it was dangerous to leave Beria alive! One thing that the living Beria could ruin the whole "case", besides being a moral support for the "accomplices", forced Khrushchev and Rudenko to take immediate action.

However, the murder of Beria could not have happened earlier than the above dates. So for some time he sat in the MVO bunker.

And there is - in my opinion - a convincing indirect confirmation. But first I will make a small introductory remark.

I don't know about anyone, but I believe in the value of small details. They are hard to take into account falsifiers, but they are important for an inquisitive researcher. It is often considered that

a liar most often "pierces" on trifles! But, on the contrary, small details are often very conclusive, because a trifle is easy to see, and therefore not easy to hide.

So, this is a hint. And I want to tell you this ... In No. 41 for 2000 weekly "Independent Military Review", on page 8, under the heading "Notes on shoulder straps" was placed material by Alexander Shchelokov "Vymposity with big stars. (The fight against hazing in the army must begin with the eradication commander's rudeness.)

"The article was about the troubles of the modern army, about firmly rooted already in Soviet Army public command mat. And as one example, the author of the article in a number of others brought the one that I inform the reader without any abbreviations.

"My colleague and friend military journalist Alexei Kotenev," wrote A. Shchelokov, who himself gave the army service a quarter of a century due to an officer, spoke about a case that he himself witnessed. General (later - Marshal) Pavel Batitsky, who in 1953 provided security for the bunker, in which the arrested Lavrenty Beria was kept, spent the day and night on a guarded object. And then one day he was informed that Beria refused food and announced hunger strike. Batitsky became furious. He went to the bunker. opened before him steel heavy doors. Batitsky nervously descended the stairs into the womb of the underground command post of the Moscow military district, and its a bass commander's roar resounded under the vaults:
- Beria, f ... your mother! If you don't eat, I'll put you in chains!
Kotenev later admitted that Batitsky's threat impressed even against him, who was not a prisoner at all... Especially the threat of "putting him in chains", the meaning of which was linked only with the distant past. Why is this idea came to the general's mind, it's hard to say. But even Beria cannot continue the hunger strike. took a
chance. And how Pavel Fedorovich knew how to frighten his subordinates, hardly requires explanation.

I do not think that the episode with Batitsky was inserted by A. Shchelokov into the article (or told to him at one time A. Kotenev) with the aim of clever strategic misinformation, designed to reinforce the version that Beria was not shot during the arrest. No, it's just that small detail that allows us to conclude: Beria was indeed kept in MVO headquarters

bunker. But how long was he kept there? The official version - until the end of December 1953. However, I repeat, I am convinced that Lavrenty Pavlovich was shot dead before the fall of 1953. It was risky to deal with him right away - you never know how everything could turn around. But that's all safely (for the conspirators) ended. At the plenum, no one listen to Beria did not demand, the planned "nationwide condemnation" at the very least, but took place - the July issues of Pravda are full of relevant reports and photographs "from places."

Beria does not know about this, but after his last letter he understands what to write useless. And he's attempting a hunger strike. Alas, Batitsky's behavior shows that this step did not give the desired effect. You can date the hunger strike attempt tenth of July.

So the session of the Supreme Council passed ... And, too, without a hitch for Khrushchev and the Presidium of the Central Committee. Rudenko and his investigative team were already working with might and main with arrested Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky (Merkulov was arrested later), and it was necessary to break them as quickly as possible and force to be involved in the process of total discrediting of Beria. Beria's death here could become probably became the decisive factor that provided Rudenko with the desired behavior accused.

Actually, the absence of confrontations with Beria was for his arrested associates, each of whom was himself an experienced investigator, obviously proof that LP is no longer alive. Perhaps the defendants were even shown the corpse of Beria or his photographs. And after

that ... Well, after that it was possible to receive from five persons under investigation, and later - from sixth (Merkulov) any "confessions" ...

About the alleged participation of Beria and themselves in torture, beatings, butchery, about the alleged reprisal against objectionable during the repressions in the Transcaucasus and in Moscow, etc.

A. Sukhomlinov's book is full of such "evidence", and about some of these, even its author, who does not deviate far from the "democratic" interpretation of Beria, remarks: "All this is nonsense!" Regarding the materials of the "case" of Beria, he says this:

"The case itself is 90 percent non-original documents and protocols, and from typewritten copies certified by the major of the administrative services of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (Main Military Prosecutor's Office. - **S.K.**) Yuryeva. <...> In short, not a criminal case, but solid copies ... "

However, the entire protocol of the court session on this "case", as evidenced by A. Sukhomlinov - "not the first copy."

ADDITIONALLY conclusion about the murder of Beria in the summer of 1953 - before the start of the investigation on his "case" - the analysis of facsimile reproduction in the book also convinces

A. Sukhomlinov documents related to the execution of sentences in December 1953. The

order on the "execution" of Beria and the act on his "execution" on December 23, 1953 at 19:50 are documents **separate** from the order on the execution of Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky and the act on their execution on December 23, 1953 year at 21:00. Both orders were signed by the

chairman of the Special Judicial Presence Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. But if the order to "execute" Beria addressed to "the commandant of the special judicial presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR colonel-general comrade Batitsky P.F. ", then the order to shoot the rest addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel-General Comrade. Kruglov S.P.

The same is true with acts of execution. The act of the "execution" of Beria, dated December 23, 1953, was signed by Batitsky (allegedly the executor) and supposedly present at the same time the Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko and the General of the Army Moskalenko. This trinity has been firmly tied by participation in the "case" of Beria since the end of June 1953, and only they could be trusted with the December "participation" in the "execution" for a long time killed LP.

And **the real** execution of the LP comrades-in-arms by December 1953 could have been instruct the people of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, who produced it. They were the first deputy Minister of Internal Affairs K. Lunev, Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor D. Kitaev, commander of the armored forces of the Moscow Military District, Colonel-General A. Getman, Lieutenant General Baksov from the Air Defense Headquarters and a certain Major General Sopilnik ...

It is significant that if the death of six people actually shot in December certified in the act by the signature of a doctor, then in the act of the "execution" of Beria there is no such signature.

There is no act of cremation of the corpse of Beria, although with respect to the rest it is real in December shot - there is such an act. A.

Sukhomlinov explains all these inconsistencies by the fact that *"to transport it (Beria. - S.K.) there was no need to go to another place of execution "* and Batitsky de" with pleasure "shot Beria right in the bunker (where, to avoid rebound allegedly delivered a wooden shield). And from the bunker the military, ignorant of the procedure "activation" of corpses, they took the corpse to the crematorium, without documenting anything. But,

as Sukhomlinov himself wrote about one of the accusations against the LP: *"All this is nonsense!"*

HOWEVER, in the end, it is not so important for the essence of the problem - when and how was physically destroyed Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. What is important and essential is why he was arrested and destroyed. And this question, already in many ways, I hope it is clear for the reader, we will ask ourselves ...

chapter

27

Beria's innocence before the people and the country is also proved by the way thus he was publicly accused and publicly condemned. Previously, political leaders in the USSR accused of state crimes were convicted in open political trials. Stalin was not afraid to introduce enemies people to people and show that they deserve condemnation. In the case of Beria, everything was otherwise. His civil execution ended on August 8, 1953. But how! On this day in the Kremlin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov signed, and the secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Pegov countersigned his signature on the decision of the fifth session of the Supreme Council, held from 5 to 8 August. It read:

"As a result of the revealed criminal anti-state actions
L.P. Beria aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests
foreign capital, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
The Republic decides: To
approve the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the deprivation
L.P. Beria of the powers of the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, remove him from his post
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and from the post of Minister
Internal Affairs of the USSR with the deprivation of all titles and awards assigned to him and about
transfer of the case on the criminal actions of L.P. Beria to the Supreme
court of the USSR.

And this decision of the supreme power showed its growing legal and intellectual incompetence. If Beria's guilt was proved so obviously that he was publicly overthrown from the heights of state power into the abyss of state crimes, then why was it then necessary to conduct some kind of investigation in the form of an upcoming court? And what kind of court could there be if Beria had already been condemned by the highest body government authority? But if

by August 8, 1953, Beria's guilt was only established and the "investigation" in his "case" was only "conducted" and was "finished" only in late autumn, then on the basis
Why was Beria sentenced to this civil - yet - execution?

On August 8, the Supreme Council, within the framework of the law, could no more than authorize, except removal of Beria from government posts, investigative measures in the case of the deputy the Supreme Council, suspending its deputy powers. But deprive him of these powers, and even more so all titles and awards before the court, where his case was transferred "to consideration"?

It's up to you, but something is not right
here ... Of course, in fact, Beria or was already secretly, unjustly and innocently shot - as soon as Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites realized that the members of the Central Committee "surrendered" their colleague unconditionally and shamelessly, or his execution - after the end of the session of the Supreme Court - was a matter of coming days. But now I'm talking about the legal side of things.

Officially, the investigation into the Beria case was completed in December 1953, and about this, as well as about his "execution" on December 23, at the end of 1953, all the central newspapers appeared

extremely short message. But already on August 15, 1953, it was put into recruitment, and on September 5 In 1953, a verbatim report on the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Council was signed for publication. And soon any Soviet citizen, having paid 7 rubles, on pages 144 and 223 of this report could read the speeches of deputies V. M. Bakradze and A. I. Mirtskhulava (who also spoke at Plenum of the Central Committee). Only the two of them, as fellow countrymen of Beria, were entrusted with the "high honor" to "condemn" him from

the deputy rostrum. And here is a deputy from the Kutaisi constituency, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgian SSR Bakradze (once called in hearts Lavrenty Pavlovich "preserver") said:

"The entire Soviet people, including the Georgian people, with an exceptional met with unanimity and gratitude timely and decisive measures ... to eliminate the criminal ... actions of the bourgeois renegade Beria. This sworn enemy of the party and the Soviet people, in carrying out the tasks of the imperialists, wanted to undermine the foundations of Soviet society, destroy the Communist party, destroy our socialist state and let the Soviet people under the yoke of capitalism. Beria, a spy of international imperialism, harmful "patronage" caused enormous damage to the Georgian people ... "

etc.

Mirtskhulava spoke in the same vein ... Was it worth it after such an "accusatory conclusions" to transfer the paper to the protocols of "interrogations" and waste the time of the investigators?

Alas, with this obvious question, none of those who prepared the fifth session of the SC did not wondered. Having done away with Beria physically, the Khrushchevites sought to end him as best they could. faster and politically. And the highest representatives of Soviet power - the deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR, "surrendered" their colleague-deputy as unanimously as they did this month

ago, the highest representatives of the party - members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and members of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Double-mindedness and incompetence triumphed along both lines. And now the country, moving, it would seem, up and up, to the "tops of" communism ", actually began rise to fall.

At the same time, the initial systemic point of the beginning of the process of the death of the Power was "Anti-Beriev" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1953. Then, at the plenum, Khrushchev for the first time took accomplices in the crime of the entire Soviet party and state elite. And after how she allowed Khrushchev to deal with his outstanding and competent representative, with a leader best able to ensure further socialist development of the country, after that all of them: Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Konev, Zavenyagin, Malyshev, Tevosyan, Kosygin, Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Bagramyan, Shtemenko and others, and others, and others, like people and personalities are gone!

And they knew it! Yes,

I'm sure: without admitting it to each other, deep down they couldn't help but realize that, left without the strict eye of Stalin and having the opportunity to lead discussion of any acute issues on an equal footing, on "you" (which in recent years has not been allowed himself with Stalin, even Molotov), they are in the second - after the death of Stalin - a critical moment in the history of the country, instead of a businesslike, Bolshevik approach to the crisis, they discovered bureaucratic, partocratic approach. Something

incomprehensible happened to their colleague and leader. Perhaps this one is theirs the leader spoiled a lot of nerves and blood for them in the past, but they, after all, are each on their posts - spoiled the nerves and blood of a considerable number of their subordinates, and did not always for business. So how could one overthrow without first looking thrown into the eyes? But

that's just it, that they all - like a certain community of people - **were afraid** that Beria look them straight in the eyes. They were afraid that they, and not him in this case, would have to take

eyes to the side.

Never before the July Plenum of the Central Committee of 1953 at plenums, party conferences and congresses of the Bolsheviks was not dominated by an atmosphere of such total and frank hypocrisy and false unanimity. For the first time, a session of the Supreme Council was held in such an atmosphere. Council of the USSR.

And this fact testified that after the death of Stalin, a rapid degeneration of the elite and its degradation. If earlier - at the very least - she lived in the interests of the cause and was guided at least in a number of cases by fundamental considerations, then from now on the desire to keep the post became dominant. For he was now connected not so much with responsibility, how much with benefits, with the notorious "envelope" - that is, monthly an unaccountable amount given to the highest stratum of the party-state nomenclature to the regional level. The minister, with a salary of 5,000 rubles, had an "envelope" containing 9,000 rubles, while the chairman of the regional executive committee, with a salary of 4,000 rubles, had 5,000 rubles. (The salary of a qualified engineer or worker was approximately 1000–2000 rubles.)

At the initiative of Beria and Malenkov in April 1953, these "envelopes" and benefits for a number of categories of nomenclature were eliminated. However, back in 1947, under Stalin, in general, for all categories, for example, closed distributors were canceled industrial goods under the structures of the MGB.

Now the "envelope" returned. And its preservation now depended not so much on business qualities, how much does it depend on whether you are ready to play the tune for the sake of your superiors (and before all to Khrushchev).

Stalin not only allowed objections *to himself*, he even encouraged them. Stalin did not tolerate (and right here - up to and including anger) **incompetent** objections.

Khrushchev did not need objections **as such**. And the more competent there were someone's objections, the more chances the obstinate had to fly out of the leadership "clip". Not to Kolyma, but only as an ambassador somewhere in Mongolia or as a manager trust to Asia, but ... But no one wanted to pay such a price for adherence to principles.

Not daring to listen to Beria at the plenum, the members of the Central Committee proved that both the competent leading organ of the party and its Central Committee has ended. And deep down their souls, I repeat, could not fail to understand this.

OF COURSE, Khrushchev understood that they understood this. That's why he pierced so brazenly to everything more power and to their own cult of personality. Immediately after the murder of Beria across the country a ditty went for a walk, put into circulation by no means, as I understand it, not by the people creativity:

And the traitor Beria lost his trust, And the
chairman Malenkov kicked him.

For all the outward simplicity, this mini-libel is done quite well. professionally, which allows me to doubt his true folklore origin. However, Chairman Malenkov appeared here only "for rhyme." IN In reality, kicks were now more and more often handed out by "Secretary Khrushchev." But he could do it only with the support of the "silent" nomenclature majority, to whom the cult Khrushchev was advantageous in every respect.

Already on September 7, 1953, the next plenum of the Central Committee ended like this (I quote from transcript):

Malenkov: So, that's over with. The agenda has been exhausted, but

The Presidium of the Central Committee has one proposal.

The Presidium of the Central Committee proposes, comrades, to approve Central Committee Comrade Khrushchev. Do you need clarification on this case?

Voices: No.

Malenkov: No. We vote. Who is in favor of approving Comrade Khrushchev First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, please raise your hands. I beg lower. Are there no objectors?

Voices: No.

Malenkov: So, the work of the plenum is over. I announce the meeting closed."

Everything happened, as we see, in passing ... But by no *means* prepared! After all, what happened gave into the hands of Khrushchev (that's just - Khrushchev whether?) the fullness of the supreme power!

So that the reader can be sure that more than one author of this book is looking at those events the way he looks, I will refer to the assessment of the historian Yuri Zhukov, who states that Khrushchev's election as first secretary led to the return to power of the most conservative circles of "broad leadership" and the return to them of all those selected in the spring 1953 privileges. Now the Secretariat of the Central Committee, writes Zhukov, *"could ... afford frankly incompetent, but turning out to be decisive judgments on all without exceptions to questions, for example, the opinion of M. A. Suslov and N. S. Khrushchev about the design (!! - S.K.) shortcomings of the recently created potato planter ... "*

I will only clarify that all this was the result of the elimination of the volitional competent Beria, who did not tolerate incompetence from anyone and therefore knew the limits well own competence. Relatively competent, but relatively weak-willed, Malenkov could not resist Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. And now the careerists with sycophants, coupled with agents of influence gaining secret strength, could freely create a formal cult of personality "dear Nikita Sergeevich". They created a cult.

There was no personality.
Therefore, around

this all-Union mediocrity - both at the level of top management and at the lower level of leadership, there were no personalities either (except for the "personalities" of the dark ones). "Surrendering" in July 1953 to Beria, his comrade, about great merits and huge the scale of which they were well aware of, all the leaders of the country - I emphasize this again - ceased to be individuals. Even those who, unlike Khrushchev, were them under Lenin and Stalin.

And that is the only reason Khrushchev was able to hold the second major "signature" action. At the same time, it seemed to him that its essence was to strengthen his position. However in fact, it was conceived (not by Khrushchev, of course) as a new important step towards discrediting and preparing the collapse of socialism and the USSR. I mean the 20th Congress, at which the elite "surrendered" Stalin

already. Lenin in one of his works cited a Russian proverb: "The first is a stake, the second is a falcon, and the rest are small birds" ... And so it happened! Having "surrendered" Beria in 1953, it was already easier for Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan to pass and Stalin in 1956. After that,

Khrushchev did not need much effort to topple, with the help of a decaying elites, themselves. And only then such "trifles" as responsibility for business, personal modesty, ideals, decency, concern for the country and its future.

The "party" of the partocrats never lived on such "little things" even under Stalin. Yes even under Lenin. This circumstance was well revealed, among other things, in the behavior members of the "party" of partocrats in the summer of 1941, during the evacuation into the interior of the country. Party members the Bolsheviks then went ahead of those going on the attack, and the members of the "party" of the partocrats fled ahead of those retreating to the

rear ... But Stalin did not give this "party" a move, and it existed in spite of him. When it daughter Svetlana, having arrived during the war from Kuibyshev to Moscow to her father, told him to the word that he was studying in the evacuation in a separate school for the children of the leadership, Stalin did not

restrained himself, and burst out: "Oh, the damned caste ..."

And after the destruction of Beria and the consolidation of Khrushchev's power, the "damned caste" of partocrats began to grow rapidly and develop in full accordance with life the attitudes of his First Secretary "dear Nikita Sergeevich" Khrushchev. Intelligence now it has been replaced by the "collective mind" of the Central Committee, which has established itself in a "monolithic unity". However, the English historian and philosopher Thomas Carlyle expressed an idea long ago, the verbal expression of which would do well to be cast in bronze and hung over the entrance to all public buildings:

"I don't believe in the collective intelligence of ignorant individuals."

Lavrenty Beria therefore "lost confidence" among his colleagues in the highest state power, which, in comparison with them, possessed *simply* reason - without regard to the Central Committee.

It can be said in another way: the manager Beria was more than competent in matters management of society, but the functionary Khrushchev and his ilk do not. I'm talking about it already spoke, but now I would like to approach the question from the other side, drawing on the experience of a developed West.

The intellectual treasury of mankind has long included those discovered in Britain "Parkinson's Laws", stating that: 1) an official multiplies subordinates, but not rivals; 2) officials work for each other. Around the same era,

"Murphy's Law" was discovered in the United States with many consequences and additions to it. The main postulate looked like this: "If any trouble can happen, it happens", and one of the main consequences: "provided by things tend to get worse."

The final completeness of the science of analysis by supposedly playful methods It acquired serious management problems only after the formulation, again in the USA, of the "Peter Principle" and the creation of "hierarchology" along with "merfology". The Peter Principle informs us: "In the hierarchy, each individual tends to rise to his level of incompetence. It follows, among other things, that the main work is performed by someone who has not yet reached his level of incompetence and, therefore, in his area is competent. By

the way, by the beginning of 1953, Stalin, perhaps, had reached his level of incompetence, and this was manifested both in the fact that he succumbed to the deceptions of Khrushchev, and in the fact that he did not reinforced Beria with the status of successor. Although...

Although, if we recall the Troika sanctioned by Stalin, headed by the LP, then it cannot be ruled out that Stalin was already "ripening" to such a decision - which additionally forced Khrushchev and the forces behind him to hurry.

So, Beria was competent. And even - supercompetent! And what did that mean? Peter came to the following conclusion:

"In most hierarchies, overcompetence is taken as a greater evil than incompetence ... Overcompetence often serves as the basis for dismissal, because it undermines the hierarchy and thereby violates the first commandment of hierarchical existence: the hierarchy must be preserved ...

Another way an organization can use to protect against destructive (for the hierarchy, not for the cause. - **S.K.**) influence overcompetent is their isolation."

So, this is also said about Lavrenty Beria. To eliminate him from his colleagues in power there were many reasons, but far from the least of them was the fact that among the higher leadership, only Beria after the death of Stalin was competent enough and even super-competent in order to provide solid paths for the further development of the country.

And what is the supercompetence of a state leader? It is primarily a skill

select competent and even super-competent (that is, extremely active) personnel for all responsible positions in the system of managing society, the state, and the economy. There would be no place for mediocrity and careerists in such a system! So Beria his super-competence undermined the nomenklatura hierarchy and was subject, from her point of view, to "dismissal".

The nomenklatura simply could not help but take advantage of the destructive her influence from Beria in a different way than "isolation". She used it, but she was able to do this, among other things, because it was led in such actions by the systemic antipode Beria is the super-incompetent and ignorant but energetic Nikita Khrushchev.

A COMPETENT decision in the interests of the development of socialism in the USSR and its victory in on a global scale, there would be a gradual transfer of all power from the party the state. That is, in a political sense - the transfer of political power to the bodies Soviet power, elected by all the people, and in the economic and technological relation - the transfer of management rights to economic executive authorities, consisting of scientific and technical specialists, and responsible to the authorities Soviet power.

Such a decision would provide the Allied Union, which had already won great victories, The Soviet Socialist State has a strong, stable great future. Such a country would be led by communists, but *communists-specialists!* Communists by conviction, and specialists by special education and professional experience. But

what would the ignorant and incompetent Nikita Khrushchev do and *who would he be* in such a society that has reached a new level of development? Someone from the Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU, in one way or another, could be in such a way, communist specialists managed, the country at least by someone. No wonder Malenkov, who almost finished in the 1920s MVTU, when he fell from the heights of power, was the director of the hydroelectric power station in Ust-Kamenogorsk, the director CHP in Ekibastuz ... And he was engaged in self-education a lot and knew perfectly economy Kaganovich - manager of the trust "Soyuzasbest" in Asbest Sverdlovsk areas. Kaganovich had, by the way, a particularly high potential for a competent economic manager of a national scale. There would be a place for Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan ... Even Bulganin, not to mention Saburov and Pervukhin.

But Khrushchev?

Who could he become? Collective farm chairman? No! In a new hypothetical country Beria would not have brought candidates for chairmanship from the district committee, but would have searched among educated agronomists or livestock breeders. And in such a country, there would hardly be a collective farm that, of its own free will, would take Nikita as its chairman. He is, in contrast to Beria - could not do anything! And he didn't know anything.

Head, they say, had a good one? So in Rus' it is not uncommon. Especially in Rus' Soviet, in the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 50s, we had enough not only good, but also not bad at the same time educated heads. No, in the Soviet Union, a sample of Beria Khrushchev there would be no place.

Therefore, Khrushchev did everything to remove and politically discredit both Stalin and Beria. The discrediting of Beria was organized so multi-layered that in August 1953, valuable agents of Soviet intelligence in the West were given assignments reveal the alleged presence of his secret ties with W. Churchill and the British intelligence services. Such assignments from Moscow made the Center look stupid and distracted agents from really important reconnaissance tasks, but this is how the Khrushchevites set up regular false political "beacons". Khrushchev knew, of course, that Beria had no connections and could not be, but the tasks were set. For what? Yes, to show - albeit not wide to the masses, but to a narrow circle of intelligence officers that there was a "boy", what happened to Beria

really dirty - after all, Comrade Khrushchev himself sets the task. With such an action Khrushchev at the same time he insured his leading reputation - they say, I did not remove Beria because hated him, but because he turned out to be politically suspicious in terms of renegade.

Perhaps someone will have a question for the author: "Was Khrushchev a conscious - like Gorbachev and Yeltsin - a renegade and a political degenerate?" Well my answer here: "I don't think ..." In 1956, when Shepilov, who had not yet "joined them", as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the UN Security Council has successfully completed negotiations on to the Suez Canal in favor of Egypt, Khrushchev sent a coded message to New York: *"Just before When you leave, kick these imperialists in the face."* It's not for print, it's from sincere rejection of the "bourgeois". Although, of course, not from a great mind.

However, even Khrushchev was smart enough at one of the plenums of the Central Committee to finish his speech with the words: *"What are you all about Stalin and about Stalin! Yes, we all do not stand together Stalin's g..."* As we can see, Khrushchev sometimes had a certain understanding of his historical place - not like the current "possessors of power" who are not even worth Khrushchev's Mr. ... But Khrushchev was not enough for

more. President Reagan's aide Elizabeth Dole once jokingly or seriously stated:

"The President in his environment does not need men and women who can just give in. If the president says no, we all say no."

Madam Dole - I don't know how much she understood it herself - formulated the vital creed of self-seekers of all times and all peoples under any political system. So, if Khrushchev and his ilk did not agree with Stalin only when he said "no", then Beria and his ilk (he was not the only one who was a competent person surrounded by Stalin) could say "no" and "yes" to Stalin's - because they could competently justify your position. And Stalin, being at the top of the hierarchy, did not tolerate precisely incompetence. Competence was respected, welcomed and promoted. Because put forward he and Beria.

BACK IN 1924, when a serious confrontation between the competent Stalin and the incompetent Trotsky, Stalin in his "Fundamentals of Leninism" defined Leninist style as a combination of Russian scope with American efficiency. and Beria fits that definition very well. And the opportunity to live in just such a style was for him the main pleasure and reward. After all, a person who knows how to work First of all, it's fun to work! If, of course, his work is adequately evaluated. AND the notorious "workaholism" has nothing to do with it. Beria was not a "workaholic", but the meaning I saw life without any lofty words at work.

Earlier, I quoted one of Beria's letters to Malenkov from the bunker, warning the reader that I had removed a certain phrase from it, which I will quote later. Now the time has come for this, and I put it in context, in bold:

"Comrades Pervukhin and Saburov said that I had a privileged position during Comrade Stalin's lifetime. This is not true, Georgy, you know this better than others, other members of the Presidium know this too. IN

In reality, when I worked in the Transcaucasus, and then in Georgia, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Comrades Stalin strongly supported and helped in my work. And the work went well, **and personally I was delighted...** "

Enjoy, dear reader! What a precise and characteristic word for a man of action! Yes, it proves that the letters from the bunker are genuine, that Beria wrote them! How can a cold craftsman, a forger, not only know, but even guess that one can be **delighted** with

such a life when you have higher than the top of the cases, duties and responsibilities?

Not when you're scouring the auctions and buying a personal review of Rubens or Renoir... Not when you playboy on a personal yacht with "beauty queens"...

Not when he managed to break the "bank" in Monte Carlo, and not when "hang out" on elite "get-together", and when Comrade Stalin personally can call to the Kremlin office and say: "Lavrenty! How do you see if we will instruct you ...

"And you, with the excitement of a new big and difficult task, anticipating a new job, with You answer with delight: "I take it, Comrade Stalin! We will do everything on time!" And then you go to night, which will soon be replaced by morning ... And this new morning will paint the walls with a gentle light ancient Kremlin.

No, the current "naughty people from Courchevel" and Kremlin fans of tennis and mountain skiing such sensations are not available! You can't buy this for any amount of money! It's possible just deserve it!

Work.

And work not for himself, not for "uncle" (Sam), not for the "golden clan", but for the great a free state, living in the name of the people and created by the free people. Thomas Edison once stated:

"My only desire is to work ... I do not need ordinary pleasures the rich. I don't need horses or yachts, I don't have time for all that. To me need a workshop.

One intelligent scientist once joked, defining modern science as a way satisfaction of curiosity at the expense of the state. And there is some truth in this joke.

So, any major - not only in terms of position, but also in terms of personal scale - a politician, a major statesman in the USSR Stalin had almost limitless opportunities to satisfy your thirst to do business! Unless, of course, you know how to do it, and not imitate. For

such a politician "workshop" where one could work on the best - more the whole Soviet Union became smart and interesting - life for people! And only in In the Soviet Union, a naturally great politician got the opportunity to work with enthusiasm!

Like Beria.

That is why if he led the country, then this *delight* of creation would become a nerve throughout the social life of Russia. After all, the competence of a leader is a great thing, especially in relation to Russia. To paraphrase Stalin, it is appropriate to state here: "The leader decides everything." Of course, in the event that he is a leader, that is, he does what he answers the needs of the era.

And the needs of the era were met by the complete emancipation of the initiative and potential new, dedicated, socialist professionals. And do it after Stalin could only L.P. Beria.

Here is what Academician Yevgeny Tarle wrote about Napoleon more than half a century ago:

"In front of him were mountains of old-fashioned debris and a lot of new ... very a lot of started and unfinished, started and abandoned, started and taken back; everything was as if in chaos and fermentation ...

Bonaparte began with the organization of a new government ... He spoke correctly about Napoleon poet Goethe: for Napoleon, power was the same as a musical instrument for a great artist. He immediately put this instrument into action as soon as I managed to get hold of it."

Beria was not subject to the "Bonapartism" complex, but to draw some analogy here Can. As soon as the "instrument" of power fell out of the hands of the great ruler, Beria raised

this "instrument", hoping that the comrades in the "orchestra" will recognize, if not the formal, then the informal right of the LP to the leading part. He had the right to it like no one else.
another!

Former long-term deputy head of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, which ensured the security of the country's top leadership, Major General Dokuchaev recalled that in private conversations, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger admitted that he did not understand three moments in the history of the Soviet Union: the first - how he was able to defeat fascism; second, how he was able to build the atomic bomb so quickly; And third, how he was able to take Gagarin into space. All this

is reminiscent of the bewilderment of the Chief Bourgeois in Gaidar's fairy tale about Malchish-Kibichish: "Why, Malchish, Forty Kings fought with the Red Army and Forty Kings, fought, fought, but only crashed themselves?"

The "military secret" of the powers was "surrendered" to the bourgeoisie at the turn of the 80s and 90s by the heirs and the successors of those who in July 1953 "surrendered" Lavrenty Beria in order to soon "surrender" and Stalin's case. But this is so, by the way! Now, remembering Kissinger's question, I want to say this: about what ... It is significant that in all three key moments in the history of the Soviet Union, which caused the astonishment of the US Secretary of State, the role of Beria was outstanding! His personal contribution turned out to be paramount both in ensuring the Victory and in solving the uranium problems, and in the formation of the Soviet rocket industry! I do

not want to say that it is precisely to Beria that Soviet Russia owes its three most outstanding achievements - they were provided by new people of a new era. However, what Beria was at the forefront of state work in all three cases - a fact!

WHAT did he think in those days when he was sitting in
the bunker? What did you think
the first night?
In the

second? In the third? His letters from the bunker allow to some extent to answer this question as follows: "He he thought about many things, but ultimately he thought about the affairs of the state, and thought about them because I haven't separated myself from them for a long time."

AFTERWORD

Prosecutor Sukhomlinov's BOOK begins like this:

"How many times do we hear, and we ourselves say: "God forbid" ... warning the interlocutor so that he does not suspect us of some unseemly deed. So, I also want to say: "God forbid," so that someone thought that I took up the pen in order to justify, whitewash, rehabilitate, simply put, wash Lavrenty Beria from human blood ... "

I am finishing my book. And now, knowing about Beria immeasurably more than I knew about him six months ago, I can say that I took up the pen primarily in order to understand what kind of person Beria was. The fact that he possessed the talent of the beautiful, the largest organizer, I, having worked in the arms business for thirty years, knew for a long time. But did he have human talent?

So, now, knowing much more than I knew, I declare that I wrote this book in order to justify, whitewash, rehabilitate and, simply put, wash Lavrenty Pavlovich from dirt that filled it. In May

2000, the Chief Military Prosecutor, Colonel General of Justice Demin appealed to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with a request to "recognize Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich, Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich, Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich, Kobulov Bogdan Zakharyevich, Goglidze Sergey Arsenievich, Meshik Pavel Yakovlevich and

Vlodzimirsky Lev Emelyanovich not subject to rehabilitation. And exactly two years later, on May 29, 2002, the Military Collegium issued a ruling, signed by the presiding A. Ukolov and judges Y. Parkhomchuk and A. Petrochenkova. The verdict of the special court presence of December 23, 1953 in attitude towards Dekanozov, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky changed, and their actions retrained so that people shot in 1953 were in 2002 sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Regarding the rest, the Military Collegium granted the request of Demin and recognized Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich, Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich, Kobulov Bogdan Zakharyevich, Sergey Arsenyevich Goglidze not subject to rehabilitation.

Well ... Such figures as Lavrenty Beria condemn and rehabilitate the court not people, but the court of history ... And sooner or later he will rehabilitate LP Beria! And I hope that my book will serve both the cause of the future complete rehabilitation of Beria and his era, and the cause gaining by my contemporaries and fellow citizens a correct view of the great past of their homeland.

Only by gaining a correct view of this past can we secure a historical future. I understand that I have now written something banal for many, but what to do: twice two equals not five, but four, despite the banality of this truth.

I deliberately did not avoid publicity in my research, and here's why ... How a publicist who does not have a deep knowledge of the era he is evaluating is incapable of anything but unconvincing high-flown chatter, and a historian who is trying to "academic" to drape their civil failure, afraid of the element publicism in his work, is not able to give a true scientific picture of the era. After all every epoch is created by living people, acting in it or ... Or, alas, inactive.

It must be said in conclusion that only in the last fifteen years about Beria written dozens of books, magazine and newspaper articles. And for a full critique even what I had at my disposal (and, I must say, there was quite a lot), it would take a book twice as large as this one - and so not so small. Therefore, in fact, many documents of that era turned out to be outside the scope of my analysis.

about Beria's participation in the organization of the post-war economy, and libels, such as, say, "Red Sunset" by Valery Boldin, and the anti-Beria fabrications of the American Harrison Salisbury in his book "900 days. Siege of Leningrad", and memoirs by Larina-Bukharina, and books by Amy Knight, Boris Sokolov "Beria. The fate of the all-powerful (n-yes! - S.K.) people's commissar, "and a number of other books, and a number of "Internet assessments" of Beria, for example, by Peter Wagner and Rudolf Pihoya. I could not pay due attention to the correct interpretation of personality Lavrenty Pavlovich by Alexander Bushkov or the line "Beria - German nuclear specialists" ... Yes, and the same book by A. Sukhomlinov could be disassembled in more detail, for the benefit of her analysis - contrary to the intentions of its author - is useful precisely from the standpoint of rehabilitation Beria ...

But about one study that I have not yet mentioned (and, unfortunately, known to me so far only on the cover), it's impossible not to say. Back in 1998, in the publishing house "Rusich. Olympus" N. Rubin's book "Lavrenty Beria. Myth and Reality. On the Internet, she annotated like this:

This book is a fascinating historical study of personality of the infamous Lavrenty Beria. Reconstructing the events Based on documents and testimonies of contemporaries, the author claims that L. Beria was not at all that cruel and bloody executioner, which is traditionally it has been accepted for many years. The author sees in the figure of L. Beria one of the most talented and far-sighted figures of the Stalin era, and the crimes that are attributed to him, he considers in many respects an invention of his rivals in the struggle for power (for which Beria personally, however, did not fight. - S.K.). Comparing traditional accusations against Beria with real facts

of his life, the author shows how and why each of these accusations arose, leaving readers to decide for themselves how convincing his version is.

As we can see, no matter who undertakes an objective analysis of Beria, he immediately departs from traditional clichés. As for the last sentence of the above abstract, the reader for always - without needing the permission of the author - he himself makes his own judgment about his work. He will also bear it with regard to my efforts, but that's another story. I did them and this is enough for me...

But there is something else I need to say.

THE FAMOUS writer Alexander Bushkov asked himself: *"There must be some explanation for the fact that Beria, in fact, was assigned to the place that in most religions are occupied by an evil spirit, a demon, Satan..."* And in this one question, even without an answer - more mind and feeling than in all the writings of the "democratic" researchers of Beria. But what is the answer

here? Actually, not in the last analysis so that the reader can answer such question, I wrote this book. But for the exact question of Alexander Bushkov to have the most a complete answer, let's estimate - what figures in the modern history of Russia should be recognized today the most iconic? The first,

of course, is Lenin. The second is Stalin. And the third is Beria! What was Lenin in the history of Russia? By 1917, only the external short-term debt of the Russian Empire was equal to three pre-war budgets ... What would this lead to after the end of the First world war? *"Russia,*

*"*wrote the American B. Hopper in the 1930s, *"probably would pledged to foreign banks.* Yes, it would be so! Journal of English-Russian financial circles "Russia" in May 1918 wrote:

"What we are seeing in Russia is the beginning of a great struggle for her immeasurable resources of raw materials.

The London Financial News thought the same way in November 1918:

"Events are increasingly taking on a character that indicates a trend towards establishing an international protectorate over Russia in the image and likeness of British plan for Egypt. Such a turn of events would immediately turn the Russians securities into the cream of the international market".

This is what the great Russian patriot Ulyanov-Lenin led Russia away from. And he gave the peoples of Russia a chance for freedom and happiness.

Further, Russia and its peoples were led to freedom and greatness by Stalin. And what is Stalin? Stalin is the task of "catching up and overtaking!". No wonder in his time machine tools were produced DIP series. But above all, Stalin is the task of forming that new man, whose mass appearance was to become the main factor in the victory of socialism in Russia.

And Beria?

And BERIA is the second largest after Stalin - a figure in the epic of building socialism and the transformation of bastard Russia into an advanced powerful state with a huge development potential. Yes, not Molotov, not Kaganovich, not Ordzhonikidze, but Beria!

Already before the war, Beria as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR began to take on an increasingly significant part of the concrete leadership of government work. The war finally showed its significance, even formally putting Lavrenty Pavlovich in 1944 in second place in the structure the then supreme power.

And then it became completely clear that the Chekist, the head of the special services, Beria was state necessity, but the organizer of the nationwide and economic work, he was by vocation, in essence a talent.

Aleksey Vasilievich Topygin, who died untimely, did not have time to hold in your hands a printed copy of his book "Unknown Beria", published in 2002. I highly appreciate his work - to recreate an objective historical The appearance of Beria Topygin did a lot. However, he himself, perhaps, in the essence of the LP is not completely figured it out. In any case, in the afterword to his book, Topygin suddenly begins reflect on the fate and personality of Beria in comparison with the fate and personalities of ... SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler and the "Grand Inquisitor" of the CPC and the PRC Kang Sheng. A Was it even worth posing the question like this? Topygin, however, writes:

"Kang Sheng is often called the Chinese Beria. **I don't know how much this comparison is true** (highlighted by me. - **S.K.**). Beria, objectively speaking, he was not a hero in white robes, but his services to the state, which he faithfully served in various fields, certainly do not go to what comparison is there with the cold-blooded killer G. Himmler, or with the bloodthirsty demagogue Kang Sheng.

But Topygin, as we see, does not have an unambiguous assessment. But any attempt somehow comparing LP with Himmler and Kang Sheng is objectively illegal in itself! Illegal if only because it is impossible to imagine successful Himmler or Kang Sheng is out of the security service. And Beria can not only be imagined - he, in addition to its really brilliant and of great importance for the state activities in the special services, made an outstanding contribution to the overall economic and state development countries. And his nationwide efforts were undoubtedly much more significant and significant than purely KGB, with all the undoubted scale the latest!

Two gloomy figures of German and Chinese history cannot be compared with the figure of LP and purely human. Nevertheless, A. V. Topygin did not dare to completely clear position in relation to his hero, in the penultimate paragraph of the afterword, only reporting to the reader that *"Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was an intelligent man, talented organizer both in good and in evil" ...*

My position is rigidly defined: the evil deeds of Beria, like the evil deeds of Stalin, exist only in the malicious and malicious myth-making of those for whom and in general a powerful, independent, global, prosperous Russian state is evil.

In 1917, for the future of such a power, Lenin had no alternative. Then came the time of Stalin ... Kalinin in his suicide letter addressed to "In the Politburo Comrade Stalin" and written no later than June 3, 1946, stated:

"Sickness and the expectation of death did not dull my interest in the fate of our countries, especially in the near future. The main element of its provision in my deep conviction is the leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Since the day of Lenin's death, I have firmly maintained my policy and behavior personified in the face of Comrade Stalin. Not personal relationships or motives of me pushed for this, and a deep conviction that only he will cope with difficulties as state and party order ... I did not consider other applicants

serious..."

It is hardly necessary to add something to this statement of Kalinin. And just as Stalin, during his maturity, was the uncontested leader of the country, who alone was able to lead it to success, so the 54-year-old Beria by 1953 objectively was the only one of Stalin's associates capable of ensuring complete success the Lenin-Stalin cause. That is, the cause of the final, indestructible by anyone and nothing the rise of Russia.

So that this truth could not acquire the credibility of a fact, Beria was destroyed. Otherwise, a year or two would have passed, and it would have become clear to everyone: the head of the country should be Lavrenty Pavlovich. And since

everyone who took part in one way or another in the destruction of Beria turned out to be criminals in relation to the existing state system, that is turned out to be state criminals, then in order to hide this, Beria must was to be presented in the eyes of contemporaries and especially descendants as a "knight of demons", "the key all fetters", "barbarian, villain" and "executioner".

After the physical destruction of Beria, it was necessary not to hesitate a day, in real time scale, begin the process of its complete demonization. And only by convincing both Russia sample of 1953, and future generations that Lavrenty Beria is a "executioner", "monster", "fiend", "ghoul", "pervert", "sexual maniac", "sadist", "molester", "Satanail", the nomenklatura could count on some historical laurels.

What is there - "laurels"! The main thing is that now it was possible to be calm, knowing that no one will seriously disturb the higher education with fresh ideas and constant initiatives. partocratic swamp, covered with a greasy duckweed of well-being. Moreover, Beria had to

not only be eliminated as a disturbing factor, as the current supreme state leader - for this it would be enough to do with him what Khrushchev soon did with the "anti-Party group" and Shepilov, who "joined her". No, Beria had to be completely wiped out of life - in order to stop at the root of anyone's inclinations to pursue a sincere, enterprising and active, domestic and foreign policy. In Stalin's policy there were sometimes excessive rigidity and cruelty, there were sometimes

serious mistakes (as, for example, the call to burn forests at the beginning of the war, etc.), but in it there has never been hypocrisy and falsehood! And with the coming to power of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, this falsehood at the highest levels of the party-state power was becoming more and more intensified, becoming the times of Gorbachev total!

However, everything that the post-Stalinist nomenklatura could afford in relation to Stalin is to belittle his role and greatness, smearing his name and deeds in the dirt of the 20th Congress. But even the "democrats" were unable to achieve the total demonization of Stalin. One Churchill's posthumous assessment of Stalin spoiled the whole game for them. You can't put Sir Winston in red-brown. But with Beria, this "trick" was a

success. And at one time it seemed - forever. And yet the wind of history is the wind of history ... It is capable of sweeping away from outstanding figures any heaps of dirt and debris. And sweeps.

Stalin did almost everything he was supposed to do. He accepted the post-tsarist Russia with a plow, but left it with an atomic bomb. You can't say here more precisely and shorter than Churchill, Sir Winston was still able to find a *word*. Stalin did

not do one thing or did not have time to do it - he did not leave an immense and rich the talents of a country worthy of its successor. Perhaps Stalin hoped to see him in dual, so to speak, the figure of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky, but both of them turned out to be from small-grassed, alas, breed. Alone with each other and with their immediate environment, they

dreamed not about how to better *build communism* in Russia, but about how they would *rule* Russia after Stalin.

Upon learning of this, Stalin experienced, as I understand it, something like the feelings of Taras Bulba, who learned about Andriy's betrayal. Stalin acted like Taras! He gave birth to them ... He them - how Taras Andria - and killed.

And a competent successor was nearby - Beria. Stalin did not understand this, and Beria without Stalin was doomed. And in the end, the country entrusted its fate to a clever, narrow-minded, unprincipled and ignorant intriguer. And is it only for him - after all, "Nikita", like any other, standing in the highest power, was "played" by the environment. Just as incompetent as he is, and to some extent anti-Soviet and pro-Western.

The task of Beria as Stalin's successor should have been and would have been the task gradual, supported by the development of the masses, the democratization of society, the task of developing all the creative forces of the people, the task of providing victorious socialism in the country to all fullness of rights not to the nomenklatura, but to the people. Not functionaries, but professionals. Beria and already his successors should have been and could strengthen and develop socialism, and not betray it, as Khrushchev and his

successors. Beria could lead the ever-increasing and flourishing Soviet A union of years, say, up to sixty-five - seventy, that is, he could meet at the head country fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power. And it would be completely different, different from really held, the country!

I think his Soviet Union would not have such a huge the number of "habitants" that Khrushchev bred, and then Brezhnev. Soviet Union Beria would not have poisoned his state body with petrodollar injections. In his the Soviet Union could not have formed a "fifth column" of Gorbachev's Yeltsinoids. And in his Soviet Union, any negligent leader according to the Constitution would be responsible for his work not before the bureau of the city committee, but before the labor collective, which and would have the right to return such a negligent leader "to the primitive", not leading, state.

In short, his Soviet Union would confidently enter the 21st century as a decisive factor world social process. And not only Russia would have a completely different look and a completely different place in the world, but the world itself would have a completely different look!

This is the Khrushchevites-partycrats, Gorbachevites, Yeltsinoids-"democrats", the world plutocracy and the world aristocracy of Beria - albeit for different reasons - cannot be forgiven could neither during his lifetime, nor even more so beyond

the grave. They could not forgive the fact that he was able, together with the people, to bring Russia to such a level of development when the fate of the people would no longer depend on a handful that imagines itself "elite", but from the mass intellectually and spiritually competent core of society. When the leading and guiding force of society would not be the "collective mind of the Central Committee", but public mind.

THIS BOOK was prefaced by a quote from Carlyle: "I do not believe in a collective mind ignorant individuals." Well, I, the author of this book, don't believe in him either. But I ask the question to ourselves and to everyone: "Is it possible to believe in the collective mind of comprehensively developed individuals? As for

me, I confidently answer: "Yes!" And we -

Russia, the world - have yet to acquire this mind. If, of course, we we want to live on the planet, and not die on it in our own spiritual and material sewage.

Beria was not a genius - like Lenin, like Stalin. He was only overcompetent. Among other things, he was ruined, and this - in full accordance with Peter's principle. And he was also ruined by a naive belief in a good beginning in people, in colleagues. IN his head could not fit the thought that just out of envy, out of "selfishness"

you can raise such a MONSTER slander on a friend and stab him in the back

dagger.

Over decades of ever-increasing and increasing power, the initially mean and a vile person by the age of fifty would finally turn into a complete boor and callous villain. And Beria in 1950, in the rank of Deputy Prime Minister, member of the Politburo, head Special Committee, in the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, finally could, for the first time in his life seeing chubby Russian guy, a simple sergeant, immediately ask - why is it

does his teeth

hurt? No, dear readers, it's up to you, but such a person could not be a bad person!

MY book is finished. I

part with my hero and say goodbye to the reader. A glorious and high-profile era is left behind - battles, struggle, construction, defeat and victories...

Life...

Great Life of the Great Country. She came to life again in my thoughts, lay down on paper, and so it remained on it. And you and I, dear reader, are left face to face with the vile no longer partocratic, but oligarchic regime, a hundred times more disgusting and destructive than partocratic. We remain one on one with the vile of the regime is no longer just snickering incompetence - as under Khrushchev, under Brezhnev, under Andropov and Gorbachev, and with vile regime of triumphant super-incompetence. Are we alone?

So far - yes ... But maybe

it's time to

unite somehow? Unite to work together form the collective mind of competent individuals. And then we'll understand that only by correctly evaluating what has been done by our predecessors, we ourselves become people capable of our own accomplishments, conditioned by the challenges of the time.

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